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This thesis examines the international legal framework that governs the 
protection of foreign investments in times of armed conflict. It addresses the 
laws of armed conflict and the international law of foreign investment and 
their regulation of investments in particular situations. 
The thesis provides an overall argument that the potential for conflict 
between investment law and international humanitarian law is a significant 
issue of growing relevance, as the two regimes, through their different 
norms, may regulate the same conduct with different objectives in mind, but 
that international law mostly (but not entirely) has the tools to resolve any 
such conflict through the rules of interpretation or through rules of priority. 
The thesis first establishes that the outbreak of hostilities does not, ipso 
facto, abrogate the operation of investment treaties. Then, the analysis 
proceeds to assess the application of investment treaties and their 
standards of protection in situations of armed conflict. In this respect, the 
thesis analyzes the legal frameworks that govern the dispossession and 
destruction of foreign investments, the treatment of investments under the 
contemporary laws of targeting, and the obligation to protect foreign 
investments from the effects of armed conflict (precautionary obligation). 
Having dealt with the substantive standards of protection, the thesis 
examines whether the occurrence of armed conflicts can be used to 
exempt, excuse, justify, or carve-out investment obligations during armed 
conflict. Finally, the analysis deals with the consequences of the State’s 
failure to guarantee the protection of foreign investments as required by 
international law and the obligation to award ‘adequate’ compensation for 















The thesis aims to provide a clear legal framework for the treatment of 
foreign investments in times of armed conflict, through an analysis of both 
the laws that govern armed conflict and the international law of foreign 
investment. 
Impact inside academia  
This thesis takes on an issue of growing relevance in international law – the 
protection of investments in armed conflict. An important impact of the 
thesis will be in addressing a gap in the academic literature, since the 
treatment of the issue thus far has mostly focused on investment law norms, 
with insufficient focus on the law of armed conflict (international 
humanitarian law) and the effect that humanitarian law has on the 
interpretation and application of investment standards of treatment.  
The thesis provides an overall argument that the potential for conflict 
between investment law and humanitarian law is a significant issue, as the 
two regimes may (and in some cases, do in fact) regulate the same conduct 
with different objectives in mind, but that international law mostly (but not 
entirely) has the tools to resolve this (potential) conflict through interpretive 
means or through rules of priority. 
To ascertain the legal framework that governs the treatment of investments 
during hostilities, the thesis takes on, and resolves, several ubiquitous, yet 
contentious, standards in investment law and arbitration, such as ‘full 
protection and security’ clauses, provisions dealing with compensation for 
war losses, and security exceptions. Such analyses add to the existing 
literature and attempt to reconcile, where possible, different conflicting 
approaches.  
Likewise, in the process of determining the law that governs investments 
during hostilities, the thesis seeks to resolve several debates in the law of 
armed conflict, namely debates over the lawfulness of economic targets and 
destruction of private property. In this regard, the study seeks to add to the 
literature in international humanitarian law, beyond the treatment of 






By clarifying the meaning and content of several contested investment 
standards of treatment and by considering the interaction between warfare 
practices and investment liberalization policies, the thesis seeks to engage 
with military lawyers and investment lawyers, and it hopes to be of help to 
policymakers and public servants involved with the drafting of investment 
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The Protection of Foreign investments in Armed Conflict 
I was first introduced to the concept of foreign investments in the summer 
of 2006 during the Second Lebanon War, when my unit was instructed to 
avoid areas in Lebanon that were otherwise cleared for operation. This 
order followed a request of certain European countries that the Israeli army 
spares, inasmuch as possible, areas where they and their nationals had 
economic assets. Although mine was not to reason why, I was of the view 
that foreign economic assets and financial interests should remain outside 
the scope of my considerations as an operations officer.  
I came across the idea of foreign investments for the second time in 
the spring of 2014 amid the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of 
hostilities in eastern Ukraine. A client of the firm for which I work, who had 
assets in Crimea, grew concerned that the turmoil would affect his operation 
and asked to ascertain his legal rights.1 Although his question remained a 
hypothetical exercise since his concerns were resolved in a different way, I 
took note of the fact that this question gained practically no attention in 
jurisprudence. With this dissertation I answer a question that has occupied 
my mind for years as an officer, a lawyer, and a researcher: What treatment 
does international law prescribe for foreign investments in times of armed 
conflict?  
Accordingly, this first introductory chapter proceeds as follows. First, 
section 2 explains the focus and scope of this research on the protection of 
foreign investments in armed conflicts. Next, the doctrinal methodology of 
this study is briefly outlined. Sections 3 and 4 introduce, respectively, the 
two main fields of law that regulate the treatment of investments in armed 
conflicts – international investment law and international humanitarian law 
(IHL). Then, section 5 elucidates the treatment of IHL and investment law 
norms in this study.  
 
11 For professional and personal reasons, this dissertation mostly avoids the analysis of 





Next, mindful of the significant role that litigation plays in the 
enforcement of investment standards of protection, including in times of 
hostilities, section 6 deals with the ability of the host State to invoke IHL in 
investment arbitration concerning claims that arise out of, or in relation to, 
conflicts. Section 7 proceeds to explains the structure and flow of the thesis 
and the perspective through which each of the issues in the thesis is 
addressed. Finally, the aims of this study and its target audience are 
addressed in section 8. 
1. Terminology and Scope 
The title of the research, the protection of foreign investments in armed 
conflict, was carefully drafted to delimit the scope of this study through three 
main elements. 
First, unless specifically provided otherwise, the phrase ‘protection 
of investments’ is not limited to the colloquial idea of physical protection and 
security. It rather encompasses the overall legal treatment of the 
investment, including its physical integrity. The term ‘protection’ is preferred 
over ‘treatment’ or ‘regulation’ as it better fits the reality of hostilities and the 
types of threats that this reality represents for investments. Second, the use 
of the term ‘investment’ (and ‘investor’) in this research is of note. Broadly 
speaking, the term ‘investment’ determines the economic interests to which 
States extend substantive protections in investment treaties, while the term 
‘investor’ specifies the range of legal and natural persons who stand to 
benefit from any such treaty. In principle, this research is not concerned with 
the protection of foreign investors, as legal or natural persons, from the 
effects of hostilities. Rather, this research is concerned with investments in 
the form of tangible objects and premises, such as – hotels, oil platforms, 
mines, factories, refineries, and hydro plants, and the protection of such 





question whether a particular asset meets a treaty’s definition of 
‘investment’ are mostly left outside the scope of the discussion.2  
Third, the research is concerned with situations of ‘armed conflict’. 
An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
States (international armed conflict (IAC))3 or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups within a State (a non-international armed conflict (NIAC)).4 
Legally speaking, no other type of armed conflict exists; every armed 
conflict is either an IAC or a NIAC. The point of departure for this study is 
that an armed conflict exists. The questions whether and when violence 
rises to the level of an armed conflict and the conflict’s classification are not 
addressed in this analysis. This also means that this research is principally 
not concerned with hostilities that do not rise to the level of an armed 
conflict; different international law governs such situations. In this study, the 
terms ‘armed conflict’ and ‘hostilities’ are used interchangeably to refer to 
IACs and NIACs. The expressions ‘conflict-ridden States’ and ‘war-torn 
countries’, in turn, are used to refer to host States that are involved in an 
armed conflict. 
 
2 See: A Grabowski, ‘The Definition of Investment under the ICSID Convention: A Defense 
of Salini’ (2014) 15(1) Chicago Journal of International Law 287-309; D Williams and S 
Foote, ‘Recent developments in the approach to identifying an ‘investment’ pursuant to 
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention’ in C Brown and K Miles (eds) Evolution in Investment 
Treaty Law and Arbitration (CUP 2011) 42-64; Z Douglas, The International Law of 
Investment Claims (CUP 2009) 161-202.  
3 Article 2 common (CA GC) to Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 75 UNTS 31 (GCI), Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, 75 UNTS 85 (GCII), Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 UNTS 135 (GCIII), and Geneva Convention 
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 UNTS 287 (GCIV). 
Additional Protocol I extends the definition of international armed conflicts to include armed 
conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation or 
racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination (Article 1(4), Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3 (API)). 
4 CA 3, GC; Article 1, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 





Notably, this discussion assumes that there is nothing undesired or 
illegitimate per se with investing in a conflict-ridden State.5  On the contrary, 
this research postulates that capital inflows are required for economic 
reconstruction and development and that often foreign investment is a 
prerequisite for transitions from conflict to peace.6 Mindful of other views,7 
the thesis is predicated on the assumption that even if the exact policies 
that States adopt to promote, facilitate, and protect investments are 
debated, the promotion, facilitation, and protection of investments, as such, 
are desired on the national and international planes.  
Finally, the implication of the proposition that this research is 
concerned with the protection of investments in armed conflicts is, as further 
explained in section 5 below and elaborated in the next chapters, that this 
study is not concerned with the treatment of investments against the general 
backdrop of hostilities, but rather with the treatment of investments in 
relation to the armed conflict. This is to say that it should be borne in mind 
that not every measure that a conflict-ridden host State takes vis-à-vis 
foreign investments in its territory relates to the armed conflict in which it is 
engaged.  
For instance, to promote environmental aims or public health, Israel 
may adopt regulatory measures that adversely affect foreign investments 
in, say, the energy sector. Such measures need have nothing to do with the 
conflict in Gaza or the hostilities in the northern border. The lawfulness of 
such measures  is not dealt with in this research.8 By contrast, the issue of 
the protection of investments in relation to armed conflicts will arise, for 
 
5 Indeed, questions concerning the investor’s conduct may arise (EC Gillard, ‘Business 
Goes to War’ (2006) 88(863) IRRC 525-72), and elements of the investment might be used 
to violate international law (eg knowingly investing a chemical plant in Syria). This research 
does not address the lawfulness and legality of the investor’s conduct. 
6 E De Brabandere, ‘Jus Post Bellum and Foreign Direct Investment: Mapping the Debate’ 
(2015) 16 JWTI 590-603. 
7 See generally: G Van Harten, Investment arbitration and public law (OUP 2007) ch 7. 
8 In this example, the existence of the armed conflict and implications thereof are separate 
from assessment of whether Israel’s measures constitute, say, a violation of the fair and 





instance, where a foreign investment in Israel suffers losses in the 
framework of a military operation whether authored by Israel or not, or when 
Israel adopts regulatory measures that adversely affect a foreign 
investment in its territory so as to protect the civilian population from the 
effects of hostilities or in pursuit of military aims in the context of hostilities. 
2. Methodology  
This is a gap-based, doctrinal research that seeks to ascertain the meaning 
and content of international law by way of using the methodology of sources 
and interpretation. To bring further clarity to the examined norms, the 
research conducts a historical analysis of the development of relevant 
international standards going back as early as the 18th century. At the same 
time, mindful of the significant developments in the law and policy of treaties 
and war over the years, the thesis also uses modern case-studies of foreign 
investments in conflict-ridden States that have not been addressed in 
doctrine and arbitral jurisprudence.  
The sources of international law are generally considered to be listed 
in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).9 These 
are treaties, customary law, and general principle of law; judicial decisions 
and the writings of the most highly qualified publicists are subsidiary means 
that assist in determining the rule of law.10 In this research, the meaning of 
treaty rules is determined by way of applying rules on treaty interpretation 
which are codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
 
9 Article 38, Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered 
into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS xvi (ICJ Statute). 
10 Of course, decisions of international tribunals have implications for the relations between 
States beyond the parties to the dispute. In fact, some areas of the law cannot be fully 
understood without recourse to judicial jurisprudence, in particular that of the ICJ. See: C 
Tams and A Tzanakopoulos, ‘Barcelona Traction at 40: the ICJ as an agent of legal 
development’ (2010) 23(4) Leiden Journal of International 781-800 and C Tams, ‘Meta-
Custom and the Court: A Study in Judicial Law-Making’ (2015) 14 Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals 51-79. On the contribution of domestic courts to the 
development of international law, see: A Tzanakopoulos and C Tams, ‘Introduction: 
domestic courts as agents of development of international law’ (2013) 26(3) Leiden Journal 





(VCLT).11 In turn, the content of customary norms is ascertained by way of 
examining State practice and opinio juris. On this point, the research takes 
note and makes use of the Statement of Principles Applicable to the 
Formation of General Customary International Law, which was adopted in 
2000 by the International Law Association (ILA),12 and the Conclusions on 
the Identification of Customary International Law as adopted in 2018 by the 
International Law Commission (ILC).13 The reasoning and conclusions that 
follow from the analysis of treaties and customs are then checked and 
verified against the decisions of international courts and tribunals, domestic 
instances, and contemporaneous authorities.  
Within the boundaries of the traditional rules of sources and 
interpretation, the research is also assisted by historical analysis. The 
premise here is that it is only when placed in its context that law is imbued 
with a meaning and a function, and only by looking at the temporal context 
can it be determined what the relevant actors understood the law to mean 
at various times in the past.14 Historical context also offers a better 
understanding of the political, socio-cultural, and economic conditions 
 
11 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 33 (VCLT). For authorities that recognized and applied the 
VCLT as a reflection of customary law, see: Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) [1971] ICJ Rep 3 para 
94; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v Iceland) [1973] ICJ Rep 
49 paras 24-36; Kasikili/Sedudu Island, Botswana v Namibia, Judgment, Merits, [1999] ICJ 
Rep 1045, para 18. There has yet been no case where the ICJ has held that the VCLT 
does not reflect customary law (M Mendelson, ‘The International Court of Justice and the 
sources of international law’ in V Lowe and M Fitzmaurice (eds) Fifty Years of the 
International Court of Justice. Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (CUP Cambridge 
1996) 63, 66). 
12 Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, ‘Final Report of 
The Committee Statement of Principles Applicable to The Formation of General Customary 
International Law’ in International Law Association Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference 
(London 2000) (International Law Association, London 2000). 
13 ILC, Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law with 
Commentaries, 70th session (2018) UN Doc A/73/10. 
14 M Payek, ‘The History of International Law – or International Law in History?’ (EJIL Talk! 
8 January 2015) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-history-of-international-law-or-international-
law-in-history-a-reply-to-alexandra-kemmerer-and-jochen-von-bernstorff/> accessed 10 
September 2018 and K Miles, ‘History and international law: Method and mechanism – 
empire and ‘usual’ rupture’ in S Schill et al (eds) International Investment Law and History 





under which particular ideas, such as the protection of ‘aliens’ and their 
property during ‘war’, became conceivable as legal concepts that yield 
certain rights and obligations. Importantly, a careful assessment of the 
development of international law allows us to identify continuities and 
discontinuities in the perception and application of the law and thus, to 
identify the emergence of binding norms on the treatment of investments in 
armed conflict.15 
Additionally, this research uses several case studies to demonstrate 
how armed conflicts affect the promotion, facilitation, and protection of 
foreign investments in practice. The premise here is that the protection of 
investments in armed conflicts has been addressed in a relatively small 
number of known arbitral decisions, where the issue was dealt with in a 
rather limited manner that mostly neglected the laws that regulate the 
conduct of hostilities (IHL) and the implications of the applicability of IHL 
norms to matters involving investments, often notwithstanding the 
recognition that an armed conflict existed at the relevant time.  
Accordingly, to identify and demonstrate the range of challenges that 
the protection of investments in armed conflict raises in practice for 
investors and States there is a need to look beyond the known case law. 
On this point, the thesis uses examples of investment projects in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Israel, which were adversely affected by hostilities, but 
have not resulted in claims to date. These examples also offer a convenient 
set of facts against which the relevant international norms (once identified 
and explained) can be applied.  
3. The International Law Regulating the Protection of Foreign 
Investments 
Since the law that regulates the treatment of foreign investments is central 
to this discussion, it is useful to explain how this law is perceived and which 
of its aspects are explored in this research.  
 
15 H Bray, ‘Understanding change: Evolution from international claims commissions to 





In principle, the term ‘international investment law’, may refer either 
to the international law governing investments or to all the law applicable to 
international investments.16 In this study, ‘international investment law’ or 
‘foreign investment law’ (and like formulations) describe a field of public 
international law that is concerned with the protection of the investments of 
one State’s nationals in the territory of another State. 
As with any other field of public international law, investment law 
comprises treaties, custom, and general principles. During the 18th and 19th 
centuries, most foreign investments were made in the context of colonial 
expansion. Since European countries effectively controlled the actions of 
the government and its legal system in colonized territories, these imperial 
powers had no need for detailed treaty instruments to regulate the treatment 
of their merchants and their property abroad.17 To prevent adverse 
interferences with the investments and the commercial activities of their 
nationals, such powers used a ‘blend of diplomacy and force’.18 Beginning 
in the 18th century, with the establishment of the US and its entrance into 
the international arena, western powers began to conclude commercial 
treaties among themselves on a basis of equality between ‘civilized nations’.  
Although today these treaties of friendship, commerce, and 
navigation (FCN treaties) are often referred to as ‘a forerunner of modern 
bilateral investment treaties’,19 in proper temporal context this is not 
necessarily an accurate statement. While FCN treaties contained provisions 
affecting the ability of the national of one country to own property and 
engage in commerce in the territory of the other country, they were 
 
16 R Dolzer and C Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd edn, OUP 
2012) 12; J Salacuse, The Three Laws of International Investment National, Contractual, 
and International Frameworks for Foreign Capital (OUP 2013) Preface.  
17 K Miles, The Origins of International Investment Law (CUP 2013) 24-5; J Salacuse, The 
Law of Investment Treaties (2nd edn, OUP 2015) 89-93. 
18 Salacuse – The Law of Investment Treaties (ibid) 92; G Schwarzenberger, Foreign 
Investments and International Law (Praeger 1969) 22-24. 
19 Miles (n 17) 24. In this research, unless where a special appellation exists (eg: The Jay 
Treaty), FCN treaties are cited using their short title (eg: US – Iran FCN treaty) rather than 
the official title (eg: ‘Treaty of amity, economic relations, and consular rights between the 





designated to regulate a range of issues relating to the treatment of 
nationals of the Sate parties.20 These instruments were, as Walker 
described them, ‘a basic accord fixing ground-rules governing day-to-day 
intercourse between two countries’ and the ‘medium par excellence through 
which nations have sought in a general settlement to secure reciprocal 
respect for their normal interests abroad’.21 At the same time, it is because 
of their broad scope that the negotiation, interpretation, and application of 
FCN treaties teaches us a great deal about the development of international 
law, and the law on the protection of foreign property in particular.  
In the 19th century, FCN treaties were extended beyond the 
regulation of the reciprocal interaction of equal western powers to non-
European countries. With this, FCN treaties turned into to ‘the first 
steppingstone’ to establishing a more intrusive presence within non-
European nations’.22 As a result, Latin American countries often found 
themselves held to standards which ignored their weaker socioeconomic 
position. However, changes in the world order in the post-colonial era 
somewhat relaxed the coercive nature of FCN treaty obligations, turning 
them from absolute standards that disregard the abilities of the State, to 
relative standards that account for the prevailing conditions in the host 
State.23 
Since the end of World War II (WWII), States worldwide have been 
engaged in building an international regime for the regulation of investment 
by way of negotiating and concluding bilateral investment treaties (BIT). As 
 
20 FCN treaties also dealt with freedom of movement and worship, rights to trade and 
engage in commercial enterprise, national treatment and most-favored-nation (MFN) 
status, and navigation rights through territorial waters. See: J Coyle, ‘The Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the Modem Era’ (2013) 51 Colombia Journal of 
Transnational Law 302, 307-12. 
21 H Walker, Jr., ‘Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation’ (1958) 42 
Minnesota Law Review 805, 805 and Coyle (ibid) 306-7. 
22 J Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law (CUP 1894) 144; A Anghie, 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP 2004) 74-76; Miles (n 
17) 25; Salacuse – The Law of Investment Treaties (n 17) 93-95. 





part of this effort, FCN treaties gradually made way for investment treaties.24 
While the US proceeded to conclude FCN treaties until the late 1960s25 and 
its first BIT was concluded only in 1982,26 European countries turned to 
other avenues earlier, with the very first BIT concluded between Germany 
and Pakistan on 25 November 1959.27  
In contrast to FCN treaties, which dealt with an array of issues, 
investment treaties are essentially instruments that deal with the protection 
(and promotion) of investments.28 In these treaties, States undertake 
commitments to guarantee a certain legal treatment to the investors of the 
other contracting party and consent to mechanisms for the enforcement of 
those commitments. As of April 2019, the total number of known investment 
treaties according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), is 3,319, comprising 2,938 BITs, of which 2,346 
are in force, and 387 other treaties with investment provisions, of which 313 
are in force. Most countries in the world are parties to at least one such 
instrument.29  
The historical development of these instruments from FCN treaties 
and the process of their negotiations based on existing models and 
 
24 On the factors leading to the demise of FCN treaties, see: Coyle (n 20) 309-11. 
25 The US – Thailand FCN treaty entered into force on 8 June 1968. It was the last of its 
kind.  
26 The US – Panama BIT was signed on 27 November 1982.  
27 This treaty, as further explained below, was based on the US FCN Draft Treaty, which 
served as the basis for the negotiations of a treaty between the US and Germany (never 
concluded).  
28 Granted, whether investment treaties do in fact promote investment inflows is debated. 
See: J Webb Yackee, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment 
- Some Hints from Alternative Evidence’ (2001) 51 Virginia Journal of International Law 
397-441; J Salacuse and N Sullivan, ‘Do BITs Really Work: An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46(1) Harvard International Law 
Journal 67-130; N Bhasin and R Manocha ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote FDI 
Inflows? Evidence from India’ (2016) 41(4) The Journal of Decision Makers 275–287. 
  
29 All investment instrument in this study, unless specified otherwise, are available at 
UNCTAD’S International Investment Agreement Navigator 
<https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA>. All BITs in this study are cited under their 
short title (eg: ‘Argentina – Japan BIT’) rather than the official title of the treaty (eg: 






instruments resulted in many commonalities in structure, language, 
definitions, scope, and purpose between these 3,000 separate treaties.30 
Nonetheless, since each investment treaty is legally distinct, separate, and 
binding only on its parties, unless it can be established, using the 
methodology of sources and interpretation, that certain similarities in 
formulation are designated to reflect the same customary treatment, due 
respect is given in this research to variations in formulation and to the 
separate status of each investment treaty.  
Customary law plays a key role in the analysis of the protection of 
investments in armed conflict. Starting at least as early as the 19th century, 
various rules emerged in the law of nations concerning the treatment of 
aliens and their property, including the right to be free from a denial of justice 
and the right of aliens to protection against bodily harm. In investment law 
jurisprudence, the sum of these rules is often referred to as ‘the international 
minimum standard’.31 Mindful that many aspects concerning the ‘minimum 
standard’ remain contested, this study clarifies some elements concerning 
of content and scope of the customary standard of treatment of aliens and 
their property in wartime.  
Finally, a notable feature of the regime of investment law concerns 
the nature of investor’s rights. On the one hand, investment treaties and 
customary law impose certain obligations on host States to provide 
protections to foreign investors and investments, and investment treaties 
often contain consent to investor-state arbitration over investment disputes. 
At the same time, it remains unclear whether these treaties codify 
inalienable rights of investors or rights that are shared by the investor with 
his home State and enjoyed by the investor only under sufferance, or 
whether investment treaties merely grant investors recourse to ad hoc 
 
30 See generally: A Newcombe and L Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties 
(Kluwer Law International 2009) ch 1. 
31 See generally: H Dickerson, ‘Minimum Standards’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2010) 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-





procedural mechanisms that provide for ‘the public international law 
equivalent of subrogation’.32 With this overview of the regime of investment 
law the study proceeds to analyze the meaning and content of investment 
standards of protection. 
4. The International Law Regulating the Conduct of Hostilities  
The main implication of the proposition that an armed conflict exists, which 
predicates this research, is that IHL applies.  
IHL applies from the initiation of armed conflicts and extends even 
beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is 
reached or a peaceful settlement is achieved. It is a set of rules that seek 
to limit the effects of armed conflict by way of protecting those who are not, 
or are no longer, participating in hostilities and restricting the permitted 
means and methods of warfare. IHL achieves these objectives through 
several treaty and customary rules and standards.  
Broadly speaking, IHL comprises the ‘Hague Law’ and the ‘Geneva 
Law’. The Law of The Hague is a colloquial term that derives its name from 
the Hague Conventions and Regulation of 1899 and 1907 (HC and HR).33 
The Hague Law refers to the body of laws that deal with the conduct of 
hostilities and which establish restrictions on the means and methods of 
warfare. The ‘Geneva Law’, in turn, refers to the body of law that mainly 
deals with the protection of the victims of armed conflicts. It usually 
references the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (GC) and the two 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 (API and APII).  
 
32 Under the latter constellation, the host State essentially recognizes that the investor can 
enforce its home State’s rights while the home State, in turn, allows the investor to keep 
any remedy otherwise owed to it from the host State. A Roberts, ‘Triangular treaties: the 
nature and limits of investment treaty rights’ (2015) 56(1) Harvard International Law Journal 
353-355-60; R Volterra, ‘International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility 
and Investor-State Arbitration: Do Investor Have Rights?’ (2010) 25(1) ICSID Review-FILJ 
218-23; Douglas (n 2) 167-70. Chapter 6 returns to the issue of investors’ rights. 
33 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its 






This research deals both with The Hague and the Geneva Laws 
depending on context. As regards the status of these laws it is important 
that not all the provisions of The Hague Law and Geneva Law are 
customary, and it is not always easy to identify which norm is.34 
Nonetheless, this research mostly deals with IHL treaty norms that codify 
pre-existing custom or which have attained customary status after their 
adoption and are therefore applicable to international and non-international 
conflicts and bind all belligerent parties. Where the content of the treaty or 
customary IHL norm at issue is debated, this debate is addressed in detail.  
 ‘But’, as Pictet remarked, treaty and customary IHL norms are ‘not 
the whole story. Behind these rules are a number of principles which inspire 
the entire substance of the documents’.35 Since these principles are 
repeatedly referenced throughout the thesis, it is useful to briefly outline 
them at this point: Distinction, military necessity, humanity, and 
proportionality.36 Distinction is a fundamental and ‘intransgressible’ principle 
of customary international law.37 It mandates that the parties to the conflict 
must at all times distinguish between civilians and civilian objects, who may 
not be the subject of direct and deliberate attacks, and combatants and 
military objectives, against whom attacks may be directed subject to certain 
qualifications.38  
 
34 See for instance: Section 1.8.1 of USA Department of Defense, Office of General 
Counsel, Law of War Manual, June 2015 (revised 2016) 
<https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=797480> (DoD LOAC Manual). 
35 J Pictet Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
1985) 59-60. 
36 Additionally, the prohibition to attack those hors de combat and the prohibition to inflict 
unnecessary suffering are both considered as fundamental IHL principles. Since they are 
less pertinent for this discussion of investments’ protection in armed conflict they are not 
addressed herein.  
37 Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory 
Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 26, 257. 
38 Articles 48 and 52, API; Rule 1 in J-M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck (eds) 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(Cambridge ICRC 2005). The most updated version of the rules and the one used in this 
thesis is available at <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home> 





Next, military necessity appears as both a specific element and a 
general foundational principle that pervades the entire body of IHL by 
undergirding individual rules.39 At its most basic, military necessity is what 
permits combatants to lawfully cause damage and destruction and even to 
injure or kill. But necessity is also what prohibits combatants from using 
violence if and when it is not required by military necessity.40 It is also 
important that while military necessity allows a deviation (exemption) from 
a humanitarian rule (eg: to destroy property when required by military 
necessity), it is not an excuse nor a justification for violations of IHL. 
Necessity cannot permit what is otherwise prohibited under IHL.  
Humanity is a broad open-ended term41 that is commonly associated 
with the ‘Martens Clause’.42 The Martens Clause instructs that even in 
situations that are not expressly covered by IHL instruments, both 
combatants and civilians enjoy a minimum level of protection, namely that 
all armed conflicts should be regulated by the principles of international law 
‘as they result from the usages established between [States] from the laws 
of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience’.43 This reflects 
 
39 M Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: 
Preserving the Delicate Balance’ in M Schmitt (ed) Essays on Law and War at the Fault 
Lines (Springer 2011) 89, 90. 
40 Hostage Case, United States v List (Wilhelm) and others, Trial Judgment, Case No 7, 
(1948) 11 TWC 757 reported in: H Lauterpacht (ed), Annual Digest and Reports of Public 
International Law Cases: Being a Selection from the Decisions of International Courts and 
Tribunals and Military Courts given during the year 1948 (1953), 632, 646; I Henderson, 
The Contemporary Law of Targeting: Military Objectives, Proportionality and Precautions 
in Attach under AP I (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 35. 
41 J Pictet, Commentary on the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross (Henry Dunant 
Institute, Geneva, 1979) 12-23. See further: T Meron, ‘The Humanization of International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 94(2) AJIL 239-278; R Coupland, ‘Humanity: What is it and how 
does it influence International Law?’ (2001) 844 IRRC 969-90. 
42 The Martens Clause was introduced in the Preamble to the 1899 HC II and has gained 
customary status by the time of its incorporation into API. Declaration Renouncing the Use, 
in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight (adopted 11 
December 1868, entered into force 29 November 11 December 1868) 138 Consol TS 297, 
Preamble. See: M Bothe, et al (eds), New rules for victims of armed conflicts: commentary 
on the two 1977 protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (2nd edn Martinus 
Nijhoff 2013) 43, 224. 
43 ibid; Corfu Channel case (UK v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 22; V Pustogarov, 
‘Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens (1845-1909) — A Humanist of Modern Times’ (1996) 312 





the overarching goal of IHL: To establish minimum, non-derogable 
standards of restraint that apply in all situations of armed conflict. 
What follows next is the principle of proportionality, which serves as 
the ‘inescapable link’ between the principles of military necessity and 
humanity, when they pull in opposite directions.44 IHL proportionality 
essentially mandates that even attacks that comply with the principles of 
distinction and military necessity are prohibited if they ‘may be expected to 
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’.45  
While the object and purpose of IHL, as reflected in IHL norms and 
principles, is to protect the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, 
questions remain whether individuals have rights under IHL and even if so, 
whether they can assert these rights against the State. Treaty IHL norms 
are silent in this regard. This silence stems from the traditional stance that 
only States are subjects of international law with full rights and obligations 
while individuals are, at most, beneficiaries, who must claim their rights 
through their State of nationality.46 While it is now mostly accepted that 
individuals hold some substantive rights under IHL,47 problems still remain, 
since IHL instruments are silent on the exercise of rights, leaving it to 
customary international law or domestic law to empower international 
tribunals or national courts to give effect to that right.48 Effectively, this 
reality prevents individuals from pressing claims against the wrongdoing 
belligerent. 
 
317 IRRC 125-34; A Cassese, ‘The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?’ 
(2000) 11(1) EJIL 187-216. 
44 M Sassòli et al (eds) How does the law protect in war? Vol 1 (3rd edn ICRC 2014) ch 9, 
section 6. 
45 Article 51(5)(b), API; ICRC – Customary IHL Study (n 3738) Rule 14.  
46 See: A Alexander, ‘A Short History of International Humanitarian Law’ (2015) 26(1) EJIL 
109-138. 
47 This point is addressed in detail in chapter 7. 





As regards its development, IHL is no different from most other 
spheres of international law, including investment law, in its traditional 
development in the form of absolute norms which prescribe certain uniform 
minimum standards and obligations.49 Hence, just as with investment law, 
the application of war law was generally equal in that the laws applied 
equally to all belligerent parties in an international armed conflict, 
irrespective of the question of how the war began or the relative justice of 
the causes involved, but this application was not necessarily equitable 
insofar as it affected differently situated parties unevenly.50  
Today, many IHL norms are articulated in absolute terms that do not 
account for the State’s level of development but prescribe certain minimum 
standards to be equally applied across belligerents.51 This is mostly the 
case with norms that anchor core humanitarian notions. For instance, the 
principle of distinction, which translates into the uniform prohibition on 
indiscriminate attacks and bans the targeting of civilians, excludes 
differential treatment.52   
At the same time, like the contemporary international legal system,53 
modern IHL also comprises norms that account for the State’s level of 
 
49 E De Vattel, The Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and 
Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns Book II (translated from French by J Chitty T & J Johnson 
1844) ch 1, section 2; P Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New 
Paradigm of Inter-state Relations’ (1999) 10(3) EJIL 549, 551-2.   
50 G Blum, ‘On a Differential Law of War’ (2011) 52(1) Harvard International Law Journal, 
163, 177. 
51 Eg: the intentional killing of civilians is always a war crime (API, Article 51), the use of 
chemical or biological weapons is absolutely prohibited (Article 1(b), Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on their Destruction 3 September 1992, 1974 UNTS 45; see also Article 1, Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacterial (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 10 April 1972, 1015 UNTS 163),  the torture 
of prisoners of war or civilians is never lawful (Article 3, GCIII) and the carrying out of 
attacks while posing as a civilian is illegal perfidy (Article 37(1)(c), API). 
52 A Roberts, ‘The Equal Application of the Law of War: A Principle Under Pressure’ 90 
IRRC 931, 932 (2008) (‘Under this principle, [IHL] apply[s] equally to all those who are 
entitled to participate directly in hostilities [...] it is not relevant whether a belligerent force 
represents an autocracy or a democracy, nor is it relevant whether it represents the 
government of a single country or the will of the international community’). 
53 Examples of differential environmental norms are contained in the Kyoto Protocol (Article 
10(c), Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 





development.54 Such norms hold States to contextual standards with which 
they can practicably comply relative to their means, abilities, and particular 
circumstances. Schmitt explains this state of play in terms of ‘normative 
relativism’55 that holds belligerents to the standards to which they are 
‘capable of rising’.56 Importantly, such relative norms are not to be confused 
with differential treatment norms as under, say, the instruments of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). While relative IHL norms take the State’s level 
of development into account in the assessment of compliance, as one of 
the considerations, IHL norms do not prescribe preferential treatment to 
developing countries.57  
5. Investment Law and Humanitarian Law 
The relationships between different international norms, in particular the 
relationships of IHL, or that of investment law, with other fields of 
international law, ‘are often examined from a high-altitude perspective of a 
relationship between two or more legal regimes’, as Milanović has  
observed.58 It is therefore important to explain that this thesis is not 
 
special provisions which grant developing countries special rights, and which give 
developed countries the possibility to treat developing countries more favorably than other 
Members (WTO – Trade and Development Committee, ‘Special and differential treatment 
provisions’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.ht>) 
54 D Magrawt, ‘Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual, and 
Absolute Norms’ (1990) 1 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 
69, 76; Lt Cdr S Belt, ‘Missles Over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary Norm 
Requiring the Use of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas’ (2000)  47 Naval Law Review 
170; N Gallus, ‘The Influence of the Host State’s Level of Development on International 
Investment Treaty Standards of Protection’ (2005) 6 JWIT 711–729. 
55 M Schmitt, ‘Bellum Americanum: The US View of Twenty-First Century War and Its 
Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict’ (1998) 19 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 1051, 1088.  
56 ibid (‘The sole exceptions are absolute prohibitions, such as the direct targeting of 
civilians or the use of poison’).  
57 M Schmitt, ‘The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare’ (1999) 2 Yale Human 
Rights & Development Law Journal 43, 176 (explaining that it is ‘simply beyond credulity 
to suggest that the acceptability of striking a particular type of target or causing a certain 
amount of collateral damage or incidental injury might one day depend on the 
characteristics of the attacking State’). 
58 M Milanović, ‘Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ in 
O Ben-Naftali (ed) International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law 
(OUP 2011) 95, 100. See, among many, ‘high-altitude’ discussions of investment law with 





concerned with, nor does it presume to offer, a thorough examination of the 
interaction between two legal regimes, IHL and investment law, as such.59 
Rather, the study deals with the relationship between investment law and 
IHL ‘at the level of specific problems regulated by specific norms’.60  
Principally, and as suggested with respect to the interaction between 
other international norms, the relationship between investment law and IHL 
norms may be one of compatibility, where the norms are complementary 
and go in the same direction,61 or one of conflict, where the application of 
both IHL and investment law norms leads to two different results and a 
‘norm conflict’ arises.62   
On this point, it should be clarified that this research adopts a broad 
definition of ‘conflict’ that also covers incompatibilities between permissive 
norms and obligations.63 However, other definitions exist in scholarship and 
jurisprudence. The difference between the approaches to the definition of 
conflict mostly concerns the question of whether a norm conflict should 
cover only incompatibilities between obligations and prohibitions or whether 
it should also extend to ‘incompatible obligations, prohibitions and 
permissions’.64  
 
never went away’ in F Baetens (ed) Investment Law within International Law: Integrative 
Perspectives (CUP 2013) 259-297 and M Hirsh, ’Investment Tribunals and Human Rights: 
Divergent Paths’ in P-M Dupuy et al (eds) Human Rights in International Investment Law 
and Arbitration (OUP 2009) 97-114. 
59 Albeit, as chapter 8 explains, an inductive reasoning allows us to make broader 
inferences about the different levels of interactions between IHL and investment law 
60 M Milanović, ‘The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis’ in J-D Ohlin (ed) Theoretical Boundaries 
of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (CUP 2016) 80. 
61 ibid. 
62 Milanović – Norm Conflicts (n 58) 100; M Milanović, ‘Norm conflict in international law: 
Whither human rights?’ (2009) 21(1) Duke Journal of Comparative International Law 63, 
72-5; J Pauwelyn, Conflict of norms in public international law (Hart 2003) 176. 
63 Pauwelyn (ibid) 176. 
64 E Vranes, ‘The Definition of ‘Norm Conflict’ in International Law and Legal Theory’ (2006) 
17(2) EJIL 395, 396 (Vraners explains that, ‘an example of the last constellation would be 
a situation in which one norm requires a person to pay an indemnity of $200, while another 
norm stipulates the sum of $100. Compliance with the second obligation may violate the 





For some commentators and adjudicative instances,65 a norm 
conflict exists only when two (or more) obligations ‘cannot be complied with 
simultaneously’.66 According to this (narrow) view, ‘there is no conflict if the 
obligations of one instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, 
those of another’.67 Nor is there a conflict if it is possible to comply with the 
obligations of one instrument by ‘refraining from exercising a privilege or 
discretion accorded by another.’68 Marceau , one of the main proponents of 
the narrow definition of ‘conflict’, proposes that three cumulative conditions 
define a ‘conflict’. First, two States must be bound by two different 
obligations. Second, these obligations must cover the same substantive 
subject-matter. Third, the provisions must conflict, in the sense that the 
provisions must impose mutually exclusive obligations.69  
One of the main difficulties with this narrow view, which the 
supporters of this approach themselves recognize, is that incompatibilities 
between permissions and obligations, incompatibilities between 
permissions and prohibitions, and unilateral incompatibilities between 
obligations, which are not mutually exclusive, may ‘from a practical point of 
view be as serious as a conflict’, since they ‘may render inapplicable 
provisions designed to give one of the divergent instruments a measure of 
flexibility of operation which was thought necessary to its practicability’, and 
yet the narrow approach effectively disregards this reality.70  
 
65 Eg: WTO, Appellate Body Report, Guatemala—Anti-Dumping Investigation regarding 
Portland Cement from Mexico (25 November 1998) WT/DS60/AB/R, para 65 (‘A special or 
additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a 
situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, 
that is, in the case of a conflict between them’). See also: WTO, Report of the Panel, 
Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (23 July 1998) WT/DS54, 
55, 59 and 64/R, paras 14.29–14.36, 14.97–14.99. 
66 W Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’ (1953) 30 British Ybk Int 401, 425. See 
further authorities in G Marceau, ‘Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions the 
Relationship between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and other Treaties’ (2001) Journal 
of World Trade 1081–1131 and in Vranes (n 64) 401-402). 
67 ibid. 
68 Jenks (ibid). 
69 Marceau (n 66) 1084. 
70 ibid, 404; Jenks (n 66) 426-27; E Vranes Trade and the Environment: Fundamental 





A different view maintains that a conflict arises where one norm 
prohibits, or restricts, what a different norm permits.71 For Kelsen, for 
instance, a ‘conflict between two norms occurs if in obeying or applying one 
norm, the other one is necessarily or possibly violated’.72 Vranes builds on 
Kelsen’s proposition and argues that, ‘there is a conflict between norms, 
one of which may be permissive, if in obeying or applying one norm, the 
other norm is necessarily or potentially violated’.73 This study follows the 
latter broad definition. This approach ‘gives weight to “possibilities, 
privileges or rights” that are recognized in treaties’.74 
The distinction between these narrow and wide definitions of ‘conflict’ 
is of practical significance. The first Panel Report Indonesia – 
Automobiles,75 which concerned a claim that was brought against Indonesia 
inter alia under the national treatment provision of Article III of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), is illustrative. In defence, 
Indonesia invoked its special developing country rights under the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Essentially, 
Indonesia invoked a permission to provisionally maintain certain subsidies.  
The Panel espoused a strict definition of ‘conflict’, under which a 
norm conflict only exists in a situation of mutually exclusive obligations, 
thereby rejecting the proposition that a normative conflict may arise in 
 
71 L Bartels, ‘The Relationship between the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’ (2016) 50 Journal of World Trade 
7-20. See also a broad definition to conflicts in WTO, Panel Report on European 
Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, (EC—
Bananas III) (22 May 1997), WT/ DS27/R(US) para 7.159. See a detailed analysis of 
jurisprudence espousing a broad definition to ‘conflict’ in Vranes (n 64) 406-407. 
72 H Kelsen, ‘Derogation’, in H Klecatsky et al (eds) Die Wiener Rechtstheoretische Schule 
(1968) 1429 – 1438; H Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen (MANZ Verlag Vienna 
1979) 99. See also Vranes (n 64) 414-15. a 
73 Vranes (n 64) 414-418. He illustrates: ‘Assume that under norm A, restrictions of imports 
from country X are prohibited, while under norm B import bans on goods from country X 
are permitted if there is no sufficient environmental protection in country X.  A State that 
complies with norm A does not violate norm B. However, where a State asserts the explicit 
permission under norm B, then its compliance with norm B is in violation of norm A’. 
74 Marceau (n 66) 1085 (discussing the advantages of a broader definition to a conflict, as 
reflected namely in the writing of Bartels).  






instances involving express permissions and duties. This narrow definition 
influenced the outcome of this dispute, leading the Panel to refrain from 
addressing Indonesia’s developing country rights under the relevant 
instrument, which could potentially have prevailed if a broader conflict of 
norms approach were adopted.76 
The distinction between the approaches to conflict is also significant 
with respect to IHL norms and their interaction with other international 
norms, including investment standards. Since IHL is designed to regulate 
the conduct of hostilities, aside from and subject to, limitations and 
restrictions on the use of lethal or potentially lethal measures and other 
means, IHL permits (but does not oblige or mandate) States to take certain 
lethal or potentially lethal measures against persons and property. Thus, 
the question of whether a conflict arises at all in instances of 
incompatibilities between permissions and other obligations or prohibitions 
is potentially decisive for the treatment of incompatibilities involving IHL 
norms. 
On this point,77 d’Aspremont and Tranchez argue, with respect to the 
issues of the right to life that, ‘IHL and HRL are not conflicting sets of norms 
since only HRL imposes obligations; IHL does not prescribe killing, it ‘just’ 
permits the fact of killing in time of wars’.78 Therefore, they propose that in 
such cases, the norms are to be construed as ‘competitive’ rather than 
‘conflicting’.79 By contrast, Milanović who, like this study, adopts a broad 
definition of conflict, suggests that ‘a norm conflict would exist whenever the 
 
76 ibid, see footnote 649 and the authorities cited therein. Since this incompatibility was not 
classified as a ‘conflict’, the Panel did not apply the rules on conflict resolution (below) and 
therefore did not examine whether the permissive norm invoked by Indonesia was the lex 
specialis which should have prevailed. 
77 See a through discussion of the potential compatibilities and divergence between IHL 
and human rights norms in: N Lubell, ‘Parallel Application of International Humanitarian 
Law and International Human Rights Law: An Examination of the Debate’ (2007) 40(2) 
Israel Law Review 648-660. 
78 J d’Aspremont and E Tranchez, ‘The Quest for a Non-conflictual Coexistence of 
International Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law: Which Role for the lex specialis 
Principle?’ in R Kolb and G Gaggiol (eds) Research Handbook on Human Rights and 






application of the two norms leads to two opposite results, for example if 
IHL provided that a particular use of force was lawful, while IHRL made it 
unlawful’.80 That said, in contrast to the referenced Panel Report in 
Indonesia – Automobiles, both d’Aspremont and Milanović, who hold 
different definitions of  conflict, essentially propose to resolve the friction 
between these norms (be they ‘competing’ or be they ‘conflicting’) with 
analogous tools, relying on interpretive means and on priority rules, namely 
the lex specialis rule (discussed below).81  
Having established the broad approach to ‘conflict’ that this study 
adopts, additional distinctions between ‘apparent and genuine’ norm 
conflicts and conflict ‘avoidance’ and conflict ‘resolution’, should be 
addressed. An ‘apparent’ conflict exists where the content of two 
international norms is professedly contradictory, but interpretive means 
(under the VCLT) allow to ‘avoid’ the conflict by way of interpreting it away 
in a compatible manner.  
The avoidance of an apparent conflict is possible, as Milanović 
explains, ‘when the language, object and purpose, and other structural 
elements of the two potentially or apparently conflicting norms can be 
reasonably reconciled without much effort’.82 Doctrine and jurisprudence 
often cite, as a notable example of such a technique, the Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion,83 where the ICJ held that, in times of armed conflict, what 
is an ‘arbitrary deprivation of life’ under Article 6 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) ‘can only be decided by 
 
80 Milanović – Norm conflict (n 58) 102-108. 
81 ibid, 234-41 (suggesting the application of interpretive tools under the notion of 
systematic integration and priority rules). See further on the apparent and real difference 
between the perceptions to the interaction between IHL and human rights law in W 
Schabas, ‘Lex specialis? Belt and suspenders? The parallel operation of human rights law 
and the law of armed conflict, and the conundrum of jus ad bellum’ (2007) 40(2) Israel Law 
Review 592-613. 
82 Milanović – Norm conflict (n 58) 106. 
83 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Advisory Opinion) 





reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the 
terms of the Covenant itself’.84  
But not all conflicts may be interpreted away. In such cases a 
‘genuine’ conflict exists. Of course, the proposition that a genuine conflict 
exists does not conclude the legal analysis of norm interaction, it is but one 
of the phases in the examination. The next step requires consideration of 
whether there are legal means to ‘resolve’ any such genuine conflict. In 
contradistinction to conflict avoidance, norm conflict ‘resolution’ requires 
one conflicting norm (including permission) to prevail, or have priority, over 
the other norm. This also means that for a genuine conflict to be resolved, 
‘it is necessary for the wrongfulness on the part of the state for failing to 
abide by the displaced norm to be precluded as a matter of state 
responsibility’.85  
It follows that, generally, where an incompatibility between two 
international norms potentially arises, the examination proceeds in two main 
steps. First, an assessment of whether it is possible to avoid the conflict by 
interpretive means that make the two, potentially conflicting norms, 
compatible. Second, where the avoidance of a conflict is not possible 
through interpretive means, the resolution of the genuine conflict will be 
dealt with, namely by way of assigning priority to one norm (potentially  
including a permission) over the other.86 In this latter respect, and without 
any pretense to exhaust the issue of conflict resolution rules, for its breadth, 
the study suggests recourse to the lex specialis rule.87  
Mindful of the debates over its origins, function, and application in 
particular cases, for the purpose of this study suffice it to explain, in the 
words of the ILC, that lex specialis ‘is a generally accepted technique of… 
 
84 ibid, para 25. For a critical analysis of the technique used by the Court, see further in 
Milanović – Origins of lex specialis (n 60) 103-114 and Schabas (n 81) 592-613. 
85 Pauwelyn (n 62) 327 and Milanović – Norm conflict (n 58) 102. 
86 Pauwelyn (n 62) 272; Milanović – Whither human rights? (n 62) 73-4; Milanović – Norm 
conflict (n 58) 103-106. 






conflict resolution in international law. It suggests that whenever two or 
more norms deal with the same subject matter, priority should be given to 
the norm that is more specific’, the ‘special norm’.88 Principally, a norm may 
be lex specialis ‘because it addresses the particular subject matter that a 
general law also addresses more directly or precisely89 or because it deals 
with the same subject-matter ‘but in a way that goes further, either in detail 
or in terms of the objectives pursued under both treaties’.90 
Without derogation from the aforementioned, it should also be noted 
that there are situations in which ‘all legitimate interpretive tools will fail us’ 
and so will the lex specialis rule.91 These are cases, as Milanović observes, 
‘where a norm conflict will be both unavoidable and irresolvable due to a 
fundamental incompatibility in the text, object and purpose, and values, and 
where the only possible solution to the conflict will be a political one’.92 In 
such cases, as further explored below, the State has to make a strategic 
choice as to the international policies to which it prefers to give 
precedence.93 
The issue of the interaction between IHL and investment law norms 
arises in this research in different contexts and is thus addressed from 
several perspectives. In the aggregate, this allows the study to flesh out 
different kinds of interactions between IHL and investment law. As further 
explained below, some IHL norms and investment law standards of 
treatment share a common historical backdrop. This historical development, 
 
88 See further in: ILC, Study on the Function and Scope of the Lex Specialis rule and the 
Question of ‘Self-Contained Regimes’. ILC (LVI)SG/ FIL/CRD.1 (2004) and the authorities 
therein, Milanović – Norm conflict (ibid) 113-17 and the authorities cited there.; N 
Prud’homme, ‘Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifaceted 
Relationship?’ (2007) 40(2) Israel Law Review 355-395. 
89 Pauwelyn (n 62) 389. (eg: ‘an obligation to do something in the events A to Z is less 
specific than an obligation not to do this something in the events A and B. Or a WTO 
obligation not to restrict trade, irrespective of the product involved, must be seen as less 
specific than an obligation (or permission) to restrict trade in the specific products A and 
B’). 
90 Pauwelyn (ibid) 390. 
91 Milanović – Norm conflict (n 58) 102-103. 
92 ibid, 108-113. 
93 Milanović suggests that such situations are better resolved by the legislator, not the 





in turn, has resulted in several compatibilities between the language, object 
and purpose, and other structural elements of these potentially divergent 
norms, thereby allowing both norms to ‘be reasonably reconciled without 
much effort’.94 In such cases, the thesis suggests using several interpretive 
technics.  
For instance, with respect to some investment standards of 
treatment, it is suggested that the investment provision uses terms of art 
with a recognized meaning under IHL, and thus, under the VLCT (Articles 
31(1), (4)), the ordinary (or special) meaning of the treaty standard makes 
a reference to customary IHL; and thus, the content of the IHL rule informs 
the meaning of the investment standard (chapter 3). In another instance, it 
is proposed that a potential incompatibility between IHL and investment law 
norms may be avoided through evolutionary interpretation of  investment 
treaty terms, such as ‘war’ or ‘armed conflict’, in a manner that conforms 
with the way in which IHL defines and treats the notions of ‘war’ (chapter 6).  
In other instances, the study suggests that, under VCLT Article 
31(3)(c), IHL rules may be taken into account as part of the context (rather 
than the ordinary meaning) in the interpretation of investment standards of 
treatment (chapters 5 and 7). Further, this study proposes that, as a 
supplementary means of interpretation (VCLT Article 32), the mentioned 
historical backdrop regarding the symbiotic development of IHL and 
investment norms, assists to bring further compatibility in the interpretation 
of international norms by way of confirming and clarifying the meaning of a 
given standard (chapter 3-7).  
The study also deals with an instance when a potential 
incompatibility cannot be avoided or interpreted away, and a genuine 
conflict arises. In this case, the research looks to the application of the lex 
specialis rule so as to resolve the conflict (chapter 5). Finally, an instance 
of an ‘unavoidable’ and ‘unresolvable’ conflict is addressed.95 Here, priority 
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rules are of little assistance. In such cases, it is suggested that the 
contradiction of investment law and IHL policies and practices is resolved 
through a political solution. That is to say that in such cases, rather than 
leaving it to the adjudicators to reconcile potential incompatibilities between 
particular norms, it is for the State to prioritize its conflicting policies by way 
of making a value judgment with respect to certain issues. (chapter 4). 
Overall, depending on context, the thesis illustrates how existing tools in 
international law may be used to clarify the interaction between investment 
law and IHL.  
While international law offers tools (namely interpretive instruments 
and priority rules on the resolution of conflict) to address the interaction 
between investment law and IHL norms at the ‘level of specific problems’, it 
remains unclear how an international forum will resolve such problems. The 
identity and function of the forum and its perception of international norms 
may affect the use of these regime-interaction tools and the results of their 
application.96  
Faced with a ‘specific problem’ concerning the protection of 
investments in armed conflict, an investment tribunal is likely to treat the 
investment instrument as the point of departure in the resolution of the claim 
and assess, at best, the effect of IHL on the interpretation and application 
of the investment standard at issue. Other international tribunals or national 
courts may approach a similar problem primarily from the perspective of 
IHL, which they may construe differently. Mindful that IHL lacks a 
 
96 This proposition is supported by the different treatment of IHL in national courts and 
human rights tribunals. See: E Buis, ‘The Implementation of International Humanitarian 
Law by Human Rights Courts: The Example of the Inter-American Human Rights System’ 
in R Arnold and N Quénivet (eds) International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: 
Towards a New Merger in International Law (Brill Nijhoff 2008) 269-93; S Tabak, 
‘Ambivalent Enforcement: International Humanitarian Law at Human Rights Tribunals’ 
(2016) 37(4) Michigan Journal of International Law 661, 684-715; D Jinks et al, ‘Introducing 
International Humanitarian Law to Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies’ in D Jinks et al (eds) 
Applying International Humanitarian Law in Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies (Asser, 
Springer 2014) 1-26. Also compare the decision on the expropriation of Yukos’s property 
in a human rights tribunal (Case of Yukos V Russia Application No 14902/04, Judgment, 
31 July 2014) with the decision of the investment tribunal on similar issues (Yukos v Russia, 





specialized forum for enforcement and that investment claims involving war-
torn States have already arisen, this research approaches the protection of 
investments in armed conflicts from the perspective of investment 
arbitration.97  
6. Litigating War in Investment Arbitration: How Much IHL is Too 
Much IHL?  
To provide the relevant actors and decision makers with workable tools to 
address the problem of the regulation of investments in armed conflicts this 
discussion must be aware of the significant role that litigation plays in the 
enforcement of investment standards of protection. Accordingly, while this 
research deals with the substantive, rather than the procedural, 
international law that regulates the protection of investments in armed 
conflict, it is mindful that the value of a legal argument, as sound as it may 
be, is diminished if it cannot be introduced before a relevant forum. It is 
therefore useful to address, at this preliminary stage, the question whether 
IHL norms can be invoked in investment arbitration and if so, how and by 
whom.  
As explained below, the analysis of this thesis could form the basis 
for IHL-based arguments that may be raised by host States defensively.98 
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that, as with human rights-
based arguments, investors, third parties, and the tribunal could (but rarely 
do) also introduce IHL-based arguments in investment arbitration.99 In line 
 
97 For the sake of accuracy, and as further explained below, to a degree chapter 4 is an 
outlier to this perspective. As further explored below, chapter 4 deals with the contemporary 
laws of targeting and the rare instances when an investment may be said to be classified 
as target susceptible to direct attack. This discussion, while also relevant for the 
interpretation and application of investment standards of protection in hostilities (including 
by investment tribunals), approaches the issue of the protection of investments in armed 
conflicts from a broader policy perspective. 
98 IHL-based counterclaims against investors are not addressed in this study. For a 
discussion of the substantive and procedural limits to counterclaims based on non-
investment norms, see: E De Brabandere ‘Human Rights Counterclaims in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration’ (2017) 50(2) Revue Belge de Droit International 591-611. 
99 For a breakdown of cases by the identity of the party invoking human rights arguments 
see: S Steininger What’s Human Rights Got to Do with It? An Empirical Analysis of Human 
Rights References in Investment Arbitration References in Investment Arbitration’ (2018) 





with the fact that investors rarely invoke other international norms, such as 
human rights,100 IHL arguments are not generally invoked by investors. 
Based on the (limited) willingness that some tribunals have demonstrated 
to entertain human rights considerations when such were made in amicus 
curiae briefs,101 it may be said that, even where such arguments are not 
raised by the litigants for whatever strategic, procedural, or substantive 
reasons, IHL-considerations can be introduced by third-parties.102 But there 
is no known case of such submissions. Finally, by analogy to the treatment 
of human rights instruments in investment arbitration, it may be suggested 
that the tribunal itself can raise IHL. However, based on the non ultra petita 
rule103 such IHL-based arguments can, at most, be invoked to support a 
decision with respect to the investment claim, they cannot be used to 
introduce new arguments.104 
The next question is whether, given their limited jurisdictions and the 
rules on applicable law, investment tribunals can, as a matter of principle, 
consider IHL-based arguments when such are raised by the State. The 
starting point is that investment tribunals are endowed by the parties with 
the power to settle the specific category of disputes that the parties have 
 
100 This may be in part because as judicial entities, investor benefit from few protections 
under human rights instruments or because investors are of the view that investment 
treaties provide equivalent, and even higher protections. See further: C Reiner and C 
Schreuer, ‘Human Rights and International Investment Law’ 
<http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/h_rights_int_invest_arbitr.pdf> (accessed 30 July 2018). 
Notably, when such human rights-based claims were made by investors, these were mostly 
rejected, as explained below. 
101 Aguas del Tunari v Bolivia, ICSID Case No ARB/02/3, NGO Petition to Participate, 29 
August 2002, paras 26-8 and Aguas del Tunari v Bolivia, ICSID Case No ARB/02/3, Letter 
from President of Tribunal Responding to Petition, 29 January 2003). See further on this 
analysis in Reiner and C Schreuer (ibid). 
102 Eg: Tecmed v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB (AF/00/2), Award, 29 May 2003. The case 
concerned measures that were taken by Mexico in order to abide by its human right 
obligations (access to water), neither the investor nor the State raised human right. See 
further in: E De Brabandere, ‘Human Rights Considerations in International Investment 
Arbitration’ in M Fitzmaurice P Merkouris (eds) The Interpretation and Application of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 209-14. 
103 For a discussion of the ultra petita rule in investment arbitration, eg: SAUR v Argentina, 
ICSID Case No ARB/04/4, Decision on Annulment, 19 December 2016.  
104 Eg: In Tecmed v Mexico, the Tribunal cited the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the context of expropriation 





accepted for submission.105 While some treaties limit the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction to disputes ‘concerning expropriation’,106 other treaties provide 
for broader jurisdiction that encompasses disputes ‘concerning matters 
governed by this agreement’, ‘an alleged breach of any right conferred by 
this agreement’,107 disputes over ‘interpretation and application’ of the 
treaty, etc.108  
Under another strand of drafting, tribunals have jurisdiction over 
disputes relating to the treaty’s substantive standards and disputes that 
concern investment agreements and investment authorizations.109 Finally, 
investment treaties are replete with broad jurisdiction clauses that limit the 
subject-matter jurisdiction not by a reference to certain instruments but 
rather by circumscribing a type of disputes that the tribunal can hear.110 
Such language refers to any ‘investor-State dispute’,111 an ‘investment 
dispute’,112 or dispute ‘arising in connection with investment activities’.113  
While jurisdictional clauses have implications on the law that will be 
applied by the tribunal, jurisdiction is different from the question of the law 
applicable to the dispute.114 It is the parties’ autonomy as expressed in the 
 
105 J Collier and V Lowe, The settlement of disputes in international law (OUP 2009) 227. 
106 Some former Communist countries limit jurisdiction to disputes ‘concerning 
expropriation’. Eg: Article 7, Cyprus – Hungary BIT; Article 4(3), Bulgaria – Germany BIT. 
See: ST-AD GmbH (Germany) v Bulgaria, Award on Jurisdiction, 18 July 2013, PCA Case 
No 2011-06, para 361. 
107 Eg: Article 17(1), Japan – Cambodia BIT; Article 13, Austria Model BIT; Article 26(1) 
Energy Charter Treaty, Energy Charter Treaty, 2080 UNTS 95; 34 ILM 360 (1995) (ECT); 
Article 1116, The North American Free Trade Agreement 32 ILM 289, 605 (1993) (NAFTA). 
108 Eg: Article IX, UK – Colombia BIT; Article 11(1), Lithuania – Russia BIT. 
109 Eg: Article VII, US – Argentina BIT; Article 24(1), 2012 US Model BIT. Most recently, 
this approach has been espoused by the parties to the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Article 9.19. 
110 Eg: Iberdrola Energia v Guatemala, ICSID Case No ARB/09/5, Award, 17 August 2012, 
para 306 (the Tribunal contrasted the scope of jurisdiction under the language ‘matters 
governed by this agreement’ with the language ‘every dispute’, ‘any dispute’ etc. 
concerning the investment, holding the former to be narrower in scope). 
111 Article 14, Rwanda – UAE BIT. 
112 Article 24, Israel – Japan BIT. 
113 Article X(1), Russia – Turkey BIT. 
114 It is usually accepted that there is a ‘cardinal distinction’ between jurisdiction and 
applicable law clauses as pronounced in MOX Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom), 
Procedural Order No. 3, 24 June 2003, 126 ILR 310, para 19 and cited with approval in 
Channel Tunnel Group v France and United Kingdom, Partial Arbitral Award, 30 January 





governing law clause that determines whether a tribunal can hear IHL-
arguments as a matter of applicable law. Ideally, the parties’ consent to 
apply IHL to their disputes would be expressly stipulated. In the absence of 
a specific mention or incorporation of IHL rules in investment treaty 
provisions, IHL norms are applicable to investment disputes to the extent to 
which they are included in the parties’ choice of law provisions. But many 
investment treaties do not contain such provisions.115 When treaties do 
contain a choice of law clause, they are not uniform in language. Mostly, 
such provisions enumerate one or more of the following – the investment 
instrument, the law of the host State, and international law.116  
Where the applicable law clause stipulates ‘rules of international law’ 
(and like formulations), IHL norms, as part of international law, will form part 
of the applicable law. In the absence of a choice of law clause, the 
determination of the applicable law depends on the arbitration rules in 
accordance with which the arbitration is conducted. For its popularity as a 
leading institution for the resolution of investment claims,117 it is convenient 
to use the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) as an 
exemplifier.118 Article 42 provides that, in the absence of an agreement to 
the contrary ‘the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party 
 
distinction is or how do these clauses interact (L Bartels, ‘Jurisdiction and applicable law 
clauses: Where does a tribunal find the principle norms applicable to the case before it?’ 
in T Broude and Y Shany (eds) Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law (Hart 
2011) 115, 125)). 
115 Until 2008, most of American BITs did not contain applicable law clause (cf: Article 30, 
US – Uruguay BIT; Article 30, 2012 US Model BIT). A little over a dozen of the 91 French 
BITs in force contain an applicable law clause, and fewer than a dozen of the UK’s BITs 
contain applicable law clauses. The same is true for German BITs. 
116 Eg: Article 9, China Model BIT; Article 10(1), Argentina – Germany BIT; Article 8(4), UK 
– Vietnam BIT; 
117 According to UNCTAD, as of April 2019, most of the known investment arbitrations 
cases were submitted to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) (UNCTAD, ISDS monitor <https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS> 
(accessed 20 April 2019)). 
118 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 





to the dispute and such rules of international law as may be applicable’.119 
‘International law’, in this respect, encompasses treaties, custom, and 
general principals of law.120  
Save for stipulations to the contrary, the application of international 
law to the treaty means that the secondary rules of public international law, 
such as the rules on attribution, State responsibility, reparations, and 
interpretation (including the principle of systemic interpretation), apply and 
that IHL, as a field of international law, forms part of the applicable law.121 
It follows that where public international law is the governing law the limited 
scope of jurisdiction of investment tribunals does not principally prevent 
tribunals from considering issues relating to the conduct of hostilities when 
these matters are raised by the litigants as part of the applicable law.  
But just how the incorporation of IHL as part of the applicable law 
interacts with the limited jurisdiction of the investment tribunal is a complex 
question of a different order.122 What seems to be agreed is that the 
jurisdiction of a tribunal established to hear certain kinds of disputes cannot 
be extended to any type of dispute between the investor and the host State, 
even ‘if the alleged breaches are of obligations under peremptory norms, or 
obligations which protect essential humanitarian values’, to cite the ICJ in 
the Genocide Case.123  
 
119 Article 42, ICSID Convention. See similar language in Article 28.1, SIAC 2017 
Investment Arbitration Rules (see also: Article 21.1, ICC 2017 Arbitration Rules; Article 
27.1, SCC 2017 Arbitration Rules). 
120 Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (1965) 13 1 ICSID Reports 25). 
and E Gaillard and Y Banifatemi, ‘The Meaning of “and” in Article 42(1), Second Sentence, 
of the Washington Convention: The Role of International Law in the ICSID Choice of Law 
Process’ (2003) 18(2) ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal,375-411. 
121J Calamita, ‘Countermeasures and jurisdiction: Between effectiveness and 
Fragmentation’ (2011) 42 Georgetown Journal of International Law 233, 276-77. 
122 See (n 114). 
123 Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) [2007] ICJ 
Rep 1, para 147. The Court addressed the question whether it can adjudicate alleged 
breaches of other international norms, not amounting to genocide. While Article 38(1) of 
the Court’s Statute comprises such norms as part of thje applicable law, the Court’s basis 
of jurisdiction, Article IX of the Genocide Convention, restricted the Court’s jurisdiction to 





This determination is consistent with the practice of investment 
tribunals. Relevant in this respect is the case of Biloune v Ghana.124 Biloune 
was a Syrian investor that operated in Ghana. On the State’s orders, he 
was arrested, held in custody for 13 days without charge, and finally 
deported. He brought a claim based on the investment agreement, arguing 
that Ghana’s measures breached investment standards of protection. He 
also sought compensation for the violations of his human rights, adding that 
the investment tribunal is the only forum where he may seek redress for his 
injuries.125 However, the Tribunal held that it ‘lacks jurisdiction to address, 
as an independent cause of action, a claim of violation of human rights’126 
since its jurisdiction under Article 15(2) of the agreement was limited to 
commercial disputes arising under the contract between the parties only ‘in 
respect of an approved enterprise’.127 
The Bernhard von Pezold v Zimbabwe Tribunal followed a similar 
reasoning. Article 10(5) of the Germany – Zimbabwe BIT instructed the 
Tribunal to decide disputes ‘on the basis of… rules of general international 
law’128 while the Tribunal’s jurisdiction was limited to disputes ‘concerning 
the interpretation or application of this [BIT]’.129 And so, the Tribunal refused 
to allow claims ‘on the putative rights of the indigenous communities as 
“indigenous peoples” under international human rights law’ as such fell 
‘outside the scope’ of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.130 
 
Convention, thereby ousting claims that are based on ‘other’ international norms. 
Accordingly, the Court found that it had ‘no power to rule on alleged breaches of other 
obligations under international law’ irrespective of the significance of IHL norms.  
124 Biloune v Ghana, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 27 October 1989. 
125 ibid, 202-3. 
126 ibid, 203. 
127 ibid, 188. Article 24 of the investment agreement instructed the Tribunal to decide the 
dispute ‘according to the laws of Ghana’. Nevertheless, the Tribunal held that absent a 
clear indication to the contrary in Ghana’s laws, international law, including human rights, 
forms part of the substantive applicable law. 
128 Article 10(5) Germany – Zimbabwe BIT. 
129 Article 10(1), ibid. 
130 Bernhard von Pezold v Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No ARB/10/15, Procedural Order No 2, 
26 June 2012, paras 57–61. See also Rompetrol v Romania, where both parties relied 
extensively on the possible application of the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
Tribunal explained that its sole function is to decide legal disputes that arise directly out of 





But this is not what is at issue. The question, as explained, is not 
whether an investor can argue that the State breached IHL in investment 
arbitration. The question is rather, what should a tribunal to do when the 
investor invokes a treaty provision to assess the unlawfulness of a certain 
conduct, whilst the State invokes other international rules to justify (for want 
of a better term) the conduct that is allegedly inconsistent with the treaty or 
to narrow the scope of the treaty standard?  
For instance, can a tribunal empowered only to resolve disputes 
‘concerning expropriation’ hear a defense whereby the taking of the 
investment without an independent right of review or against the offer of 
compensation below Fair Market Value (FMV), is not an unlawful 
expropriation that fails to comply with the treaty rule, but rather a lawful act 
of dispossession during armed conflict, which is subject to different 
qualifications that do not include due process and do not entail FMV 
compensation?131 Or, can a tribunal established to resolve disputes over 
the ‘interpretation and application’ of the investment treaty hear a defense 
whereby the State did not breach the FPS standard by failing to take 
reasonable measures to protect the investor’s property from damage during 
a military operation, since what is ‘reasonable’ in armed conflict is 
determined by IHL concepts of ‘feasible precautions’, with which the State 
had fully complied?132  
How to deal with disputes of this type is controversial since in 
contradistinction to the referenced Biloune case, an IHL defense to an 
investment treaty claim does not fall plainly within the scope of the 
jurisdictional clause, nor clearly outside it, ‘it straddles the dividing line’.133 
 
the parties’. The Tribunal went on to explain that the applicable law is the investment treaty 
and that claim that concerns the violation of the European Convention should be submitted 
to the competent instance, established under this Convention (ICSID Case No ARB/06/3, 
Award, 6 May 2013, paras 170-172). 
131 This question is addressed in chapter 3. 
132 This question is addressed in chapter 5.  
133 E Cannizzaro and B Bonafe, ‘Fragmenting international law through compromissory 
clauses? Some remarks on the decision of the ICJ in the Oil Platforms Case’ (2005) 16(3) 





Put a different way, a question may be asked whether an international 
tribunal with jurisdiction over investment disputes (or over disputes under 
an investment treaty) can be said to have jurisdiction over the entirety of the 
legal dispute, including the determination that the measure at issue 
complied with IHL and that this is a defense against an investment claim.134 
On this point, De Brabandere suggests that, considering the specific 
and limited jurisdiction of investment tribunals, IHL-arguments will in effect 
be taken into consideration ‘only provided’ that the State can ‘effectively 
prove and demonstrate’ the relevance of these considerations in the event 
of an investment dispute.135 Based on the jurisprudence of international 
courts and tribunals it is suggested that IHL defenses assume relevance in 
investment disputes and should be taken into consideration by investment 
tribunals when the application of IHL affords a justification (for want of a 
better term) for conduct potentially inconsistent with the investment treaty 
commitments136 and when IHL norms curtail the scope of the investment 
standard.137  
 
134 This question was put by Calamita in relation to countermeasures that arise from a norm 
extrinsic to a treaty (Calamita (n 121) 276-78. See also: K Trapp, ‘WTO Inconsistent 
Countermeasures—A View from the Outside’ (2010) ASIL Proceedings 264-70. 
135 E De Brabandere, Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law (CUP 2014) 
135. 
136 Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal 
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v UK), 
Preliminary Observations (Preliminary Objections) [1998] ICJ Rep 9, para 25 and ICJ 
Judgment of 27 February 1998, Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and 
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v USA), (Preliminary Objections) [1998] ICJ Rep 115, para 24. 
There, the UK and the US argued in their defense to Libya’s claim that, their request to 
extradite two Libyan nationals and their refusal to cooperate with Libya in criminal 
proceedings, was not in breach of the Montreal Convention since these measures were 
adopted as a reaction to Libya’s involvement in terrorism, and as such governed by 
international customary law. Similarly, in the Hostages case the US asked the Court to 
assess whether the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 and the 1955 FCN Treaty had 
been breached by Iran as a result of the seizure and holding of US diplomatic and consular 
staff in Tehran by Iranian nationals. Defensively, Iran maintained that the allegedly unlawful 
conduct should be assessed in the broader context of previous unlawful American 
interference in the domestic affairs of Iran. While the ICJ ultimately rejected the Iranian 
argument, it was not for want of jurisdiction (Case Concerning United States Diplomatic 
and Consular Staff in Tehran (USA v Iran) (Merits) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, paras 80-86). 





It is only when the conduct is governed by several international 
norms, including IHL, and this conduct falls within the scope of one or more 
of the treaty standards, that an investment tribunal can examine the 
relationship between IHL norms and investment obligations, in order to 
settle an investment dispute.138 Such IHL-based defenses directly concern 
the State’s treatment of the investment; they do not ‘expand’ the jurisdiction 
of the tribunal, but rather fall within its scope. Indeed, investment tribunals 
have exhibited some readiness to consider the concomitant international 
obligations of the host State when assessing its compliance with investment 
treaty commitments to foreign investors.139 
At the same time, opening the door for IHL-based arguments risks 
transforming the investment tribunal ‘into an unqualified and 
comprehensive’ generalized forum140 or turning the investment claim into a 
matter that is merely ancillary to the adjudication of the host State’s conduct 
of hostilities, thereby circumventing and undermining the parties’ consent. 
In 1986, Judge Jennings addressed this conundrum:141 
 
138 Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, Mauritius v United Kingdom, Final Award, 
PCA, 18 March 2015, Chapter 5; Philippines v China, Award on Jurisdiction and 
admissibility, 29 October 2015, para 393; P-M Dupuy, ‘Unification Rather than 
Fragmentation of International Law? The Case of International Investment Law and Human 
Rights Law’ in (n 58) 59; Reiner and Schreuer (n 100) 84; De Brabandere – Investment 
Treaty Arbitration (n 135) 135. 
139 For instance, the SPP v Egypt Tribunal entertained the argument that Egypt’s parallel 
obligations to preserve cultural property required it to interfere with the investment project, 
but found that, on its merits, ‘the UNESCO Convention by itself does not justify the 
measures taken by the Respondent to cancel the project, nor does it exclude the 
Claimants’ right to compensation.’ (SPP v Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/84/3, Award, 20 
May 1992, para 154). See also Suez/Vivendi v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/19, 
Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010, para 262 (the Tribunal eluded that it would have been 
willing to hear an argument whereby human rights obligations contradict the dually 
applicable investment norm, thus shielding the State against the treaty claim. However, the 
Tribunal did ‘not find a basis for such a conclusion either in the BITs or international law’). 
See further in: L Peterson and K Gray, ‘International Human Rights in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ IISD (April 2003) <https://www.escr-
net.org/docs/i/404561> (accessed 1 July 2016) 28-9. 
140 Ireland v United Kingdom (‘OSPAR Arbitration’), PCA, Final Award, 2 July 2003, ILM 42 
(2003), para 85. 
141 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, Nicaragua v US (Merits) 





Suppose hostilities, or even war, should arise between parties to an FCN 
treaty, then the Court under a jurisdiction clause surely does not have 
jurisdiction to pass upon the general question of the lawfulness or 
otherwise of the outbreak of hostilities or of war…; though of course it might 
have jurisdiction for instance to decide whether there was a “war” or 
hostilities, for the purposes of interpreting and applying a war clause which 
was a term of the treaty. If it were otherwise, there would be no apparent 
limit to the kinds of dispute which might in certain circumstances be claimed 
to come under such a jurisdiction clause.142 
If so, barring treaty language to the contrary, the above review allows 
us not only to ascertain the jurisdictional limits to IHL-litigation in investment 
arbitration, but also to distinguish the possible uses of IHL by an investment 
tribunal. First, as Jennings suggested in the above-cited passage, IHL may 
serve as a potentially relevant factual consideration in the application of 
another source of law. For instance, when a tribunal is required to ascertain 
whether an ‘armed conflict’ exists for the purpose of the interpretation and 
application of a security exception that reserve the State’s right to take 
emergency measures in armed conflict or a war clause that prescribes 
certain treatment for situations of ‘armed conflict’.143  
Second, IHL may be used as an applicable source of law (direct 
application)144 when, say, relying on a broad definition of ‘conflict’, the State 
submits, in defense against an investment claim, that an IHL norm 
(including a permission) that was complied with, excludes the application of 
the breached investment standard.145 Third, an investment tribunal may 
treat IHL as a ‘secondary’ source of law that influences the interpretation of 
 
142 ibid, Dissenting Opinion of Sir Robert Jennings 528, 539; emphasis added.  
143 These issues are addressed in chapters 6 and 7 respectively. As noted above, in terms 
of ‘norm interaction’, this use of IHL as applicable law facilitates the compatibility between 
investment law and IHL norms through interpretive means (conflict ‘avoidance’). 
144 See: T Begic, Applicable Law in International Investment Disputes (Eleven 2005) 155-
165. 





the primary applicable law.146 For instance,147 a tribunal required to 
ascertain what is ‘adequate and prompt’ compensation for appropriation or 
seizure of property, may take into account the IHL-meaning of these 
concepts.148  
The Award in the mentioned Von Pezold v Zimbabwe case is 
illustrative of these potential uses of IHL. There, the Tribunal rejected a 
defense that relied on the direct application of human rights, refusing to 
apply the doctrine of the margin of appreciation (primary source of law). 
However, the Tribunal acknowledges that it ‘takes some heed’ from the 
jurisprudence of human rights bodies in the assessment of moral damages 
(secondary source).149 Thus, even if an investment tribunal does not ‘import’ 
IH L norms to the investment dispute, it may nonetheless be guided by such 
non-investment considerations.150 
In sum, a tribunal established to adjudicate ‘investment disputes’ or 
disputes concerning the ‘interpretation and application of the treaty’ (and 
like formulations) is endowed with the power to assess the effect produced 
by IHL on the applicability and application of the treaty provisions to the 
conduct at bar.151 Whether tribunals should, even if they can, consider IHL-
based defenses is a question of a different order, which is assessed against 
a separate set of considerations, such as the composition and expertise of 
the tribunal, the availability of other domestic and international IHL fora, and 
 
146 H Kjos, Applicable Law in Investor–State Arbitration (OUP 2013) 187-89. See also EDF 
v Argentina, where Argentina referenced several human rights instruments as part of its 
submission that ‘obligations under investment treaties do not undermine obligations under 
human rights treaties, and thus, the Treaty should be construed and interpreted 
consistently with international canons aimed at fostering respect for human rights’ (ICSID 
Case No ARB/03/23, Award, 11 June 2012, para 192).  
147 Other interpretive techniques to avoid a potential incompatibility between investment 
law and IHL norms were addressed in the previous section and are further elaborated in 
the next chapters below.  
148 This example is addressed in chapter 7. 
149 Von Pezold v Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No ARB/10/15, Award, 28 July 2015, paras 460-
68, 910, and footnote 95.  
150 Steininger (n 99) 46. 
151 Dupuy (n 138) 57. See also ILC, Final Report of the ILC Study Group on the Issue of 
Fragmentation of International Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, para 169 (concluding similarly 





broader legitimacy debates over investment arbitration. While significant, 
this question is not addressed in this thesis. 
7. Structure 
This research of the protection of foreign investments in armed conflicts 
proceeds as follows. 
Since foreign investments are mostly regulated through treaties, the 
first issue that this thesis takes on is the effect of armed conflicts on the 
operation of investment instruments. Accordingly, chapter 2 asks: Do 
investment treaties remain applicable in times of armed conflict or does the 
outbreak of hostilities ipso facto abrogate investment treaties?  
Ideally, the treaty will contain express provisions on its operation in 
hostilities. But this is not always the case. As further explained below, even 
when a treaty contains provisions on the treatment of investments in ‘war’, 
it is not entirely clear whether this provision also encompasses modern 
forms of hostilities that do not involve two or more States. Moreover, some 
States deliberately exclude from their recent investment instruments the 
obligation to guarantee the physical protection and security of investments, 
including in hostilities.  
In the absence of treaty stipulations to govern the issue, it is 
necessary to ascertain the general rules of international law to govern the 
matter by default. Such rules have been arguably articulated by the ILC in 
a set of draft articles that propose that the outbreak of hostilities does not 
automatically abrogate treaties. However, as chapter 2 explains, this 
instrument is not a treaty and therefore its legal relevance emanates not 
from an instrumental pedigree but from reflecting custom, a proposition with 
which many States expressly disagree. 
Since the question of hostilities’ effect on investment treaties is not 
always resolved within the four-corners of the treaty nor by the work product 
of the ILC, it is useful to first identify and elucidate the legal position 
governing the effect of war on treaties and its rationales through conducting 





analysis allows the thesis to better assess the status of the work of the ILC 
and the general rules of international law that govern the matter absent 
treaty stipulations to the contrary.  
Overall, it is argued in chapter 2 that under the current governing 
position, armed conflicts do not ipso facto terminate (or suspend) 
investment treaties, and unless terminated (or suspended) by the parties, 
they remain operational during armed conflicts. Consequently, absent a 
stipulation to the contrary, covered investments continue to benefit from 
substantive investment treaty standards of protection. The next step, then, 
is to consider what treatment, if any, these treaties prescribe in armed 
conflict, and how do any such standards of treatment interact with other 
norms of international law that apply in armed conflict. This is the focus of 
chapters 3 through 7. 
Accordingly, chapter 3 deals with the qualifications to the State’s 
ability to adopt measures that result in interference with an investor’s ability 
to manage, use, or control, in a meaningful way, investments in the form of 
tangible objects and premises during armed conflict. In other words, the 
discussion deals with appropriation (including destruction) of foreign 
investments in times of armed conflict. Aware that the analysis of 
appropriation of investments is usually associated with (and often limited to) 
expropriation,152 and in order to provide the reader with a broader and more 
nuanced normative context to the treatment of investments in hostilities, 
chapter 3 starts from a higher degree of abstraction and gradually zeroes in 
on particular investment treaty provisions.  
First, starting from a bird’s-eye view, chapter 3 briefly introduces the 
main differences between the legal paradigms that principally regulate State 
measures that interfere with foreign investments in armed conflicts – the 
conduct of hostilities paradigm, which derives from IHL, and the law 
enforcement paradigm that is mainly based on international human rights 
 
152 On the expropriation-oriented mindset of investment jurisprudence see further in 





law (and is not the focus of this study). This introductory discussion 
establishes an important proposition that underscores the different 
discussions in this thesis: When assessing whether a particular State 
measure that adversely affects investments during hostilities complies  with 
international law, ‘it is also necessary to address the role of the jus in bello, 
which gives belligerents substantial latitude to… act in ways contrary to 
international law in time of peace’.153 For instance, an international tribunal 
observed that, ‘the deliberate destruction of aliens’ property in combat 
operations may be perfectly legal, while similar conduct in peacetime would 
result in State responsibility’.154  
Turning then to the paradigm of hostilities, which is the focus of this 
thesis: Chapter 3 demonstrates that, by contrast to expropriation, which is 
predicated on the balance between the State’s regulatory freedom and the 
protection of property rights (and is therefore qualified namely by public 
purpose, due process, nondiscrimination, and compensation),  the authority 
of the State to interfere with private property under the hostilities paradigm, 
is circumscribed by the delicate equipoise of military necessity and 
humanity. As a result, international law recognizes an array of lawful 
interferences with private property during hostilities that are distinct from 
expropriation and are qualified by different conditions.  
Honing in further on the dispossession and destruction of foreign 
investments in armed conflicts, chapter 3 demonstrates that during the first 
half of the 20th century, war law rules on the treatment of private property, 
namely as codified in The Law of The Hague, infiltrated the international law 
on the protection of aliens and shaped the rules on State responsibility for 
damage to foreign property in wartime, resulting in a consensus that 
appropriation of private foreign property is lawful only when justified by 
military considerations and against compensation, while destruction of 
 
153 Civilians Claims-Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23, and 27-32, Eritrea v Ethiopia, Partial award, 






property is prohibited, other than in instances of ‘imperative military 
necessity’. 
At the next step, the analysis focuses on a common mechanism in 
modern investment treaties – the extended war clause (EWC). Such 
clauses, deal with ‘requisition of property by the armed forces’ and with the 
‘destruction of property that is not required by the necessity of war’ (and 
similar language). This analysis of the EWC also deals with the interaction 
of the EWC with the expropriation provision, which regulates dispossession 
of property irrespective of the existence of hostilities. It is suggested that 
under the VCLT, the ordinary meaning of the cited language of the EWC 
makes a reference to customary law on the treatment of alien property in 
wartime. Accordingly, to ascertain the meaning of the EWC, it is necessary 
to look to the content of customary law, which is circumscribed by war law.  
In this sense, the discussion in chapter 3 comes full circle: It 
demonstrates not only that the distinction between the hostilities and law 
enforcement paradigms is crucial for the treatment of foreign investments 
in armed conflict generally, but that this notion is already reflected in (many) 
investment treaties, which contain provisions on appropriation in the context 
of armed conflict (the EWC) and separate rules on takings that do not 
necessarily relate to hostilities (expropriation provisions).  
Of course, as chapter 3 explains, the fact that the language of the 
EWC makes a reference to war law, by way of using technical terms of art 
with a recognized meaning under The Hague Law, does not mean that 
modern investment instruments are to be interpreted in accordance with 
war law as it stood in the early 20th century. Rather, it is suggested that such 
an interpretation accommodates developments in international law. Indeed, 
IHL has developed considerably since the Hague Law rules on the 
treatment of private property and their infiltration into the customary 
standard of treatment. The intercommunication between IHL and 
investment law, more generally, has too developed since the mid-20th 





Chapter 4 picks up on the proposition from the paragraph above 
whereby the interpretation of the EWC accommodates flexibility and 
development in international law and focuses on one such significant 
development – the contemporary law and policy on targeting (i.e., the 
deliberate process that a military commander follows in deciding against 
which objects she will apply force). The laws on targeting are not found in 
the Hague Law, the subject matter of chapter 3, but in the later instruments 
of the Geneva Law. Hence, from the perspective of war law, chapter 4 
chronologically follows the analysis of the treatment of private property 
under chapter 3.  
Chapter 4 complements the discussion in chapter 3 in another 
significant way. Chapter 4 establishes that, while The Hague Law (as 
addressed in chapter 3) circumscribes  the destruction of property by 
‘imperative military necessity’, modern IHL rules on targeting (the Geneva 
Law) spell-out that ‘military necessity’, with respect to attacks on targets, 
means that only property that makes an effective contribution to military 
action may be destroyed, and only if such destruction in the circumstances 
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. Thus, to examine 
whether a destruction of property (including foreign investments) ‘was 
required by the necessity of the situation’ under the EWC, in some 
circumstances it is necessary to assess whether this property (including 
foreign investment) is a ‘military objective’ susceptible to targeting.  
Turning then to assess when an object (including a foreign 
investment) is a ‘military objective’ susceptible of targeting, chapter 4 
demonstrates that the ambiguity over the concept ‘military objective’ has 
resulted in the formation of several controversial classes of targets, namely 
– dual-use and revenue-generating targets (discussed further below). The 
formation of these classes of targets and the policies and practice that 
conflict-ridden States adopt with respect to such targets have implications 





The chapter demonstrates that in today’s reality of trade and 
investment liberalization, foreign investments are often made in economic 
sectors that are prone to dual-use classification (eg: industrial plants, ports, 
or factories) since in warfare the military also uses this civilian infrastructure. 
It is also suggested that the revenue-generating target doctrine, whereby 
any economic infrastructure that generate revenues for the enemy’s armed 
forces may be lawfully targeted, is potentially incompatible with the law and 
policy on the promotion and protection of investments in hostilities. 
The broader point that chapter 4 makes concerns the potential 
incompatibility between the law and policy of IHL and foreign investment, 
which stems from the basic notion that, under IHL, what is sauce for the 
goose is sauce for the gander. Since there are no separate sets of IHL rules 
for home and host States, and there are no special targeting rules for foreign 
investments, when a State adopts expansive approaches to target 
classification as a party to a conflict (eg recognizing that any economic 
asset that generates revenues for a belligerent is a lawful target), it risks 
‘inviting’ the targeting of its foreign investments by way of reciprocation.  
Another difficulty with expansive targeting policies is that they deem 
investments in certain economic sectors in conflict-ridden States (eg: 
petroleum, mining, or hydro) particularly susceptible to attacks, thereby 
undermining national and international agendas to promote investments, in 
particular in such sectors, in conflict-ridden States so as to assist in post-
conflict reconstruction. Accordingly, this chapter cautiously suggests that 
investment law and policy may be used to induce States to observe certain 
limits when engaging in armed violence, and thus investments serve as an 
informal restraining qualification on the conduct of hostilities. 
Under IHL, whenever an object (including a foreign investment) is 
not classified as a ‘military objective’, or whenever there is doubt as to its 
classification, it shall be treated as a ‘civilian object’, which must be 
protected from the effects of hostilities. Thus, having outlined in chapter 3 





having circumscribed the limited instances when investments may be 
targeted in chapter 4, chapter 5 deals with the obligation to protect 
investments (civilian objects) by way of taking precautionary measures 
when planning or launching an attack and when defending against an 
attack.  
Accordingly, chapter 5 first focuses on the customary standard of 
treatment which requires States to ‘take reasonable care’ to protect aliens 
and their property. Consistent with the methodology of the previous 
chapters, chapter 5 conducts a historical analysis of relevant authorities and 
suggests that, by the 20th century, the language, practice, and jurisprudence 
relating to provision in FCN treaties on the protection and security of aliens 
recognized a customary standard that required host States to exercise due 
diligence in order to protect foreign persons and property from damage 
caused by the State’s own actions and from damage caused by third 
parties. Although this norm first coalesced as a uniform standard, it 
developed into a relative ‘due diligence’ obligation that accounts for the 
available resources of the State in assessing its compliance.  
The discussion then moves to examine the meaning and content of 
a ubiquitous investment treaty standard – full protection and security (FPS) 
– focusing on the origins, development, and meaning of FPS and on the 
assessment of compliance with the FPS standard. Consistent with the 
methodology of chapter 3, which dealt with the EWC, chapter 5 deals with 
the interpretation of the language ‘full protection and security’ (and similar 
wording) under VCLT Article 31. It is suggested that the ordinary meaning 
of this language refers to the customary obligation to take ‘reasonable’ care. 
Consequently, the meaning of the obligation to provide ‘full protection and 
security’ is established by the examination of the content of this relative 
customary standard. In practical terms this means that assessment of 
compliance with the FPS rule turns, to a degree, on the resources and 





Then, chapter 5 deals with the obligation to take precautionary 
measures in favor of civilian objects (including foreign investments) under 
IHL. It is argued that IHL prescribes a due diligence obligation that requires 
States, whether they initiate an attack or are attacked by their adversary, to 
do what is practical and practicable in the prevailing circumstances in order 
to protect foreign investments under their control from the effects of 
hostilities. The implication of conditioning the obligation to take precautions 
by what is practicable in the prevailing circumstances, as chapter 5 
explains, is that the international responsibility for the obligation to take 
precautionary measures is, inter alia, circumscribed by the resources and 
the financial and technical capacity of the war-torn host State.  
Next, chapter 5 assesses the interaction between the obligations to 
take precautionary measures under investment law and IHL against the 
backdrop of a particular set of circumstances. Although chapter 5 proposes 
that the FPS standard and the obligation to take precautions under IHL are 
both relative standards that should, in principle, lead to similar outcomes in 
the application against the same set of facts, the debates in investment law 
jurisprudence over the interpretation and application of FPS require that the 
analysis also looks to a situation where the application of both norms leads 
to different results.  
For instance, a potential conflict of norms (as broadly defined above) 
arises where a State takes certain precautions to protect an investment from 
an attack, and these measures comply with IHL, in that IHL does not require 
the State to do more or go beyond the measures it has  adopted (or: permits 
the State not to take other measures), but these measures simultaneously 
breach FPS, which holds the State to a higher standard, requiring it to adopt 
additional or other measures to protect the same investment in the same 
circumstances. Building on the broad definition of ‘conflict’ discussed 
above, chapter 5 examines whether such a conflict between the two norms 
may be avoided through harmonious interpretation of FPS and the IHL 





Nonetheless, it is argued that the conflict can be resolved, namely by 
applying the lex specialis principle to ascertain which norm deals with the 
factual-matrix more closely and in more detail or goes further in the way that 
it deals with the situation. Overall, this exercise leads chapter 5 to suggest 
that under international law, States have an obligation to do what is practical 
and practicable in the prevailing circumstances, including the resources of 
the State, so as to protect foreign investments under their control from the 
effects of hostilities, whether they author an attack or are attacked by their 
adversary. It is also suggested that this is a desirable outcome that gives 
due respect to the limited capacity of States, in particular war-torn host 
States.   
 Having outlined the normative framework that regulates the 
protection of investments in armed conflict, the thesis continues to deal with 
the treatment of investments by looking to the effect of the reality of 
hostilities on investment claims. Essentially, Chapter 6 asks: Can States 
successfully invoke security exceptions, carve-outs, and customary 
excuses and justifications155 as defenses against investment claims that 
arise from or in relation to hostilities?  
First, the chapter examines whether IHL-consideration (i.e., the 
occurrence of hostilities, military aims, humanitarian objectives, and related 
circumstances) can be introduced in investment arbitration using treaty 
exceptions, assuming such exist, which reserve the State’s right to take ‘any 
measure which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests’. This analysis focuses on the origins, scope, and meaning 
of security exceptions and their application in the context of armed conflict. 
 
155 This thesis does not deal with the classification of defenses into justifications and 
excuses. Briefly put, justifications are defenses that go to the characteristics of the act at 
issue. While justifications render conducts lawful, or at least permissible, excuses are 
defenses that go relate to the characteristics of wrongdoing actor. Excuses exclude the 
negative consequences (for that wrongdoer) that arise out of an unlawful conduct. See: M 
Berman, ‘Justification or Excuse: Law and Morality’ (2003) 53(1) Duke Law Journal 1-77; 
V Lowe, ‘Precluding Wrongfulness or Responsibility’ (1999) 10 EJIL 405-411 and F 
Paddeu, Justification and Excuse in International Law: Concept and Theory of General 





It is suggested that, under a VCLT-consistent interpretation, subject to 
drafting to the contrary, whenever the security exception references ‘war’ or 
‘armed conflict’, it also encompasses modern forms of hostilities, such as 
NIACs. It is also proposed that the intensity of the conflict is not dispositive 
for the invocation of the security exception.  
That said, the suggested broad scope of the security exception, 
coupled with the proposition that not every measure that a host State adopts 
vis-à-vis foreign investments during hostilities relates to national security 
concerns (or to the conflict), raises concerns over the abusive invocation of 
the security exception. A particular concern is the extent to which the State’s 
invocation of the exception is conclusive upon any tribunal and renders any 
cause-of-action with respect to which the exception was invoked 
unjustifiable.   
On this point, chapter 6 resorts to a historical analysis of security 
exceptions and contextualizes the inferences from this analysis within a 
VCLT-consistent assessment of modern security exceptions in investment 
treaties. It is suggested that, in the context of armed conflict, security 
exceptions leave States ample room for appraisal with respect to 
emergency measures, however unless explicitly stated otherwise, this 
discretion is subject to limited judicial review. 
Next, the analysis examines whether a host State can use the 
outbreak of conflict, the conditions and reality of hostilities, or military aims 
to defend against an investment claim that arises out of, or in relation to, 
hostilities, by invoking the pleas of necessity, distress, self-defense, or force 
majeure. This analysis demonstrates that the outbreak of armed conflict 
limits rather than expands the host State’s arsenal of available defenses. 
Finally, the discussion deals with the denial of benefits clause, which 
allows the State to carve-out from the definition of ‘investor’ certain 
companies due to security concerns. The analysis demonstrates that, while 
the denial of benefits clause may principally be invoked to safeguard 





relating to modern hostilities, since the invocation of the clause is 
conditioned by the severance of diplomatic relations between the relevant 
States. In practice, however, situations of hostilities are more abundant 
than, and are not necessarily accompanied by, the official absence of 
diplomatic relations or an economic embargo. 
Overall, it is argued that in the context of armed conflict States have 
discretion to adopt emergency measures that impinge upon investment 
obligations, and this discretion is reflected in various treaty and customary 
defenses. At the same time, the reality of hostilities operates in practice as 
a double-edged sword that imposes limitations on the State’s ability to be 
exempt or excused from certain investment obligations, such as FPS and 
the war clauses. Because armed conflicts, by their very nature and essence, 
entail extreme and dynamic conditions, over time States have developed 
primary rules that are tailored for this reality. Such international norms 
include not only IHL norms but also other investment treaty mechanisms, 
such as security exceptions, war clauses, and precautionary obligations 
(including FPS). Each of these rules reflects an account (or a balance) of 
the State’s military and security priorities in hostilities and other, potentially 
conflicting, humanitarian considerations.  
The creation of such primary norms to deal with extreme conditions 
and threats to national security, in turn, resulted in a limitation on the 
application of secondary defenses, whereby States cannot use the extreme 
conditions of hostilities to excuse, justify, or circumvent the special primary 
norms that were created specifically for the regulation of the extreme 
conditions of hostilities. The relative length of each section in this chapter 6 
is designated to reflect this state of play and to correlate to what seems to 
be the relative weight and primacy of these defenses in modern practice. 
Accordingly, the discussion of security exceptions takes up more room than 
the analysis of customary defenses, while the discussion of denial of 





Chapter 7 deals with the consequences of the State’s failure to 
provide investments with the treatment required by international law during 
armed conflicts. The point of departure for this analysis is that acts and 
omissions of a State in denying an investment the treatment guaranteed 
under the applicable investment treaty are internationally wrongful acts.  
The previous chapters laid out the pertinent customary and treaty 
bases of liability capable of giving rise to a cause-of-action in relation to 
armed conflict in investment arbitration. These mostly comprise unlawful 
appropriation of property, including what may proport to be an unlawful 
expropriation but is in fact a different form of property dispossession (as 
explained in chapter 3), unlawful destruction of property (subject to the 
analysis of chapters 3 and 4), and the failure to take precautions in and 
against attacks (i.e., a violation of FPS standard and/or the IHL obligation 
to take precautions as per the discussion in chapter 5). These standards, 
like most investment standards, are silent with respect to the consequences 
of their violation. Accordingly, chapter 7 assesses whether the reality of 
armed conflict affects the obligation to make reparations in an adequate 
form for losses owing to the destruction or appropriation of investments and 
if so, how. 
First, the chapter looks at the compensation that IHL prescribes for 
the above identified bases of liability. It is argued that States are under an 
obligation, vis-à-vis States and individuals (including foreign investors) to 
make reparation in the form of ‘adequate’ compensation for violations of IHL 
norms, including for unlawful appropriation and destruction of private 
property (foreign investments inclusive) or for the failure to take precautions 
in favour of civilian objects (including foreign investments). It is proposed 
that the notion of ‘adequate’ compensation is determined according the 
circumstances of each case, accounting also for the gravity of the violation 
and the resources of the violating State. This analysis also discusses the 
prevalent practice on ex gratia compensations, which are awarded for 





Having outlined the IHL rules on compensation for losses to 
investments owing to armed conflict, the chapter proceeds to elucidate the 
rules on compensation for losses owing to hostilities under investment 
treaties. Here, the discussion focuses on a common treaty mechanism – 
the plain war clause (PWC), which instructs that, ‘investors whose 
investments suffer losses owing to war shall be accorded compensation that 
are no less favorable than that which the host State accords to its own 
investors and/or to investors of third parties in like situations’ (and like 
formulations). 
As regards the debates over the meaning of this language and the 
function of the clause, it is argued that the PWC duplicates a portion of the 
nondiscrimination obligation with respect to compensation. Consistent with 
the methodology in other chapters, this discussion is assisted by a historical 
analysis of the development of the PWC, which demonstrates that the PWC 
serves, and was introduced to early trade instruments with the intention to 
serve, an important function: In a reality where war reparations are not 
limited to violations of international law and legal obligations, the PWC 
effectively guarantees that the host State will be obliged to compensate the 
foreign investor whenever it pays war compensation for whatever legal or 
moral reason. In this respect, the IHL-informed historical backdrop assists 
to resolve an interpretive debate over the meaning and scope of an 
investment treaty standard and to ‘avoid’ a potential conflict with IHL by way 
of reading the contemporary function of the modern investment treaty 
mechanism in light of the prevailing practice on ex gratia reparations in 
modern warfare.  
Next, Chapter 7 picks up the discussion of the EWC where chapter 
3 left off. Chapter 3 suggested that the EWC prescribes primary rules on 
the treatment of foreign property in armed conflict. Namely, the EWC 
includes a pronouncement of the State’s right to appropriate private 
property in armed conflict subject to certain qualifications and it codifies the 





required by ‘the necessity of war’. Additionally, EWC instruct that any such 
appropriation and destruction of property denote ‘adequate compensation’. 
As the former two elements of the EWC were addressed in chapter 3, 
chapter 7 focuses on the meaning and scope of the requirement to accord 
‘adequate compensation’. 
Given that most investment instruments include an obligation to pay 
‘adequate compensation’ against expropriation, an important interpretive 
question that arises here is whether the expression ‘adequate 
compensation’ in the EWC is effectively a cross-reference to the 
expropriation provision and thus entails the Fair Market Value standard 
(FMV) of the destroyed or appropriated property at the relevant time? Or, is 
‘adequate’ also informed by IHL-considerations, and if so, what would be 
the practical effect of that? Here, a VCLT-consistent analysis on the 
language of EWCs and expropriation provisions demonstrates that a 
sweeping conclusion that the adjective ‘adequate’ in the EWC necessarily 
means FMV in all instances cannot be reached.  
Then, the analysis examines whether, and to what extent, the 
proposed IHL meaning of ‘adequate’ compensation can be taken into 
account in the interpretation of the EWC. Here, as with previous chapters, 
the analysis attempts to harmonize IHL and investment law through 
interpretive means and thus, to avoid a potential conflict between the EWC 
and the IHL rules on compensation for destruction or dispossession of 
property. It is suggested that by taking the IHL standard into account in 
assessing what is ‘adequate’ compensation under the EWC the interpreter 
must look beyond the FMV of the investment at the time of the injuring 
measure, and assess the ‘adequacy’ of the compensation in proportion to 
the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case, including 
the State’s resources, abilities, and concomitant international obligations.  
At the fourth step, chapter 7 suggests that the occurrence of an 
armed conflict, rather than the laws regulating hostilities (IHL), is also a 





Namely, it is suggested that the existence of hostilities should be 
contextualized in the determination of the heads of damage, the 
assessment of causation and the valuation, and it can be used to cap the 
award in order to prevent crippling results. Overall, this chapter suggests 
that investment tribunals should consider IHL standards of compensation 
and the occurrence of hostilities in their assessment of compensation for 
losses to foreign investments in the context of hostilities. 
Finally, while this thesis, as mentioned, does not presume to offer an 
exhaustive research of the conflict of norms in international law, nor is it a 
study about the interaction of legal regimes, as such, chapter 8 adopts an 
inductive perspective that suggests some broader inferences regarding the 
different levels of interaction between investment law and IHL. Accordingly, 
the analysis outlines the ways in which IHL may be said to affect the 
interpretation and application of investment norms and the potential effect 
that investment law and policy may have on IHL.  
The concluding chapter also attempts to understand why, 
notwithstanding the fact that the historical analysis in the thesis 
demonstrates that in many ways IHL and investment law evolved in a 
complementary, and even symbiotic way, contemporary IHL practitioners 
and jurisprudence mostly disregard investment law (and vice-versa). It is 
suggested that, among many potential theories, the phenomenon may also 
be explained by the development of international law and its sub-fields and 
by the change in the education and the qualifications of international 
lawyers.  
It is suggested that the contemporary treatment (i.e., the teaching 
and practice) of IHL and investment law as technical, niche areas of the law, 
rather than as fields of public international law with potentially similar 
origins, may explain why, by contrast to doctrine and jurisprudence from the 
20th century and earlier, which identified the connection between war law 





lawyers today do not conceive of these fields of law as related and disregard 
the implications thereof.   
8. The Main Objectives of The Research and its Target Audience 
Finally, before proceeding to the substantive arguments, it is worth 
understanding who these arguments are for and what is it that they aim to 
achieve.  
 As noted, the main aim of this study is to clarify the international legal 
framework for the protection of foreign investments in times of armed 
conflict. To that end, the study deals not only with the meaning and content 
of the potentially relevant investment law norms and their application in the 
context of armed conflicts, as was done in recent literature on the issue, but 
also with the meaning and content of potentially relevant IHL norms and 
their application to investments. The thesis seeks to have a gap-filling 
impact in academic literature by looking at the potential effects that IHL may 
have on the interpretation and application of relevant investment norms and 
at the potential effects that investment law and policy may have on the 
conduct of hostilities.  
It is not the purpose of this study to cover the entire body of 
international law concerning normative conflicts and regime interaction, but 
rather to provide a contemporary and more detailed analysis of the law 
concerning investment protection in conflicts, and thereby to provide a 
broader analytical framework of the normative reality in which investments 
operate during hostilities. In this respect, the thesis provides an overall 
argument that the potential for conflict between investment law and IHL is 
a significant issue of growing relevance, as the two regimes (through their 
norms) may – and do in fact – regulate the same conduct and the same 
factual-matrix with different objectives in mind, but that general international 
law mostly (but not entirely) has the tools that allow to resolve any such 






Further, by clarifying particular issues concerning the interpretation 
and application of relevant investment standards of protection in hostilities 
(the existing law), the study assists to form a critical view of the law. Thus, 
the clarification of the meaning and content of the war clauses, the standard 
of diligence under the FPS obligation, or the scope of the security exception, 
informs our assessment of the adequacy of these standards and, in turn, 
may lead to potential reform. Put differently, the contribution of this doctrinal 
study is not only in the clarification of what the law is, but also in the 
assistance to determine what the law should be given the types of 
challenges that hostilities present for the protection of investments and in 
light of the national and international policies that States wish to promote.  
Correspondingly, the target audience of this research is broad. First, 
investment lawyers will find this work useful as it is concerned with an issue 
of increasing relevance that, thus far, has not been addressed in a manner 
that thoroughly accounts for the effect that IHL has on the interpretation and 
application of investment standards of protection. Additionally, investment 
lawyers may find in this thesis several workable tools and useful concepts 
that they can apply, should they wish to do so, to the assessment of 
investment protection outside the context of armed conflict.  
The analysis of the meaning and scope of the FPS standard (chapter 
5), for one, is as relevant to, say, the State’s obligation to remove squatters 
from the investor’s real-estate or to protect the property of the investor 
during protests. The examination of war clauses (chapters 3 and 7), in turn, 
offers an important clarification of the origins, scope, and function of these 
treaty mechanisms that is useful outside the context of armed conflict. 
Likewise, the discussion of scope and reviewability of security exceptions 
in investment treaties (chapter 6) is relevant for other national emergencies.  
Second, this study takes on (and suggests the resolution of) several 
debates over the modern practice of warfare. The inferences from these 
analyses are relevant for IHL lawyers and army practitioners irrespective of 





the contested interaction between the norms of the Law of The Hague on 
the destruction of private property and the Geneva Law rules on targeting 
(chapters 3 and 4). Additionally, the analysis focuses on contentious 
practices of targeting of dual-use objects and bombing of revenue-
generating targets (chapter 4), which have direct relevance to current 
military operations. Likewise, the discussion of the obligation to take 
precautionary measures in and against attack (chapter 5) is relevant for any 
analysis of contemporary urban warfare. Further, the treatment of the 
individual’s right to remedy for violations of IHL (chapter 7) adds the 
perspective of investment law to the existing IHL scholarship.  
Third, ‘generalist’ international lawyers will find the research 
interesting for its assessment of the development of the law on the effect of 
the war on the operation of treaties, since the analysis of chapter 2 applies, 
subject to necessary adjustments, to other categories of treaties. Finally, 
this thesis is relevant for social and political scientists who focus on the 
study of foreign investments and armed conflict as well as for those 
interested in the historical development of international law. Overall, this 
study seeks to contribute to the existing literature of international law and to 
bring more clarity to debated issues in the law and policy of foreign 
investment, while also exposing IHL lawyers to a record of relevant 
authorities, which they have traditionally overlooked in the research of the 











The first step in this study deals with the question of whether investment 
treaties apply in times of hostilities. This question, however, has no pithy 
answer.  
Ideally, the treaty will contain express provisions on its operation in 
hostilities. But this is not always the case. As explained in chapters 3 and 
7, while provisions on ‘losses owing to armed conflict’ are common, they 
are not as ubiquitous as rules on, say, expropriation or FPS provisions. 
Even when a treaty contains provisions on the treatment of investments in 
‘war’, it is not entirely clear whether such provision also encompasses 
modern forms of hostilities that do not involve two or more States.156 
Moreover, recently some States have begun to deliberately exclude from 
their investment instruments any and all obligation to guarantee protection 
and security of investments (FPS).157  
In the absence of treaty stipulations, it is necessary to ascertain the 
general rules of international law to govern the matter by default. Such rules 
have been arguably articulated by the ILC in the Articles on the Effect of 
Armed Conflict on Treaties (the ‘2011 ILC Articles’ or ‘ILC Articles’, 
depending on context),158 which propose that the outbreak of hostilities 
does not automatically abrogate treaties. However, it should be borne in 
mind that the ILC Articles are not a treaty and therefore their legal relevance 
 
156 This issue is addressed, namely, in chapter 6, section 2 (the scope of security 
exceptions) and in chapter 7, section 3 (the scope of the plain war clause).  
157 For instance, the Brazil – Guyana BIT (signed 13 December 2018, not in force) excludes 
FPS and Article 4(3) stresses that, ‘for greater certainty … “full protection and security” [is] 
not covered by this Agreement and shall not be used as, interpretative standards in 
investment dispute settlement procedures’. Such a stipulation also appears in the Brazil – 
UAE BIT (signed 15 March 2019, not in force).  
158 ILC, Draft Articles on the Effect of Armed Conflict on Treaties with Commentaries, 
Report of the International Law Commission, 63rd Session, UN Doc A/66/10, adopted by 





emanates not from an instrumental pedigree but from reflecting custom, a 
proposition that many States expressly reject. 
Since the question of hostilities’ effect on investment treaties is not 
always resolved within the four-corners of the treaty nor by the text of the 
ILC Articles, it is useful to consider the issue from a higher degree of 
abstraction and to address a broader long-standing controversy in public 
international law: Does war abrogate treaties? The difficulty with resolving 
this question is that the response to it has changed over many years. In 
1673, for instance, King Charles II informed the Scottish judges that the war 
with the Dutch ‘certainly’ voided the treaty of Breda.159 A century later, in 
1758, Vattel asserted that, as a rule, ‘the conventions, the treaties made 
with a nation, are broken or annulled by a war arising between the 
contracting parties’.160  
By the late 20th century it appeared that ‘the passage of time 
[brought] with it the realization that there are many exceptions to this 
statement’161 that war terminates treaties. In 1985, the Institut de Droit 
International (IDI) went even further and proposed that the outbreak of 
hostilities does not ipso facto terminate or suspend treaties ‘between the 
parties to the armed conflict’.162 But, in 2005 the Ethiopia – Eritrea Claims 
Commission (EECC) returned to the view that, ‘there is a broad consensus 
that bilateral treaties, especially those of… economic nature, are at the very 
least suspended by the outbreak of a war’.163 As further explained below, 
some commentators reference this view to demonstrate that the issue of 
hostilities effect on investment treaties is far from settled.  
To extract a cohesive legal position on the effect of war on the 
operation of treaties from the significant, yet inconsistent, record of State 
 
159 Cited in: Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (OUP 1986) 698. 
160 E de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, Book III (Philadelphia, 
1758) 371, section 17  
161 McNair (n 159) 699.  
162 Article 2, Institut De Droit International, The Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties 
(Helsinki Session, 1985). 
163 Economic Loss throughout Ethiopia–Ethiopia’s Claim 7 (Partial Award) (2005) 26 RIAA 





practice, jurisprudence, and doctrine, a nuanced examination is required. 
Specifically, any analysis of this issue should account for the diversification 
and development of the notion of ‘war’ into the legal concept of ‘armed 
conflict’ and the changes in the law and policy of treaties and treaty-making 
over the years. These issues are addressed in section 2. Then, section 3 
outlines the progressive development of international law on the effect of 
war on treaties. It is argued that the traditional view that war automatically 
abrogates all treaties gradually made way for certain exceptions, which 
resulted in the emergence of an opposite position whereby war does not 
ipso facto abrogate certain treaties.  
Having established in Section 3 that by the close of the 20th century 
it was accepted that the outbreak of hostilities does not automatically 
abrogate certain treaties due to their explicit provisions and subject-matter, 
section 4 turns to assess the content and status of the 2011 ILC Articles. It 
is suggested that while the 2011 ILC Articles, as a whole, are not a 
codification of customary law, certain Articles reflect custom.  
Finally, the inferences from these analyses are used to assess the 
fate of investment treaties. It is argued that under the current governing 
position, absent treaty stipulations to govern the matter, armed conflicts do 
not ipso facto terminate (or suspend) investment treaties, and unless 
terminated (or suspended) by the parties, they remain operational during 
armed conflicts. Consequently, covered investments continue to benefit 
from substantive investment treaty standards of protection. 
2. The Relevant Authorities and Their Assessment  
To properly distil the legal position on the effect of armed conflicts on the 
operation of investment treaties, it is necessary to identify the relevant 
sources of law and how those sources relate to one another in proper 
context.164  
 





As regards treaties, two instruments are potentially pertinent to the 
issue: The VCLT and the 2011 ILC Articles. Ostensibly, the VCLT contains 
a specific provision (Article 73) on ‘cases of…outbreak of hostilities’.165 
However, Article 73 merely provides that the VCLT ‘shall not prejudge’ any 
question that may arise in regard to a treaty from the outbreak of hostilities. 
The ILC deliberately ‘decided not to include… any provisions relating to the 
effect of the outbreak of hostilities upon treaties’ in the VCLT,166 because 
the participants at the conference leading to the drafting of the VCLT 
perceived the issue as too complex to be resolved in the framework of the 
law of treaties.167 Thus, although touching upon the issue and highlighting 
its controversial nature, the VCLT adds nothing substantive to the 
discussion.168 This is important context for assessing views, such as the 
Australian position (2017) whereby, the VCLT ‘should continue to be the 
primary source of law on [the] topic’ of the effect of armed conflicts on 
treaties.169  
The 2011 ILC Articles, in turn, are to be treated with care. The 2011 
ILC Articles are not a treaty and should not be treated as such. The legal 
relevance of the 2011 Articles emanates from reflecting custom, not from 
 
165 Article 73, VCLT. The provision was adopted with a 91:0:0 vote.  
166 See commentaries to draft article 69 (now 73) in: ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the law of treaties 
with commentaries’ UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1 (1966), 112, 267. The ILC 
‘concluded that it was justified in considering the case of an outbreak of hostilities between 
parties to a treaty to be wholly outside the scope of the general law of treaties to be codified 
in the present articles; and that no account should be taken of that case or any mention 
made of it in the draft articles’. 
167 ILC, ‘Fourth report of the Special Rapporteur, Ian Brownlie’, UN Doc A/CN.4/589, 14 
November 2007, paras 25-8.  
168 I Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn, Manchester 
University Press 1984) 165; M Villiger, Commentary on the Vienna Convention on the 1969 
Law of Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 899, 904. To a degree, that the VCLT is silent on 
the effect of hostilities on the operation of treaties is consistent with the fact that this 
instrument offers little guidance on treaty breaches and responses, categories of treaties, 
and other ‘general law’. On the limits of the VCLT and the reasons thereof, see: C Tams, 
‘Regulating Treaty Breaches’ in M Bowman and D Kritsiotis (eds) Conceptual and 
Contextual Perspectives on the Modern Law of Treaties (CUP 2018) 440, 442-46. 
169 See the declaration of Ms McDougall before UNGA Sixth Committee, Summary Record 
of the 17th meeting, A/C.6/72/SR.17, item 86 (‘State comments 2017’). State declarations 





an ‘instrumental pedigree’.170 At the same time, not every product by the 
ILC is necessarily an accurate expression of pre-existing customary law. 
This is only logical given that the ILC was established by the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) to ‘initiate studies and make recommendations for the 
purpose of... encouraging the progressive development of international law 
and its codification’.171 
Accordingly, the text of the 2011 ILC Articles is not the first – but the 
last – port of call in this analysis. First, the discussion ascertains the 
international law on the point using the traditional rules of the doctrine of 
sources and interpretation. To that end, the analysis examines State 
declarations before international tribunals, official correspondences and 
diplomatic acts, and legal pleadings. Then, the content and status of the 
2011 ILC Articles is assessed against these authorities and in consideration 
of the drafts that preceded the 2011 Articles and the comments that 
governments submitted to the ILC and the Sixth Committee of the UNGA 
regarding the 2011 Articles. 
Next, the conduct of States is critical to ascertain the formation and 
the existence of custom. State practice on war’s effect on treaties, however, 
is very much a function of two interlinked, yet independent, challenging 
aspects in which this legal issue arises:172 ‘armed conflict’ and ‘treaties’. 
First, it is challenging to determine the effect of hostilities on ‘treaties’ (as a 
whole) given the wide range of treaty categories. Indeed, judicial and 
scholarly jurisprudence mostly represent the view that the question of 
whether treaties survive the outbreak of hostilities is resolved according to 
 
170 A similar position was expressed with respect to a different work product of the ILC, see 
M Paparinskis, ‘Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in International Investment Law’ 
(2016) 31(2) ICSID Review 484, 487-88. 
171 Article 31(1)(a), UN Charter. See further: UN, ‘Documents of the United Nations 
Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945’ (UN Information 
Organization1945) Vol III, documents 1 and 2; Vol VIII, document 1151; and, Vol IX, 
documents 203, 416, 507, 536, 571, 792, 795 and 848. See also: D Caron, ‘The ILC Articles 
on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship between Form and Authority’ (2002) 
96 AJIL 857, 867-72. 
172 A Pronto, ‘The Effect of War in Law what happens to their treaties when states go to 





the type of treaty involved.173 Accordingly, the following analysis focuses on 
FCN treaties, which are considered to be the predecessors of modern 
investment instruments, making it plausible that the legal position on the 
effect of armed conflicts on investment instruments would not be 
disconnected from the legal position on FCNs.174 
It is also notable that war may have various effects on the operation 
of FCN and investment treaties. Potentially, the outbreak of hostilities may 
lead to the abrogation of treaties by way of withdrawal from, or termination 
or suspension of the treaty. In this respect, the study is concerned with the 
question of automatic termination of investment treaties. This examination 
is also relevant, mutatis mutandis, to the question whether hostilities lead 
to the automatic suspension of investment treaties.175   
Further, the concept of ‘armed conflicts’ itself raises a set of 
difficulties.176 Traditionally, States used to declare ‘war’. This proclamation 
assisted in ascertaining the official outbreak of hostilities as well as the 
exact time when war commenced.177 For sake of clarity, such declarations 
were often accompanied by statements as to the fate of the treaties 
between the belligerents, or treaties with third States.178 However, under 
modern warfare, not only do States no longer declare war as a matter of 
 
173 McNair (n 159) 703, noting that there is a ‘need of discriminating between different 
categories of treaties for the purpose of ascertaining the effect of the outbreak of war upon 
them’. 
174 On FCN treaties, see the discussion in chapter 1. On the effect of FCN standards on 
modern investment provisions, see the discussion in chapters 5 and 6.  
175 As addressed below, the 2011 ILC Articles, as most modern jurisprudence, do not 
prescribe a separate law for the assessment of suspension or termination of treaties as a 
result of hostilities.   
176 Villiger (n 168) 901-02. 
177 Eg: when the Turks declared a ‘holy war’ on multiple countries, they also addressed the 
fate of pre-war treaties (‘Proclamation of the “Holy War”, the Fetva, 15 November 1914’, 
reported in English: US Naval War College, International law documents: neutrality, 
breaking of diplomatic relations, war, with notes 1917 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1918), 220-21 (‘Turkey, having declared a holy war on Serbia and its allies, treaties, 
conventions, and agreements concluded between Turkey and Serbia cease to have effect, 
thus the treaty of March 1, 1914, terminates from the 1st of December’). 
178 See: ILC, ‘The effect of armed conflict on treaties: an examination of practice and 






practice, but they are principally prohibited from doing so, for a declaration 
of war is a potential breach of the jus cogens prohibition on the use of 
force.179 In fact, modern warfare is not concerned with ‘wars’ but with ‘armed 
conflicts’ of varying scopes, intensity, and kind. Armed conflicts, in particular 
the more pervasive kind of NIACs, are rarely accompanied by official 
proclamations, making it difficult to ascertain when the conflict commenced 
or ended.180  
As it is not always clear when an armed conflict began (or ended), it 
is also difficult to distinguish non-performance of a treaty obligation ‘from an 
actual legal effect’ of armed conflicts on the treaty itself.181  In practical terms 
this means that State practice on the effect of hostilities on treaties is 
manifested (and assessed) differently before and after the reforms of the 
mid-20th century (the adoption of the UN Charter (1945) and the Geneva 
Conventions (1949)). 
Subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law are of limited 
assistance in ascertaining the law. The application and interpretation of 
treaties in wartime was mostly addressed by national courts in hindsight, 
sometimes after the passage of decades and even centuries. As a result, 
judicial determinations on the effect of a certain war on a specific treaty were 
often informed by the consequences of the war and the notion of prevailing 
 
179 Articles 2(4) and 51, UN Charter, 1 UNTS XVI, 1945. For further discussion of the effect 
of the UN Charter on the issue see:  ILC Study (ibid) para 8 nn 39 and Pronto (n 172) 230, 
239. For the widespread opinion that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter constitutes a jus cogens 
norm, see among many: J Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd edn., 
OUP 2006) 146 and Y Dinstein, War, Aggression And Self-Defence 99-104 (4th edn, CUP 
2005). 
180 See: Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction) IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995) para 70. For the acceptance and development 
of this position in IHL, see the discussion in: C Greenwood, ‘International Humanitarian 
Law and the Tadic Case’ (1996) 7 EJIL, 265-83; S Vite´, ‘Typology of armed conflicts in 
international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual situations’ (2009) 91 IRRC, 69-
94; D Kritsiotis, ‘The Tremors of Tadić’ (2010) 43 Israel Law Review 262-300. 
181 ILC Study (n 178) para 4; S McIntyre, Legal Effects of World War II on Treaties of the 
United States (Springer 1958) 10 and Y Ronen ‘Treaties and Armed Conflicts’ Tams et al 






peace.182 When courts addressed the question of war’s effect on treaties in 
a timely fashion, they did so within the four-corners of the treaty subject-
matter of litigation, not in an attempt to develop or distil international law. As 
regards investment tribunals that were constituted to hear treaty claims that 
arise out of, or in connection to, hostilities, they have completely ignored the 
question.183  
Scholarship also leaves a lot to be desired. In fact, Sir Cecil Hurst 
remarked already in 1921 that, ‘there are few questions upon which people 
concerned with the practical application of the rules on international law find 
text-books less helpful than that of the effect of war upon treaties…’184 
Indeed. While multiple books185 and many doctrinal articles186 have been 
written on the topic during the first half of the 20th century, fewer academic 
pieces were dedicated to the issue during the second half of the century.187 
The scope of the discussion on the effect of war on treaties in Oppenheim’s 
International law over the years is illustrative of the doctrinal contribution to 
the determination of the law. While the first two editions of War and 
 
182 Eg: Italian courts did not rule on the effect of the WWII on extradition treaties until 1970 
(In re Barnaton Levy and Suster Brucker, Court of Appeal, Milan (30 October 1970), cited 
in ILC Study (n 178) 7. The UK declared, in a 200 years delay, that the 1790 Nootka Sound 
Convention had been terminated in 1795 due to the war between Spain and GB. (reported 
in: M Akehurst ‘United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1983’ (1983) 54(1) British 
Ybk Intl L 370). 
183 Eg: AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No ARB/87/3, Award, 27 June 1990, para 59. The 
Tribunal ascertained that, ‘there is no doubt that the destruction of the [investment] took 
place during the hostilities’ but paid no attention to the effect the civil war may have had on 
the operation of the BIT. This award is analyzed in detail in chapters 5 and 7. 
184 C Hurst, ‘The Effect of War on Treaties’ (1921) 2 British Ybk Intl L 37, 38. 
185 Eg: R Jacomet, La guerre et les traités: étude de droit international et d’histoire 
diplomatique (1909); H Tobin, The Termination of Multipartite Treaties (Columbia 
University Press 1933) and ILC Study (n 178) para 8. 
186 Eg: J Moore, ‘The Effect of War on Public Debts and on Treaties – The Case of the 
Spanish Indemnity’ (1901) 2(1) Columbia Law Review 209-223; Hurst (n 184); A McNair, 
‘Les effets de la guerre sur les traités’ (1937) 59 Recueil des cours de l’Académie de Droit 
International 527; A de La Pradelle, ‘The Effect of War on Private Law Treaties’ (1948) 2(4) 
International Law Quarterly 555-76; R Rank, ‘Modern War and the Validity of Treaties: A 
Comparative Study (Part I)’ (1953) 38(3) Cornell Law Quarterly 321-55; R Rank, ‘Modern 
War and the Validity of Treaties (Part II)’ (1953) 38(4) Cornell Law Quarterly 511-40. 
187 C Chinkin, ‘Crisis and the Performance of International Agreements: The Outbreak of 
War in Perspective’ (1980-81) 7 Yale Journal of World Public Order 177. For the sake of 
completeness, as mentioned, several studies were conducted during this period, including 





Neutrality188 briefly addressed the point of ‘cancellation of treaties by war’ 
in the framework of the section on the ‘Effects of the Outbreak of War’,189 
later versions added little to the discussion, mostly referring to earlier 
editions.190  
Scholarly contributions from the 21st century are scant and 
inconsistent. While IHL specialists mostly represented the view that armed 
conflicts plainly abrogate trade and investment treaties,191 commentators 
from the field of international economic law maintain that these instruments 
are not automatically terminated by war,192 and ‘generalists’ focused on the 
2011 ILC Articles, as such, but not on the law that these 2011 Articles 
purport to represent.193  
Against the backdrop of the foregoing observations, section 3 
proceeds to distil a cohesive legal position on the effect of hostilities on the 
operation of FCN treaties.  
3. A Progressive Development of Treaty Law: From Abrogation to 
Continuity  
This section argues that a progressive development of international law 
occurred during the 19th and 20th centuries, whereby the legal position on 
the effect of war on FCN treaties moved away from a presumption of 
discontinuity, but for a few instances, to a presumption of continuity, with 
 
188 L Oppenheim, International law: A Treatise, Vol II War and Neutrality (London: 
Longmans 1906), 106-8, at section 99; L Oppenheim, International law:  A Treatise, Vol II 
War and Neutrality (London: Longmans 1912), 128-30, at section 99. 
189 ibid.  
190 Eg: Sir R Roxburgh (ed) Oppenheim’s International law: A Treatise, Vol II: War and 
Neutrality (3rd edn, London: Longmans, 1921), 145-47, section 99 (repeating the content 
of the previous editions). The seventh edition elaborated more on the issue (H Lauterpacht, 
Oppenheim’s International law: A Treatise, Vol 2 (7th edn, London: Longmans 1952) 302-
6). But subsequent editions mostly added nothing (Sirs R Jennings and A Watts (eds), 
Oppenheim’s International law:  A Treatise, Vol 1 (9th edn, Harlow: Longman 1992) 1310) 
191 L Green, ‘The Law of War in Historical Perspective’ (1998) 72 International Law Studies 
39. However, see Milanović – Lost origins (n 60) 103 (treating the 2011 ILC Articles as a 
statement of the law). 
192 Eg: C Schreuer, ’The protection of investments in armed conflicts’ in (n 58) 3. 
193 Ronen – Treaties and Armed Conflicts (n 181) 543-44; F Paddeu, ‘Self-Defence as a 
Circumstance Precluding Wrongfulness: Understanding Article 21 of The Articles on State 





some exceptions. To that end, the analysis offers a chronological review of 
contemporaneous jurisprudence, doctrine, and State practice. 
As of the 19th century, the traditional view amongst jurists and 
diplomats was that, but for few narrow exceptions, treaties did not survive 
war. The British-American dispute over fishing rights in the Grand Bank 
under the 1783 Paris Treaty,194 where Great Britain (GB) also recognized 
the independence of the US, is illustrative of the prevailing and opposing 
positions. On behalf of the US, John Quincy Adams, then US Ambassador 
to the Court of St James’s, submitted that the American fishing rights under 
the Paris Treaty could not be terminated by the outbreak of war between 
the parties, since war cannot abrogate treaties recognizing the 
establishment and independence of a State.195 By contrast, Lord Bathurst, 
the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, replied that, ‘to the position 
of this novel nature GB cannot accede’.196 He argued that, Britain ‘knows 
no exception to the rule that, all treaties are put an end to by the subsequent 
war between the same parties.’197  
Notwithstanding Bathurst’s stance, the British and American 
positions were not unreconcilable. In 1817, for instance, the British High 
Court of Admiralty in The Louis case asserted that, ‘treaties…it must be 
remembered, are perishable things and their obligations are dissipated by 
the first hostility’.198 However, Lord Stowell also remarked that, ‘at the same 
time it may be hoped that so long as the treaties do exist, and their 
obligations are sincerely and reciprocally respected, the exercise of a right’ 
under a treaty would be respected.199  
 
194 Article 3, The Paris Peace Treaty of 30 September 1783. 
195 US Congress (ed) American State Papers: Documents, Legislation, and Executive Vol 
IV (US Congress, Washington, 1832) 352, letter from Adams to Buthrust dated 25 
September 1815.   
196 ibid, 354, letter from Lord Buthurst to Adams dated 30 October 1815. 
197 For sake of completeness, this dispute was resolved with the conclusion of a convention 
in 1818, which restated the fishing rights under dispute, but ‘neither side yielded its 
convictions [regarding the fate of treaties] to the reasoning of the other’ (see: ibid, 362-405; 
McIntyre (n 181) 44). 






The American judiciary was willing to go further than the British 
Court. For instance, in 1823 in the matter of Society for Propagation of the 
Gospel v Town of New Haven200 The Supreme Court of the US (SCOTUS) 
was asked to determine whether title that had been acquired over property 
under Article 9 of the 1794 Jay Treaty was extinguished by the 1812 Anglo-
American War. SCOTUS held that it is ‘not inclined to admit the doctrine… 
that treaties become extinguished, ipso facto, by war between the two 
governments.’201 On the contrary, the Court considered itself ‘satisfied, that 
[this] doctrine is not universally true.’202 On this point, the Court reasoned 
that a distinction should be drawn between ‘treaties of such a nature, as to 
their object and import, that war will put an end to them’,203 and ‘treaties… 
professing to aim at perpetuity, and to deal with the case of war as well as 
of peace’.204  
This position gained traction across the Atlantic.205 In 1830, 13 years 
after The Louis and 7 years after SCOTUS’s decision in Society for 
Propagation of the Gospel v Town of New Haven, Sir John Leach delivered 
the opinion of the Court in Sutton v Sutton,206 concerning the effect of war 
on the 1794 Jay Treaty. The Master of Rolls found that, ‘it is a reasonable 
construction that it was the intention of the Treaty that the operation of the 
Treaty should be permanent, and not depend upon the continuation of a 
state of peace…’ Therefore, ‘British Subjects, who now hold lands in the 
 
200 Society for Propagation of the Gospel v Town of New Haven, 21 U.S 464 (1823). 
201 ibid, 29. 
202 ibid 
203 ibid 
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205 For instance, in 1854, during the Crimean War, the British Government addressed the 
effect of the war on the applicability a pre-war loan treaty with Russia and maintained that 
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11 February 1864. 
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Territories of the [US] and American Citizens who now hold lands in the 
Dominions of His Majesty’ under the provisions of the 1794 Jay Treaty, 
‘shall continue to hold them’.207  
Scholarship followed suit. In his 1840 treatise Kent ascertained that, 
‘as a general rule the obligations of treaties are dissipated by hostility, and 
they are extinguished and gone forever unless revived by a subsequent 
treaty’.208 Nevertheless, he observed that as for treaties that ‘contemplate a 
permanent arrangement of national rights, or which by their terms are meant 
to provide for an intervening war, it would be against every principle of just 
interpretation to hold them extinguished by the event of war’.209 Notably, the 
US – Mexico Claims Commission cited Kent when it held that the 1831 US 
– Mexico FCN was not abrogated by war and therefore ‘the expulsion of 
[US] citizens from their places of residence and business in Mexico, during 
the existence of the late war… was in violation of their rights secured by 
treaty.’210 
The debate between the US and Spain over the 1795 FCN is 
illustrative of the prevailing views at the close of the 19th century. On 8 May 
1898, Spain sent an official decree to the US Secretary of State,211 where it 
asserted that, ‘war existing between Spain and the US terminates all 
agreements, compacts, and conventions that have been in force up to the 
present between the two countries’,212 including the 1795 FCN. Spain was 
willing, subject to a special agreement, to leave operative only one provision 
from the FCN, Article 13, which mandated that in case of a war foreign 
 
207 ibid. See further discussion of the Suttan case in: J Abdy (ed) Kent's commentary on 
international law (Cambridge 1966) 421; McNair (n 159) 711-12; and, McIntyre (n 181) 47-
8. For similar positions expressed in Italian and French domestic courts, see: de La 
Pradelle (n 186), 560-61. 
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209 ibid. See also: McIntyre (n 181) 51. 
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merchants shall be granted a year to leave the countries freely, they would 
be protected from injury, and their property would be protected from 
takings.213 The US rejected the Spanish position completely, arguing that 
war does not affect FCN treaties. As regards Article 13 the US emphasized 
that, it ‘does not consider treaty provisions expressly applicable to war 
between contracting parties as abrogated by war, and therefore cannot 
propose or make new agreement embodying the conditions of article 13.’214  
Whereas the 19th century witnessed the formation of several 
exceptions to the rule that treaties do not survive war, the 20th century 
developed these exceptions until the presumption changed from 
discontinuity to continuity of treaties. Notable in this regard and illustrative 
of the legal position antebellum is the British – American fisheries dispute. 
In 1910, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague (PCA) 
adjudicated the dispute over the interpretation and application of fisheries 
rights under the 1818 FCN215 and the effect of war on its operation.216 The 
Tribunal asserted that, ‘international law in its modern development 
recognizes that a great number of treaty obligations are not annulled by war, 
but at most suspended.’217   
McIntyre identified the Tribunal’s position as a catalyst for 
progressive development. He argued that, ‘the international lawyers sitting 
on the tribunal and their brethren elsewhere’ were becoming increasingly 
concerned with the desirability of recognizing that some treaties survive war 
between the parties.218 Indeed, two years later, the IDI published the 1912 
draft articles on the effect of war on treaties, and maintained that war ‘does 
 
213 Article 13, US – Spain FCN treaty (or: Treaty of San Lorenzo) (27 October 1795). The 
provision also guaranteed ‘full satisfaction’ in case foreign merchants or their property are 
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not affect the existence of treaties, conventions and agreements, whatever 
their title or object, between the belligerent States’.219 In 1913, Westlake, as 
a representative of British scholarship, adopted this line of jurisprudence 
and recognized ‘several exceptions’ to the ‘general rule that war abrogates 
the treaties existing between the belligerents’.220 Such exceptions include 
treaties ‘which are intended to establish a permanent condition of things’ 
and treaties that include ‘stipulations which confer rights intended for use 
daily in daily life having nothing no conceivable connection with causes of 
war of peace’, such as private proprietary rights of aliens under FCN 
treaties. 221  
As regards WWI, the contemporaneous view seems to be that the 
War did not abrogate FCN treaties. In 1917, for instance, Wilson, the 
President of the US (POTUS) and his Secretary of State analyzed the effect 
of WWI on the applicability of the 1799 US – Prussia FCN. Secretary of 
State Lansing argued that the FCN is not abrogated by war but rather ‘is in 
force until terminated in accordance with the terminating article of the 
treaty…’222 President Wilson agreed: ‘It is clear to me, as it is to you, that 
we cannot arbitrarily ignore this treaty. It was made for war, not for peace, 
– for just such relations between ourselves and Germany as have now 
arisen’.223 Yet, Wilson introduced an exception to this continuity in the form 
of the State’s security interests. He argued that, ‘the treaty cannot have 
been intended to extend privileges to those who might from any reasonable 
point of view be thought to be plotting or intending mischief against us’.224  
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220 J Westlake, International Law, Pt II: War (2nd edn, CUP 1913) 29-30. 
221 ibid. 
222 US Department of State, Paper Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United State, 
Supp 2: The World War (1918) 169. See McIntyre’s discussion on these correspondences 
(n 197) 56-8. 
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Further, in Schultz v Raimes (1917),225 while the US was still at war, 
the New York District Court was required to address the status of the 
Prussian FCN and the rights that emanate therefrom.226 The Court held that 
as long as the Prussian FCN was not ‘denounced as inoperative, it would 
seem to confer upon alien enemies of German nationality, notwithstanding 
the existence of a state of war’.227 Similarly, in 1917, the Court of Chancery 
of New Jersey refused to stay a suit brought by a German national resident 
in the US, for the preservation of rights as a stockholder in a New Jersey 
corporation. The German national argued for the protection of treaty rights 
under US – Prussian FCNs, while the Defendant maintained that the FCN 
was abrogated by WWI. Chancellor Lane recognized the continued 
operation of the FCN treaty.228 
 The interbellum period followed a similar line. In the 1920 case of 
Techt v Hughes,229 the NY Court of Appeal was required to decide whether 
heritage rights under the 1848 US – Austria FCN remained in force 
notwithstanding hostilities between the States. Justice Cardozo noted that, 
‘the effect of war upon the existing treaties of belligerents is one of the 
unsettled problems of the law’, and while ‘the older writers sometimes said 
that treaties ended ipso facto when war came, [t]he writers of our own time 
reject these sweeping statements.’230 Accordingly, he asserted that the 
case turns on whether the provision at bar is inconsistent with US national 
security interests. On this point he held that there is ‘nothing incompatible 
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with the policy of the government, with the safety of the nation, or with the 
maintenance of the war in the enforcement of this treaty’.231 
In 1929, in Karnuth v US,232 SCOTUS held that Article 3 of the 1794 
Jay Treaty, which allows reciprocal passage over the US – Canada border, 
was abrogated by the 1812 War. Although under a cursory reading this 
decision represents a break with the Court’s jurisprudence, a closer look 
reveals that the decision is on the continuum of the progressive 
development of the law. The Court observed that, it was ‘sometimes 
asserted, especially by the older writers, that war ipso facto annuls treaties 
of every kind between the warring nations, [however this view] is repudiated 
by the great weight of modern authority.’233  
Analyzing such ‘modern authority’, SCOTUS distinguished three 
potential levels at which treaties upholding private rights affect national 
policy during war. Reciprocal inheritance treaties affect national policy the 
least, and thus remain operative during armed conflict; extradition treaties 
somewhat engage national security and are often construed as suspended 
during war; and, treaties that guarantee the private right to cross an 
international border during war have the largest effect on national security, 
and are thus abrogated.234 If so, it were the particular circumstance of the 
case, and not a sweeping legal position, that predicated the Court’s decision 
that Article 3 of Jay’s Treaty was abrogated by the outbreak of hostilities. 
 Judicial jurisprudence concerning the effect of WWII on FCN treaties 
represents similar thinking. In 1947, in Clark v Allen,235 SCOTUS dealt with 
the fate of inheritance provisions under the 1923 US – German FCN treaty. 
There, the Court did not adopt the default rule that war abrogates treaties. 
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Rather, following the methodology of Karnuth v US, the Court focused on 
the question whether the treaty provisions are compatible with national 
policy in time of war and held that the Treaty was not abrogated by WWII.236 
Notably, while German, Dutch, and French courts advanced different views 
with respect to the effect of WWII on some of their FCN treaties,237 a 
nuanced analysis of judicial jurisprudence demonstrates that, on balance, 
there is a shared agreement between States that commercial aspects of 
FCN treaties were not abrogated (terminated or suspended) by WWII.238 
State practice during the second half of the 20th century, as inferred 
from positions before international tribunals, supports the view that FCN 
treaties are not automatically abrogated by armed conflicts. For instance, 
because Iran’s application to the ICJ in the Oil Platforms case relied on the 
compromissory clause in the US – Iran FCN, Iran argued that the Treaty 
was still in force notwithstanding the outbreak of hostilities in 1979.239 The 
same may be inferred from Nicaragua v US, where the ICJ considered that 
the US – Nicaragua FCN remained in force notwithstanding the 
hostilities.240 Arguably, the fact that the US later refused to participate in the 
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case and denounced the FCN under its terms is indicative, in itself, of the 
fact that the US construed the FCN to be unaffected by the hostilities.  
The foregoing review of authorities demonstrates that by the mid-20th 
century, the law on the effect of armed conflict on treaties moved away from 
the traditional view that war abrogates all treaties. For the sake of 
completeness, it is important that a thorough review of FCN-litigation 
reveals not only that FCN treaties were not automatically terminated by 
wars but that they were not automatically suspended, nor regarded as 
suspended, by war either.241  
It also arises from the review of authorities that two schools seem to 
have emerged in the 20th century on the effect of hostilities on treaties. 
Under the first, the effect of armed conflict on treaties is determined by the 
question ‘whether the signatories of the treaty intend that it should remain 
binding on the outbreak of war?’242 This intention is inferred either from the 
explicit provisions of the treaty or implicitly from the object and purpose of 
the instrument. This view was advanced by eminent scholars, such as Sir 
Cecil Hurts, Lord McNair, and Borchard.243  
However, because it is often difficult, if not ‘wholly fantastic’, as 
McDougal put it,244  to identify the intention of the parties to the treaty, a 
second school of thought was born. Under this approach, which grew from 
American practice and jurisprudence, the fate of the treaty is mostly a 
function of its compatibility with ‘the conduct of war’ and the national security 
policy of the State. Notable in this respect is a correspondence between the 
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US State Department and the Department of Justice, where both agreed 
that: 
With respect to the effect of war on the operation of treaty provisions 
generally… The determinative factor is whether or not there is such 
incompatibility between the treaty provisions in question and the 
maintenance of a state of war as to make it clear that a given 
provision should not be enforced.245 
However, this second, compatibility approach is not without flaws, 
since it potentially reserves the State’s right to terminate unilaterally, and 
even arbitrarily, a treaty for the way its provisions are perceived by its courts 
and governmental bodies. Eventually, the fallacies of both approaches 
yielded a more modern way of thinking. Starting from the 1960s, it is 
possible to identify in international scholarship a new, combined approach 
that attempted to ascertain the intention of the parties with respect to the 
fate of the treaty in war while at the same time accounting for the tendency 
of certain categories of treaties to infringe upon the State’s national security 
discretion.246 Against this historical backdrop, the next section assesses the 
legal position that is expressed in the 2011 ILC Articles.   
4. The 2011 ILC Articles on the Effect of Armed Conflicts on 
Treaties 
In 2010, 10 years after including the ‘Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties’ 
as a topic in its long-term work program,247 the ILC prepared a first draft of 
articles.248 In 2011, a set of 18 articles was adopted (second reading) and 
presented to the UNGA together with commentaries and 
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recommendations.249 The 2011 ILC Articles are the result of extensive study 
of case law, scholarly jurisprudence, State practice, and previous attempts 
to codify this area of international law,250 which led the ILC to adopt ‘the 
general principle of legal stability and continuity’.251  
Under Article 3, ‘the existence of an armed conflict does not ipso 
facto terminate or suspend the operation of treaties as between States 
parties to the conflict, and as between a State party to the conflict and a 
State that is not’.252 This language informs that under the modern legal 
position, war does not lead to the automatic termination or suspension of 
treaties alike. What also follows from this language is that the Articles cover 
not only situations of two belligerents that are simultaneously parties to 
(say) a treaty, as the proposition advanced by the 1985 IDI draft articles,253 
but also the broader effect hostilities may have on the operation of treaties.  
Thus, the Articles are relevant to a situation where, say, Russia and 
Ukraine are parties to a treaty and they are also involved in hostilities,254 
and as relevant to a situation when only one of the contracting parties to a 
treaty (say, Israel) is undergoing hostilities in its territory, while the other 
contracting party, say, Japan is not involved in the hostilities between Israel 
and the Hamas.255 
It follows from the previous section that Article 3 reflects a well-
established position in international law. It also enjoys wide endorsement 
by States today. In 2010, for instance, China considered Article 3 to be 
‘conducive to maintaining the stability of international relations’.256 Colombia 
thought it to be ‘consistent with the general principles of international law’ 
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and the VCLT,257 and Poland ‘applauded’ this assertion.258 States also 
supported the provision during the 2014 and 2017 discussions before the 
Sixth Committee.259 The African Group, for one, stated that ‘the basic 
principle that armed conflicts did not lead to the termination or suspension 
of treaties was already supported by customary international law’, and 
maintained that Article 3 ‘would be binding on States regardless of the 
status of the draft articles’.260 El Salvador, on its part, explicitly referred to 
the language of Article 3 as a ‘codification’.261  
Based on the pacta sunt servanda principle,262 Article 4 of the ILC 
Articles adds that, where a treaty contains a provision on its operation in 
hostilities, this provision shall continue to apply.263 It is noteworthy that in its 
previous drafting, Article 4 was concerned with treaties which contain an 
‘express’ provision on their operation in times of armed conflicts.264 Thus, a 
treaty prescribing reparations for ‘losses owing to war or other armed 
conflict’ (and like formulations) would be a treaty with an ‘express provision 
on its operation’ in hostilities.265  
The requirement that the provision be of an ‘express’ nature was 
omitted from the 2011 Articles as ‘it was found that such a qualifier could be 
unnecessarily limiting, since there were treaties which, although not 
expressly providing therefor, continued in operation by implication’ due to 
the subject-matter and nature of the treaty.266 Indeed, many rules may be 
designated to regulate conduct and situations which are as relevant in 
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peace as in wartime, even without a clear stipulation that they are operative 
‘in times of armed conflict’ (eg: protection of persons and property, 
detention, etc.).  
Like Article 3, Article 4 is consistent with a long pedigree of case-law 
and jurisprudence. It also benefits from a rather broad consensus amongst 
States. In 2010, Poland even suggested deleting Article 4, since it 
considered that it ‘states the obvious, and it is not needed in view of the 
general principle’ that treaties are not ipso facto terminated by hostilities.267 
No State made any declaration, positive or negative, with respect to Article 
4 before the Sixth Committee in 2014 and 2017.268 Nonetheless, that the 
provision is endorsed may be inferred from the fact that while some 
provisions were specifically typified by States as ‘progressive development’, 
Article 4 was not.269  
Article 5 represents the next stage of the inquiry if the treaty does not 
contain wording regulating continuity or if the application of Article 4 proves 
inconclusive.270 The provision requires that, in the absence of a clear 
indication in the text of the treaty itself, ‘the rules of international law on 
treaty interpretation [VCLT] shall be applied to establish whether a treaty is 
susceptible to termination, withdrawal, or suspension in the event of an 
armed conflict’.271 It is important that Article 5 is not concerned with the 
intention of the parties, but rather with the treaty. In line with the interpretive 
approach of the VCLT and mindful of the aforementioned difficulty to find 
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the parties’ intention,272 the ILC deliberately rejected the inclusion of a 
reference to ‘the intention of the parties to the treaty’.273 
Next, the 2011 Articles stipulate a list of treaty categories which due 
to their nature and subject-matter continue to apply in hostilities (Article 7 
and the Annex to Article 7).274 This list, as the ILC stressed, ‘offers 
approximations rather than hard and fast rules’. In other terms, ‘treaties do 
not continue in operation simply because they fall into one of the listed 
categories’.275 Notably, FCN treaties are enumerated in the Annex to Article 
7.276 This does not mean however that FCNs are necessarily unaffected by 
armed conflicts. It only indicates that as a matter of practice FCN treaties 
mostly remained operational in armed conflicts due to their subject-matter 
and provisions, and therefore they made their way to the indicative list in 
the Annex.277 Such a proposition is fully consistent with the overwhelming 
majority of jurisprudence and literature on the issue.   
In contradistinction to Articles 3 and 4, which enjoyed the 
endorsement of States, the list of treaty categories Annexed to Article 7 
drew several objections. In 2010, the US posited that some FCN provisions 
may not ‘carry the necessary implication of their continuance’278 and 
Switzerland objected to the inclusion of FCN treaties in the Annex to Article 
7 altogether. While the Swiss objection was rejected by the Special 
Rapporteur who asserted that the inclusion of FCNs in the Annex ‘reflects 
practice’,279 reservations as to the inclusion of FCNs in the Annex were 
expressed by other States in 2014 and 2017. Russia agreed that, ‘by and 
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large [Article 7] was based on a well-founded premise’, but stated that ‘the 
list of treaties [in the Annex] required further discussion.’280 Singapore 
agreed that FCN provisions remain operational during hostilities but only 
insofar as these provisions deal with ‘private rights’,281 and Malaysia 
maintained that, ‘further discussion was needed’ on the indicative list of 
treaties referred to in Article 7, ‘which remained unclear, particularly… 
treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation.’282 Only El Salvador 
seemed to explicitly support the inclusion of the indicative list of treaties in 
the Annex to Article 7.283 
   Importantly, the proposition that armed conflicts do not terminate (or 
suspend) FCN treaties does not prevent the parties to the treaty from 
terminating (or suspending) it, subject to necessary procedure.284 On this 
point, Article 9 of the 2011 ILC, which mirrors VCLT Article 65, establishes 
a duty of notification of termination, withdrawal, or suspension from the 
treaty.285 At the same time, Article 9 recognizes the inherent right of the 
other State to raise an objection, which would remain unresolved, until a 
solution is reached through means of pacific dispute settlement in 
accordance with the UN Charter.286 Additionally, Article 18 enshrines the 
possibility of termination, suspension, or withdrawal of a treaty arising from 
the application of other rules of international law, namely under the VCLT 
Articles 55-62.287 Article 18 is designated to ‘dispel the possible implication’ 
that the occurrence of an armed conflict gives rise to a lex specialis 
precluding the operation of other grounds for termination, withdrawal, or 
suspension.288  
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While the reception of the aforementioned 2011 Articles is on 
balance positive, it is not clear that States construe the Articles as binding 
rules of law that accurately reflect custom. For instance, Greece maintained 
that it follows the concepts expressed in Article 3, but it did not clarify if it 
felt legally obliged to conduct itself this way because this is a rule of 
customary law or because this is a desired progressive development of the 
law, which it is happy to endorse.289 Finland asserted that some of the 
Articles deal with ‘mainly untouched domain calling for the progressive 
development of the law rather than its codification’.290 Singapore specifically 
identified Articles 2, 5, 6, 7 and the Annex as leaning ‘more towards 
progressive development than codification’.291 And, Russia asserted in 
2014 and 2017 that, ‘all in all, the draft articles under consideration could 
not be regarded as reproducing norms of international customary law… 
They could be useful as a guide for States and might enable future practice 
to develop’.292  
Further, most States do not perceive the 2011 Articles as suitable for 
codification. For instance, the US spelled-out that it ‘did not support the 
elaboration of a convention on the topic’.293 The African Group expressed a 
more moderate view in 2014 and 2017 whereby, ‘while the draft articles 
contributed considerably to the development of international law… their 
elaboration in the form of a binding legal instrument’ is not desirable.294 
Further down the line, Australia and the Nordic countries ‘agreed that an 
attempt to elaborate a convention at this present time [October 2017] would 
be premature’, but viewed the Articles as providing ‘valuable guidance’.295 
Portugal was more reserved and opined that the Articles will ‘be suitable for 
an international convention’ at a later stage.296 Only Cuba expressed its 
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willingness to ‘continue to work towards the elaboration of a convention on 
the effect of armed conflicts on treaties’.297  
Even so, the suitability of the Articles as a whole for codification is 
not a definitive indication of the current or future status of each Article.298 
Although the adoption of the Articles ‘in the form of a multilateral treaty 
would give [States] durability and authority’,299 these outcomes may be 
achieved absent codification, as Crawford noted in the context of a different 
set of eminent ILC articles, the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).300 For instance, the VCLT, an ILC 
work product, was adopted in the form of a convention, and ‘had a 
stabilizing effect’ and a continuing influence on customary international 
law.301 ARSIWA, conversely, were not codified in treaty form but adopted 
by the UNGA. Nonetheless, the ARSIWA have since been regularly applied 
by States and adjudicative fora as reflective of customary law.302 In fact, the 
lack of treaty codification has been said to allow ‘for a continued process of 
legal development’ by international courts and tribunals and State 
practice.303  
Scholarship that has addressed the 2011 ILC Articles does not 
greatly assist in determining their status.304 For instance, in 2014, Ronen 
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noted that the ‘Articles cannot be regarded as codification of customary law, 
but constitute an important stage in the progressive development of 
international law’.305 Yet, she did not elaborate whether her position 
concerns every one of the ILC Articles, or the Articles as a whole. In 2013 
and again in 2018, Schreuer asserted, but did not explain why, that the ILC 
Articles ‘may be taken as reflecting the current state of international law’.306 
Pronto, a senior member of the ILC Secretariat, was more cautious, and 
referred only to Article 3 as reflective of ‘the contemporary default 
position’.307 
As for arbitral practice and judicial decisions, the 2011 ILC Articles 
have yet to be directly considered. Nonetheless, a recurring thorny issue 
that arises over the status of the Articles concerns their compatibility with 
the aforementioned 2005 Partial Award in Claim No 7 by the EECC.308 
Although this decision preceded the ILC Articles by six years,309 it merits 
consideration since it is one of the few cases in the 21st century to directly 
address the continued operation of economic obligations in times of 
hostilities. What is more, this decision is often, mistakenly, referred to in 
investment scholarship as indicating that armed conflicts do abrogate 
treaties.310  
There, the EECC was required to determine whether Eritrea 
breached certain bilateral treaties and therefore owed compensation to 
 
305 Ronen (n 181) 548. Paddeu – Self-defence (n 193) fn 123 citing Ronen in support of 
the contention that ‘ILC’s Articles on the matter are not considered to reflect customary 
law’. 
306 Schreuer – Investments in armed conflict (n 192) 3; C Schreuer, ‘War and peace in 
international investment law’ (2018) 1 TDM, 1.  
307 Pronto (n 172) 235. 
308 Ethiopia–Ethiopia’s Claim 7. See also Final Award, Pensions, Eritrea’s Claims 15, 19, 
and 23, para 29 (19 December 2005), 45 ILM 633 (2006). 
309 The EECC cited Brownlie’s first report (ILC, ‘Effects of armed conflicts on treaties’, first 
report on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties by Mr. Ian Brownlie, Special Rapporteur, 
a/cn.4/552, 21 April 2005). The ILC was of the view that the use of Brownlie’s report in the 
Claims Commission evidences the ‘current relevance of the question’ and the need to ‘take 
account of policy consideration’ in the drafting of the Articles (ILC, ‘Summary record of the 
2926th meeting, meeting’ (2007) UN Doc A/CN.4/2926  para 27). The Commentaries to 
the 2011 Articles do not mention the EECC. 





Ethiopia. To that end, the Commission had to first establish whether the 
agreements remained in force once the conflict broke. Since Eritrea did not 
give notice of any act of termination or suspension of the treaty, the claim 
turned on ‘the issue of the automatic termination of bilateral agreements 
with the outbreak of a conflict’.311 Although the Commission observed that 
the issue is ‘currently debated in the literature’, it ‘nevertheless’ held that 
‘there is a broad consensus that bilateral treaties, especially those of… 
economic nature, are at the very least suspended by the outbreak of a 
war’.312  
True, this conclusion seems to contradict the 2011 Articles and what 
was identified as the governing law. However, a careful review of the 
jurisprudence of the EECC demonstrates that the Commission’s decision is 
mostly consistent, but not fully congruent, with the ILC Articles and law that 
they reflect.313 First, the Commission’s starting point was that, ‘the parties’ 
presumed intent is generally seen as a key factor in determining a treaty’s 
wartime status, even though such intent often is not clear from treaty 
texts’.314 Additionally, following the footsteps of the ILC Articles, and the 
legal position that they reflect, the EECC examined, first, whether the 
subject-matters of the five economic treaties at issue are susceptible to 
termination, and second, whether the features of the armed conflict affect 
its operation.315  
Against this backdrop, the Commission noticed that four of the five 
treaties subject-matter concerned transportation links between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea and that their application in the prevailing circumstances was directly 
affected by the conflict in a manner that deemed them inoperative. Indeed, 
transportation agreements are specifically enumerated by the ILC 
Commentaries to the 2011 Articles as an example of treaties that may be 
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adversely affected by the outbreak of hostilities.316 Arguably then, with a 
grain of context, the jurisprudence of the Commission does not take away 
from what was established as the prevailing legal position. In any event, 
decisions of arbitral bodies do not create law. These are subsidiary means 
that assist to determine the content of the law. As for the relative value of 
this award in the determination of the law, it is outweighed by a long and 
consistent record of authorities to the contrary. 
Overall, it may be noted that the 2011 Articles are not legally binding 
as a convention, and it is doubtful that they will ever be codified. It may also 
be suggested that, as a whole, the 2011 Articles do not reflect pre-existing 
customary law. Nevertheless, some of the provisions are reflective of 
custom. Pointedly, it is argued that, as a matter of established law, FCN 
treaties (Article 7) are not ipso facto abrogated by the outbreak of hostilities 
(Article 3) because FCNs contain provisions on their operation in hostilities 
(Article 4), they were intended to apply in wartime (Article 5), and they 
create proprietary private rights that are unaffected by the outbreak of 
hostilities (Article 6). With this, the analysis turns to examine the effect of 
armed conflicts on investment treaties, the modern form of FCN treaties. 
5. Conclusion: Investment Treaties Are Not Ipso Facto Abrogated 
by Hostilities  
Having established the pertinent principles to ascertain the effect of 
hostilities on treaties, the provenance of these principles, and their status, 
this section concludes the discussion with the effect of armed conflicts on 
investment treaties. 
 Subject to the remarks above concerning recent trends to omit 
certain provisions from investment instruments, and without derogating 
from the proposition that absent treaty language to the contrary, the default 
rules as set out above will govern the question of hostilities’ effect on the 
operation of treaties, the first – and practically only – step of this inquiry 
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concerns the wording of the treaty. Hence, the investment instrument itself 
is determinative of the effect hostilities would have on it.317  
Under Article 4 of the 2011 Articles, which reflects a well-established 
legal position, where a treaty contains a provision on its operation in armed 
conflicts, it shall continue to apply. As the next chapters explain in detail, 
investment instruments frequently contain several different provisions on 
their operation in armed conflicts. These provisions include explicit rules 
concerning the State’s right to appropriate and destroy the property of the 
foreign investor during armed conflict (chapter 3) and the obligation to 
compensate foreign investors thereof (chapter 7). Investment treaties also 
usually prescribe the obligation to take precautionary measures in favor of 
investments against the effects of hostilities (chapter 5) and exceptions that 
reserve the State’s right to take any measure for the protection of its security 
interests during armed conflict (chapter 6).  
If so, in principle, the outbreak or existence of an armed conflict does 
not terminate, in and of itself, the operation of investment treaties. This 
proposition coincides with State practice. One will struggle to point to a 
single explicit statement by a State that its investment treaties were ipso 
facto terminated (or suspended) by the outbreak of hostilities. In fact, it 
appears that conflict-ridden States negotiate, conclude, and ratify 
investment treaties in parallel to their participation in hostilities, thereby 
indicating that such countries do not conceive hostilities as negatively 
affecting their international trade and investment obligations.  
For instance, Israel has been in a continuous state of emergency 
since 19 May 1948 (four days after Israel was established).318 Yet, during 
the last 70 years of national emergency and wars, Israel concluded over 50 
different investment-related instruments. Notably, the 2006 Israel – 
Guatemala BIT was negotiated alongside the Second Lebanon War and it 
 
317 ILC Articles, commentary to Article 4.  
318 Article 9(1), Law and Administration Ordinance, 1 Laws of the State of Israel (enacted 
19 May 1948). The state of emergency has since then been extended annually, most 





entered into force in the midst of Operation Cast Lead,319 and the 2012 
Israel – Ukraine BIT entered into force in November 2012 during Operation 
Pillar of Defence.320 Also of note is that Russia signed a BIT with Palestine 
in November 2016, although both entities are (and were at the relevant time) 
embroiled in protracted hostilities.321 But it is not just belligerent parties that 
conclude investment treaties in the face of hostilities, but also neutral States 
who enter into investment agreements with conflict-ridden States, thus 
indicating that they too do not perceive armed conflicts to be, quite literally, 
a ‘deal-breaker’. For instance, Japan concluded a BIT with Ukraine in 2015 
against the backdrop of the hostilities in eastern Ukraine.322  
Overall, this chapter demonstrated that, whether the investment 
treaty includes explicit language to that effect, or the matter is governed by 
default by ‘general international law’, the outbreak or existence of armed 
conflict does not, in and of itself, terminate investment treaties. The same is 
true for the prevailing legal position (and dearth of practice) concerning the 
automatic suspension of investment treaties by hostilities.323 This argument 
is also supported by the fact that although, as noted, States are free to 
include a provision that instructs that armed conflict leads to the suspension 
or abrogation of some or all of the terms of the investment treaty, they do 
not include any such language in investment instruments.324 Put a different 
 
319 The Israel – Guatemala BIT was signed on 7 November 2006 and entered into force on 
16 January 2009. The Second Lebanon War broke on 12 July 2006 and ended in 
September 2006. Operation Cast Lead took place between 27 December 2008 and 18 
January 2009.  
320 Operation Pillar of Defence took place on 14 – 21 November 2012; Israel – Ukraine BIT 
entered into force on 20 November 2012.  
321 Russia – Palestine BIT (singed 11 November 2016, not in force). 
322 Japan – Ukraine BIT (signed 5 February 2015, entered into force 26 November 2015). 
323 There is no modern practice or declarations to point to the automatic suspension of 
treaties. The ILC Articles and the studies predicating them point to no such conclusion 
either.  
324 Eg: the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation instructs that, ‘in case of war, 
the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the freedom of action of any of the 
contracting States affected, whether as belligerents or as neutral’. (Article 89, Chicago 






way, in armed conflict, the termination or suspension of investment treaties 
is invocable subject to certain qualifications, it is not automatic.  
Of course, the assertion that investment treaties remain operative is 
only the first step in the analysis of the regulation of investments in armed 
conflict. At the next step, it should be asserted what treatment, if any, these 
treaties prescribe in armed conflict, and how does any such treatment 
interact with other international norms that regulate the conduct of 
hostilities.325 Accordingly, having established the applicability of investment 
treaty norms, the next chapters address the application of these standards 
in armed conflict.  
  
 
325 On this point, the ILC clarified that, ‘the implication of continuity does not affect the 
operation of the law of armed conflict as lex specialis applicable to armed conflict’ 






Appropriation and Destruction of Foreign Investments in Armed 
Conflicts 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter established that the outbreak of armed conflict does 
not, in and of itself, abrogate the operation of investment treaties and thus, 
investment standards of protection continue to apply in armed conflict. 
Accordingly, this chapter deals with the customary and treaty standards of 
treatment of investments during armed conflict. This discussion examines 
the limits and qualifications to the State’s authority to interfere with the ability 
to manage, use or control, in a meaningful way, investments in the form of 
tangible objects and premises during armed conflict, focusing mainly on 
appropriation and destruction of property. 
The use of intrusive measures or lethal or potentially lethal force 
against private property by the State’s armed forces and law-enforcement 
officials in armed conflict is governed by two different legal paradigms: The 
conduct of hostilities paradigm, which derives from IHL, and the law 
enforcement paradigm that is mainly based on international human rights 
law. This discussion does not presume to offer definitive ways to determine 
when the State’s conduct falls within the paradigm of hostilities and when, 
by contrast, such conduct is regulated by the law enforcement 
paradigm. The following analysis rather examines how the distinctions 
between both paradigms affect the treatment of foreign investments in 
armed conflicts. 
Accordingly, section 2 briefly introduces the main differences 
between the legal paradigms that regulate State measures that interfere 
with foreign investments in armed conflicts – the conduct of hostilities 
paradigm, which derives from IHL, and the law enforcement paradigm that 
is mainly based on international human rights law (and is not the focus of 
this study). This introductory discussion establishes an important 





analyses in this thesis: When assessing whether a particular State measure 
that adversely affects investments during hostilities complied with 
international law, ‘it is also necessary to address the role of the jus in bello, 
which gives belligerents substantial latitude to… act in ways contrary to 
international law in time of peace’.326 For instance, the deliberate 
destruction of aliens’ property in combat operations ‘may be perfectly legal, 
while similar conduct in peacetime would result in State responsibility’.327  
Section 3 establishes that the State’s authority under the law 
enforcement paradigm to lawfully interfere with private property, in the form 
of expropriation, is qualified by several conditions that reflect a balance 
between the right of the State to regulate property in its territory and the 
protection and respect of private property rights. The inferences from this 
discussion are then used to compare and contrast the permitted 
interferences with property under the paradigm of hostilities.  
Turning then to the paradigm of hostilities, which is the focus of this 
thesis, section 4 compares and contrasts expropriation (as a form of lawful 
interference with private property) with the interferences that IHL allows in 
times of hostilities. It is established that, by contrast to expropriation, which 
is predicated on the balance between the State’s regulatory freedom and 
the protection of property rights,  the authority of the State to interfere with 
private property under the hostilities paradigm, through dispossession and 
destruction of property, is circumscribed by the delicate equipoise of military 
necessity and humanity. As a result, international law recognizes an array 
of lawful interferences with private property during hostilities that are distinct 
from expropriation and are qualified by different conditions, which do not 
necessarily comprise the requirement of, say, due process. 
Honing in further on the dispossession and destruction of foreign 
investments in armed conflicts, section 5 demonstrates that during the first 
half of the 20th century, war law rules on the treatment of private property, 
 






namely as codified in The Law of The Hague, infiltrated the international law 
on the protection of aliens and shaped the rules on State responsibility for 
damage to foreign property in wartime, resulting in a consensus that 
appropriation of private foreign property is lawful only when justified by 
military considerations and against compensation while destruction of 
property is prohibited, other than in instances of ‘imperative military 
necessity’. 
At the next step, the analysis of section 6 focuses on a common 
mechanism in modern investment treaties – the extended war clause 
(EWC). The EWC deals with ‘requisition of property by the armed forces’ 
and with the ‘destruction of property that is not required by the necessity of 
war’ (and similar language). In this respect, section 6 also deals with the 
interaction of the EWC with the expropriation provision, which regulates 
dispossession of property irrespective of the existence of hostilities. It is 
suggested that under the VCLT, the ordinary meaning of the cited language 
of the EWC makes a reference to customary law on the treatment of alien 
property in wartime. Accordingly, to ascertain the meaning of the EWC, it is 
necessary to look to the content of customary law, which is circumscribed 
by war law.  
In this sense, the discussion in chapter 3 comes full circle: It 
demonstrates not only that the distinction between the hostilities and law 
enforcement paradigms is crucial for the treatment of foreign investments 
in armed conflict generally, but that this notion is already reflected 
investment treaties, which contain provisions on appropriation in the context 
of armed conflict (the EWC) and separate rules on takings that do not 
necessarily relate to hostilities (expropriation provisions).  
Overall, this discussion proposes that just as it is well-established 
today that not every lethal measure that results in loss of life in armed 
conflict is necessarily an arbitrary deprivation of life in violation of human 
rights instruments since the paradigm of hostilities may deem this loss of 





necessarily a lawful or an unlawful expropriation since the paradigm of 
hostilities may allow it.  
2. The Conduct of Hostilities and the Law Enforcement Paradigms  
Before determining whether a certain State measure, which resulted in the 
total or partial dispossession of a foreign investment, complied with 
international law, it is necessary to ascertain the applicable legal paradigm 
against which the lawfulness of this measure will be assessed. This section 
presents the international legal regimes governing the use of force and 
intrusive measures against property in armed conflicts and addresses 
briefly the main differences between these two paradigms.  
 The use of intrusive measures or lethal or potentially lethal force 
against private property by the State’s armed forces and law-enforcement 
officials is governed by two different legal paradigms in armed conflict: The 
conduct of hostilities paradigm, which derives from IHL, and the law 
enforcement paradigm that is mainly based on international human rights 
law. This is the consequence of the fact that in the modern practice of 
warfare, the State’s armed forces are performing, or are expected to 
conduct, not only combat operations against the adversary but also law 
enforcement missions that aim to maintain or to restore public security and 
law and order.328  
However, notwithstanding the coexistence of both paradigms in 
practice, international law does not provide clear guidelines to determine 
which situations in the context of an armed conflict are governed by the 
 
328 In particular NIACs and hostilities involving occupied territories. See Article 43, HR and 
Article 42, GC III, which both deal the obligation of an occupying power to maintain public 
order and safety and the authority of a detaining State to use force as a last resort against 
POWs attempting to escape. See further: ICRC, Expert Meeting Report, The Use of Force 
in Armed Conflicts: Interplay Between the Conduct of Hostilities and Law Enforcement 
Paradigms, January 2012 <https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4171-use-force-armed-
conflicts-expert-meeting> (accessed 20 November 2018) and ICRC, Expert Meeting 
Report, Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory, Third Meeting 
of Experts: The Use of Force in Occupied Territory (2012) 
<https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4094-occupation-and-other-forms-administration-
foreign-territory-expert-meeting> (accessed 20 June 2018); K Watkin, ‘Use of force during 





hostilities paradigm and which are covered by the law enforcement 
paradigm. For the purposes of the present analysis of the treatment of 
foreign investments in armed conflict, it is important to recall that IHL rules 
were crafted to reflect the reality of armed conflict and thus, IHL is 
predicated on the assumption that the use of force and the ability to interfere 
with individual rights are inherent to hostilities. At the same time, the 
authority to take such measures is not unlimited. It is constraint by the 
principles of distinction, necessity, humanity, and proportionality.329  
By contrast, human rights law is based on different assumptions, it is 
not designed to regulate extreme circumstances that anticipate the use of 
lethal force. Human rights law was initially conceived to protect individuals 
from abuse by their State. And this is important. While similar principles, 
such as necessity, proportionality, and precautions seem to underscore 
both regimes, these notions entail different meanings and different 
application under each legal paradigm.330  
As further explained below, under the hostilities paradigm the notion 
of ‘necessity’ means that lethal force, which may result in the total 
destruction of property, may be directed against lawful targets as a ‘first 
resort’, subject to a proportionality assessment. ‘Military necessity’ under 
IHL does not translate into an obligation to resort to less-destructive (or 
deadly) means. In contrast, the use of lethal force in law enforcement 
operations may be employed only as a ‘last resort’, subject to strict or 
‘absolute’ necessity.331  
 
329 See discussion in chapter 1. 
330 See: ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary 
Armed Conflicts, Geneva, December 2015 
<https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-humanitarian-law-and-challenges-
contemporary-armed-conflicts> (accessed 20 November 2018) and ICRC – The use of 
force in armed conflict (n 328) 8-10.  
331 This notion is not absolute. Deadly force may be used as first resort when it is necessary 
to protect persons against an imminent threat to their lives or serious injury or when lethal 
force is the only way to prevent the perpetration of a serious crime that possesses grave 





Another difference concerns the principle of proportionality. The 
proportionality principle under the law enforcement paradigm requires 
balancing the risks posed by an individual (and his property) against whom 
force might be used, on the one hand, with the potential harm to this person 
(and his property) and others uninvolved, on the other. In contrast, IHL 
proportionality balances the military advantage anticipated from an attack 
against a military objective (human and non-human targets) with the 
expected incidental harm to the civilian population (persons and objects) 
from this attack.  
Further, the notion of precautions is distinct. Under the hostilities 
paradigm, as further explored in chapter 5, the obligation to take feasible 
precautionary measures requires the belligerents to take constant care to 
spare the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects.332 In contrast, 
the law enforcement paradigm instructs that all precautions be taken to 
avoid, as far as possible, the use of force, as such, and not merely to 
prevent and minimize incidental civilian death and injury or damage to 
civilian objects.333  
The differences between the two paradigms have practical 
implications on the State’s authority to interfere with private property. Under 
the law enforcement paradigm, it is axiomatic that States have broad 
authority to regulate the use and ownership of movable and immovable 
objects within their territory. Whenever foreign investors position their 
 
332 See further in chapter 5. 
333 In contrast to IHL, the principle of precautions is not anchored in treaty instruments 
specifically, it derives from other principles. The notion of precautions was developed in 
the jurisprudence of human rights bodies, namely the ECtHR. Eg: McCann v UK, 
Judgment, Merits and Just Satisfaction, App No 18984/91[1995] ECHR 31, paras 150 and 
194; Ergi v Turkey, App No 23818/94, Report of European Commission of Human Rights 
of 20 May 1997, and judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 28 July 1998, 
para 79. Case of Neira Alegría et al v Peru, Merits, IACHR Series C No 20 [1995] IACHR 
3, para 62; Case of Montero Aranguren et al (Detention Center of Catia) v Venezuela, 
Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, IACHR Series C no 150, (IACHR 
2006), para 82; UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment No 6, The Right 
to Life (article 6), 30 April 1982, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, para 3. See also Principle 5, 
UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 
adopted by the Eight UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 





property in the territory of another State, they subject this property to the 
States’ authority to regulate the use and ownership of objects within its 
territory. Such foreign property thus becomes susceptible to legislative and 
administrative acts that may interfere with its use and ownership.334 The 
most intrusive State interference with the right to use property happens 
when the owner is completely deprived of the ability to use or own the 
property, usually as a result of its direct appropriation or destruction.335 
To prevent abusive interferences with private property, virtually all 
investment treaties include provisions that reflect the recognition of the 
State’s right to regulate property but place some limitation on the exercise 
of this said right. As further explored below, under customary law, as 
reflected in modern investment instruments, expropriation is lawful if it 
serves a public purpose, is conducted in a manner that is not arbitrary or 
discriminatory, follows principles of due process, and is against 
compensation. But not every taking of private foreign property for public 
objectives by State officials during armed conflict is necessarily 
expropriation that is governed by the law enforcement paradigm. Some 
takings by State officials during armed conflict are governed by a separate 
legal paradigm.   
On this point and relying on the substantive distinctions between the 
hostilities and law enforcement paradigms, the EECC stressed that, while 
‘peacetime rules barring expropriation continue to apply’ during armed 
conflicts, ‘it is also necessary to address the role of the jus in bello, which 
gives belligerents substantial latitude to place freezes or other 
discriminatory controls on property… or otherwise to act in ways contrary to 
international law in time of peace’.336 ‘Under the jus in bello’, as the 
Commission rightly noted, ‘the deliberate destruction of aliens’ property in 
 
334 For an overview of various interferences with investment worldwide during the 20th 
century see: C Dugan et al Investor-State Arbitration (OUP 2008) 430-41; Salacuse (n 17) 
64-78.  
335 Fireman’s Fund v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/02/1, Award, 17 July 2006, para 
176(a). 





combat operations may be perfectly legal, while similar conduct in 
peacetime would result in State responsibility’.337  
The substantive differences between the governing legal paradigms 
make it crucial that the international responsibility of States for the 
dispossession of foreign investments in situations of armed conflict be 
assessed in a nuanced way that goes beyond the four-corners of 
investment treaty provisions on expropriation, lest a tribunal mistakenly 
finds a lawful requisition to be an unlawful expropriation for want of due 
process, thereby holding a State responsible where its international 
responsibility is simply not invoked.338 To mitigate such concerns, when 
approaching the assessment of appropriation of foreign investments in 
armed conflict it is necessary to first determine whether the State’s conduct 
falls within the conduct of hostilities paradigm or, by contrast, within that of 
law enforcement.339 Only then, the lawfulness of the measure can be 
assessed against the identified applicable legal regime.  
3. Expropriation of Foreign Investments under the Law 
Enforcement Paradigm  
Under the law enforcement paradigm, the State’s authority to take 
measures that result in interference with private property has been 
circumscribed in recent years mainly by international human rights law and 
international investment law.340 These fields of law have developed rather 
analogous standards for assessing the lawfulness of measures that 
interfere with the right to use or own private property, including 
‘investments’, namely in the framework of expropriation. It is not the purpose 
of this analysis to conduct a thorough discussion of the law on expropriation, 
but rather to sketch the pertinent elements of such measures so as to use 
these in the following sections to illuminate and contrast the rules on 
 
337 ibid. 
338 The relationship between these measures is addressed in detail below.  
339 As explained in chapter 1 (introduction), conflict classification is outside the scope of 
the present thesis.  
340 For an analysis of human rights see: J Sparkling, The International Law of Property 





appropriation of foreign investments during armed conflicts. Accordingly, 
this section outlines the cumulative qualifications of lawful expropriation and 
briefly elucidates each condition.  
An overwhelming majority of investment treaties qualify expropriation 
with the requirements that the taking is for a public purpose, in a non-
discriminatory manner, under due process of law, and against the payment 
of compensation.341 Essentially, these conditions are a crystallization of 
customary law.342 Although these conditions are sometimes expressed 
using different language, their essence has not changed substantively over 
the years.343 
Public purpose (or: ‘public interest’,344 ‘public benefit’,345 ‘public order 
and social interest’,346 etc.) is used as term of art347 that requires the taking 
be motivated by pursuance of legitimate welfare objectives, in contrast to a 
 
341 The same conclusion arises from a review of national laws on the protection of 
investments. Most of these laws describe the conditions for a lawful expropriation and 
provide guidelines on the amount of compensation. The conditions under which an 
expropriation is lawful have been standardized to the point that laws authorize 
expropriations for the public benefit, without discrimination, against compensation and 
under due process of law (UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2017, at 106-7 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf> (accessed 1 June 2018). Under 
human rights law, the limitations of the right are similar. A lawful taking ought to comply 
with: the principle of legality; the principle of public interest; and the principle of 
proportionality. 
342 These principles were recognized as such at the time of the conclusion of the very first 
BIT, see: McNair ‘The Seizure of Property and Enterprises in Indonesia’ (1959) 6(3) 
Netherlands Journal of International Law 218-56; G Christie, ‘What constitutes a taking of 
property under international law?’ (1962) 38 British Ybk Intl L 307– 338; E Lauterpacht, 
‘Issues of compensation and nationality in the taking of energy investments’ (1990) 8(4) 
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 241–250. 
343 For sake of completeness, some treaties also require that the expropriation will not 
violate contractual undertakings, eg: Article 5(2), Bulgaria – France BIT; Article II(3) US – 
Tunisia BIT.  
344 Article 133, China – Peru Free Trade Agreement (FTA).  
345 Article 4(1), Germany – Pakistan BIT (signed 1 December 2009, not in force). 
346 Article 811 (and footnote 7), Canada – Colombia FTA. 
347 See for instance the footnote accompanying Article 9.10 in the Peru – Singapore FTA, 
which clarifies that, ‘for the purposes of this Article, public purpose refers to a concept in 
customary international law…’ Likewise the Canada – Colombia FTA clarifies that public 
purpose ‘shall be interpreted in accordance with international law…’ see further discussion 
in UNCTAD, Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II: Expropriation: A 






purely private gain or an illicit end.348 In practice, States have identified, 
among other goals, environmental, social, economic, and health objectives 
and military, security, economic and political aims as ‘public purposes’ that 
predicate expropriation. Investment tribunals seem to have afforded a 
margin of appreciation to States in determining whether an expropriation 
serves a public purpose.349  
Non-discrimination reflects a customary standard whereby 
expropriation that is predicated solely on the affiliation of the alien to a 
different racial, religious, or ethnic group, is forbidden. Nonetheless, some 
distinctions between different types or groups of investors may be 
predicated on relevant (non-discriminatory) reasons.350 ‘Due process’, in 
turn, is a wide term which mostly requires that the measure (expropriation) 
complies with procedures established in domestic legislation and that the 
affected investors will be allowed to have the case reviewed before an 
independent and impartial instance (right to an independent review).351 
Further, the expropriation process must be free from arbitrariness.352  
Finally, practically all investment instruments contain stipulations, at 
a varying degree of detail, which refer to the standard of compensation and 
valuation method, date for determining compensation, convertibility, and 
payment of interest. Most of these instruments have adopted some version 
of the ‘Hull Formula’, which requires that compensation should be ‘prompt, 
 
348 Walter Fletcher Smith Claim (1929) II RIAA 915, 917-918; Liberian Eastern Timber 
Corporation (LETCO) v Liberia, Award, 31 March 1986, 26 ILM 647, 664-667; James v UK, 
Merits, App No 8793/79 (A/98), [1986] ECHR, paras 38-52. 
349 See generally the discussion in: R Dolzer and M Stevens, Bileteral Investment Treaties 
(Martinus Nijhof 1995)104-5; Newcombe and Paradell (n 30) 370-72.  
350 Feldman v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, 16 December 2002, para 
137. See further Newcombe and Paradell (ibid) 373-74. 
351 Eg: Article XX, Montenegro – Switzerland BIT; Article 4(3) Austria – Mexico BIT. For 
arbitral practice that focused on the requirement of due process and its breach see eg: 
Middle East Cement v Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/99/6, Award, 12 April 2002, para 143; 
ADC v Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/03/16, Award, 2 October 2006, para 435. 
352 Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (United States v Italy) (Merits)[1989] ICJ Rep 15, para 
128. ‘Arbitrariness’ was defined as ‘a willful disregard of due process of law, an act which 





adequate and effective’.353 ‘Prompt’ normally means that a payment for the 
expropriated property should be made without undue delay. The ‘effective’ 
benchmark requires that the payment be made in a realizable, 
exchangeable, and readily transferable currency. Since the term ‘adequate’ 
is more elusive, most instruments provide further guidance as to what is an 
‘adequate’ payment; chiefly, by prescribing that ‘adequate’ denotes the ‘fair 
market’ value (FMV) of the expropriated investment.354  
FMV reflects the attempt to find the price the property would trade at 
in a hypothetical commercial transaction between a willing seller and a 
willing buyer, ‘in circumstances in which each had good information, each 
desired to maximize his financial gain, and neither was under duress or 
threat, the willing buyer being a reasonable person.’355 In practice, arbitral 
tribunals have based compensation on FMV even when the treaty did not 
use the language ‘fair’ or like adjectives to qualify the payments.356 The FMV 
standard and its application in cases of damage owing to hostilities is 
address in chapter 7 below.  
In arbitral practice, in particular before 2006, this FMV standard has 
been often treated as a stipulation on the consequence of a failure to comply 
with the provision on expropriation, rather than as one of the conditions for 
a lawful expropriation.357 But this is not accurate. First, the explicit language 
of treaty provisions on expropriation is silent on the consequences of their 
breach. There is nothing in the explicit wording that addresses a breach of 
the provision. In fact, according to the ordinary meaning of practically all 
 
353 S Ripinsky and K Williams, Damages in International Investment Law (BIICL 2008) 78-
9; N Nikièma, ‘Compensation for expropriation’, IISD 2013. 
354 Eg: Article 6(2), US Model BIT 2012; Article 10.9 US – Chile FTA; 1110.2, NAFTA. 
Some treaties prescribe ‘actual value’, ‘real value’, ‘market value’, ‘genuine value’, etc.  
355 Starrett Housing Corp v Iran, 19 December 1983, 4 Iran-USCTR 122, 201. 
356 FMV was applied also in cases when the treaty mandate ‘real’, ‘actual’, ‘just’, or 
‘genuine’ value. See: Siemens v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/8, Award and Separate 
Opinion, 6 February 2007, para 353; Vivendi Universal v Argentina, ICSID Case No 
ARB/97/3, Award, 20 August 2007, para 8.2.10. 
357 Eg: Santa Elena v Costa Rica, ICSID Case No ARB/96/1, Final Award, 17 February 
2000, paras 71-83, 92-5; Metalclad v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97, 20 August 





investment treaties, compensation is but one of the qualifications for a lawful 
expropriation. Further, the analytical distinction in international law between 
primary and secondary rules means that the standard of compensation for 
unlawful expropriations that do not comply with the qualifications of the 
treaty, is to be found elsewhere, namely in the customary principle of ‘full 
reparation’, whereby compensation shall cover any financially assessable 
damage including lost profits insofar as it is established.358 This customary 
standard requires putting the aggrieved investor in the economic position it 
would have possessed, hypothetically, but for the wrongful conduct, thus 
setting the date of valuation for the time of the award, not the taking.359  
In this respect, the 2006 ADC v Hungary case marked a shift in 
arbitral jurisprudence. There, the Tribunal stressed the distinction between 
lawful and unlawful expropriation for purposes of compensation and applied 
the full reparation standard to the unlawful expropriation of ADC’s 
investment.360 However, the jurisprudence that followed ADC indicates that 
the distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriations is often more 
apparent than real. Ratner’s extensive study361 demonstrates that some 
tribunals did not rely on the distinction between lawful and unlawful 
dispossession of investments in their award of damages; they simply 
applied FMV reflexively.362 In some cases, tribunals noted the difference 
between lawful and unlawful takings, but did not consider this difference 
 
358 Articles 31 and 26, ARSIWA. 
359 ADC v Hungary, paras 480-99, 521. 
360 ibid, pars 429-44. See also: Siemens v Argentina (Award), paras 349–52; Vivendi v 
Argentina (Award), paras 8.2.3–5; Saipem SpA v Bangladesh, Award, ICSID Case No 
ARB/05/7, Award, 30 June 2009, para 201. 
361 S Ratner, ‘Compensation for Expropriations in a World of Investment Treaties: Beyond 
the Lawful/Unlawful Distinction’ (2017) 111(1) AJIL 7-56. 
362 Eg: Rumeli Telekom v Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No ARB/05/16, Award, 29 July 2008, 
para 785; Sistem Muhendislik v Kyrgyz Republic, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/06/1, Award, 9 
September 2009,  paras 121, 156, 159; Occidental v Ecuador,  ICSID Case No ARB/06/11, 
Award, 20 September 2012, para 707; Abengoa y Cofides v Mexico, ICSID Case No 
ARB(AF)/09/2, Award , 12 April 2013, para 681; SAUR v Argentina, ICSID Case No 
ARB/04/4, Award, 22 May 2014, para 85; Tenaris and Talta-Trading E Marketing v 





relevant for assessment of damages.363 In other instances, arbitrators 
accepted the distinction between compensation for lawful and unlawful 
expropriation, but the actual outcome, in contrast to the ADC case, was the 
same.364 This is because in contrast to many properties that decline in value 
following the expropriation, the value of ADC’s investment had risen 
significantly. Therefore, in that case the distinction between the treaty and 
the customary standards of reparation translated into concrete figures, but 
this is rarely the case. This arbitral practice notwithstanding, the analytical 
difference between lawful and unlawful conduct stands.   
A related question that arises from the distinction between lawful and 
unlawful expropriation is whether the failure to compensate for expropriation 
deems the conduct unlawful. Some tribunals suggested that ‘an 
expropriation wanting only a determination of compensation by an 
international tribunal is not to be treated as an illegal expropriation’.365 
Rather, as the Tribunal in Tidewater v Venezuela explained, it ‘has to be 
considered as a provisionally lawful expropriation’.366 This argument 
postulates that, since ‘the tribunal dealing with the case will determine and 
award… compensation’, the failure to award compensation is only a 
temporary technicality, not a violation of international law.367 On this point, 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) suggested that expropriation 
that lacks only compensation entails lesser wrongfulness; it does not trigger 
the same consequences as an inherently illegal taking.368 For instance, 
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expropriation that results in discrimination and which was committed for the 
personal profit of the members of the government ‘appears to be a graver 
wrong’ than, say, the dispossession of property for public purpose that is 
tainted by illegality merely for the absence of accompanying payments.369 
Both views are problematic.  
First, not only that the ‘provisional legality’ reasoning of the Tidewater 
v Venezuela case conflates primary and secondary obligations, it also 
undermines the parties’ consent and the jurisdiction of the tribunal, and 
potentially opens any subsequent decision to challenges on jurisdictional 
grounds.370 The mandate of the Tidewater Tribunal, like that of most 
tribunals, was ‘limited to determining’ whether there is a breach of the treaty, 
whether such breach ‘has caused damages to the national concerned, and, 
if such is the case, the amount of compensation.’371 A tribunal so constituted 
cannot declare that the expropriation was lawful and, at the same time, 
award compensation. In other terms, this tribunal is only authorized to 
award compensation, as a modality of reparation, if there is a ‘breach’ of the 
treaty. In other terms still, unless explicitly provided otherwise, investment 
tribunals usually do not have authority to quantify the amount of payments 
due under the treaty as a primary obligation but, rather, to assess the 
lawfulness of the expropriation and award damages if it is found unlawful.372  
At any rate, at its highest it may be said that the ‘legality’ of a taking 
that lacks in compensation is provisional when the State and the investor 
merely disagree on the amount owed,373 or when the payment is reasonably 
delayed.374 The proposition is far less convincing when the State bluntly 
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refuses to compensate.375 The argument that, ‘the lack of compensation 
does not make the taking … eo ipso wrongful’376 is likewise problematic. It 
seemingly assumes that the cumulative requirements that must be met in 
order for a taking to be lawful differ in significance and, that there is a certain 
trade-off between these qualifications.377 However, there is nothing in the 
explicit language of investment treaties or State practice to indicate that 
compensation is conceived by States (or investors) as less significant than, 
say, due process of law.  
A more accurate statement of the law on this point would account for 
the important distinction between rights and remedies.378 The obligation to 
provide reparations for a breach of a primary obligation arises once a 
breach of the primary rule is ascertained. In this case, the primary rule 
requires conduct that comprises several different acts and omissions, 
including the act, or refusal, of offering compensation. If the State refuses 
to compensate where the provision mandates it to do so, one aspect of the 
multifaceted conduct is breached, and the conduct is therefore tainted with 
illegality. This wrongful act gives rise to the obligation to compensate ‘as a 
modality of reparation’.379 This form of compensation therefore originates 
from a different source.380  
 To recapitulate, the law enforcement paradigm allows for lawful 
interferences with private property. In investment law, the category of lawful 
measures against property mostly encompasses expropriation. Since the 
underpinning rationale of this measure is that public welfare requires that 
private property be taken in certain instances, lawful expropriation 
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comprises several qualifications, including the obligation to pay 
compensation.  
4. Appropriation and Destruction of Property under the Paradigm 
of Hostilities: The Hague Law 
As with the law enforcement paradigm, the State’s right to interfere with 
private property during hostilities is not unlimited.381 Yet, whereas the 
authority of the State to interfere with private property under the law 
enforcement paradigm reflects a balance between the State’s regulatory 
freedom and the protection of property rights, the right to interfere with 
private property under the hostilities paradigm is circumscribed by the 
principles of military necessity and humanity, which pervade contemporary 
IHL in both a general and a specific sense.382 
This section proceeds as follows. As an introductory point, the 
concepts ‘property’ and ‘enemy property’ are addressed first. Then, the 
section proceeds to outline several permitted measures that result in the 
depravation of property during armed conflict, focusing specifically on the 
qualifications for lawful dispossession of private property and the prohibition 
to destroy property, unless when ‘imperatively demanded by the necessities 
of war’. Overall, this section demonstrates that relative to the law 
enforcement paradigm, the State’s prerogative to interfere with the right to 
own or enjoy private property in hostilities is potentially broader, but it is not 
unlimited. The balance between military and humanitarian considerations 
translates into several cumulative qualifications that bound the ability to 
dispossess private property.  
IHL recognizes various derogations from the principle that private 
property must be respected and protected in the conduct of hostilities, such 
as – destruction, neutralization, capture, confiscation, seizure, 
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sequestration, angary, and requisition.383 Each of these forms comprises 
several different subparts that reflect a particular balance between military 
requirements and humanitarianism.384 Therefore, to assess whether a 
measure against private property complies with international law, it is 
necessary to accurately typify and identify the measure at hand.  
Traditionally, the scope of lawful measures that a State was allowed 
take against private property turned on the classification of any such 
property into enemy property and the property of loyal citizens and neutrals. 
Conventional wisdom held that, ‘the belligerents are entitled to exercise 
measures against enemy persons and property from which neutrals are 
free’.385 International humanitarian law, however, does not define the 
composite concept ‘enemy property’, or the terms ‘enemy’ and ‘property’ 
separately. Nonetheless, practice, doctrine, and jurisprudence support the 
determination that ‘property’ encompasses all kinds of movable assets, real 
property, and intangible property such as intellectual property rights, 
shares, and claims to money.386 As for the term ‘enemy’, in warfare it 
signifies the adverse State and its armed forces. Whether, and when, 
private persons are to be characterized as ‘enemy’, is determined mostly by 
domestic legislation, on the basis of a person’s nationality or domicile or 
doing business within the enemy State. This question is left outside the 
scope of the present discussion.   
The composite concept of ‘enemy property’, in turn, originates from 
ancient warfare practices whereby the victorious party had unlimited powers 
 
383 For sake of completeness, there are other forms of taking of private or public movable 
property (including enemy military equipment) for private or personal use, such as pillage. 
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over the property of its vanquished adversary.387 Over time, the ability to 
arbitrarily appropriate spoils of war made way for the obligation of 
belligerents to protect enemy property in their territory.388 This notion was 
codified in 1899 and reaffirmed in 1907 in The Hague Regulations, whereby 
the destruction or appropriation of enemy property must not be adopted as 
means of injuring the enemy, unless military necessity so requires. By the 
second decade of the 20th century, the influence of the Hague Law was that 
the treatment of private foreign property turned less on its classification into 
neutral or enemy property and focused more on military needs:  
Neutral and enemy property in hostile territory are in general subject 
to the same treatment. Where such property is seized or destroyed 
for strategic reasons directly incident to belligerent action, the private 
owners need not be compensated for their losses.389  
Against this backdrop, the analysis proceeds to outline the various 
permitted interferences with private property under IHL and their 
qualifications.  
Requisition is a formal authoritative demand in belligerent occupation 
for the temporary or permanent use of movable or immovable property or 
services, in return to compensation.390 The right to requisition is secondary 
to the primary duty of the occupying power, which is ensuring the survival, 
safety, health, or wellbeing of the occupied population.391 Accordingly, 
customary law, as reflected in The 1907 Hague Regulations,392 mandates 
immediate cash payments against requisition or the issuance of receipts 
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that will guarantee a payment as soon as possible.393 As with other forms 
of property dispossession, the requirement to pay compensation is a 
condition of the lawfulness of requisition.394 Hence, ‘requisition, though 
lawful when originally made, becomes unlawful, when after a reasonable 
time no adequate compensation was paid’.395 
Aside from requisition, customary law traditionally recognized more 
specific forms of depravation of property. ‘Angary’ is the right of the 
belligerent to requisition certain neutral property for his own usage, subject 
to ‘exceptional’ military necessities, and in return for compensation.396 The 
type of neutral property that may be acquired jure angaria mostly comprised 
merchant vessels and other means of transportation and ammunition.397 
‘Sequestration’ conversely,398 is the temporary use or taking of private 
enemy property in order to prevent it from being used against the 
sequestering State during hostilities.399 Because the public purpose at the 
heart of sequestration is narrow and specific (not to allow the property to be 
used against the State), sequestration, unlike angary, traditionally took the 
form of asset freezing. Notably, sequestration and angary are no longer 
mentioned in contemporary military manuals or in post-1977 sub-sets of 
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IHL.400 This development of international law is consistent with the 
abovementioned shift from examining the status of the foreign property 
(neutral – enemy) to analyzing the military necessity that justifies an 
interference, at least in warfare on land.401 
Relative to the above, confiscation and seizure are more intrusive 
forms of acquisition. ‘Confiscation’ refers to permanent appropriation of 
certain types of property without compensation.402 As a limitation to this 
broad power, a belligerent can only confiscate movable property belonging 
to the enemy State, which can be used for military operations.403 ‘Seizure’ 
entails the temporary taking of State or private immovable or movable 
property. Seized property has to be returned after the cessation of 
hostilities, otherwise the seizing authority is obliged to compensate the 
owner.404  
Two terminological clarifications are due at this point with respect to 
the different measures outlined above. First, in practice, the term ‘seizure’ 
is used by some commentators and in some instruments to refer to any 
uncompensated appropriation, without distinguishing confiscation.405 
However, as explained, these are not the same measures.406 Additionally, 
in colloquial form, ‘requisition’ is sometimes used to describe any 
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appropriation in hostilities against compensation. However, in the proper 
legal sense, requisition denotes a taking by an occupying power. Thus, not 
every reference to ‘requisition’ in scholarship and jurisprudence necessarily 
entails or references occupation. This is a point to which the discussion 
returns below.  
Finally, subject to certain conditions, enemy property may be lawfully 
and deliberately destroyed during hostilities. Article 23(g) of the Hague 
Regulations, which reflects customary law,407 prohibits the destruction of 
the enemy’s property, ‘unless such destruction be imperatively demanded 
by the necessities of war’.408 ‘Destruction’ denotes certain conduct, such as 
burning houses or ‘setting ablaze, demolishing, or otherwise damaging 
property’,409 but it does not require a particular result, such as the complete 
shattering of property. It is accepted that ‘badly damaged property may be 
akin to partial destruction’, which qualifies as ‘destruction’.410 The phrase 
‘imperatively demanded by the necessities of war’, in turn, is an exceptional 
language that modifies the content of the humanitarian rule on the 
protection of property to which it is attached.  
Because IHL has been developed to reflect a realistic balance 
between military and humanitarian considerations, each IHL rule that 
permits a particular conduct in hostilities constitutes ‘the result of ‘equations’ 
that already include the ‘necessity-factor’’.411 Such equations may appear 
as an explicit element of the lex scripta using the language ‘necessity’ or 
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implicitly.412 Where a norm that mandates a certain humanitarian treatment 
anticipates a ‘potential collision’ with military considerations, it adjusts the 
balance by expressly permitting ‘deviations’ from the humanitarian rule 
insofar as such deviations are required by military necessity.413 Article 23(g) 
is one such case.414 In other words, Article 23(g) is a rule on the protection 
of property that also prescribes the conditions for its exemption; it is not a 
permission to destruct property. Nor is it a justification or an excuse for an 
unlawful destruction of property.415  
Measures that are required by ‘the necessity of war’ are not limited 
to measures that are required to secure the submission of the enemy.416 
For instance, in the William Hardman case, the Anglo-American Tribunal 
was established to hear a claim for reimbursement for losses of personal 
property by a British subject in Cuba when American forces, during the 
Spanish-American War, burned certain houses as health measures. The 
Tribunal held that the measures taken by the American force for the 
maintenance of its sanitary conditions constituted military necessity. Thus, 
the destruction of private foreign property was allowed and no 
compensation was due.417 In Hostage, as another example, the Military 
Tribunal held that, ‘the destruction of public and private property by 
retreating military forces which would give aid and comfort to the enemy 
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may constitute a situation coming within the exceptions contained in Article 
23(g)’.418  
To recap, under the hostilities paradigm States have a broad, but not 
unfettered, discretion to interfere with private property. This authority is 
circumscribed by military and humanitarian considerations, which translate 
into rules on the protection of private property from appropriation and 
destruction. As further explained in chapter 7, the violation of these rules is 
a violation of IHL that mandates reparation.419  
5. The Hague Law and the Customary Standard of Treatment of 
Foreign Property in War  
Having identified the main qualification on the dispossession of foreign 
investments under the law enforcement paradigm and the limits to the 
State’s ability to appropriate and destroy private property under IHL, this 
section deals with the customary standard of treatment of foreign 
investments in armed conflict.  
It is suggested that during the 20th century, The Hague Law rules on 
the treatment of property infiltrated the law on State responsibility for losses 
to alien property during war.420 This development occurred in the framework 
of claims for injuries to, or wrongful seizures of, private foreign property by 
revolutionists during civil unrest and by armed forces during the World 
Wars. In turn, this progressive development resulted in the emergence of a 
set of specific customary rules on State responsibility for damage to private 
foreign property in war. And so, only eight years after the adoption of 1907 
Hague Conventions and Regulations Borchard observed that, ‘a long 
course of practice and The Hague Regulations have given some authority 
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to certain rules for the treatment of alien property in the country of the 
territorial sovereign’.421 
American practice is illustrative.422 Following the Spanish – American 
War, the US Court of Claims and SCOTUS repeatedly addressed the legal 
status of American property in Cuba.423 Notably, these American instances 
consistently held that, the ‘property of citizens of the United States in Cuba 
was during the war with Spain to be regarded as enemy property subject to 
the laws of war, and to be destroyed whenever military necessity so 
demanded’.424 In Herrera v US (1912)425 SCOTUS clarified that, ‘all persons 
residing [in Cuba] pending the war, whether Spanish subjects or Americans, 
were to be deemed enemies of the United States, their property enemy’s 
property and subject to seizure, confiscation and destruction’.426  
During the 1920s and 1930s the policy of the State Department with 
respect to international claims on behalf of its nationals was that, ‘war 
damages which are caused in due course in the conduct of hostilities do not 
ordinarily form the basis for international reclamation.’427 What was 
considered as ‘due course in the conduct of hostilities’ was ‘determinable 
by reference chiefly’ to war law.428 Similarly, Borchard explained in 1915 
that, ‘no compensation is due to private individuals, on account of injuries 
to their persons or property, resulting from legitimate acts of war.’ As for 
‘what is a legitimate act of war’, it is answered by reference to ‘The Hague 
Regulations, and the instructions issued by national to their own armies.’429 
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In 1922, for instance, the State Department rejected the application 
of the Standard Oil Company of New York to bring a claim for the losses 
caused to the company in the Greek bombardment of Samsun, because the 
bombardment of American property was justified under the Hague 
Conventions.430 On the same grounds, the US refused to file a 
compensation claim against Germany for losses to American property that 
resulted from the bombardment of Almería, Spain.431 In 1923, as another 
example, the US contended before that Anglo-American Claims 
Commission that it was entitled to treat a British-owned property ‘as having 
the character of enemy property’, and insofar as its destruction ‘was a 
necessity of war [it gave] rise to no obligation to make compensation’.432 
The Commission agreed and maintained that British property was ‘subject 
to destruction without compensation in case of necessity of war.’433 The 
Commission also explained that requisition of foreign property in wartime 
for certain purposes is a right of the belligerent; this right is ‘not absolute but 
limited, and is in reality only itself acquired in consideration of the payment 
of compensation.’434 
Along a similar line, international fora that were established during 
the 20th century to hear claims for the interferences with private foreign 
property during hostilities, such as the Netherlands – Venezuelan Claims 
Commission,435 the US – Venezuelan Claims Commission,436 the Mixed 
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Claims Commission (US – Germany),437 the Spanish Treaty Claims 
Commission,438 the Nicaragua Mixed Claims Commission,439 the American 
–Turkish Claims Settlement,440 and Max Huber in the Spanish Zone of 
Morocco,441 all assumed that the destruction and appropriation of private 
foreign property were lawful only subject to the qualifications of military 
necessity and the limitations of customary war law.442  
Codification attempts that were made by the League of Nations also 
evince the relationship between the Hague Law and the protection of foreign 
property abroad.443 Illustratively,444  Basis 21 of the 1930 Hague 
Codification Conference was formulated based on the positions of the 
participating States regarding the instances when the State is under an 
obligation to compensate aliens for losses to their property owing to various 
forms of hostilities. From these responses, the Codification Commission 
distilled a consensus over the standard of treatment of private foreign 
property in war and the consequences of its violations.445 Basis 21 read: 
A State is not responsible for damage caused to the person or property of 
a foreigner by its armed forces or authorities […] The State must, however: 
 
437 Eg: Administrative Decision VII (US and Germany) VII RIAA (1925) 248. 
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(1) Make good damage to foreigners by the requisitioning… their property 
by its armed forces or authorities; 
(2) Make good damage caused to foreigners by destruction of property by 
its armed forces or authorities, or by their orders, unless such 
destruction is the direct consequence of combat acts; 
(3) Make good damage caused to foreigners by acts of its armed forces or 
authorities where such acts manifestly went beyond the requirement of 
the situation or where its armed forces or authorities behaved in a 
manner manifestly incompatible with the rules generally observed by 
civilized States…446 
It should be clarified that the term ‘requisition’ in the above-cited 
Basis 21 is used as a shorthand for a taking of private property for military 
purposes against compensation, and not in its strict-sense as a formal 
demand of the occupying force for the use of property or services. A review 
of the materials from which the language of Basis 21 derives supports this 
view. The Codification Commission asked States to express their opinion 
on the international responsibility for damage to the property of foreigners 
owing to ‘requisitions, etc.’447 This question did not focus on belligerent 
occupation nor was it limited to measures qualifying as requisition 
specifically. Indeed, States did not direct their responses to situations of 
occupation or ‘requisition’ pointedly, they rather used the terms 
‘appropriation’, ‘requisition’, and ‘confiscation’ interchangeably.448 Overall, 
it is suggested that the cited Basis 21 reflects the governing legal position 
on the standard of treatment of private foreign property during war and the 
State’s responsibility to compensate for losses to such property.  
Contemporaneous scholarship supports this proposition.449 
Brochard explained that under the prevailing legal position, the standard of 
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treatment of private foreign property during war ‘may be measured by the 
state’s obligation… to observe the rules of international law and of war’.450 
Also of note here is Eagleton, who handily summarized the customary 
standard of treatment of alien property during war: 
The belligerent may requisition, but he must pay for what he takes; he may 
destroy or damage, but only… that property which, unless seized or 
destroyed, presents an obstacle to a military operation or jeopardizes the 
safety of his troops. If the belligerent does not observe these principles, he 
may be held responsible in international law, and may be called upon to 
make reparation... 451 
6. Modern Investments Treaty Provisions Incorporate Customary 
IHL Rules on Appropriation and Destruction of Private Property  
This section focuses on the treaty standard of treatment of investments 
during armed conflict as expressed in the language of the EWC. It is 
suggested that under the customary rules of treaty interpretation, the 
language ‘requisition by forces and authorities’ and ‘destruction not required 
by the necessity of the situation’ are terms of art that make a reference to 
customary law. Therefore, the meaning of the treaty rule in the EWC is 
ascertained through the content of the customary norms on requisition and 
destruction of foreign private property in wartime.452 It is also suggested that 
an IHL-informed meaning of the EWC brings further clarity to practical, 
contested aspects of the provision, namely the burden of proof and the 
threshold of invocation. 
Many investment instruments, including the instruments of conflict-
ridden States contain explicit stipulations that prescribe a right to 
compensation under certain circumstances.453 These treaty mechanisms 
are known as EWC. For instance, Article 9 of the Morocco – Nigeria BIT 
(2016) reads: 
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1) Investors of one Party whose investments in the territory of the other 
Party suffer losses due to war, armed conflict, revolution, state of national 
emergency, insurrection, civil disturbances or other similar events… 
2) … resulting from:  
a) requisitioning of their property by its forces or authorities; or  
b) destruction of their property by its forces or authorities, which was not 
caused in combat action or was not required by the necessity of the 
situation;  
shall be accorded restitution or adequate compensation.454 
The cited language ordinarily indicates that such clauses encompass 
instances when, say, a Moroccan investment in Nigeria suffers losses owing 
to its destruction by Nigerian forces in the framework of a military operation 
against the Niger Delta Avengers.455 This clause also covers the ‘requisition’ 
or ‘destruction’ of, say, a Nigerian investment in Morocco by Moroccan 
forces during a massive protest in Rabat. A separate question is what do 
these concepts of ‘destruction’ and ‘requisition’ mean in the context of 
investment treaties? As this is an interpretive issue, it is resolved by way of 
applying the customary rules of treaty interpretation, as codified in the 
VCLT.  
The first element of the general rule of interpretation under VCLT 
Article 31 requires giving the terms of the treaty an ordinary meaning, i.e., 
identifying the ‘regular, normal, or customary use of the term’.456 The idea 
is that words are interpreted in the technical and professional meaning they 
have in the particularly relevant community of word-users.457 Therefore, to 
ascertain the ordinary meaning of ‘requisition’ and ‘destruction not required 
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by the necessity of armed conflict’, under Article 31(1), the interpreter is 
required to look not to dictionaries but to the manner in which these phrases 
were used in ‘the parlance of lawyers’458 ‘in the particular context’ of 
investment treaties,459 i.e., to the technical meaning of these expression.  
The analysis of State practice, jurisprudence, and doctrine in section 
4 above demonstrates that in the first half of the 20th century, the language 
‘requisition by the armed forces’ and ‘destruction not required by the 
necessity of war’ (and like formulations) was used in the context of State 
responsibility for losses to alien property during war as a reference to 
customary war law. Post-WWII authorities followed the same practice. The 
words of the Abs – Shawcross draft Convention on Investment Abroad may 
be taken as representative of the prevailing legal position in 1960, whereby 
‘the generally accepted laws of war delineated the treatment of aliens’:460 
First, ‘the destruction of or damage to the property of an alien is wrongful, 
unless it is required by the circumstances of urgent necessity’.461 Second, 
‘requisition by the authorities’ of foreign property is considered a ‘valid 
exercise of belligerent rights’ in return for compensation.462  
 Importantly, as with the language of Basis 21 of the Hague 
Codification Conference,463  the term ‘requisition’ is used in modern 
investment instruments as a shorthand for appropriation of private property 
by the State’s armed forces during armed conflict for military needs and 
against compensation. By using the term ‘requisition’ in investment treaties 
States do not intend to prescribe rules for the taking of investments in 
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occupation specifically.464 In fact, ‘occupation’ is not enumerated under a 
single war clause as one of the ‘situations’ covered by the provision (eg:  
‘war, armed conflict, revolution, state of national emergency’). That being 
so, there is no reason to assume that ‘requisition’ under the EWC pertains 
to a situation that is not stipulated in the provision (occupation) but does not 
pertain to any of the situations that are expressly covered by the provision.  
Moreover, a strict-IHL reading of ‘requisition’ whereby the scope of 
takings covered by the EWC is limited to situations of occupation alone, 
leaving out all other prevalent forms of armed conflict, leads to an absurd 
outcome that cannot be reconciled with practice. Why would States address 
the protection of investments in belligerent occupation but not, say, in 
NIACs, the more prevalent type of hostilities? Arguably, some States (eg: 
Israel) might be interested in arranging the regulation of foreign investments 
in occupied territories, which may explain why a provision on requisition 
(senso stricto) will appear in their investment treaties. However, this does 
not explain over 1,000 other treaty mechanisms of States that have no 
involvement in occupation and no reason to arrange the regulation of 
dispossession of investments in occupation specifically.465  
Accordingly, it is argued that the term ‘requisition’ in the EWC is a 
technical term with a ‘special’ meaning, in the sense of VCLT Article 
31(4),466  which is not the jus in bello ordinary meaning of the term. Although 
the VCLT does not explain how or where to find the special meaning of a 
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term,467 it is suggested that Article 31(4) is likely to assume relevance where 
the ‘special meaning’ can be derived from materials and circumstances that 
are extrinsic to the treaty subject-matter of interpretation.468 The above 
review of the materials of the 1930 Hague Codification Conference and 
contemporary treaty language reveals the intention of States to give the 
term ‘requisition’, in the context of investment protection, a broad meaning 
that encompasses appropriation of property during armed conflict by the 
State forces for military needs against compensation.   
Overall, it is proposed that the meaning of the phrases ‘requisition by 
armed forces’ and ‘destruction of property not required by the necessity of 
the situation’ has a recognized meaning under international law, which 
references customary law. If the technical, be it ordinary or be it special, 
meaning of ‘requisition by armed forces’ and ‘destruction of property not 
required by the necessity of the situation’ references the customary 
standard of treatment of foreign property, then under the VCLT, the 
meaning of the EWC is ascertained by way of examining the content of the 
customary rules on the treatment of alien property.  
A different interpretive route to an arguably similar outcome may be 
found in VCLT Article 31(3)(c), whereby the IHL norms on the appropriation 
and destruction of property are brought into the interpretive exercise by way 
of ‘taking it into account’ as a ‘relevant rule of international law’.469 Indeed, 
the ILC proposed that, custom is ‘of particular relevance to the interpretation 
of a treaty under article 31(3)(c)’ where the ‘terms used in the treaty have a 
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recognized meaning in customary international law’470 and the EWC is 
arguably one such case.   
For the purpose of the present analysis suffice it to say that, for a 
certain legal instrument to be ‘taken into account’ under Article 31(3)(c) it 
must meet several cumulative admissibility conditions. It must be a rule of 
international law; which is relevant; and applicable; between the parties and 
their relations.471 Briefly put, the concept of ‘rules’ encompasses treaties, 
custom, and general principles.472 The notion of ‘parties’ denotes an overlap 
between the parties to the treaty subject-matter of interpretation and the 
other ‘rules of international law’.473  
Finally, there seems to be a spectrum of ‘relevant rules’. On one end 
of the scale is the view that, ‘in order to be ‘relevant’ for purposes of 
interpretation, rules of international law […] must concern the same subject-
matter as the treaty terms being interpreted’,474 while on the opposite end 
is the notion that almost all rules of international law are ‘relevant’ if treated 
with a certain amount of abstraction.475 If a rule passes these admissibility 
hurdles it will be taken into account ‘together with the context’. Taking a rule 
‘into account’ does not mean that it supplants the treaty language under 
examination.476 This rather entails something on the continuum between 
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‘drawing inspiration’,477 ‘consideration’,478 and direct ‘application’, of this 
relevant rule.479  
Thus, compared to the above-suggested interpretation technique of 
the language ‘destruction not required by the necessity of war’ and 
‘requisition by the armed forces’ (and like formulations) through Articles 
31(1) or 31(4), the relative weight of the interpretive technique of Article 
31(3)(c) is rather limited. This proposition however should not be taken as 
a statement of a personal preference, but rather as a reflection of the 
customary rules on treaty interpretation. Put a different way, the two ways 
of bringing customary law into the process of interpretation entail different 
assessments and different effects.  
If the language ‘destruction not required by the necessity of war’ and 
‘requisition by the armed forces’ (and like expressions) has an identifiable 
(ordinary or special) meaning in international law, and it is argued that it 
does, then this should be accounted for through the language itself, not its 
context.480 As one commentator explained: 
In the argument by Article 31(1) or Article 31(4) the benchmark is 
the content of (the reference in) the treaty rule and the interpretative 
weight directly affects ordinary or special meaning. In the argument 
by Article 31(3)(c), the benchmark of admissibility is the subject 
matter of the treaty rule and the interpretative weight is limited to that 
of context.481 
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Overall, it is proposed that a VCLT-consistent interpretation, which is 
further supported by supplementary means of interpretation such as the 
historical development of the EWC,482 leads to an IHL-informed meaning of 
the EWC as proposed above. Of course, it may be argued that even if in the 
mid-20th century States introduced the EWC to investment treaties with the 
intention to award them a recognized meaning under customary war law, 
modern instruments have no such intention.  
Yet, it is submitted that if the treaty language itself makes a reference 
to customary law, pursuant to VCLT Article 31, then to preclude this 
reference and to award phrases, such as ‘destruction not required by the 
necessity of the situation’, a meaning other than their technical recognized 
meaning in customary law, it should be ‘established that the parties so 
intended’.483 Such is the case with the use of the term ‘requisition’, for 
instance, which entails ‘appropriation of private foreign property for military 
needs during armed conflict’ and not the accepted meaning of ‘requisition’ 
under the law of occupation.  
This is not the case however for the phrase ‘destruction of property 
not required by the necessity of the situation’ (and like formulations). As 
explained, there is nothing in the express treaty language, negotiations 
history, or the use of this treaty language over time to evince a clear 
intention of the parties to break from the customary IHL meaning of this 
phrase. On the contrary, this seems to be precisely the meaning that States 
awarded to this phrase over time. 
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The proposition that the language of the EWC makes a reference to 
customary law, pursuant to VCLT Article 31, has several conceptual and 
practical implications. Conceptually, what follows from the suggested 
interpretation is that the EWC deals with the obligation of States to pay 
compensation for lawful conduct and for unlawful conduct in the same 
breath. While compensation is prescribed as part of the primary rule for any 
requisition of investments insofar as it is carried out by the host State’s 
forces or authorities, the EWC also mandates compensation for destruction 
that fails to comply with certain conditions (‘not caused in’ and ‘not required 
by’), i.e., compensation as part of the secondary obligation.  
Although it may not appear elegant, it is only logical that the EWC 
includes elements of both primary and of secondary rules of international 
law. International law, in particular the law on the protection of foreign 
property, did not develop under the strict separation between rules that 
address the scope and content of international obligation on one hand, and 
the rules that deal with the legal consequences of the breach of any such 
obligation, on the other. Rather, the treatment of foreign property and the 
international responsibility thereof were construed in an ‘integrated’ 
manner.484 Traditional attitudes, such as those reflected in the materials of 
the 1930 Hague Conference, considered the subject of State responsibility 
as a matter concerned with injuries caused to foreigners.485 Illustratively, 
Basis 21 as cited above dealt with State responsibility for lawful requisition 
and for unlawful destruction under the umbrella of a single rule.486 The EWC 
essentially reiterates this 1930 ‘integrated’ norm structure.  
In practical terms, the reference to IHL means that the customary 
qualifications on dispossession are incorporated into the unqualified 
investment treaty provision.487 Therefore, irrespective of treaty language 
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which does not mention proportionality or humanity, destruction of foreign 
investments is in principle subject to an IHL proportionality assessment, 
which prohibits excessive destruction. Likewise, notwithstanding the treaty 
language, which does not mention ‘military necessity’, a lawful 
dispossession of foreign investments in armed conflict is only one that is 
justified by military necessity and against compensation. This also means 
that, as with compensation for lawful expropriation, the stipulation on the 
obligation to compensate in the EWC (‘adequate compensation’) is part of 
the primary obligation.488  
In turn, this potential resemblance between the EWC and 
expropriation raises the question of the interaction between both forms of 
property dispossession and the question whether the expropriation 
provision deems the EWC redundant. This concern over the possible 
redundancy of the EWC arises from the fact that while provisions that deal 
with the transfer of title and/or outright physical seizure of property are 
commonly known as ‘expropriation clauses’, they encompass other 
takings.489 Different concepts, such as ‘expropriation’, ‘taking’, 
‘nationalization’, ‘deprivation’, ‘dispossession’, or a combination thereof,490 
can be encountered in investment instruments. These terms are often used 
interchangeably with no clear elucidation as to their differences;491 their use 
typically depends on legal tradition and translation. Potentially, the 
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dispossession of private property in armed conflict may be said to be 
covered by the wide concept of ‘expropriation’. 
However, the regulation of expropriation does not negate the need 
for rules on appropriation of investments in armed conflict. While 
‘requisition’ is a form sui generis of expropriation for reasons of public utility 
that requires compensation, it substantively differs from expropriation. First, 
whereas expropriation may be grounded in various national priorities 
including health and safety, environmental consideration, and political 
agenda, the only national need that is capable of justifying appropriation of 
property (whether requisition, seizure, angary, etc.) in hostilities is military 
necessity.492  
Second, expropriation must also comply with due process. 
Dispossession of property under IHL is not conditioned upon these 
qualifications. In the case of requisition, in contrast to expropriation, the 
investor is not entitled to, say, an independent right of review or prior 
notification. In practical terms this means that a taking for a legitimate 
purpose against compensation that is lacking in due process may constitute 
lawful requisition but unlawful expropriation. Hence, the expropriation 
provision and the EWC do not fully overlap.  
An additional consequence that arises from the proposition that the 
EWC references customary law concerns the stringency of the treaty 
standard. Any legal norm may be made more or less stringent through the 
formulation of different burdens of proof, evidentiary standards, and 
thresholds of invocation.493  
Placing the EWC in the broader normative framework of IHL assists 
to elucidate the burden of proof under the EWC. It clarifies how to construe 
the language ‘destruction of property…that was not required by the 
necessity of the situation’ with respect to the burden of proof. This language 
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may be taken to establish a presumption of illegality, whereby the State 
must show that the destructing measure was necessary to accomplish a 
military purpose. Alternatively, this language may be construed as a 
presumption of legality under which the destructing measure is assumed to 
be lawful unless it is established that the measure was unnecessary to 
accomplish a military purpose. The former assumption disfavors the State, 
while the latter presumption favors the State. In this respect 
Eagleton  proposed that, ‘the wording of the Hague Convention’, which is 
referenced by the treaty language of the EWC, ‘makes it reasonable to say 
that the burden of proof is upon the belligerent to show that his seizure or 
destruction of private property was imperiously demanded by the 
necessities of war’.494  
Further, placing the EWC in the broader normative framework of IHL 
assists to ascertain the threshold of the provision’s invocation, as it brings 
further clarity to the meaning and role of the qualifiers of ‘necessity’, which 
may allow, in exceptional cases, to destroy property. In IHL instruments, the 
threshold of invocation of military necessity varies from ‘necessity’ 
(unqualified) through ‘imperative necessity’ under Article 23(g) of The 
Hague Regulations495 to ‘absolute necessity’ and like formulations.496 In 
contrast to IHL instruments, the EWC usually instructs that destruction that 
is ‘necessary’ (unqualified) will not invoke the responsibility of the State. 
Arguably, the use of qualifiers implies that IHL sets a different, potentially 
higher threshold of invocation relative to the unqualified EWC, thereby also 
raising the question of the interaction between the unqualified treaty rule 
and the customary standard.  
On this point, it is suggested that both the unqualified ‘necessity’ 
under the EWC and the ‘imperative’ threshold under The Hague Law, 
represent the same standard, since under IHL the qualifier ‘imperative’ is 
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conceived as a cosmetic, not a substantive adjective. In fact, the same 
question arose with respect to the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), which instructs that, destruction of property is not punishable under 
Articles 8(2)(b)(xiii) and 8(2)(e)(xii) if it is ‘imperatively demanded by the 
necessities of war’.497 Schabas explained that the language ‘imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of war’ is ‘an archaic expression borrowed 
from the 1907 Hague Convention.’498 Dinstein went even further and 
asserted on this point that, ‘the modern tendency is to regard all such 
adverbs [i.e., ‘absolute’ and ‘imperative’ necessity’] as synonymous and 
self-evident, and, therefore, redundant’.499 The same is true for the 
‘necessity’ of the EWC and its reference to customary law on the treatment 
of aliens. 
However, propositions as those expressed above have led some 
commentators to opine that EWCs ‘are arguably superfluous in light of the 
protection afforded private property under the laws of war.’500 But this is not 
accurate. First, the incorporation of custom into treaties removes any 
ambiguity over the acceptance of the customary rule, and its scope of 
application to investments.501 Additionally, incorporation of custom ensures 
that the [customary] standard as applied to covered investment ‘is 
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499Y Dinstein, ‘Military Necessity’, in (n 31) paras 12-3. 
500 S Gudgeon, ‘United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on Their Origin, 
Purpose, and General Treatment Standards’ (1986) 4 Int’l Tax & Bus L 105, 128. In 
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enforceable through the investor-state and state-state disputes 
provisions’.502  
Further, that the EWC references customary law by way of using 
technical terms of art with a recognized meaning under The Hague Law 
does not mean that modern investment instruments should be interpreted 
in accordance with 1907 war law. Of course, States are free to agree that a 
treaty norm is to be interpreted in accordance with customary law as it stood 
at a certain point in time.503 But the EWC does not explicitly reflect any such 
agreement. In fact, seeing as war law, and its exclusive focus on military 
necessity, has evolved considerably since The Hague Law into modern 
humanitarian law,504 it is absurd to propose that 21st century EWCs intend 
to apply war law norms, which modern war law itself no longer recognizes.  
It is suggested that the interpretation of the language of the EWC as 
a reference to customary law, pursuant to VCLT Articles 31(1) and 31(4), 
accommodates flexibility and allows for development. Thus, if the 
customary rules on requisition and destruction of property evolve, and 
indeed The Hague Law has evolved in the Geneva Law as discussed in the 
next chapter 4, then the treaty reference will reflect any such change.  
7. Conclusion 
This chapter focused on dispossession and destruction of foreign 
investments under the paradigm of hostilities.  
It was established that under IHL, States have a broad authority to 
interfere, subject to certain qualifications, with the right to use, own, or 
control a foreign investment. Under customary war law as codified in The 
Hague Law, appropriation is lawful if it is required by military necessity and 
against compensation. Destruction of property is, conversely, prohibited. 
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Exceptionally, property may be destroyed only when required by military 
necessity and subject to a proportionality assessment. Because destruction 
of property is prohibited as a rule, in contrast to requisition, when the 
destruction is lawful for military needs it does not denote compensation. It 
was then established that these IHL rules infiltrated the law on the protection 
of foreign property abroad during the 20th century and shaped the 
customary standard of treatment of foreign property during war. The 
practical implication of this historical development is that, today, IHL is 
effectively incorporated in the language of the EWC.  
In broader terms it may be said that the one important practical take 
away from this discussion is that the assessment of the international 
responsibility of the State for lethal measures that result in the total or partial 
dispossession (including destruction) of foreign investments is in principle 
no different than the assessment of the State’s responsibility for lethal 
measures that result in the loss of life. First, the applicable legal paradigm 
must be established (paradigm of hostilities or the paradigm of law 
enforcement). Then, the measure at issue ought to be property 
characterized (confiscation, seizure, requisition, destruction, etc.) so as to 
identify the qualifications against which the lawfulness of the conduct is to 
be assessed. Only then, can it be determined whether the international 
responsibility is invoked for the conduct at issue. 
And so, just as it cannot be said that every State measure that results 
in loss of life is a violation of international law on grounds that it is an 
arbitrary deprivation of life in breach of human rights law (any more than it 
can be presupposed that every loss of life is necessarily lawful incidental 
damage), it cannot be said that every taking of property in armed conflict is 
either lawful or unlawful expropriation. The law of armed conflict recognizes 
a range of various interferences with private property that differ by their 
qualifications from expropriation. Ignoring this fact risks holding a State 






On a higher level of abstraction, this analysis demonstrates one, 
complementary level of interaction between IHL and investment law. It was 
argued that the codification of war law in the Hague instruments facilitated 
a progressive development of the law on State responsibility for damage to 
foreign property, which eventually resulted in the formation of a customary 
standard of treatment. Today, investment treaties incorporate this 
customary standard in the EWC. Thus, the historical backdrop allows us to 
interpret IHL and investment law norms in a compatible manner and thus, 
to ‘avoid’ (in the sense of chapter 1) a potential conflict between IHL and 








The Treatment of Foreign Investment under the Contemporary Law 
of Targeting  
 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 addressed the IHL rules on the protection of private property as 
reflected in The Hague Law and the interaction of those rules with 
customary and conventional standards of investment protection. That 
chapter concluded with the proposition that IHL is ever-developing and that 
any such development also affects the protection of investment in warfare. 
In continuance, this chapter addresses several such developments in the 
contemporary law and policy of targeting. Targeting describes the 
deliberate process followed by a military commander in deciding against 
which objectives she will apply force. Hence, the act of targeting is 
distinguished from the conduct of attacking a target, which is the actual 
application of force.505 
In contrast to The Hague Law, subject of chapter 3, the Geneva 
Conventions and the Additional Protocols do not speak in terms of ‘property’ 
but in terms of ‘objects’. While the Hague Law regulates the treatment of 
private ‘enemy’ and ‘neutral’ property, the Geneva Law regulates the 
treatment of ‘civilian objects’, which are protected from direct attacks, and 
‘military objectives’ that may be targeted under certain circumstances. As a 
preliminary step, therefore, section 2 addresses the relationship between 
the concepts of ‘property’ and ‘objects’ and the interaction between the 
Hague Laws and the Geneva Law as regards targeting.  
Establishing in section 2 that the rules on the protection of objects 
from attacks under the Geneva Law operationalize the rules on the 
protection of private property under The Hague Law, section 3 proceeds to 
focus on API Article 52. Article 52(1) instructs that, ‘civilian objects shall not 
be the object of attack’ and that ‘civilian objects are all objects which are not 
 





military objectives’. If so, to ascertain whether a certain artefact is protected 
from an attack, it is necessary to determine if it is a military objective. 
Accordingly, section 3 focuses on API Article 52(2), which defines a ‘military 
objective’ using a two-pronged test. At the next step, the discussion focuses 
on the classification of investments as targets in today’s reality of 
belligerency. The discussion examines two contentious classes of targets 
that emanate in practice from the ambiguity over the definition of ‘military 
objective’ under API Article 52: dual-use objects (section 4) and revenue-
generating objects (section 5).  
Overall, it is not the purpose of this chapter to cover the entire body 
of international law concerning target selection during international armed 
conflict, but rather to provide a contemporary and more detailed analysis of 
the law concerning targeting that applies to conflict-ridden host States 
specifically, and thereby to provide a broader analytical framework of the 
normative reality in which investments operate during hostilities. This 
analysis demonstrates that in modern warfare, foreign investments in 
certain economic sectors are particularly prone to classification as military 
objectives, which may be subject to lawful attacks. Such war practices 
appear to directly contradict concomitant standards of investment protection 
and undermine investment promotion and facilitation policies. Aware of this, 
this chapter cautiously suggests that foreign investment law and policy may 
be used to induce States to observe certain limits when engaging in armed 
violence, and thus investments serve as an informal restraining qualification 
on the conduct of hostilities. 
2. The Interaction between The Hague Law and the Geneva Law on 
Targeting 
This section explains the interaction and normative link between the 
discussion in chapter 3 above and the analysis of targeting in this chapter 
4. It elucidates that while The Hague Law (as addressed in chapter 3) 
circumscribes the destruction of property by ‘imperative military necessity’, 





to attacks on targets, means that only property that makes an effective 
contribution to military action may be destroyed, and only if such destruction 
in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Thus, to examine whether a destruction of property (including foreign 
investments) ‘was required by the necessity of the situation’ under the EWC, 
in some circumstances it is necessary to assess whether this property 
(including foreign investment) is a ‘military objective’ susceptible to 
targeting.  
To so assert, this discussion of the law of targeting must start with some 
account of the sources of that law, and of how those sources relate to one 
another. Accordingly, before dealing with the content of the rules of API on 
targeting, this section addresses the relationship between these rules and 
the aforementioned Article 23(g) HR, which prohibits destruction of property 
unless required by imperative military necessity. 
Relative to antiquity when the sovereign exercised unlimited powers 
over the property of the vanquished party, The Hague Law represents a 
move toward humanitarianism. Nonetheless, the Law of the Hague was 
drawn up at a time when attitudes on private property in times of armed 
conflict reflected prevailing notions of ‘laissez-faire and a clear separation 
between the property of the sovereign and that of individuals’, and the 
provisions of the Hague Regulations reflect these attitudes.506 The Geneva 
Law developed some of these perceptions and attitudes. In contrast to The 
Hague Law, the 1949 and 1977 instruments do not speak in terms of 
‘property’,507 let alone ‘enemy property’, but rather in terms of ‘objects’ and 
‘objectives’. Under the principle of distinction – the cornerstone of the 
modern law of armed conflict – attacks are permitted only against ‘military 
objectives’, whereas ‘civilian objects’ shall not be the object of deliberate 
attacks. However, while the Geneva Conventions repeatedly refer to 
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‘military objectives’,508 they do not define the term. Such a definition is 
provided only in API Article 52. For this reason, the discussion of target 
selection under the Geneva Law is conducted within this ambit. 
The ordinary meaning of the term ‘object’ denotes ‘something that is 
visible and tangible’,509 distinguished from abstract notions such as the 
goals and aims of the conflicting parties.510 In a similar vein, the concept of 
‘objectives’ under IHL does not mean goals, desired achievements, or 
purposes, as under colloquial, everyday language, but rather concrete 
artefacts. On the point of this special meaning, the ICRC Commentaries to 
API elucidate that ‘both the English and French texts [of API] 
intended tangible and visible things by the word ‘objective’, and not 
the general objective (in the sense of aim or purpose) of a 
military operation’.511  
Mindful of the discussion in chapter 3, it appears that the concepts 
of ‘object’ and ‘objective’ at the core of the Geneva Law partially overlap 
with the notion of ‘property’ which is the subject-matter of the Law of The 
Hague. This implies that two concomitant sets of rules regulate the 
treatment of a given article in armed conflict. Thus, the destruction of an 
artefact is potentially regulated by the Article 23(g), under which destruction 
of property is permitted only when it is required by imperative military 
necessity, and by API Article 52(2), which permits attacks that may result in 
total or partial destruction of an object, only if this object qualifies as a 
military objective. But how do HR Article 23(g) and API Article 52(2) 
interact? 
There are several views on this point. Henderson, for one, opined 
that, while the rules on property protection under The Hague Law ‘are still 
in force and indeed considered to represent customary international law… 
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API has superseded’ them.512 As an example, he suggested that because 
‘Article 52 API provides the same protection for undefended towns’ as that 
mandated by HR Article 25, which deals with the protection for undefended 
towns, villages etc., from attack or bombardment,513 ‘there is no need to 
consider separately article 25 when considering the lawfulness of an 
attack’.514 In this example, an undefended town would not meet the 
definition of military objective in Article 52(2) API; ‘and therefore would be a 
civilian object for the purposes of article 52(1) API; and therefore would be 
protected from attack in accordance with article 52(1) API’.515  
The ILA study group on ‘The conduct of hostilities under international 
humanitarian law’516 suggested that ‘Article 23(g) HR and Article 52(2) API, 
if considered singularly, are quite distinct’. However, the Report of the Study 
Group goes on to suggest that both provisions reflect ‘identical’ customary 
norms, and therefore, ‘today in the conduct of hostilities any destruction due 
to attacks against property is exclusively regulated by the rule contained in 
Article 52(2) API’.517 This proposition led the Study Group to conclude that, 
‘in situations of hostilities, imperative military necessity does not allow 
attacking an object that does not constitute a military objective under Article 
52(2) API and the corresponding rule of customary law’.518 Dederer, as 
another example, suggests that the rules on the destruction and 
appropriation of enemy property under The Hague Law are ‘flanked’ – but 
not supplanted or negated – ‘by the more modern principle of distinction, 
which has become a norm of customary international law as well’.519  
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These views are not mistaken, but they are not accurate either. It is 
suggested that API Article 52 does not ‘supersede’ the rules on the 
protection of property under the Hague Law per se. The concomitant 
existence of these rules is evidenced inter alia in the separate provisions of 
the Rome Statute. Article 8(2)(b)(ii) concerns the principle of distinction 
while Article 8(2)(b)(xiii) addresses destruction of enemy property.520 API 
does not flank Article 23(g) either. Although there is some overlap in the 
scope of both norms, there are also practical521 and conceptual522 
distinctions between the two.523  
For the purposes of the present discussion it is suggested that API 
Article 52(2) operationalizes the notion of military necessity under Article 
23(g) HR in the context of targeting. While HR Article 23(g) circumscribes 
the destruction of property by ‘imperative military necessity’, API Article 
52(2) spells-out that ‘military necessity’ with respect to ‘attacks’ on targets 
means that only property that makes ‘an effective contribution to military 
action’ may be destroyed, and only if such destruction ‘in the circumstances 
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage’.524 A similar rationale 
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was followed in Katanga. The Trial Chamber explained that property which 
is ‘protected from the destruction or seizure under international law of armed 
conflict’ in the sense of Article 23(g) is a ‘civilian object’, i.e., property that 
does not meet the definition of a military objective under API Article 52(2).525 
Hence, whether private foreign property is protected from or subject to 
targeting turns on its classification as a ‘civilian object’ under Article 52. 
3. Target Classification under API Article 52(2)  
It follows from the conclusion of the previous section that the treatment of 
investments under the modern law of targeting is mostly circumscribed by 
the rules on the treatment of objects and military objectives. Accordingly, 
this section analyzes the definition of ‘military objective’ as prescribed in API 
Article 52(2). The inferences from this discussion are then used in sections 
4 and 5 to assess when, in the contemporary practice of targeting, 
belligerents may target foreign investments and when are investments 
classified as ‘civilian objects’ that cannot be targeted.  
IHL does not define ‘civilian objects’. This concept is defined a 
contrario; a civilian object is one which is not a ‘military objective’.526 This 
means that to learn what a protected object is, it is first necessary to identify 
what is a targetable objective. Article 52(2) API, which is widely recognized 
as customary law,527 sets out the two-pronged definition of ‘military 
objectives’, whereby: 
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[M]ilitary objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action 
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.528  
The language of Article 52(2) illuminates a significant aspect of the 
definition of ‘military objectives’ under IHL. While API prescribes a two-
pronged test for assessing whether something is a military objective, in no 
case does Article 52 provide that an object is ipso facto a military objective. 
This means that target selection is always fact-based and context sensitive. 
Under the first prong of Article 52(2) API, the targetability of an object 
is determined by the examination of its use and function with the armed 
forces.529 In this sense, an object can offer an ‘effective contribution’ to the 
military in four possible ways – nature, location, purpose, or use.530 The 
criterion of ‘location’ concerns the geographical features of the object.531 
Civilian buildings, for instance, may become military objectives if they 
obstruct the field of fire for an attack on another valid military objective.532  
An object that is ‘owned or usually controlled’ by the armed forces,533 
and possesses ‘intrinsic military significance’,534 would qualify as a military 
objective by its ‘nature’.535 Such objects may include headquarters, military 
aircraft, and enemy warships.536 ‘Use’ refers to the object’s actual usage by 
the forces, i.e. whether it is presently used militarily either by the military 
itself or in a manner which benefits the forces.537 Finally, ‘military purpose’ 
is construed from an established intention of the belligerent as regards 
‘future’ use. The purpose of an object refers to the adversary’s known 
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intentions, not to ‘those figured out hypothetically in contingency plans’.538 
In practice, it is often more than one feature that will inform the target’s 
assessment. For instance, a tank is an object that is regularly used militarily, 
but its remote location from the battlefield, for instance, will reduce its 
relative military contribution.539  
Notably, the focus of the first prong is on the ‘effective contribution’ 
of the object, while it is ‘far less important to be able to pigeonhole’ how that 
contribution arises under one of the words nature, location, purpose or 
use.540 For the purposes of this discussion it is enough to explain that, 
‘effective’ does not denote a linear correlation or a direct causation between 
the object and its military contribution. It is mostly accepted that ‘effective 
contribution’ entails a ‘proximate nexus’ between the object and the war-
fighting.541 The original wording of the provision, as suggested by the ICRC, 
was concerned with objects that ‘contribute effectively and directly to the 
military effort’.542 This qualifier however was deliberately omitted.543 It 
follows that ‘effective contribution’ comprises not only direct, but indirect 
contributions to the military action.544 However, how indirect may any such 
contribution be is contentious, as further addressed below. 
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Whereas the first prong is concerned with the permitted classes of 
targets, the second part offers ‘tailor-made’ criteria for the assessment of 
military necessity with regard to objects. Under the second-prong of Article 
52(2), it is necessary to determine that given the circumstances ‘ruling at 
the time’, the ‘total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization’ of the 
objective ‘offers a definite military advantage’ to the military ‘action’. The 
language ‘circumstances ruling at the time’ is inherent to IHL and to the 
notion that a conduct in warfare is to be assessed in consideration to all 
factors and existing possibilities as they appeared to the commander at the 
time.545  
Article 52(2) clarifies that a ‘definite advantage’ ought to be of a 
‘military’ category, characteristic, or nature. This ‘military’ modifier is 
substantive. It excludes economic, civil, political, or national advantages 
from the scope of Article 52(2) API.546 At the same time, it is widely accepted 
that a military advantage is not restricted to ‘tactical gains’; the spectrum is 
necessarily wide, and it extends to the security of the attacking force.547 The 
qualifier ‘definite’ (‘military advantage’) is used as a term of limitation that 
requires a perceptible military advantage rather than a ‘hypothetical and 
speculative one’.548 This means that there should be a reasonable 
connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the 
enemy forces.549 Further, the drafting history of Article 52(2) API teaches 
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that an ‘extensive discussion took place’ before agreement was reached on 
the word ‘definite’. Among the qualifiers that had been considered and 
rejected at the Diplomatic Conference were – ‘distinct’, ‘direct’, ‘clear’, 
‘immediate’, ‘obvious’, ‘specific’, and ‘substantial’.550 The intentional 
rejection of these adjectives indicates that Article 52(2) API aims at a lower 
standard; ‘something that is capable of articulation and evaluation, rather 
than something that is, in a sense, certain or bound to happen’.551 
In sum, while the term ‘military objectives’ effectively informs the 
targetability of any private property, including investments, this definition of 
the concept leaves a lot to be desired. Each part of the multifaceted 
definition of Article 52(2) lends itself to ambiguity, which has resulted in 
practice in the formation of several controversial classes of targets, namely 
dual-use and revenue-generating targets.  
4. Targeting Investments under the Concept of Dual-Use Objects  
This section focuses on the classification of foreign investments under a 
controversial class of targets – ‘dual-use objects’. First, the section briefly 
outlines the meaning of ‘dual-use objects’ and the linguistic anchors of 
Article 52(2) that potentially allow for this class of targets. Then, several 
practices in Iraq and Israel are used to demonstrate that the law and policy 
of the conduct of hostilities potentially undermines the protection and 
promotion of foreign investment in certain economic sectors.  
For the purpose of the present discussion, it suffices to explain that 
in warfare particularly, the military also uses civilian infrastructure, 
telecommunications, and logistics. Objects that have both a civilian and a 
military application are commonly known as ‘dual-use objects’. To illustrate, 
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power-generating stations are used not only to grant civilians the access to 
clean water, but also to provide power to war industries.552  
It is not plentifully clear from the wording of API Article 52(2) that 
dual-use objects are lawful targets. But there is also nothing to explicitly 
prohibit dual-use targeting. To recall, the provision focuses on the military 
contribution of the object, but it pays no attention to the object’s contribution 
to civilian life. This arguably indicates that the civilian benefits of an object 
are of little to no significance to its classification as targets. Further, the term 
‘use’ in the provision is not modified by any adjectives (e.g. ‘primary’). Thus, 
any degree of military use, including secondary or marginal use, suffices to 
classify an object as a military objective.  
 State practice, doctrine, and jurisprudence, before and after the 
adoption of Article 52(2), indicate that dual-use objects are a permissible 
class of targets. Power generation stations, for instance, appear as a 
regular target as early as WWI.553 In modern warfare, States often classify 
(and attack) bridges, factories, industrial plants, ports, mines, power grids, 
broadcasting stations, etc., as dual-use objects. Judicial and scholarly 
jurisprudence also accepts that dual-use object may be classified as lawful 
targets.554  
But the ramifications of operations against dual-use objects are 
problematic. For instance, Iraq, like most modern States, uses an integrated 
electrical power grid. Thus, all power stations in Iraq contribute electricity to 
a grid which is used by all consumers, civil and military. During the 1990-
1991 Gulf War, the Coalition air campaign treated the integrated Iraqi 
 
552 L Green, ‘The Environment and the Law of Conventional Warfare’ (1991) 29 CYIL 222, 
233; M Schmitt, ‘Future War and the Principle of Discrimination’ (1998) 28 IYHR 51, 68; 
Henderson (n 505) 129-42. 
553 The targeting of electricity was also carried out in the two World Wars, in North Korea 
and Vietnam (M Roscini, ‘Targeting and contemporary aerial bombardment’ (2005) 54 
ICLQ, 411, 428. 
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of Attacks under International Humanitarian Law’ (2004) HPRC 1, 6-8 
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national grid infrastructure as lawful military targets, and removed 
approximately 80% of Iraq’s electricity generating capacity in order to deny 
the military access to electrical power and so weaken their control and 
command ability.555 However, these operations had serious side-effects on 
the civilian population since the shut-down of the electrical grid led to the 
shut-down of water purification and sewage treatment plant, which in turn 
resulted in ‘epidemics of gastroenteritis, cholera, and typhoid’ and 
thousands of civilian causalities.556  
While the humanitarian cost of this campaign casts doubt as to its 
compliance with the principle of proportionality, the lawfulness of the 
classification of power plants as targets attracted little attention. It is mostly 
accepted that the use of the plants made an ‘effective contribution’ to Iraqi 
military action since they were the principal source of electric power for the 
Iraqi forces.557 As Greenwood put it, ‘there is no intermediate category of 
‘dual use’ objects; either something is a military object, or it is not’,558 and 
there’s the rub, as Shakespeare put it in Hamlet.  
It should be borne in mind that in today’s reality of trade and 
investment liberalization foreign investments are often made in economic 
sectors that are prone to dual-use classification.559 Investment in the form 
 
555 C Byron, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Bombing Campaigns: Legitimate Military 
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557 US Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress 
(US DoD: Washington DC 1992); C Greenwood, ‘Current Issues in the Law of Armed 
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(Routledge 1993) 63, 73. 
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of, say, hydro plants,560 airport security services,561 telecommunications,562 
and certainly weapons production, may commonly be of primarily civilian 
nature, use, and purpose, but such investments also possess secondary 
military qualities, which may serve the armed forces in hostilities.  
Illustratively, in recent years General Electric (GE), a Boston 
headquartered enterprise, signed several multiyear agreements with the 
Iraqi Ministry of Electricity. Under these agreements, GE adds over 2 
gigawatts to Iraq’s power-generation capacity and builds a 3-gigawatt gas-
fired power plant in Basmaya, 40 kilometers east of Baghdad.563 The 
investment is part of Iraq’s effort to meet ‘the surging demand for power 
from the Iraqi people’ and ‘support the country’s focus on building its 
infrastructure and strengthening local industries’.564 This investment is 
desired for the development of Iraq and even required for the attainment of 
certain public aims. However, this investment also serves the Iraqi army and 
other foreign and international forces. Given that integrated power grids in 
Iraq were treated as military objectives, GE’s investment may arguably be 
attacked by Iraq’s adversary in future hostilities. Such targeting would 
necessarily undermine postwar reconstruction efforts in Iraq as well as 
attempts to promote and facilitate investment into Iraq.  
Notably, bombing campaigns in Iraq during the 21st century (eg: 
Operation Iraqi Freedom) were directed at power distribution facilities 
 
560 Eg: Amlyn v Croatia (pending) ICSID case No ARB/16/28. The dispute concerns 
investments in the construction of a biomass power plant. 
561 Eg: Abed El Jaouni v Lebanon (pending) ICSID case No ARB/15/3. The dispute 
concerns ownership of a company that operates a fleet of private jets for charter and lease 
throughout Europe and the Middle East. 
562 Eg: Lauder v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 3 September 2001 and CME v 
Czech Republic (Final Award and Separate Opinion) (2006) 9 ICSID Rep 264. These 
disputes concerned an investment in the field of information and communication, and 
programming and broadcasting activities. 
563 GE, ‘GE in Iraq’ <https://www.ge.com/power/case-studies/iraq-ministry-electricity> 
(accessed 6 June 2018). 
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instead of generation facilities, and they were carried out with carbon fibre 
bombs. While electricity and water supplies were interrupted in some cities, 
the electricity network was largely left intact. ‘Probably’, as Roscini posited, 
‘in order to facilitate the post-war reconstruction’.565 Such reconstruction is 
inherently linked to the promotion, facilitation, and protection of foreign 
investment. 
Further, even before the outbreak of hostilities, the classification of 
an investment as a dual-use object imposes certain humanitarian 
obligations upon States under the control or territory of which the investment 
is located. These obligations, in turn, result in various interferences with the 
ability to own or enjoy investments. To illustrate, since the Second Lebanon 
War of 2006, Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, repeatedly insisted that 
in any future armed conflict with Israel Hezbollah will target Haifa’s ammonia 
storage tank, which mainly serves the agriculture sector. Such an attack is 
alleged to have an effect tantamount to an atom bomb.566 True, a deliberate 
attack against a civilian industry plant is a violation of IHL, however aside 
from its civilian usage, ammonia is also used militarily as an alternate fuel, 
namely for combat jets. Arguably, the tank may be lawfully classified as a 
dual-use target by Hezbollah. Because ‘something is either a military 
objective, or it is not’, as Greenwood explained, the same is true if the 
ammonia tank is a foreign investment. In fact, this 12,000-ton storage 
container of ammonia is part of a longstanding US investment in Israel.567 
If this American investment is a military objective, by virtue of dual-
use classification, then Israel is obliged under IHL, ‘already during 
peacetime’,568 to remove and avoid locating it within, or near, densely 
populated areas and to take all other practicable precautions so as to 
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protect the civilian population under its control from the effects of attacks 
against this dual-use investment.569 Considering that the ammonia tank is 
located in the Haifa metropolitan area, the third-largest city in Israel, and 
accounting for the probability of an attack against it as evidenced in 
repeated threats by Hezbollah, and the magnitude of anticipated civilian 
damage thereof, the closure and removal of the tank is required by IHL.570 
Indeed, on 28 May 2017 the Israeli Supreme Court instructed the 
Government to discontinue the permit for the operation of the tank and 
ordered its closure, citing inter alia security concerns.571  
In sum, dual-use objects are recognized as a permissible class of 
targets under customary IHL, which subject to other conventional and 
customary restrictions, may be attacked. In today’s reality, dual-use objects 
in war-torn host States are often foreign investments. If such investments 
are susceptible to targeting and are potentially less protected due to their 
significance and contribution to the host State and its economy, the 
attempts to promote those investments into such States are effectively 
frustrated.  
5. Targeting Investments under the Doctrine of Revenue-
Generating Targets  
This section focuses on another controversial class of targets that 
increasingly challenges the promotion and protection of investments in 
hostilities – ‘revenue-generating targets’ (RGT). Accordingly, the meaning 
of ‘revenue-generating’ objects, the use of RGT in practice, and the 
 
569 Article 58, API. Chapter 5 offers a detailed analysis of this provision. 
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examine the preparations and defenses related to the hazardous materials in Haifa Bay. 
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are on record with me in their signed, Hebrew version). 





linguistic anchors of Article 52(2) that potentially allow for this class of 
targets are briefly addressed in turn. Then, the section examines the 
practice of Iraq and Afghanistan so as to demonstrate that the law and 
policy of RGT potentially undermine the protection and promotion of foreign 
investment. 
RGT are any economic infrastructure that generate revenue for an 
enemy’s armed forces,572 such as – production, transportation, storage, and 
distribution facilities of petroleum,573 energy resources,574 and generally any 
form of profit.575 Notably, the justification for targeting, say, oil assets does 
not arise from the military usage of the infrastructure as in the case of dual-
use objects; the argument is not that, say, petroleum is used to fuel military 
vehicles. Rather, the reasoning here lies with the potential revenues from 
the object, which may (or may not) be transferred to the armed forces, who 
may (or may not) use the money to sustain their war-fighting.  
Although revenues are not mentioned in Article 52(2) API, the 
ambiguity over the requirement that the object offers an ‘effective’ – but not 
‘direct’ – ‘contribution to the military action’, arguably allows for this practice. 
although (as discussed further below) this is a heavily contested issue.576 
According to the US, the main supporter of RGT, there are two main classes 
of targets that offer in practice an indirect but ‘effective’ contribution to the 
military in the sense of Article 52(2): Targets with war-fighting capabilities 
and targets with war-sustaining capabilities. While the expression ‘war-
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574 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact Sheet: Maintaining Momentum in 
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fighting’ may be considered as equivalent of the language ‘military action’ 
that is used in Article 52(2), ‘war-sustaining’ is much broader,577 for instance 
this category comprises petroleum that is used to generate revenue to 
sustain armed forces.578 
The view that Article 52(2) allows for RGT is particularly problematic 
for investment law and policy. First, taken at face value, the doctrine of 
revenue-generation essentially means that an investment is deemed 
targetable under IHL for the same reasons that merit its protection under 
international investment law. To recall, a foreign investment, which benefits 
from the protection of international law against certain State interferences, 
is an economic activity that normally entails common characteristics. Putting 
to one side the debate over these features, their interrelationship, and 
binding status,579 it may be said that, ordinarily an investment entails – profit 
and return, risk, duration, and a form of actual or anticipated contribution to 
the host State and its economy. In other words, revenue-generation and 
financial contribution to the State are inherent to foreign investments and 
their protection.  
Furthermore, foreign investment is often a prerequisite for transitions 
from conflict to peace. Hostilities-stricken States frequently seek to promote 
investments so as to benefit their economy and facilitate its transition from 
foreign aid to sustainable economic policy.580 Often, the economic sectors 
in which such host States pursue foreign capital inflows concern energy and 
natural resources.581 By definition, economic activities in these sectors 
generate revenues for the State, which are also used militarily and in pursuit 
of national security aims. If IHL is read to recognize such economic activities 
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as a permitted class of targets, then investments are prone to classification 
as revenue-generating targets.  
However, the practice on RGT is far from settled. In contrast to the 
debate over dual-use objects, there is no widespread or consistent State 
practice prior to the adoption of API (1977) to evidence that RGT were 
recognized as customary law prior to the adoption of API. The first clear use 
of the doctrine concerned the American defense in the Hannah Case, which 
concerned the destruction of British cotton by Union forces during the 
American Civil War.582 There, the British agent argued that the deliberate 
destruction of British property breached the conventional and customary 
obligation to guarantee that ‘merchants and traders…shall enjoy the most 
complete protection and security for their Commerce’.583 The main defense 
of the US was that, British ‘cotton in the insurrectionary States was 
peculiarly and eminently a legitimate subject for such destruction’ because 
the revenues from cotton sustained the war-fighting of the Confederacy.584  
The Hannah case was mentioned in US manuals starting from the 
1980s as evidence that, ‘as long ago as the 1870s… international courts 
recognized that the destruction of Confederate bales of cotton was justified 
during the American Civil War, since the sale of cotton provided funds for 
importing almost all Confederate arms and ammunition’.585 However, this is 
 
582 US Air Force, Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict AFP 110-34 
(1980); US Department of the Navy - JAG, ‘Annotated Supplement to the Commanders 
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a misstatement of the law. Although the British claim was rejected, the 
American argument on RGT was not accepted; the case was dismissed on 
grounds of attribution, and ‘upon this ground’ alone.586 Indeed, the DoD 
LOAC manual does not reiterate the reference to an ‘international 
precedent’ from the 19th century.587 If so, there is no widespread or settled 
State practice before 1977 to evidence that API ‘preserved’ or incorporated 
customary law on RGT.588  
Nor can it be said that there is widespread or consistent State 
practice on RGT post-API that indicates that a rule of customary law evolved 
on the basis of the wording of Article 52(2). The permissibility of RGT was 
dismissed in the final report of the Office of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concerning 
the NATO campaign in in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.589 The idea 
of RGT was considered and ‘firmly rejected’ in drafting the 1994 San Remo 
Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea.590 
Likewise, the proposition that military objectives comprise RGT was 
 
support enemy operations may also be attacked to gain a definite military advantage. For 
example, an 1870 international arbitral tribunal recognized that the destruction of cotton 
was justified during the American Civil War since the sale of cotton provided funds for 
almost all Confederate arms and ammunition’. 
586 There, the US filed a demurrer whereby even if the destruction of revenue-generating 
objects is deemed unlawful, this wrongful act is not attributable to the US, for that particular 
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excluded in the deliberations of the 2009 Harvard Humanitarian Policy and 
Conflict Research Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile 
Warfare,591 and in drafting the 2013 Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare.592  
In fact, aside from the destruction of cotton in the 19th century, there 
are only two clear uses of RGT, and both are highly controversial: anti-
narcotic operations in Afghanistan and operations against petroleum assets 
in Iraq. As regards the fight against narcotics, the normative framework 
applicable to the counter-narcotic operations is domestic and international 
human rights laws under a law enforcement paradigm. However, it has been 
asserted that narcotic facilities, fields, labs, and other objects can also be 
subject to military action since the profits of drug-trafficking supports the 
insurgency the sense of API Article 52.593 These operations are mostly 
criticized as unlawful.594 
The other more recent use of RGT concerns Daesh. In recent years, 
the US launched a ‘wave of strikes against oil infrastructure, tanker trucks, 
wells and refineries’ in Iraq so as to undermine Daesh’s financial base.595 
The position of the Obama Administration was that targeting of petroleum 
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infrastructure is permitted under API Article 52(2) because ‘ISIL’s oil 
production and revenues are significantly reduced’ by such operations, and 
because ‘every dollar we deny them means one less dollar to pay their 
fighters and to fund their terror’.596 The current Administration follows suit.597 
As with cotton and narcotic-industries, these operations are not widely 
endorsed.  
But the dearth of State practice alone does not dispose of the entire 
argument on RGT. Technological progress, by nature and essence, entails 
the emergence of concepts and categories that are initially ‘untied’ to any 
State practice or opinio juris regarding the interpretation of the concomitant 
legal issues. ‘In the dynamic circumstances of armed conflict’, as Bothe et 
al. remarked already in 1982, ‘objects which may have been military 
objectives yesterday, may no longer be such today and vice versa’.598 But 
it is not simply the lack of State practice but the proper treaty interpretation 
of Article 52 on a whole that demonstrates that IHL excludes bombing RGT. 
And this prohibition withstands technological developments.  
First, there is nothing in the ordinary language of Article 52(2) to 
indicate that RGT are covered. On the contrary, the double repetition of the 
qualifier ‘military’ in Article 52(2)599 excludes any and all economically-
motivated advantages and contributions from the assessment of the 
permitted class of targets. Even assuming that there is doubt as to the 
classification of economic targets under Article 52(2), then Article 52(3) 
instructs that, ‘in cases of doubt whether an object which is normally 
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dedicated to civilian purposes…is being used to make an effective 
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not.’600  
Even assuming arguendo that the wording of Article 52 allows 
bombing RGT, humanitarian considerations that pervade IHL and its object 
and purpose weigh against it, since it is inherently difficult to identify the 
limiting principles that guard against unintentional slippery slopes in the 
application of RGT.601 On this point, Goodman, a leading proponent of RGT, 
argues that the ‘three clearest and primary historic examples’ in support of 
targeting war-sustaining revenue – cotton (Confederacy), narcotics 
(Taliban), and petroleum (Daesh) – demonstrate that a ‘limiting principle 
might be’ that RGT are only those that constitute a ‘regular, indispensable, 
and principal source for directly maintaining military action’.602  
This proposition is not convincing. Over time, as evinced by 
Goodman’s examples, RGT were expanded from cotton artefacts, to poppy 
fields and opium production objects, through any economic activities that 
may be taxed by insurgents, to oil production assets, natural resources, and 
finally – cash storages. The thought that RGT will next be broadened to 
cover banks, for instance, is not science fiction. A US Air Force Judge 
Advocate General proclaimed as early as 2001 that, ‘bank accounts, 
financial institutions, shops, entertainment sites, and government buildings’ 
are susceptible to targeting as RGT.603 
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In fact, the campaign against Daesh itself does not meet Goodman’s 
‘limiting principle’. According to the International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation, six major categories of income support Daesh – taxation and 
other fees, kidnaping, foreign donations, looting, antiquities, and the 
exploitation of natural resources, including oil. Of these six, taxes account 
for most of Daesh’s income during 2014 – 2016. At its highest, oil revenues 
accounted for the second-most significant source of income. Most of this oil 
was used for domestic consumption. Only some of it seems to have been 
sold and/or smuggled into neighboring territories in return for profit that was 
used militarily.604 This oil is therefore not a ‘regular, indispensable, and 
principal source for directly maintaining military action’.605 The attempt to 
protect the limited nature of RGT only proves the flexible and ever-evolutive 
nature of this class of targets. This is particularly problematic from the 
perspective of investment promotion and protection.  
Take the Iraqi practice on the promotion and facilitation of American 
investments on one hand, and the American practice of RGT in Iraq, on the 
other. The prolonged hostilities with Daesh have resulted in humanitarian, 
social, and economic crises across Iraq.606 To resolve these and so as to 
respond to its national challenges Iraq requires capital. To attract such 
capital, the State offered in recent years convenient concession contracts, 
bids, and licenses over its oil reserves.607 With the encouragement of the 
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international community, it also passed an amended national investment 
law that improves investment terms for foreign investors, allows them to 
purchase land in Iraq for certain projects, and speeds up the investment 
license process, and it joined ICSID.608 Because Iraq has the fifth largest 
proven oil reserves in the world, approximately 90% of the Iraq’s revenues 
originate from investments in oil, most of which are foreign investments, in 
particular US-owned or controlled.   
The US, on its end, takes various proactive measures to promote 
and facilitate the operation of US companies in Iraq. First, the US – Iraq 
Strategic Framework Agreement provides intergovernmental forums to 
address impediments to investment and trade, the Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreement between Iraq and the US provides a framework for 
dialogue to increase trade and investment cooperation between the two 
countries, the American Chamber of Commerce in Iraq also provides a 
platform for commercial advocacy for the US business community operating 
in Iraq, and there are continued efforts to start an American Chamber of 
Commerce in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.609 Additionally, the US State 
Department encourages American companies to invest in Iraq.610 However, 
while the US encourages its nationals to take advantage of the profitable 
opportunities in Iraq on one hand, and Iraq to facilitate and protect such 
American investment so as to generate revenues and develop the Iraqi 
economy, on the other, the US also calls to target investments in oil in Iraq 
because they generate revenues and economically sustain other aims.  
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If objects such as ‘production, transportation, storage, and 
distribution facilities’ of petroleum,611 energy resources,612 and generally 
any form of profit,613 constitute lawful military objectives under Article 52(2), 
as the US consistently maintains, then US foreign investments may be too 
legitimately targeted in armed conflicts. For instance, the assets of 
ExxonMobil in the West-Qurna I generate revenues for the Iraqi 
government, which are then used to sustain the operations against Daesh. 
As such, this asset is (on the logic set out above) an RGT that may be 
lawfully attacked by Daesh under certain circumstances. It is doubtful that 
this is a desired outcome for ExxonMobil, Iraq, or the US. 
The case of Afghanistan is also indicative. A focus on the exploitation 
of natural resources has long been an established part of the playbook of 
various belligerents and insurgents in Afghanistan. For instance, while the 
Taliban lost almost all of its territory after the US-led invasion in 2001 it is 
still estimated to control 41 of Afghanistan’s 407 districts and to contest 
control over additional 118 districts, including parts of the Nangarhar 
province and the Logar province (as of July 2018). The Taliban’s grip on the 
talc trade in these districts generates millions for the organization. In fact, 
almost all Afghan talc generates revenue for the Taliban.614 Similarly, an 
Afghan affiliate of Daesh known as Islamic State – Khorasan Province 
(ISKP) controls a limited amount of territory in Afghanistan. But this territory, 
namely the Achin district of Nangarhar, is rich in minerals, especially talc, 
chromite, and marble. Reportedly, the revenues from the mines in 
Nangarhar sustain the ISKP and its fighting against Afghan and 
international forces.615  
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As a result, Afghan and American forces often initiate attacks against 
mines controlled by the Taliban and ISKP in an attempt to hurt the 
organizations’ financial basis. In April 2017, for instance, the US used, for 
the very first time, the American military’s largest nonnuclear bomb, 
the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air-Blast, popularly called the ‘Mother of 
All Bombs’ near the Achin mine, Nangarhar.616 While the US provided 
several (different) explanations for the classification of the location as a 
target,617 satellite imagery shows marks of extensive mining for minerals a 
few hundred meters from the impact area, which indicate that the mine was 
bombed for its classification as a RGT.618 
At the same time, at the advice of the World Bank and ‘to help fuel 
growth’ and so as to as transition into self-sustaining economy, Afghanistan 
‘is constantly seeking investment from the private and foreign investors to 
develop the huge and very diverse mineral resource potential in the Achin 
Magnesite Deposit, in the Nangarhar province’.619 But if the mines that are 
controlled by the Taliban and ISKP in Nangarhar are lawful targets for their 
revenue-generating nature, then foreign investment in Nangarhar, which 
undeniably generate revenues that are used to sustain war-fighting against 
the Taliban and ISKP, are too a lawful target for the same reason. This is 
problematic. 
Afghanistan also encourages investments in other areas, such as the 
world’s second largest copper deposit in Mes Aynak in the Logar 
 
616 B Starr and R Browne, ‘First on CNN: US drops largest non-nuclear bomb in 
Afghanistan’ (CNN 14 April 2017) 
<https://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/13/politics/afghanistan-isis-moab-bomb/index.html> 
(accessed 20 May 2018). 
617 ibid; C Wang, ‘Trump calls Afghanistan bombing a 'very successful mission' (CNBC 13 
April 2017) <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/13/trump-calls-afghanistan-operation-a-very-
successful-mission.html> accessed 20 May 2018. 
618 Global Witness – At any price (n 614) 
619 The Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, ‘Mineral is 
Afghanistan: Achin Magnesite Deposit, Nangarhar Province’ 
<http://mom.gov.af/Content/files/MoMP_MAGNESITE_Achin_Midas_Jan_2014.pdf> 





province.620 It is estimated to be enough to produce 200,000 tons of refined 
copper – some USD 450 million worth – annually.621 In 2007, Afghanistan 
awarded a 30-year lease to extract copper622 at a worth of some USD 3 
billion, to a State-owned Chinese corporation, Metallurgical Corporation of 
China (MCC).623 Under the investment agreement, MCC was to build roads 
and railways, and provide infrastructure and power plants to the 
underdeveloped area.624 The investment was estimated to create 12,000 
direct jobs and add USD 250 million in annual revenue to the State’s 
budget.625   
From 2008, when it assumed control over the site, until 2014, when 
it withdrew its personnel from the project, MCC’s investment was subjected 
to repeated deadly attacks by the Taliban that resulted in loss of life and 
damage to property.626 Nonetheless, the Taliban found a new – but familiar 
– way to generate revenues from the mine. In November 2016, the Taliban 
publicly pledged to ‘back all national projects’ and to ‘direct its Mujahideen 
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to help in the security of projects that are in the higher interest of 
[Afghanistan]’, including Mes Aynak.627 To be sure, the Taliban does not 
volunteer its protection, but levies taxes on infrastructure that it ‘guards’ so 
as to sustain itself.  
This illustrates the slippery slope that is inherent to RGT. To sustain 
its operation and war-fighting, the Taliban traditionally relied on the taxation 
of the production and sale of opium. The relative success of the counter-
narcotics operations in poppy-growing areas of Afghanistan during the 
2000s forced the Taliban to look elsewhere for revenues. Today, foreign 
investments fill in the gap. But investors, like MCC, who will pay the Taliban 
in order to avoid attacks will find themselves between a rock and a hard 
place.628 By paying protection-taxes so as to enable the operation of their 
investment in relative peace investors effectively support the insurgent’s 
financial base, thereby risking the classification of their investment as an 
RGT. The justifications for counter-narcotic operations apply verbatim to the 
new source of income that supplanted narcotics. 
In sum, the implication of conditioning the legality of attacks on 
revenue-generation is that revenue-generating foreign investments may too 
be targeted by the adversary. This renders international and national efforts 
to foster such foreign investments into conflict-ridden States futile and calls 
into question the purported role of investments in post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
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This chapter assessed the classification of investments as non-human 
targets under the contemporary law of targeting by examining targeting 
practices and policies in conflict-ridden States.  
In the aggregate, this analysis demonstrates the difficulty of holding 
expansive targeting practices in one hand and calling for investment 
liberalization in conflict-ridden States, at the same time. This difficulty 
emanates from the well-established principle that the law applies equally to 
the parties to an armed conflict. Under IHL, what is sauce for the goose is 
sauce for the gander: There are no separate sets of IHL rules for home and 
host States, and there are no special targeting rules for foreign investments 
and so, the policies and practices that States put forth as the law with 
respect to dual-use objects and RGT when they initiate attacks, are as true 
for the targeting of dual-use objects and RGT that are owned or controlled 
by foreign nationals as explained below.  
 From a higher degree of abstraction, this discussion fleshes out 
another level of interaction between IHL and investment law. Chapter 3 
demonstrated that, historically, IHL fostered and shaped the development 
of customary and conventional investment standards of treatment. This 
historical backdrop allows us to interpret IHL and investment law norms in 
a compatible manner and thus, to ‘avoid’ (in the sense of chapter 1) a 
potential conflict between IHL and investment law norms.  
By contrast, potential incompatibilities between contemporary 
targeting practices, which emanate from a broad interpretation and 
application of IHL norms, on the one hand, and investment promotion and 
protection rules and policies, on the other, cannot be interpreted away 
through, say, an investment law-informed reading of the definition of 
‘military objectives’, for this would exceed the rules and the roles of treaty 
interpretation. Moreover, because the potential divergence between 
investment law and IHL in these issues concerns not norms in the strict 





it is not clear that norm conflict ‘resolution’ tools, such as the lex specialis 
rule, offer a proper solution, as explained below.  
 This chapter illustrated several potential instances of divergence 
between investment law and IHL. One such divergence arises when the 
host State loses control over the territory where a foreign investment is 
located, and that investment becomes susceptible to targeting because the 
adversary uses it to sustain its war-fighting against the host State. As in the 
examples involving mines in Afghanistan, in such cases, an incompatibility 
may exist between the State’s obligation to protect the investment as a host 
State (the investment is arguably within the geographical scope of the 
relevant treaty) and the potential authorization under IHL, as a belligerent, 
to target that same investment. Professedly, this situation is, per the broad 
definition outlined in chapter 1, a conflict.  
 Potentially, a conflict may also arise between the State’s obligation 
to guarantee the investment certain treatment as a host State (eg: 
regulatory stability or protection of reasonably-based expectations) and its 
obligation (rather than a permission) under IHL to protect the civilian 
population. Such is the case, as with the example of the American 
investment in Israel, when an investment is classified as a dual-use object 
that is susceptible, at a high level of probability, to targeting by the adversary 
and this investment is located in densely populated civilian areas, thereby 
risking inflicting significant damage to the civilian population in case of an 
attack. In this case, IHL arguably requires (obliges) that the investment be 
relocated, removed, or terminated so as to protect the civilian population 
from the adverse effects from its targeting, but such measures are arguably 
a simultaneous breach of investment standards of treatment. This too 
seems to be a case of a conflict, under the broad definition set out in chapter 
1 above. 
Further, the State’s policies and practices on investment promotion 
and targeting may collide. Thus, by way of reciprocation, when the State 





namely concerning RGT, it risks ‘inviting’ the targeting of its foreign 
investments by its adversary. As with the example of Iraq and the US, if the 
American stance is  that, under IHL, a party to a conflict is authorized to 
target any economic object or commercial activity that generates revenues 
for the adversary (eg: mining), then, under IHL, this is as true for the 
targeting of American investments in conflict-ridden States. But it is doubtful 
that the US, as a home State, maintains the same views that it holds as a 
belligerent that attacks economic targets abroad (often the property and 
operations of US corporations). On the contrary, as a home State, the US 
seeks to promote and protect the investments of its nationals into conflict-
ridden States (eg: in mining) and it takes measures to secure them.  
 In the above examples, the potential incompatibility cannot be 
avoided through, say, harmonious interpretation of the concept of ‘military 
objective’ and the relevant investment standard of treatment or by way of 
‘interpreting away’ the divergence between the obligation to remove military 
objectives from civilian areas and the limitations to such measures under 
investment standards of treatment. In such cases, chapter 1 suggested that 
a possible conflict may be resolved, particularly using the lex specialis 
maxim. But it may also be that in these cases, the conflict is 
‘unresolvable’,629 as explained below. 
First, it should be clarified that the proposition that a conflict is 
‘unresolvable’ does not mean that the dispute in the framework of which this 
conflict arises is unresolvable. What is meant rather is that the rules on 
conflict resolution as outlined above and further explored in chapter 5 below, 
do not adequately remove the potential incompatibility and a legislative or 
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strategic stance is to be taken by the State so as to reconcile (or resolve) 
the normative tension. Situations of unresolvable conflict occur namely 
because ‘there is no single legislative will behind international law. Treaties 
and custom come about as a result of conflicting motives and objectives… 
and often result from spontaneous reactions to events in the 
environment.’630  
States, as Milanović explains, ‘are perfectly capable of making 
contradictory commitments, and to presume coherence in the intent of 
states in all circumstances would fly in the face of reality’.631 He illustrates 
this point by referencing, among others, the matter of Soering v UK,632 
where the European Court held that, under Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) a State cannot extradite a person to 
another country, where there is substantial risk that that person will be 
subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment of punishment. On this point, 
Milanović observes that:  
In reality what we had in Soering was an unresolvable norm conflict. 
The political solution to this conflict was that the US did not press the 
issue, and that it reached an accommodation with European states 
generally whereby it would provide assurances that a person whose 
extradition was being sought would not be tried for a capital 
offence.633 
Similarly, the resolution of the potential incompatibilities between the 
norms, practices, and policies set out above arguably exceeds the scope of 
conventional interpretation and priority rules. Arguably in these cases, the 
State should make a ‘policy call’ – a strategic decision – that gives due 
respect to its national and international policies on the promotion and 
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protection of investments and its targeting policies. Thus, in the example of 
the US, the DoD could consult with, and account for the agenda of, the State 
Department, which seeks to promote, facilitate, and protect US investments 
in petroleum and mining in conflict-ridden States such as Iraq or 
Afghanistan, when it forms its policies on the lawfulness of targeting of 
objects for the reason that they are economic activities in in petroleum or 
mining in conflict-ridden countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 Indeed, this seems to be the way in which such tensions have been 
resolved in the examples set out above. For instance, in the case of foreign 
investments in areas in Afghanistan over which the Government’s control is 
questionable, Afghanistan (the host State), the home State of the investor 
(China), the investor (MCC), and the adversary (the Taliban) engage in 
direct dialog that facilitates a solution of the potential tension of the complex 
situation.634  
In the above case of Israel and the American investment, the 
potential conflict was resolved through an extra-legal solution that allowed 
Israel to regulate in the public interest and to pursue’ its national security 
goals while mitigating the investor’s potential losses and allowing the 
investment to be carried out in a different location in Israel.635 Potential 
clashes between expansive targeting practices and policies on the 
promotion and protection of investments are too resolved in practice by way 
of making strategic choices when to target and with what means. For 
instance, it recently became known that Israel refrained from following a 
potential authorization, under IHL, to attack lawful targets in Gaza out of the 
desire to promote and protect foreign investments there, which in turn 
promote broader geopolitical aims.636  
 
634 Reuters, ‘Taliban delegation holds talks in China as part of peace push’ (Reuters, 20 
June 2019) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-afghanistan/taliban-delegation-
holds-talks-in-china-as-part-of-peace-push-idUSKCN1TL0V9> accessed 22 June 2019. 
635 S Gorodeisky, ‘Haifa Chemicals, Edeltech to build Negev ammonia plant’ (Globes, 5 
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 The reality, whereby investment law and policy potentially affects 
targeting practices, may be taken to suggest that the law and policy of 
foreign investment augment humanitarian considerations by offering 
additional counterweight against controversial warfare practices. Notable in 
this respect is the recent study of the ICRC on the ‘Roots of Restraint in 
War’ (June 2018).637 The ICRC sought to identify the factors that ‘induce 
weapon bearers across the spectrum to observe certain limits when 
engaging in armed violence and to preserve a minimum of humanity even 
in the heat of battle’. One of the main conclusions of the study was that, to 
effectively induce compliance with IHL, there is need to look beyond the 
‘formal norms prescribed by IHL’.638 And while cross-border trade and 
investment are mentioned obliquely only once among the various factors 
the study identified,639 this chapter demonstrates that investments arguably 
play a more central role in the policy and conduct of hostilities.640 
Finally, this analysis merits two more remarks. First, the discussion 
on the targetability of investments fits squarely with the argument in chapter 
3 on the interpretation of the EWC. As explained, the modern rules on 
targeting in API Article 52(2) operationalize the customary rules on 
protection of property in HR 23(g). Thus, in the context of targeting, to 
examine whether the destruction of the investment ‘was required by the 
necessity of the situation’ under the EWC, it is necessary to address the 
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 Second, if an investment is not classified as a military objective under 
Article 52(2) API, or whenever there is any doubt as to its classification,641 
the investment is presumed to be a civilian object. As such, the investment 
cannot be the subject of direct and deliberate attacks.642 Nevertheless, IHL 
accepts that in the harsh reality of hostilities civilian objects, foreign 
investments inclusive, may be incidentally hurt during attacks against 
legitimate military targets. This is recognized under the customary principle 
of proportionality, which prohibits launching an attack against a lawful target 
which is ‘expected’ to cause incidental civilian damage that would be 
excessive in relation to the military advantage ‘anticipated’.643  
The next chapter 5 picks up on this point and deals with the obligation 
of conflict-ridden host States to take precautions so as to protect 
investments which are not lawful targets against the effects of hostilities. To 
a degree, the next chapter 5 continues the analysis under this chapter 4. 
The next chapter 5 completes and complements the discussion of RGT in 
this chapter 4 by addressing the obligation of host States to protect foreign 
investments when they are attacked by the adversary on its territory.  
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The Obligation to Protect Foreign Investments from the Effects of 
Hostilities  
1. Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the obligation of conflict-ridden host States 
to protect the investments under their control from the effects of hostilities. 
This discussion encompasses situations when the host State attacks its 
adversary, and in the framework of this attack the investor’s property is 
damaged, and instances when the host State is attacked by its adversary 
and this attack by a third party damages foreign investments that are 
located under the control of the host State.  
As with the previous chapter 4, the starting point for this discussion 
is the fundamental principle of distinction, whereby attacks are allowed ‘only 
against military objectives’, while ‘civilian objects shall not be the object of 
attack’.644 Since responsibility for applying the principle of distinction rests 
on both the defender, who best controls the population and objects in his 
territory, and on the attacker, who alone decides on the identity of the 
targets and the means and methods for their attack, API Articles 57 and 58 
require States, whether they attack or are attacked by their adversary, to 
take ‘feasible’ precautionary measures in favor of the civilian objects under 
their control, including foreign investments.645 The benchmark of ‘feasibility’ 
under IHL is widely understood as a due diligence standard that requires 
States to do only what is ‘practical and practicable in the prevailing 
circumstances’.646 What is ‘practicable in the prevailing circumstances’, in 
turn, is determined, also, in consideration of the State’s resources.647 
At the same time, chapter 2 established that investment treaty 
standards remain applicable in wartime and thus, in addition to their IHL 
 
644 Articles 48, 51(2), and 52, API 
645 Articles 57-8, API; JF Quéguiner, ‘Precautions under the Law Governing the Conduct 
of Hostilities’ (2006) 88(864) IRRC 793, 820-21; Oeter (n 527) para 448. 
646 Articles 57-8, API. 





obligations, war-torn host States are obliged to comply with their 
conventional and customary obligations to protect investments. One such 
obligation is the protection and security standard, which has been said to 
be ‘designed to protect investors and investments against violent 
actions’.648 While some instruments prescribe an obligation of ‘full 
protection and security’,649  and others refer to a benchmark of ‘most 
constant protection and security’,650 it is mostly accepted that these 
variations in treaty language do not carry any substantive significance.651 
Therefore, for sake of convenience the discussion deals with the treaty 
obligation to guarantee ‘full protection and security’ (FPS).  
Notwithstanding the prevalence of the FPS clause, its scope of 
protection is controversial.652 FPS has been discussed in a relatively small 
number of arbitral decisions, which are mostly inconsistent in their 
interpretation and application of the standard653 but for the consensus that 
FPS is an obligation of conduct654 that requires States to take reasonable 
 
648 Schreuer – Investments in armed conflicts (n 192) 6. 
649 Eg: Article 1105, NAFTA; Article 1, 2012 US Model BIT; Article 9.6(1), CPTPP; Article 
8.10, CETA; Article 7(1) Morocco – Nigeria BIT; Article 4 Japan – Israel BIT; Article 4(1), 
China – Hong Kong CEPA Investment Agreement. 
650 Eg: Article 10(1), ECT (‘most constant’). 
651 Eg: C-M Giuditta, ‘Full Protection and Security’ in A Reinisch (ed) Standards of 
Investment Protection (OUP 2008) 131, 138-40; C Schreuer, ‘Full Protection and Security’ 
(2010) 1(2) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 1-17. However, see: Azurix v 
Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Annulment, 1 September 2009, para 408. 
652 On the scope of FPS and whether it covers legal, and not only physical, protection, see: 
CME v The Czech Republic; CSOB v Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/97/4, Award, 
29 December 2004; Siemens v Argentina (Award); Rumeli Telekom v Kazakhstan, paras 
662-68; Tatneft v Ukraine, UNCITRAL, Award, 29 July 2014, 15-27; Saluka v Czech 
Republic, para 483; PSEG v Turkey, ICSID Case No ARB/02/5, Award, 19 January 2007, 
para 258; Oxus Gold v Uzbekistan, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 17 December 2015, paras 
830-832; Houben v Burundi, ICSID Case No ARB/13/7, Award, 12 January 2016, paras 
157-158; Mesa Mining Corporation v Ecuador, PCA No 2012-2, Award, 15 March 2016, 
paras 6.80-6.82; Rusoro Mining v Venezuela, para 122; Allard v Barbados, PCA Case No 
2012-06, Award, 27 June 2016, paras 231-52. On the relationship of FPS with other 
standards, see: Giuditta (n 651) 146-49; Schreuer – Full Protection and Security (n 651); 
R Lorz, Protection and Security and Customary International law in M Bungenberg et al 
(eds) International Investment Law: A Handbook (CH Beck, Hart, Nomos 2015) 781-86. 
653 For a detailed discussion of arbitral practice, see Giuditta (ibid) 146-149; Lorz (ibid) 781-
786. 
654 AAPL v Sri Lanka, para 75; AMT v Zaire, ICSID Case No ARB/93/1, Award, 21 February 
1997, para 85; Tecmed v The Mexico, para 177; Nobel Ventures v Romania ICSID Case 





precautions so as to protect foreign investments from violence, whether 
authored by the State or third parties, in particular during hostilities.655   
A persistent point of controversy concerns the level of protection that 
the FPS standard denotes and the assessment of compliance with it. On 
this point, arbitral and scholarly jurisprudence identifies a ‘sliding scale of 
liability’.656 On one end of the spectrum is the AAPL v Sri Lanka case, which 
concerned the destruction of a shrimp farm by Sri Lankan commando forces 
during an alleged counter-insurgency operation. The Tribunal unanimously 
rejected the contention that FPS represented a strict liability obligation, and 
framed the standard using the benchmark of what a ‘well-administrated 
government’ could do in like circumstances.657 On this view, FPS prescribes 
a uniform level of vigilance rather than one that is relative to the 
circumstances of the host State.  
On the opposite end of the scale is the approach according to which 
FPS should ‘not be strictly objective and applied worldwide, but rather that 
its content differs according to the situation of the country at issue’658 in a 
manner that pays ‘due respect’ to the State’s level of ‘development and 
stability’.659 In arbitral jurisprudence, this approach has been manifested 
most predominantly by the sole arbitrator Paulsson in Pantechniki v Albania, 
where the investor’s claim that Albania was obliged to protect the 
investment from looting and riots by private parties was rejected.660 
 
Frontier Petroleum v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 12 November 2010, para 
273; AES v Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/07/22, Award, 23 September 2010, paras 
13.3.1-13.3.3; El Paso v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/15, Award 31 October 2011, 
para 523; von Pezold v Zimbabwe (Award), para 596; Allard v Barbados, para 244; Isolux 
v Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, Award, 17 July 2016, paras 818-825. 
655 Saluka v Czech Republic, para 483; PSEG v Turkey, para 258; Oxus Gold v Uzbekistan, 
paras 830-32; Houben v Burundi, paras 157-58; Giuditta (n 651), 138 (noting that it is 
‘undisputed’ that FPS applies to the hostilities paradigm); Schreuer – Full protection and 
security (n  651) 2 (stating that ‘it is beyond doubt’ that this is the purpose of FPS); Schreuer 
– investments in armed conflict (n 192) 6. 
656 AAPL v Sri Lanka, para 26. 
657 ibid, para 77, citing: A Freeman, ‘Responsibility of states for unlawful acts of their armed 
forces’ (1955) 88  Recueil des cours de l’Académie de Droit International 263, 278-80. 
658 H Zeitler, ‘Full Protection and Security’ in S Schill (ed) International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010) 182, 201. 
659 Lorz (n 653) 780.  





Paulsson explained that with regards to ‘an unpredictable instance of civic 
disorder’, a different level of protection is expected from a ‘powerful State’ 
than that from a ‘poor and fragile’ State with ‘limited capacities’.661  
More recently, the Tribunal in Houben v Burundi (2016) elucidated 
that ‘paying respect’ to the State’s personal circumstances will not 
necessarily lead to the dismissal of a FPS claim.662 The Tribunal cited 
Pantechniki v Albania, and stressed that the width of the FPS standard 
ought to be commensurate to the State’s individual circumstances.663 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal found that Burundi had breached FPS by failing 
to diligently use the resources that were available to it so as to remove 
squatters from the land that Houben acquired for a real-estate venture.664  
An additional point of ambiguity regarding the operation of FPS in 
hostilities concerns the interrelationship between FPS and relevant IHL 
norms. Not a single investment tribunal that has adjudicated a dispute that 
arose out of or in relation to an armed conflict has considered the laws of 
armed conflict (as far as such decisions are publicly available); not even 
when it was determined by the forum that ‘there is no doubt that the 
destruction of the [investment] took place during the hostilities’, as was the 
case with AAPL v Sri Lanka.665 Also notable in this regard is the recent case 
of Ampal v Egypt (2017), where the Tribunal found that Egypt breached 
FPS by failing to protect Ampal’s investment from terror attacks.666 While 
the Tribunal ‘acknowledge[d] that the circumstances in the North Sinai 
Egypt were difficult’, including political instability, operation of armed militant 
groups, ‘security deterioration and general lawlessness’,667 it did not explain 
the normative implications of this proposition in terms of applicable law and 
State responsibility.  
 
661 ibid, paras 76-7 
662 Houben v Burundi, paras 160-64 
663 ibid, paras 160-64 
664 ibid, paras 164, 170-79 
665 AAPL v Sri Lanka, para. 59 
666 Ampal-American Israel Corporation v Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/12/11, Decision on 
Liability, 21 February 2017. 





Mindful of these uncertainties, this chapter deals with the obligation 
of States to take precautionary measures in favor of foreign investment in 
armed conflict. Section 2 establishes that under customary law States are 
required to take precautions to protect investments from violence. This is a 
due diligence obligation that is relative to the particular circumstances of the 
host State. Section 3 then argues that under the VCLT, the language ‘full 
protection and security’ (and like formulations) should be understood as a 
reference to customary international law on the treatment of aliens. Section 
4 then deals with the IHL obligation to take precautionary measures as 
reflected in API Articles 57-8. It is established that IHL requires States to 
take feasible precautions, relative to their abilities and capacity, to protect 
investments from the effects of attacks, whether they author an attack or 
defend against one.  
Finally, having addressed the meaning and content of the applicable 
investment law and IHL norms, the analysis turns to the interaction between 
these standards. To that end, the discussion focuses on the application of 
both norms to a particular factual-matrix. Because in practice FPS claims 
that arise out of or in relation to hostilities mostly concern the State’s 
obligation to take measures to protect foreign investments against attacks, 
the analysis uses the example of MCC’s investment in Afghanistan from 
chapter 4 and focuses more closely on the interaction between FPS and 
API Articles 58. Overall, this chapter argues that host States are required to 
take precautionary measures to protect foreign investment from the effects 
of hostilities whether they author the violence that affects the investment or 
not. Assessment of compliance with his obligation ought to consider the 
prevailing circumstances, including (but not limited to) humanitarian 






2. The Standard of ‘Reasonable Care’ under Customary Law on the 
Treatment of Aliens  
It is an established standard of customary law that the host State is required 
to exercise due diligence or take ‘reasonable care’ to prevent injury to 
foreign nationals and their property. Yet, it is far from clear whether this due 
diligence obligation and the benchmark of ‘reasonableness’ prescribe a 
uniform rule or a relative standard that accounts for the circumstances and 
capacities of the host State. This section argues that a relative customary 
norm on the protection of aliens coalesced in the 20th century whereby what 
is ‘reasonable’ is assessed with regard to the particular resources and 
conditions of the host State.  
The obligation to protect the physical integrity of ‘merchants’ and 
‘their effects’ dates back to the Roman Empire.668 This obligation appeared 
in treaties of amity as early as the 15th century and required the main powers 
to act ‘in all haste and diligence’ so as to allow ‘all merchants’ to ‘remain in 
the countries securely’.669 As early as the 17th century British treaties of 
amity prescribed ‘complete’, ‘perfect’, or ‘constant’ ‘protection and security’ 
to foreign subjects and inhabitants.670 Across the Atlantic, American 
instruments included analogous obligations. From the 1776 draft Plan 
Treaty671 through the 1795 Treaty of San Lorenzo with Spain, which was 
the last to use this language, American treaties of amity required the parties 
 
668 I Finley, The Ancient Economy, Vol II (University of California Press, 1985) 160-62; G 
Young, Rome’s Eastern Trade: International Commerce and Imperial Policy from 31 BC to 
AD 305 (Routledge, 2001) 63-4; T Weiler, The Interpretation of International Investment 
Law (Brill 2013) 67-9. 
669 Eg: Treaty of Amity and Friendship, and of a Free Intercourse of Trade and 
Mechandizes between Henry VII King of England, and Philip Archduke of Austria, Duke of 
Burgundy (22 February 1495); Article V, Treaty of Peace and Commerce between Francis 
I King of France, and Henry VIII King of England (5 April 1515); Article XVI, Treaty of 
Confederacy and Alliance between Charles the IX, King of France and Queen of England, 
at Blois (29 April 1572); Treaty of Truce and Commerce between Portugal and the 
Netherlands (12 June 1641); Article VII, Treaty between GB and Tunis (5 October 1662); 
Article I, Treaty of Peace between France and Great Britain (13 November 1655). 
670 Eg: Article V, The Treaty of Peace between Henry II King of France, and Elizabeth 
Queen of England (2 April 1559); Articles I, II, IX Marine Treaty between the Crowns of 
Great Britain and France (24 February 1676-7). 
671 US Continental Congress, Journals of Congress Containing the proceedings from 





‘to endeavor by all means in their power’ to ‘protect and defend’ foreigners 
and their property.672 
In the late 18th century, as part of the negotiations of the Jay Treaty, 
the US adopted the British formula of ‘[adj.] + ‘protection and security’’ in 
lieu to its strand of drafting that expressed the same obligation in terms of 
‘protect and defend’. Accordingly, Article 14 of Jay’s Treaty instructed that, 
‘merchants and traders on each side shall enjoy the most complete 
protection and security for their commerce’.673 This language persisted 
through the 19th century with some variations in drafting, referencing ‘most 
perfect’, ‘entire’, or ‘complete’ protection and security.674 Contemporaneous 
practice demonstrates that, first, notwithstanding these variations in 
formulation, these provisions were widely conceived as reflective of the 
same ‘common rule of intercourse between all civilized nations [that] has 
the further and solemn sanction of an express stipulation by [t]reaty’.675 
Second, while the treaty language ‘all haste and diligence’, ‘constant 
protection’, ‘most complete protection’, and like formulations would seem to 
imply that the standard that such expressions qualify is one of strict liability, 
the standard reflected in this language was intended to require due 
diligence; it ‘entitle[d] the property of strangers… to the protection of its 
sovereign by all efforts in his power’.676 
At the same time, this obligation of vigilance was created by, and 
applied between, ‘civilized nations’, who considered themselves equal.677 
 
672 1795 Spain – US FCN Treaty (see further discussion of this instrument in chapter 2). 
673 Article 14, Jay Treaty. 
674 Eg: Article I, US – GB FCN treaty (3 July 1815) (‘most complete protection and security); 
Article 11, US – Colombia FCN treaty (3 October 1824) (‘most perfect and entire security’); 
Article III, GB – Mexico FCN treaty (26 December 1826) (‘most complete protection and 
security); Article XIII, US – Brazil FCN treaty (12 December 1828) (‘most perfect and entire 
security’). See also: Article III, US – Mexico FCN treaty (5 April 1832); Article 1, GB – Free 
City of Frankfurt FCN treaty (13 May 1832); Article III, US – Brunei FCN treaty (23 June 
1850); Article 1, GB – Japan FCN treaty (16 July 1894). 
675 US Congress, American State Papers: Documents, Legislation, and Executive Vol IV 
(US Congress, Washington 1832) 433, 460, 464, 467. 
676 ibid, 433, 460-467; emphasis added.  
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‘All efforts in his power’ thus meant a uniform standard rather than a relative 
obligation that depends on the level of protection offered to the nationals of 
the host State and the host State’s circumstances. The problem was (and 
remains) that not all States are equal. And so, while the law applied equally 
to all States its application was not equitable since it ignored material 
differences in size, population, capabilities, and resources. As a result, 
States with more limited capacities were held in practice to standards which 
they could not meet in terms of their resources. This effectively guaranteed 
a breach of the obligation to take reasonable care to protect aliens no matter 
how diligently these States acted. 
The 1874 Montijo case is illustrative. The case concerned the seizure 
of ‘Montijo’, a vessel that belonged to US nationals, by revolutionaries and 
the failure of the State to recover it. Although it was undisputed by the 
parties that Panama did not have the means to recover the Montijo, its 
failure to do so nevertheless constituted a breach of customary law. The 
umpire held that, if a State ‘promises protection to those whom it consents 
to admit into its territory, it must find the means of making it effective. If it 
does not do so, even if by no fault of its own, it must make the only amends 
in its power, viz, compensate the sufferer’.678 
The idea that all States are equal and should be held to uniform 
standards irrespective of material differences lost its appeal during the 20th 
century.679 Contemporaneous literature,680 following the footsteps of 
 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1967) 177-78; G Schwarzenberger, 
Foreign Investment and International Law (Stevens & Sons, London 1969) 163. 
678 Case of the Montijo (USA v Colombia) (1874) reported in: J Moore, History and Digest 
of the International Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a Party (US 
Government Printing Office, Washington 1898) 1421, 1444. 
679 Pointedly for international economic law, this change is partially attributed to Calvo’s 
impact on the legal traditions of Latin American States (S KB Asante, ‘International Law 
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dispute resolution bodies that were established to adjudicate claims that 
arose out of injuries to, or wrongful seizures of, property by revolutionaries 
during civil unrest began to reject the absolute nature of the customary 
obligation to take reasonable care to protect foreigners from violence; they 
rather assessed the ‘reasonableness’ of the measures that the State took 
against the circumstances ruling at the time in that State.681  
Notably, the absolute standard that was espoused by the Montijo 
umpire was explicitly rejected in the 1903 Sambiaggio Case,682 where it was 
held that assessment of diligence is a function of the capacities and the 
circumstances of the host State.683 In 1910, Root explained that, ‘the rights 
of the foreigner vary as the rights of the citizen vary between ordinary and 
peaceful times and times of disturbance and tumult; between settled and 
ordinary communities and frontier regions and mining camps’.684 The IDI 
proposed in its 1927 meeting the rule (Article 7) that, a State is not 
responsible for damage caused to foreigners and their property owing to 
hostilities, if it has used normal due diligence, which was assessed relative 
to the treatment the State has given to its nationals.685  
The same perceptions of relative due diligence were expressed by 
States in the framework of the aforementioned 1930 Hague Codification 
Conference.686 And by 1961, Article 7(1) of the draft codification of the 
principles of State responsibility instructed that the responsibility of the State 
 
681 Eg: Kummerow, Otto Redler & Co., Fuda, Fischbach, and Friedericy Cases, 10 RIAA 
369, 387 (1903); Home Frontier and Foreign Missionary Society of the United Brethren in 
Christ (US) v GB, 6 RIAA 42-4 (1920); George Adams Kennedy (US) v Mexico, 4 RIAA 
194, 195, 198-201 (1927); Solis (US) v Mexico, 4 RIAA 358-64 (1928); Mexico City 
Bombardment Claims (GB) v Mexico, 5 RIAA 80-1, 90 (1930);  
682 The Sambaggio Case (Italy – Venezuela) 10 RIAA (1903) 499, 509, 517. 
683 ibid, 518, 524 
684 E Root, ‘The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad’ (1910) 4(3) AJIL 517, 523. 
However, see J Sharpe, ‘The Minimum Standard of Treatment, Glamis Gold, and Neer's 
Enduring Influence’ in M Kinnear et al (eds) Building International Investment Law: The 
First 50 Years of ICSID (Kluwer Law International 2015) 269, 269-71. 
685 Article 7, 1927 IDI Articles (n 444); Eaglton and Dunn (n 392) 137. 
686 Rosenne (n 445) 104-19: See the German response (‘the State is not responsible for 
the conduct of insurgent’ and the damage that it causes foreign property, but it is 
responsible for such conduct if it has ‘not afforded sufficient protection to foreigners or [has] 
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‘for the injuries caused to an alien by illegal acts of individuals’ is assessed 
‘in view of the circumstances, are taken to prevent the commission of such 
acts’. Paragraph 2 augmented that these circumstances ‘shall include, in 
particular… the physical possibility of preventing its commission with 
resources available to the State’.687  
To recap, by the 20th century, the language, practice, and 
jurisprudence relating to FCN provisions on the protection and security of 
aliens recognized a customary standard that required host States to 
exercise due diligence in order to protect foreign persons and property from 
damage caused by the State’s own actions and from damage caused by 
third parties. Although this norm first coalesced as a uniform standard, it 
developed into a relative obligation that accounts for the available resources 
of the State in assessing its compliance with the obligation to take 
‘reasonable’ care. 
3. The Treaty Language ‘Full Protection and Security’ is A 
Reference to Customary Law 
This section argues that the treaty language ‘full protection and security’ 
(and similar formulations) is, under VCLT Article 31, a reference to the 
above established customary obligation of ‘reasonable care’.  
As the FPS obligation is a treaty rule of international law, its content 
is determined by way of applying the customary rules of treaty interpretation 
as reflected in VCLT Article 31-2, which instruct that the first port of call in 
this discussion is the ‘regular, normal, or customary’ use of the term ‘full 
protection and security’.688 True to this textual approach, some investment 
tribunals have attempted to elucidate the meaning of FPS and the level of 
protection it requires by looking to dictionaries.689 Under this technique, the 
 
687 Article 7, ILC, ‘Sixth report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. FV García Amador’, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/134, and Add.1 (1961). 
688 Article 31, VCLT; Schwarzenberger – Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation (n 
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phrase ‘full protection and security’, or rather the conjunction of the 
dictionary meanings of each word, prescribes a protection at an ‘absolute 
level that cannot be improved upon’.690 Along a similar line, the Azurix v 
Argentina Tribunal explained that, ‘when the terms ‘protection and security’ 
are qualified by ‘full’ […] they extend, in their ordinary meaning, the content 
of this standard beyond physical security’.691  
‘But dictionaries, alone, are not necessarily capable of resolving 
complex questions of interpretations’,692 and FPS is one such case. 
‘Ordinary meaning’, as explained in chapter 3, does not denote dictionary 
meaning alone. Rather, words are interpreted in the technical and 
professional meaning they have in the particularly relevant community of 
word-users (i.e., ‘the parlance of lawyers’).693 Disassembling the language 
‘full protection and security’ into detached words so as to ascertain the 
meaning of the entire expression, misplaces the syntax of the phrase and 
thus alters its meaning.694  
Early treaty practice and more recent State practice demonstrate 
that, prior to the arbitral jurisprudence of the 1990s, the language ‘full 
protection and security’ (and like expressions) was used as a term of art 
that referenced the customary standard on the treatment of aliens, 
especially concerning protection from hostilities. As noted, at least from the 
17th century British treaties of amity used a drafting formula that coupled 
 
690 The qualifiers ‘full’, ‘complete’, ‘constant’, and ‘perfect’ plainly refer to something 
‘absolute’ that ‘cannot be improved upon’. ‘Protection’ ordinarily denotes ‘shelter, defence, 
or preservation from harm, danger, damage, etc.’ And, ‘security’ is ‘the state or condition 
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Online, OUP June 2013) <www.oed.com> accessed 15 January 2018). 
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692 US – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
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542. 
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conjunctive nouns, such as ‘protection and security’, with qualifying 
adjectives, such as ‘complete’, ‘perfect’, and ‘constant’, so as to express an 
obligation of conduct to protect foreigners. In 1758, Vattel explained that 
this widely recognized obligation to guarantee ‘perfect security’ of aliens 
meant that, ‘the sovereign must afford perfect security, as far as depends 
on him’.695  
In 1795, as another example, Alexander Hamilton defended Jay’s 
Treaty, which used the formula ‘most complete protection and security’ in 
Article 14,696 and argued that, ‘the right of holding or having property in a 
country always implies a duty on the part of its government to protect that 
property, and to secure to the owner the full enjoyment of it’;697 and that, 
‘full protection and security to the persons and property of the subjects of 
one which are then in the territories of the other’ is an obligation of 
conduct.698 While during the 19th century ‘most perfect protection and 
security’ and similar language was also used to describe obligations of 
conduct in other contexts,699 these expressions mostly addressed the 
customary due diligence obligation to protect foreigners. 
The formula, ‘complete protection and security’, persisted throughout 
the first half of the 20th century,700 with some changes. First, interwar FCN 
treaties broadened the clause to cover not only ‘nationals’ or ‘citizens’, but 
also expressly extended rights to corporations and other juridical 
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697 H Lodge, The Works of Alexander Hamilton (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York 1904) 
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699 Eg: In 1841, Alexander Macomb, the Commanding General of the US army, ordered 
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700 Eg: Article 2, Mexico – Honduras FCN Treaty (24 March 1908); Article X, Japan – 
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persons.701 Second, interwar FPS clauses prescribed a ‘degree of 
protection that is required by international law’.702 Notably, this reference to 
international law did not affect the content of the obligation itself.703 Postwar 
FCN treaties retained the long-standing treaty practice that required each 
party to provide the ‘most constant protection and security’ and the twofold 
refinement of the inter-bellum period,704 while extending the protection to 
the provision to property of companies.705 
States continued to refer to the accepted formula, ‘most constant 
protection and security’ (and like formulations) as reflective of customary 
international law,706 irrespective of additional treaty stipulations as regards 
what was ‘required by international law’. Illustratively, during the 1948-49 
revision of the standard US FCN treaty, the State Department omitted the 
reference to treatment in accordance with ‘international law’ from the FPS 
clause and explained that US nationals and companies would be entitled to 
the protection of customary law ‘even without a reference to international 
law’.707 As another example, in 1951, during the treaty negotiations between 
the US and Ethiopia, the US stated that ‘most constant protection and 
security’ was ‘time-honored treaty language’708 that is, itself, declaratory of 
the customary obligation to act in due diligence to protect aliens.709 In 1956, 
Wilson repeated the proposition that inclusion or omission of the reference 
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to ‘international law’ did not make international law any more or ‘any less 
applicable to protection of both persons and property’.710 
It is against this regular use of the phrase ‘protection and security’ as 
a reference to custom that the first Germany – Pakistan BIT was concluded. 
Article 3(1) instructed that, ‘investments by nationals or companies of either 
Party shall enjoy protection and security.’711 This language was taken from 
the US FCN treaty draft, which served as a basis for the negotiations of the 
US – Germany FCN treaty (1953 – 55).712 Subsequently, this formulation 
appeared at least in 7 out of 10 German BITs during 1960 – 62, and in more 
than a dozen BITs that were signed by various European States during 
1963 – 66.713  
Likewise, the 1960 Abs-Shawcross Convention and the 1967 OECD 
Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, which both 
influenced subsequent bilateral practice, used the language ‘most constant 
protection and security’ to express the due diligence obligation to protect 
the property of foreign nationals.714 These provisions, as the Drafts 
themselves explain, were predicated on 1940s and 1950s US FCN treaty 
practice and used the referenced wording with the intention to attribute to it 
a certain pre-existing customary meaning.715 Legal pleadings before 
international bodies that adjudicated postwar disputes in the 1980s also 
demonstrate that States perceived the phrase ‘most constant protection and 
security’ as a term of art that reflected custom, with or without additional 
language that referenced treatment ‘in accordance with customary law’.716 
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711 Article 3(1), Germany –Pakistan BIT.   
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Vandevelde – The first BIT (n 703) 298-305. 
713 For a detailed analysis of the BIT concluded at the time, see: L Bastin, ‘State 
responsibility for omissions: Establishing a breach of ‘full protection and security’ obligation 
by omission (DPhil, Oxford 2017) 95-7. 
714 Article 1, Abs and Shawcross Draft Convention (n 460); Article 2, OECD Draft 
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What follows from the foregoing is that the generally accepted 
ordinary meaning of ‘full protection and security’ for the purposes of VCLT 
Article 31(1) is a reference to customary law on the treatment of aliens, in 
particular regarding physical protection.717  
In the alternative, this historical review of authorities may be 
construed as evidence of the intention to award the treaty expression ‘full 
protection and security’ a special, as opposed to ordinary, meaning that 
references customary law pursuant to VCLT Article 31(4).718 Either way, the 
meaning of ‘full protection and security’ is a reference to custom and thus 
the meaning of the relevant FPS treaty obligation is ascertained by way of 
examining the content of the customary rule. 
For the sake of completeness, and as suggested with respect to the 
EWC above, a different interpretive route to an arguably similar outcome 
may be found in VCLT Article 31(3)(c).719 Thus, customary law on the 
treatment of aliens may be brought into the interpretive exercise by way of 
‘taking it into account’ as a ‘relevant rule of international law’.720 For the 
purpose of the present analysis, and relying on the discussion in chapter 3, 
suffice it to say that, while the customary standard of treatment is likely a 
relevant rule of international law (in the sense of VCLT Article 31(3)(c)) that 
should be contextualized in the interpretation of FPS, if the term ‘full 
protection and security’ has an identifiable (ordinary or special) meaning in 
international law, and it is argued that it does, then this meaning should be 
 
injuries’ and that this ‘does not require that [the State] prevents any injury whatsoever’, but 
rather to take ‘reasonable actions’;  United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
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first accounted for through the language itself (VCLT Article 31(1), (4)), not 
its context.721  
In sum, since the 18th century the formula ‘[adj.] + ‘protection and 
security’’ served, almost universally, as a treaty stipulation of a customary 
due diligence obligation that imposed a relative standard that accounts for 
the host State’s conditions and resources. The treaty language ‘full 
protection and security’ is (pursuant to VCLT Article 31) a reference to this 
relative customary norm, and the meaning of the treaty rule is therefore 
directly informed by the content of the customary norm. In practical terms 
this means that assessment of compliance with the FPS rule turns, to a 
degree, on the technical, financial, and human resources of the particular 
host State.  
4. The Obligations to Take Precautionary Measures under IHL 
This section focuses on the content of API Articles 57-8 and the assessment 
of compliance with these provisions. 
As explained, because the Raison d’être of IHL is respect for civilian 
persons and objects and their protection against the effects of hostilities, 
even when a lawful attack (against a military objective) is launched, IHL 
places further restraints in the form of the requirement to take precautionary 
measures, upon both the attacking party and the party being attacked, in 
order to avoid (or at least to minimize) the collateral effects of hostilities on 
civilian persons, the civilian population, and civilian objects. These 
precautionary obligations form part of customary IHL and are codified 
mainly in API Articles 57 and 58.722  Insofar and for so long as foreign 
investments are not used militarily, they are civilian objects which cannot be 
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95-16, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para 524; W Hays Parks, ‘Air War and the Law of War’ 
(1990) 32(1) Air Force Law Review 1, 158; Quéguiner (n 645) 817; Jensen (n 545) 157. 
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the subject of direct attack, and the host State is required to take 
precautions to protect the investments from the effects of hostilities whether 
it launches an attack or are attacked by the adversary.  
  The obligation to take precautions in attack, as API Article 57(1) itself 
explains, is predicated on the general principle that the attacker alone 
decides on the objects to be targeted and the means and methods of attack 
to be employed. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the attacking party to take 
‘constant care’ in the conduct of its military operations to ‘spare the civilian 
population, individual civilians, and civilian objects’.723 Article 57 then 
materializes this principle by enumerating a non-exhaustive list of measures 
that must be taken when planning an attack, including the obligations to 
verify the lawfulness of the target, to choose means and methods so as to 
avoid or minimize civilian losses, and to refrain from attacks that are 
expected to cause disproportionate civilian loss.724 The provision also 
includes a list of precautions that concern the execution of attacks, such as 
the obligations to suspend or cancel an attack ‘if it becomes apparent’ that 
it is prohibited,725 to give ‘effective advance warning’, unless circumstances 
do not permit,726 and when a choice is possible to select the military 
objective causing the least danger to the civilian population.727 
Article 58 is titled ‘precautions against the effects of attacks’. It is 
concerned with the precautions an attacked party is to take in favor of the 
civilian population under its control.728 This obligation rests on idea that the 
most effective way to ensure the safety of the civilian population is for the 
defender, who has better knowledge and control of the location of its civilian 
population and civilian objects, to shoulder a significant burden of the 
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responsibility.729 Thus, Article 58(a) requires States to remove civilians and 
civilian objects from the vicinity of military objectives.730 Notably, under this 
rule, States are not required to evacuate civilians or civilian objects from 
built-up areas as such, but only to remove them from the vicinity of military 
objectives.731 Since under certain circumstances civilian objects may be 
classified as military objectives susceptible of direct attacks,732 Article 58(a) 
requires the defending party to regularly re-assess the situation so as to 
identify known or anticipated military objectives and act accordingly.  
Under Article 58(b) the defending party is required to avoid locating 
military objectives within, or near, densely populated areas.733 In addition, 
Article 58(c) serves as a ‘catch-all’ clause that encompasses the measures 
prescribed under, and anything that is not covered by, the other 
subparagraphs,734 requiring the parties to ‘take the other necessary 
precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian 
objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military 
operations’.735  
The scope of Article 57 and 58 is circumscribed by the term ‘control’. 
Article 57 lays down rules for the conduct to be observed in attacks on the 
territory under the enemy’s control, and Article 58 covers the protection of 
civilian objects that are found ‘under the control’ of the defending State. 
While this language may be conceived of as a territorial limitation, the 
 
729 API Commentary (n 509) para 692; F Kalshoven, Reflections on the Law of War: 
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drafting history of API elucidates that the term ‘control’ was preferred over 
‘authority’ in order to ‘impose obligations on the parties which would not 
necessarily be implied by the use of the word ‘authority’.’736  Pointedly, the 
language ‘under the control’ is used to highlight the de facto as opposed to 
the de jure scope of the obligation to take precautionary measures.737 The 
obligations to take precautionary measures therefore cover not only the host 
State’s own population, but also any other civilians and civilian objects that 
may be temporarily under its control, including refugees, aliens, and foreign 
investments.738   
Before turning to the assessment of compliance with the 
precautionary obligations, the interaction between the obligations to take 
precautions in and against attack merits consideration. On this point, 
American practice stands for the proposition that it is the defender who 
carries most of the burden to take precautions in favor of the civilian 
population, since it better controls its civilian population.739 This is a 
convenient position to hold since the US is traditionally not engaged in 
warfare on US territory, thereby shifting most of the responsibility to its 
adversary. Correspondingly, Israel, who normally engages in warfare in 
territory over which it may be said to exercise control, represents the view 
it is the attacking party, and not the defender that controls the war zone, 
who carries the burden to take precautions.740 Both views are inaccurate.  
Articles 57 and 58 are two necessarily interconnected sides of the 
same principle whereby civilians must be spared to the extent possible from 
the effects of armed conflict. Hence, the object and purpose of IHL 
mandates that all parties to the conflict will carry the burden of the 
precautionary obligation irrespective of their classification into ‘attacker’ and 
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‘defender’.741 In fact such a distinction has no place in the practice and law 
and policy of the conduct of hostilities. The practicalities of warfare render 
the distinction between defenders and attackers artificial, since in reality, a 
belligerent party takes measures that are both pro-active and offensive and 
protective and defensive. No belligerent engages in purely offensive or 
strictly defensive tactics. This notion is clearly reflected in the customary 
definition of ‘attack’, under API Article 49, as ‘acts of violence against the 
adversary, whether in offence or in defence’.742 Moreover, an attempt to 
identify who is the attacking party so as to allocate precautionary obligations 
risks collapsing into a guilt-based analysis of the conduct of hostilities and 
conflating ‘attack’ with ‘aggression’ and ‘defense’ with ‘self-defense’, 
thereby confusing jus in bello with jus ad bellum.  
The fact that the obligation to take precautions applies equally to all 
the parties to the conflict does not mean that the obligation is not equitable 
in application. The requirement to take precautionary measures imposes an 
obligation of conduct that is assessed in terms of ‘effort made rather than 
results obtained’.743 The phrase ‘everything feasible’ qualifies all the 
obligations of Article 57, while the language ‘to the maximum extent 
feasible’ modifies the precautionary obligations under Article 58.744 This 
‘feasibility’ yardstick represents the desire of the international community to 
increase the protection of civilians (objects and persons) without placing 
unrealistic constraints on the ability of the State to defend itself.745 As 
regards the meaning of this benchmark, States, doctrine, and jurisprudence 
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spell out that ‘feasible’ precautions are those which are ‘practicable or 
practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, 
including humanitarian and military considerations’.746  
The implication of conditioning the obligation to protect objects from 
the effects of hostilities by what is ‘practicable’ in the ‘prevailing 
circumstances’ is that, assessment of compliance is limited to ‘the factors 
and existing possibilities’ as they appeared to the State at the time; it is not 
subject to subsequently informed analysis.747 Further, ‘practicability’ 
requires that the measurement of compliance with the obligation to take 
precautionary measures will turn, inter alia, on the means available to the 
State.748 Of course, any such assessment of means ought to be realistic 
and context sensitive, and account for budget constraints, even of the 
wealthiest of States and most advanced of western armies.  
Indeed, the drafting history of API, the declarations of States upon 
signature and upon ratification of API,749 military manuals,750 and 
scholarship, all indicate that developed and developing countries, neutral 
and war-ravaged States alike construe ‘practicability’ as a benchmark that 
is relative to their particular topography, weather, and economic 
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conditions.751 In practice, in the assessment of what is ‘feasible’ most 
military manuals enumerate military and humanitarian considerations, such 
as the effect of taking the precaution on mission accomplishment and the 
likelihood and degree of humanitarian benefit from taking the precaution, 
and ‘the cost of taking the precaution, in terms of time, resources and, or 
money’.752  
It thus arises that IHL requires States to act in due diligence so as to 
protect foreign investments under their control from the effects of hostilities. 
The international responsibility for the obligation to take precautionary 
measures is, inter alia, circumscribed by the resources and the financial and 
technical capacity of the war-torn host State.753 This is only right. IHL does 
not presume to suggest a priority for the allocation of funds. Insofar as 
States give due respect for the paramount obligation to protect the civilian 
population (persons and objects) from the dangers of hostilities, 
international law respects their discretion to allocate their resources in 
accordance with domestic law and policy.  
5. The Relationship between FPS and the IHL Obligation to Take 
Precautions 
This section deals with the application of the international norms that govern 
the State’s obligation to take precautions in favor of foreign investments in 
times of armed conflict.  
Importantly, the issue here is not about the relationship of the two 
regimes, IHL and investment law, as such, but the relationship of particular 
norms belonging to these two regimes that control the specific factual 
situation of investments that sustain damage owing to military operations 
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during armed conflicts.754 Because, as noted, FPS claims that arise out of 
or in relation to armed conflict mostly concern the question whether the 
State took appropriate measures to protect the investment from the conduct 
of third parties, this discussion focuses on the interaction of the FPS 
obligation and API Article 58. In principle, a similar methodology applies to 
the interaction between API Article 57 and FPS. In the latter case, the 
question is whether the host State took appropriate precautions to protect 
the investment in its attack against the adversary. 
The story of MCC’s investment in Afghanistan from chapter 4 
facilitates this analysis. To recall, in 2007 Afghanistan awarded MCC a 30-
year lease to extract copper in Mes Aynak, but between 2008 and 2014 the 
copper mine was subjected to repeated deadly attacks by the Taliban.755 
Afghanistan took various costly measures and went to great lengths to 
protect the MCC’s investment over the years. It deployed armed forces to 
guard the investment, provided the workers with armed vehicles, built 
bunkers and shelters on site, and spread checkpoints around the area; all 
at a reported cost of over USD 210 million.756 The President even called on 
the Taliban to ‘stop pursuing objectives of outsiders’.757 Nonetheless, the 
attacks of the Taliban resulted in substantial loss of life and damage to 
property.758  
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Assume that MCC initiates proceedings against Afghanistan in 
ICSID,759 where it argues that the State failed to comply with the FPS 
standard and therefore, it is must compensate MCC for the losses it suffered 
as a result of the Taliban’s attacks. Let us also assume that Afghanistan 
argues that it did not breach FPS by failing to take reasonable measures to 
protect the investor’s property from damage, since what is ‘reasonable’ in 
armed conflict is determined by IHL concepts of ‘feasible precautions’ (here, 
API Article 58), with which the State had fully complied. Since both norms, 
API Article 58 and FPS, cover the facts of which the situation consists and 
both have binding force over the legal subjects regulated, then barring 
issues of jurisdiction and applicable law,760 the questions before the 
hypothetical MCC v Afghanistan tribunal may be broken-down as follows:  
(a) Do the described measures comply with the obligation to take 
reasonable precautions under investment law? (b) Assuming that IHL 
applies, do the described measures comply with the obligation to take 
feasible precautions under IHL? (c) Is there a difference between the results 
that follow from the application of both standards to the facts of the case? 
(d) If so, what is the relationship between these standards and what does 
that mean in terms of State responsibility? These questions are addressed 
below. 
Under API Article 58, Afghanistan is required, to the extent ‘feasible’, 
to take precautionary measures to protect the civilian objects under its 
control (including foreign investments) from the attacks of the Taliban. As 
explained, the assessment of the measures that Afghanistan took in favor 
of MCC’s investment (as set out above) must have regard for the fact that 
Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world; it is a landlocked 
developing country, whose economy and national armed forces 
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substantively rely on foreign aid.761 Let us assume that in these 
circumstances Afghanistan’s costly and diverse measures (as set out 
above) met the standard of what is practicable and practical in the prevailing 
circumstances, and that in these circumstances, notwithstanding the 
occurrence of damage, IHL does not impose an obligation to take more or 
other measures to protect the investment, such as the deployment of 
additional forces, the use of other, more advanced weapons, or the 
construction of better bunkers.  
As regards FPS, it was above suggested that, like Article 58, this 
norm imposes a relative due diligence obligation that is sensitive to the 
capacity of the host State. Professedly, this means that Afghanistan’s socio-
economic conditions should be taken into consideration in the assessment 
of what was reasonable in the prevailing circumstances. Yet, doctrine and 
arbitral practice give no such guarantees since the question whether FPS 
imposes an absolute or relative standard of due diligence remains 
contested. Let us therefore assume that the hypothetical MCC v 
Afghanistan tribunal, along the lines of the Ampal v Egypt Tribunal, finds 
that whereas the first few attacks by the Taliban against MCC’s assets could 
not have been prevented, the other deadly attacks could and should have 
been prevented by way of adopting better security measures and/or 
implementing such measures faster.762 
It thus follows that the application of both investment law and IHL 
norms leads to two opposite results, whereby the same precautions comply 
with international law under one norm and breach international law under 
the other. Ostensibly, this is a norm conflict.763 On this point, and as 
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stressed in the chapters above, a distinction should be drawn between an 
apparent conflict, which may be avoided by interpretive means, in particular 
through VCLT Article 31(3)(c), and a genuine conflict, which cannot be 
avoided but can be resolved through legal techniques, namely the lex 
specialis maxim.764 
Accordingly, the first step in this inquiry is the examination whether 
the potentially conflicting results may be interpreted so as to make the 
norms compatible. A notable example of such a technique is arguably found 
in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion,765 where the ICJ held that, in 
times of armed conflict, what is an ‘arbitrary deprivation of life’ under ICCPR 
Article 6 ‘can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed 
conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself’.766 Along a 
same line, it may be suggested that what is ‘reasonable’ in terms of 
precautions (or: what is ‘full protection and security’) in the context of armed 
conflict is determined by reference to IHL and its standards of feasibility.767  
Whether IHL is a ‘proper reference point’768 from which to draw 
meaning for international investment agreements depends on whether API 
Article 58 passes the admissibility hurdles of VCLT Article 31(3)(c), which 
were previously addressed. It is suggested that it does. Article 58 is a rule 
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of customary international law that applies to all types of armed conflicts 
and binds all States. It is also relevant. In the Oil Platforms case the Court 
stated that customary jus ad bellum principles were ‘relevant’ to the 
interpretation of FCN treaties.769 It is almost certain that the same would 
apply to the relevance of jus in bello customary norms to the interpretation 
of modern investment treaties.770  
At the same time, the function of Article 31(3)(c) should not be 
overstated. The provision is not a ‘peg on which to hang the whole corpus 
of international law on the use of force’.771 If API Article 58 is admissible 
through VCLT Article 31(3)(c) and is taken into account as part of the 
context in the interpretation of the FPS provision, this is as far as 
interpretation can go ‘without committing violence against the treaty’s text’, 
to use Milanović’s words.772 Put a different way, interpretation is the process 
of establishing the legal character and effects of a consensus achieved by 
the parties. In contrast, application is the process of ‘determining the 
consequences’ of such an interpretation in a concrete case.773 Hence, while 
IHL is taken into account, it is not dispositive for the interpretation of what 
precautions are ‘reasonable’ under FPS. 
Notably, in this respect, the treatment of the interaction between the 
investment law and IHL norms in this chapter 5 differs from that under 
chapter 3, which dealt with the EWC and the IHL rules on the dispossession 
and destruction of property. Chapter 3 proposed that the language of the 
EWC effectively references the customary IHL rule through its ordinary (or 
special) meaning. In practical terms, this proposition means that the 
 
769 Case concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v USA) (Merits)[2003] ICJ Rep 161, para 41. 
770 Simma and Kill (n Error! Bookmark not defined.) 698-691; Simma – A place for human 
rights (n 768) 585. 
771 A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn CUP 2013) 216; LG Garcia ‘The Role 
of Human Rights in International Investment Law’ in J Calamita et al (eds) Current issues 
in investment treaty law, Vol IV (BIICL 2013) 29, 37-9. 
772 Milanović – Origins of lex specialis (n 60) 108. See also Case concerning Oil Platforms, 
Separate opinion of Judge Higgins, para 49. 
773 Schwarzenberger - Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation (n 456), 212-219; 





meaning of the investment treaty standard is ascertained by way of 
examining the content of the IHL norm. The same, however, cannot be said 
of the language of the FPS standard and the IHL obligation to take 
precautions. While it can be demonstrated that the phrase ‘full protection 
and security’ (and similar language) was regularly used, among the relevant 
community of word users, as a reference to the customary standard of 
treatment, it cannot be shown that the language ‘full protection and security’ 
is understood as a reference to API Articles 57and 58, as such.  
Nonetheless, the discussed similarities between both norms – the 
‘protective’ function of the norms, the scope which covers foreign 
investments, and that both prescribe an obligation of conduct that is crafted 
using ‘feasibility’ and ‘reasonableness’ yardsticks implies that, even 
assuming that the conflict at hand is not ‘apparent’ but ‘genuine’ in that it 
cannot be interpreted away, it can arguably be resolved. Accordingly, the 
next step in the inquiry is to examine whether the conflict between FPS and 
Article 58 may be resolved by assigning priority to one norm over the 
other,774 namely through the lex specialis rule.775  
A norm may be lex specialis due to the following two grounds.776 
First, a norm may be ‘more special’ because it addresses the particular 
subject-matter that the general norm also addresses but in a more direct or 
precise manner.777 Second, a norm can be more special if it deals with the 
subject-matter referred to in a general rule, but in greater detail.778 In terms 
of State responsibility, under a conflict in the applicable law, only the special 
rule that must be applied can be breached and, in turn, result in 
responsibility.779 
It is suggested that, in this case, API Article 58 is the special norm. 
While investment treaties are special in that substantive standards of 
 
774 Milanović – Norm Conflict (n 62) 101-02. 
775 Pauwelyn (n 62) 327-418; ILC - Study on Lex Specialis (n 88) para 21. 
776 Pauwelyn (ibid) 327-418; ILC – Lex specialis study (ibid) para 21; Article 55, ARSIWA. 
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protection prescribed under investment instruments (eg, FPS) are tailored 
for the particular investment relations between the parties,780 these 
standards are general vis-à-vis the circumstances on the background of 
which the investment is made. FPS does not prescribe a detailed or 
particular arrangement for instances of hostilities.781 The FPS standard 
does not, for instance, comprise particular sub-parts that deal with different 
situations in hostilities. In fact, many treaties intertwine FPS with fair and 
equitable treatment, a standard that mostly concerns regulatory measures 
under the law enforcement paradigm.  
Conversely, IHL is triggered only against a factual determination that 
a given dispute has passed the threshold of hostilities. Article 58 is 
specifically tailored to address the obligations of the State to defend civilian 
objects, including investments, against attacks of third parties. Article 58 is 
therefore better able to take account of the particular circumstances of the 
complex situation in Afghanistan. It also deals with the requirement to take 
precautionary measures against the attacks of the Taliban in greater detail, 
and it is the rule which ‘approaches most nearly to the subject in hand’.782  
It is important that this determination does not suspend or abrogate 
the FPS standard. Investment rules, including FPS, continue to regulate the 
protection of investments, including during hostilities. In times of armed 
conflict, the State is under additional other obligations of police protection 
that do not relate to the dangers of military operations (eg protection from 
looting).783 As regards this particular instance however, if FPS, the 
breached norm, has to give way to the norm complied with, API Article 58, 
 
780 Amoco v Iran, Award, 15 IUSCTR 289, 14 July 1987, para 112. 
781 See in this regard Pauwelyn (n 62) 389. (‘an obligation to do something in the events A 
to Z is less specific than an obligation not to do this something in the events A and B. Or a 
WTO obligation not to restrict trade, irrespective of the product involved, must be seen as 
less specific than an obligation (or permission) to restrict trade in the specific products A 
and B’). Similarly, the obligation to take precautionary measure A through Z under all 
circumstances (whether peace or war) is less specific than an obligation (or permission) to 
take measures A and B alone in situations of armed conflict specifically. 
782 ILC – Study Group on Fragmentation (n 719) para 60. 





then Afghanistan incurs no international responsibility for the damage 
caused to the foreign investment in the framework of a military operation 
and it is therefore under no obligation (as a matter of law) to pay reparations 
MCC. Nonetheless, as explained in chapter 7, it may be that for various 
extra-judicial considerations Afghanistan will decide to compensate MCC. 
To recap, this section suggested that, in practice, the FPS standard 
and the IHL norms that require States to take precautions in favor of civilian 
objects including foreign investment may, at least apparently, conflict. 
Where the conflict may be avoided by interpretive means, the FPS 
obligation is informed (but not supplanted) by IHL notions of ‘feasibility’. 
Where, however, the conflict cannot be avoided through interpretive tools, 
the lex specialis technique will apply to ‘resolve’ the conflict.  
Under certain circumstance, as with the above example of Mes 
Aynak, the application of lex specialis may lead to the partial displacement 
of the investment norm or to the qualification of the conflicting investment 
norm to the extent required to resolve the conflict. Hence, the conduct at 
issue that would in principle breach the FPS standard (for instance, because 
more or better protective measures were not adopted), but was compliant 
with IHL norms (here, API Article 58) ‘would now also become compliant’ 
with investment law by virtue of lex specialis.784 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter set out to elucidate the scope and content of the obligation of 
host States to protect investments from the effects of hostilities.  
To that end, the discussion had to resolve several ambiguities over 
one of the most common, yet contentious, investment treaty standards – 
the obligation to protect and secure investments. First, the chapter dealt 
with certain aspects of the customary standard of treatment of foreign 
property in war. It was suggested that under customary law, States are 
obliged to act in due diligence so as to protect the property of aliens from 
 
784 Milanović – Origins of lex specialis (n 60) 106-7. See also Droege – Elective Affinities? 





the effects of hostilities. It was also argued that this customary norm 
imposes a relative obligation that depends on the particular capacity of the 
State.  
Then, the discussion dealt with the debated meaning of the FPS 
treaty standard. It was argued that, under VCLT Article 31, the language 
‘full protection and security’ is a reference to the customary standard of 
treatment. It was therefore argued that like the customary standards that 
informs its meaning, the FPS provision imposes an obligation that is 
relative, also, to the resources of the host State.  
Next, the chapter dealt with the application of FPS in the context of 
hostilities, focusing on the interaction between the FPS standard and the 
precautionary obligation under IHL. In this framework, the chapter offered 
an analysis of the meaning, scope, and function of the obligation to take 
precautionary measures in and against attacks under IHL. It was suggested 
that, as a matter of existing and desired law, there is a consensus that the 
obligation to take ‘feasible’ precautions under IHL requires States to do what 
is practicable and practical in the prevailing circumstances, including but not 
limited to – military and humanitarian considerations and socioeconomic 
capabilities.  
Finally, using the example of the Chinese investment in Afghanistan 
from chapter 4, the discussion looked into the interaction between the FPS 
standard under investment law and the IHL obligation to take precautions 
against the effects of attack. As proposed in chapter 1, and building on the 
broad definition of ‘conflict’ set therein, this analysis first attempted to 
ascertain whether a potential incompatibility between the FPS and the 
precautionary obligation under IHL may be avoided by interpreting the 
norms harmoniously, namely through VCLT Article 31(3)(c). It was 
suggested that, in this case, while the IHL norm should indeed be 
contextualized in the interpretation of the FPS, such a technique does not 
remove the potential divergence between the norms when applied to 





 This ‘genuine conflict’, while unavoidable, can be resolved. In 
contradistinction to the analysis in chapter 4 above (namely, section 6) 
where it was argued that some conflicts concerning targeting policies and 
investment promotion and protection are ‘unresolvable’, it is proposed that 
potential conflicts between FPS and API Articles 57 and 58 are resolvable. 
Thus, conflict resolution tools, namely the lex specialis rule, can resolve a 
conflict whereby a State adopts precautionary measures that comply with 
IHL, in that IHL does not require the State to do more or to take other means 
(or: IHL permits the State not to adopt other measures), but simultaneously 
these same measure breach FPS, because investment law requires the 
State to go to greater lengths and adopt more measures in these 
circumstances. In the example of Mes Aynak which involved the application 
of FPS and API Article 58, it was proposed that the IHL normf is the more 
special norm that prevails.  
 In the aggregate, this analysis allows us to identify a framework for 
assessing compliance with the obligation to protect foreign investments 
against the effect of armed conflicts – a question of growing relevance in 
practice – in a manner that accounts for both IHL and investment law. 
Assessment of compliance, it is suggested, ought to account for the 
prevailing military aims and humanitarian considerations as well as the 
socio-economic conditions of the host State. As a matter of desired law, any 
other assessment of compliance risks holding States with limited resources 
to the standards of developed countries and would de facto guarantee that 
no matter how vigilantly certain States use their limited resources to protect 








Hostilities-Based Defenses against Violations of Investment 
Obligations in Armed Conflict 
1. Introduction  
The previous chapters demonstrated that the applicability of IHL as a field 
of international law that regulates the conduct of hostilities has important 
implications for the assessment of the host State’s international 
responsibility. Where the breached investment treaty standard (eg, FPS) 
has to give way to the complied with IHL norm (eg, Article 58 API), then the 
State’s international responsibility is not engaged. Thus, barring issues of 
jurisdiction and applicable law, it may be said that IHL-arguments785 can 
serve as a defense against an investment claim. 
In continuance, this chapter examines if and how States can invoke 
the reality of armed conflicts, and not IHL norms as such, as a defense 
against an investment claim that arises out of, or in relation to, hostilities, 
and the way in which such defenses could and should be dealt with by 
investment tribunals. In this chapter, the term ‘defense’ represents an array 
of legal arguments capable of rebutting the State’s responsibility for 
violations of international law or the consequences for such violations. 
‘Defense’ comprises treaty instruments, such as exceptions and carve-outs, 
and the customary rules on circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
(CPW).786  
Accordingly, section 2 deals with the scope of security exceptions 
and the extent to which the State’s decision to invoke security exceptions in 
relation to an armed conflict is binding upon judicial instances. It is 
suggested that in the context of armed conflict, security exceptions leave 
States ample room for appraisal with respect to emergency measures, 
however this discretion is subject to limited judicial review. Section 3 deals 
 
785 See discussion in chapter 1. 
786 As noted, for the purpose of the present discussion, the analysis does not differentiate 
between justifications and excuses although conceptual and practical distinctions exist. On 





with CPW. The treatment of the issue here is limited to the examination 
whether the reality of hostilities may be used to excuse or justify violations 
of investment standards that protect the investment during conflict.787 It is 
suggested that few, if any, customary defenses can justify or excuse 
violations of investment standards of protection in the context of armed 
conflict.  
Section 4 deals with treaty carve-outs in the form of Denial of 
Benefits clauses (DoB). It is suggested that the DoB may be invoked to 
introduce security-related concerns when such concerns are reflected in the 
absence of diplomatic relations with the third country that controls the 
investment. However, since in practice situations of hostilities are more 
abundant than the official absence of diplomatic relations, DoBs are far from 
a guaranteed defense against investment claims in the context of hostilities.  
Overall, this chapter identifies a sliding scale of potential defenses to 
investment claims based on considerations relating to hostilities. At the 
same time, this chapter demonstrates that the existence of an armed 
conflict is not a silver bullet as far as defense against investment arbitration 
goes. Such defenses are subject to judicial review, they are qualified in 
scope, and are limited in application.  
This conclusion, as further explained below, is predicated on the 
development of international law. Because armed conflicts, by their very 
nature and essence, entail extreme and dynamic conditions, over time 
States have developed primary rules that are tailored for this reality. Such 
international norms include not only rules of IHL but also other investment 
treaty mechanisms, such as security exceptions, war clauses, and 
 
787 For an analysis of the origins, development, and qualifications of each CPW, see: 
Paddeu – Excuses and justifications (n 155). For the purposes of this analysis, the study 
assumes that the customary defences analysed below are relevant for investor-State 
relations. For an analysis of the applicability these customary defences, which constitute 
an expression of the law of inter-State responsibility, to relations between States and 
investors, see: Caron (n 171) 870-872; J Crawford, ‘ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: A  Retrospect’, (2002) 96 AJIL 874, 886-888; M 
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precautionary obligations (including FPS). Each of these rules reflects an 
account (or a balance) of the State’s military and security priorities in 
hostilities and other, potentially conflicting, humanitarian considerations. 
The creation of such primary norms to deal with extreme conditions and 
threats to national security, in turn, resulted in a limitation on the application 
of certain defenses, whereby States cannot use the extreme conditions of 
hostilities to excuse, justify, or circumvent the special primary norms that 
were created specifically for the regulation of the extreme conditions of 
hostilities.  
The relative length of each section in this chapter 6 is designated to 
reflect this state of play and to correlate to what seems to be the relative 
weight and primacy of these defenses in modern practice. Accordingly, the 
discussion of security exceptions takes up more room than the analysis of 
customary defenses, while the discussion of denial of benefits is the most 
concise in the chapter. 
2. ‘Security interests’ that Exempt from Treaty Standards of 
Protection in Armed Conflict 
This section examines whether IHL-consideration (i.e., the occurrence of 
hostilities, military aims, humanitarian objectives, and related 
circumstances) can be introduced in investment arbitration using treaty 
exceptions, assuming such exist. This analysis focuses on the origins, 
scope, and meaning of security exceptions and their application in the 
context of armed conflict.  
A typical security exception in treaties of recent vintage instructs that, 
‘nothing in this [instrument] shall be construed to… prevent a Party from 
taking any actions which it considers necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests…’788 Generally speaking, such security 
exceptions permit a State to lawfully take action directed at a particular 
 
788 Article 8, ASEAN - Hong Kong, China SAR Investment Agreement (signed 12 November 
2017). For a review of recent practice: K Sauvant et al. ‘The rise of self-judging essential 





regulatory objective that would otherwise be inconsistent with its 
substantive treaty obligations. In practical (or rather theoretical) terms, 
security exceptions limit the scope of investment protections in the treaty.789 
Put differently, when the host State relies on the security exception in the 
face of an allegation that it had breached an investment standard, the State 
does not deny that its measures do not conform to treaty standards of 
protection, it rather submits that the consequences of its failure to comply 
with the treaty are inapplicable since the measure was required to protect 
legitimate security aims.  
Security exception in investment treaties are a postwar American 
product. The modern language of security exceptions is properly traced to 
Article 99 of the Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO),790 
which served as the basis for many instruments.791 Article 99 reserved the 
right of a party to the Charter to take ‘any action which it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests, where such 
action…is taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations’.792   
This language reflects the American experience during WWII, when 
the US armed forces learned the breadth of the American dependence on 
critical raw materials from abroad, and the concern of the US War and Navy 
Departments that American free trade commitments under the ITO Charter 
 
789 C Henckels, ‘Investment Treaty Security Exceptions, Necessity and Self-Defence in the 
Context of Armed Conflict’ European Yearbook of International Economic Law (Springer 
forthcoming); Continental Casualty Company v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9, 
Award, 5 September 2008, paras 164-65, 192; CMS v Argentina, ICSID Case No 
ARB/01/8, Decision on Application for Annulment, 1 September 2006, para 129. For the 
view that security exceptions are not a scope limitation but rather an affirmative defense, 
see: C Henckels, ‘Scope Limitation or Affirmative Defence? The Purpose and Role of 
Investment Treaty Exception Clauses’ in F Paddeu and L Bartels (eds), Exceptions in 
International Law (forthcoming OUP, 2019) and the authorities therein. 
790 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (Havana Charter, ITO Charter 
1948) UN Doc E/CONF.2/78. This historical backdrop was recently stressed in WTO, 
Report of the Panel Russia - Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (5 April 2019) 
WT/DS512/R, paras 7.83-7.87. 
791 Most notably, Article XXI, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 UNTS 187 (1994) (GATT).  





would hamper military aims and needs. The armed forces sought to 
guarantee that American free trade and investment agenda will not interfere 
with measures that may be required so as to ensure the availability of 
natural resources necessary for defense purposes or with American efforts 
to halt the shipment of fissionable materials and military technology to the 
Soviet Union.793  
FCN treaties that were concluded by the US after 1945 retained the 
formulation of Article 99 of the ITO Charter, with some improvements that 
were required by the postwar order.794 Namely, in line with the prohibition 
on the use of force that was encapsulated in the UN Charter, the reference 
to essential interests ‘in time of war’ was omitted from postwar FCNs.795 
Illustratively, Article XXI(1)(d) of the 1955 Standard US FCN instructed that, 
‘the present Treaty shall not preclude the application of measures… 
necessary to protect [the State’s] essential security interests’.796 The US 
State Department explained that postwar security exceptions were 
predicated on the maxim that every legal system permits the State to 
‘suspend assurances of [the] rights of [the] individual’ in the ‘face of 
imminent peril’. The purpose and effect of these exceptions was ‘to 
subordinate treaty principles’ to the ‘paramount responsibility of the state to 
defend itself and protect public safety’.797 
While it is uncontested that security exceptions were introduced into 
investment instruments with the purpose and effect of giving States broad 
discretion to react to threats that relate to a war between two States or more, 
some questions remain concerning the operation of investment security 
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exception in the context of contemporaneous armed conflict. First, do 
security exceptions cover modern forms of hostilities that involve non-State 
actors? Second, how severe should such hostilities be to fulfil the 
requirements of the security exception? And third, to what extent is the 
State’s decision to take emergency measures in armed conflict open for 
judicial review? The analysis below takes these questions in turn. 
Ideally, the security exception will contain a stipulation on the State’s 
right to take measures in pursuance of security aims during armed conflict. 
Some bilateral and multilateral investment instruments in fact contain such 
an explicit recognition. For instance, ECT Article 24(3) reserves the State’s 
right to take ‘any measure which it considers necessary… for the protection 
of its essential security interests including those… taken in time of war, 
armed conflict or other emergency in international relations’.798 This 
language leaves no doubt that an international armed conflict, i.e., an armed 
conflict between two or more States,799 is covered by the provision. Yet, this 
drafting leaves open the question whether such security exceptions 
comprise or exclude other forms of hostilities, namely NIACs. 
 Schreuer proposes in this respect that the juxtaposition of the 
phrase ‘in international relations’ with the concept ‘armed conflict’ may be 
construed as a limiting language that excludes NIACs from the ambit of 
Article 24(3).800 There is some, albeit limited, logic to this proposition. At the 
time of the ECT’s conclusion and around the time some other 2,000 
investment treaties were concluded,801 1994, the law on NIAC was far from 
settled. Arguably, due to the ambiguity over this concept, the drafters of 
investment treaties intended to exclude NIACs from the scope of the 
 
798 Article 24(3), ECT.  
799 CA 2, GC. Article 1(4), API extends the scope of application of ‘international armed 
conflicts’ to hostilities in which groups are fighting against colonial domination, alien 
occupation, or racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination.  
800 Schreuer – Investments in armed conflict (n 192) 18. 
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security exception, so as not to not muddy the waters of investment 
standards with further ambiguity from IHL, as it were.  
Also of note in support of  Schreuer’s proposition is that when States, 
‘especially affected States’ in particular,802 wish to include NIACs in the 
security exception, they use explicit stipulations to that effect, thereby 
illuminating their understanding that absent such language NIACs are 
excluded from security exceptions.803 For instance, Article 83(c) of the EU 
– Egypt Association Agreement (2000) reserves the right of the State to 
take any measure ‘which it considers essential to its own security in the 
event of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and 
order, in time of war or serious international tension constituting threat of 
war.’804 Article 15(3) of the Israel – Japan BIT (2017), as another example, 
reserves the right of the State to take measures ‘which it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests taken in time 
of international or non-international armed conflict’.805  
Nevertheless, a VCLT-consistent interpretation leads to the 
conclusion that whenever the security exception references ‘war’ and 
‘armed conflict’ it also comprises NIAC, unless explicitly provided otherwise. 
Under evolutionary interpretation of treaties, with some terms, the intention 
of the parties is derived not from the meaning the term possessed, or which 
have been attributed to them at the time of the treaty’s conclusion (say, 
1994),806 but rather from the meaning of such terms today.807 The term 
 
802 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 43. 
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‘armed conflict’ in treaty exceptions is one such generic term that finds its 
validity and meaning in the perpetual, dynamic, regime of investment law. 
First, investment instruments and security exceptions, by their nature 
and essence, aim at evolution; they are designed to accommodate 
development.808 Second, the duration and lifespan of investment treaties 
aims at perpetuity or at significant periods. Both contentions support the 
notion that certain investment treaty terms are intended to be defined by the 
relevant institutional practices existing at whatever time the treaty is 
interpreted, rather than at the time of its conclusion.809 Third, other terms in 
investment instruments use evolving concepts. For instance, some 
investment standards of protection qualify the treatment of the investment 
with ‘domestic laws’; logically, such references intend the domestic law in 
force at the time the treaty is interpreted, not at the time of conclusion. 
Therefore, the concepts ‘war’ and ‘armed conflict’, like the term ‘comercio’ 
in the 1858 Treaty between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, are to be 
understood based on language conventions that apply at the time of 
interpretation.810 
Moreover, a contemporaneous rather than evolutionary 
interpretation of ‘armed conflict’ is absurd. The term ‘armed conflict’ is a 
technical term of art with a recognized meaning in IHL that has evolved 
considerably starting from the late 1990s. In 1994, when the ECT was 
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concluded, the idea of NIAC was controversial and its scope and regulation 
were ambiguous.811 Today, it is a truism to assert that NIACs represent the 
vast majority of armed conflicts, and that the humanitarian consequences 
they impinge, such as regional destabilization, refugee flows, and the 
potential for escalation to inter-State conflict, can be significant.812 The 
typology of NIACs has also become increasingly rich and imbued with more 
nuanced terminology that goes far beyond traditional perceptions of ‘war’.813 
Finally, it stands to reason that if States intended to specifically exclude the 
most prevalent form of hostilities from the scope of their power to invoke 
security exceptions, which is against their best interests, they would have 
done so with an explicit carve-out (eg: ‘other than in cases of NIAC…’).814 
For the foregoing, it is suggested that when treaty exceptions reference 
‘war’ or ‘armed conflict’ they also encompass NIACs, with or without 
additional language.  
Irrespective of explicit treaty language on the invocation of the 
exception in armed conflicts, not all measures the State takes in armed 
conflict come within the purview of the exception but only those which are 
taken for the protection of certain objectives from certain threats.815 Most 
investment instruments816 express the protected objects at the core of the 
 
811 More clarity followed the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR (in particular following the 
aforementioned, Tadic case, para 70), see: Greenwood – IHL and the Tadic Case (n 
180)265-83; T Meron, ‘Classification of Armed Conflict in the Former 
Yugoslavia: Nicaragua’s Fallout’ (1998) 92(2) AJIL 236-42; S Murphy, ‘Progress and 
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (1999) 
93(1) AJIL 57-97. For the treatment of this case and its influence on IHL today, see: D 
Akande, ‘Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts’ in E Wilmshurst (ed) 
International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (OUP 2012) 32-63; M Schmitt, 
‘Classification in future conflict’ in (ibid) 465-70; Sivakumaran (n 527) 57-60, 223-32. 
812 V Bernard, ‘Editorial: Delineating the boundaries of violence’ (2014) 96(893) IRRC 5-
11. 
813 Today, conflict are also described as ‘spillover’, ‘multinational’, ‘cross-border’, 
‘transnational’, etc. and warfare is also dealt with in terms of effect-based operations, that 
deviate from conventional war practices (see further: Henderson (n 505) 126-29). 
814 See eg: Article 24(1), ECT. 
815 Deutsche Telekom v India, PCA Case No 2014-10, Interim Award, 13 December 2017, 
paras 183 and onwards.  
816 Some treaties refer to ‘public security’ (see eg: Article 3(a) Protocol to the Germany – 





security exception and the potential risks and threats to them through the 
terms ‘national security’,817 ‘national security interests’,818 or ‘essential 
security interests’.819   
Whether UNCTAD was correct to propose in 2009 that by choosing 
one of these alternatives States ‘do not actually intend to introduce a 
distinction’ between the terms and the scopes they represent,820 or not,821 
what is certain is that these terms were chosen specifically for their flexible 
and open-ended nature and because they have ‘no precise delineation or 
interpretation’, as the US State Department explained.822 There is also a 
wide agreement that irrespective of other ambiguities over ‘national 
security’ and like formulations, at the very least, these concepts ordinarily 
entail the ‘safety of a nation and its people, institutions, esp. from military 
threat or from espionage, terrorism.’823  
Supplementary means of interpretation offer additional indications as 
to what type of emergency measures may be taken in the context of armed 
conflict,824 since occasionally, during treaty negotiations, one party inquired 
of the other party whether a particular measure would be justified by the 
security exception. For instance, during the negotiations of the US – 
 
817 Eg: Article 2, Hungary – Russia BIT. 
818 Eg: Article 18, Sweden – Mexico BIT. 
819 Eg: Article 15(2), Israel – Japan BIT; Article 6.12, India – Singapore Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation Agreement.  
820 UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development, ‘The protection 
of national security in IIAs’ (UNCTAD, 31 Jul 2009) <UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2008/5> 
(ACCESSED 10 September 2018), 73.  
821 The negotiation history of FCN treaties may lead to an opposite conclusion. For 
instance, the negotiation materials of the US – Israel FCN (1951) teach that, ‘security’ 
‘involve[d] considerations of national defense’ while ‘safety’ was construed as a narrower 
concept that somewhat overlapped with ‘considerations of public order’ (Memorandum of 
Conversation ‘Negotiation of Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Israel’ 
20 November 1950, cited in Vandevelde – The first BIT (n 703) 497. The negotiations of 
US – Philippines FCN (1948) elucidate that ‘national emergencies’ was understood as such 
that ‘might not have regard to international situations; that a threat of uprising or an 
earthquake might be a national emergency’ and, that, this concept ‘had a physical 
connotation, such as volcanic eruption or war’ (Telegram dated 20 July 1948, from the US 
embassy in Manila to the Department of State, cited in: ibid 497-510). 
822 Despatch from the US High Commissioner in Bonn to the Department of State,17 
February 1954, cited in ibid, 513-14. 
823 OED, n’ national security <http://www.oed.com/> (accessed 20 July 2018). 





Philippines FCN treaty, the American negotiators explained to their 
Philippine counterparts that the exception ‘would seem to make it possible 
for either country to apply reasonable restrictions with respect to military 
zones’.825  
As another example, the US agreed with the Netherlands that 
measures concerning the seizure of foreign property during war and 
payments thereof would normally fall within the ambit of the security 
exception.826 At the same time, the US maintained that an Argentinian law 
that prohibited aliens from owning real estate within 40 km of the border 
would not fall within the purview of the security exception.827 Likewise, the 
US and Japan agreed that while restrictions on exchange controls ‘might 
have a national security character’ they are not ‘clearly’ within the scope of 
the exception.828  
The next element that delimits the scope of valid emergency 
measures in armed conflict concerns the severity of the hostilities-related 
threat or crises that is required to invoke the exception. For instance, the 
CMS Tribunal asserted that the required level of the threat (to national 
security) should be such as to ‘result in total economic and social 
collapse’.829 For the Enron and Sempra Tribunals, the threat should be so 
severe that it needs to be directed at ‘the very existence of the State and its 
independence so as to qualify as involving an essential interest of the 
State’.830 However, there is nothing in the explicit language of security 
exceptions to support these yardsticks. What is more, such thresholds 
 
825 State Department Records, ‘Preliminary Discussion of United States — Philippine 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation’ (17 June 1947), cited in Vandevelde – 
The first BIT (n 703) 523. 
826 State Department Records, Despatch from the US embassy in The Hague to the 
Department of State, (8 September 1954), cited in ibid, ibid. 
827 State Department Records, ‘Discussion of US Revised Draft of FCN Treaty with 
Argentines’ (8 May 1950), cited in ibid, ibid. 
828 State Department Records, ‘Informal Discussions on the United States Standard Draft 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation’ (1 April 1952), cited in ibid, 524. 
829 CMS v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Award, 12 May 2005, para 355. 
830 Enron v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, Award, 22 May 2007, para 306; Sempra 





effectively prevent States from invoking security exceptions in the context 
of armed conflict, thereby leading to an absurd result that stands in stark 
contrast to the established circumstances of inclusion of security exceptions 
into investment treaties.  
Because of their temporal and territorial scope, in contradistinction 
to prolonged and severe inflation, armed conflicts do not necessarily result 
in the total ‘collapse’ of the State or its institutions, as required by the 
investment tribunals noted above. As Lubell put it, being ‘at war’ does not 
necessarily mean that ‘the whole of a state is in fact embroiled in an armed 
conflict’.831 At the same time, hostilities, irrespective of their limited scope, 
engage national security and necessitate measures that impinge on trade 
and investment policies.  
For instance, while most of Iraq turned into a war zone in 2003, life 
for American citizens, whose armed forces fought in Iraq, and the operation 
of most public institutions in the US continued uninterrupted. Likewise, the 
topography and circumstances of the protracted conflict between the armed 
forces of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front allowed 
these 20-year-long hostilities to be mostly confined to Mindanao, with little 
effect on the population and State infrastructure in other parts of the 
Philippines.  
Although the referenced hostilities outwardly fail to meet the 
threshold of CMS, Enron, or Sempra, it is a truism to state that these 
conflicts impinged upon American and Philippine national security interests. 
Analogous fallacies were arguably accounted for by the Continental 
Casualty Tribunal that held that, the invocation of the security exception 
‘does not require that the situation has already generated into one that calls 
for the suspension of constitutional guarantees and fundamental 
liberties.’832   
 
831 N Lubell and N Derejko, ‘A Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of 
Armed Conflict’ (2013) 11 JICJ 65, 66. 
832 LG&E v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1, Award, 25 July 2007, para 226; 





At the same time, the proposition that the intensity of the conflict is 
not dispositive for the invocation of security exceptions raises concerns over 
abusive invocation. Since armed conflicts do not necessarily affect every 
aspect of the State’s activities or all parts of its territory and population, not 
every measure the host State adopts vis-à-vis foreign investments during 
hostilities relates to the armed conflict or to national security.  
But just how to ensure that during armed conflict security exceptions 
will be invoked only in pursuance of security aims and not as disguised 
restrictions on investment flows that use the occurrence of hostilities as a 
façade, is a question of a different order that concerns the reviewability of 
security measures. What is meant by ‘reviewability’ is the degree of 
autonomy the State retains in the invocation of the security exception and 
the extent the State’s invocation of the exception is conclusive upon any 
tribunal and renders any cause-of-action with respect to which the exception 
was invoked nonjusticiable.  
Investment treaties may be classified into several drafting strands 
that arguably reflect different degrees of reviewability. According to one 
drafting method that characterized US treaties during the 1990s, the treaty 
‘shall not preclude a Party from applying measures necessary for the 
protection of its own essential security interests’.833 Some suggested that 
the phrase ‘necessary for’ represents self-judging language, which means 
that the invocation of the exception is conclusive upon the tribunal and 
subject only to good faith review. However, there is nothing in this explicit 
treaty language, drafting history, or State practice to support this view.834 
 
833 Eg: Article XIV, 1994 US Model BIT. See also: Article X US – Bulgaria BIT; Article IX, 
US – Latvia BIT; Article XV, US – Croatia BIT.  
834 W Burke-White and A Von Staden, ‘Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The 
Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ (2008) 48 Virginia Journal of Int’ Law 307, 381-86. They relied on 
‘inferences’ from State practice, such as the American argument before the ICJ in the 
matter of Nicaraguan v US, where the US argued that such drafting is self-judging. While 
it is freely admitted that such a position was put forth by the US, in proper context it carries 
little probative value. US litigators, in that case, adopted the position that the language is 
self-judging because they hoped to have the matter dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, or 





The Argentine tribunals did not accept this interpretation either, nor did the 
ICJ.835 
Another group of treaties, which characterized Indian BITs from the 
early 2000s, expresses the nexus between the threat that justifies the 
invocation of the exception and the measures taken to deal with it, not 
through the concept of ‘necessity’ but by using more relaxed terms. Article 
12 of the India – Mongolia BIT, for instance, reserves the right of the State 
to take any ‘action for the protection of its essential security interests...’836 
Arguably, if it is sufficient that the measure taken relates – on some level 
(‘for’) – to national security, then the State is left with great room for 
appraisal. However, exceptions drafted this way are usually qualified by 
several conditions that limit the State’s discretion.837 It is also noteworthy 
that the recent CC/Devas v India Tribunal (July 2016) rejected the 
contention that such drafting bars judicial review.838 At any rate, this drafting 
lost its appeal in recent years, and most (Indian) treaties that included this 
language were terminated.839 
Most modern investment instruments follow a different drafting 
style.840 Under Article 28.6 CETA, for instance, the State may take 
measures that ‘it considers necessary to protect its essential security 
 
Department admitted that this was an inconsistent and mistaken position. And the US 
never made such a submission again. See further in: K Vandevelde, ‘Of Politics and 
Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the BITs’ (1993) 11 int’l tax & business Lawyer 159, 172 
and J Alvarez and K Khamsi, ‘The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into 
the Heart of the Investment Regime’ in K Sauvant (ed) Yearbook of International 
Investment Law and Policy (2008- 2009).  
835 CMS v Argentina (Award), 373; LG&E v Argentina (Award) 212; Enron v Argentina 
(Award), para 332; Sempra v Argentina (Award) para 385; Nicaragua v US, 282. 
836 Article 12(2), India – Mongolia BIT; Article 12(2) India – Kazakhstan BIT; Article 12(2) 
India – Hungary BIT (terminated). 
837 These treaties usually require that any measure taken under the exception be in 
accordance ‘with its laws normally and reasonably applied on a non-discriminatory basis.’ 
838 CC/Devas v India, PCA Case No 2013-09, Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, 25 July 
2016, paras 239-45.  
839See: India’s investment instruments in: <UNCTAD 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org> 
840 Eg: Article 18(2), US – Uruguay BIT; Article 18(2), 2012 US Model BIT; Article 22(2), 





interests’.841 The language ‘it considers’ is designed to confer upon the 
treaty parties more discretion in the application of the exception, relative to 
the other referenced formulations. What is less clear is how much is ‘more’? 
If the phrase ‘it considers necessary’ is in fact representative of self-judging 
language then it is the exclusive prerogative of the host State to assess 
whether the intended investment poses a threat to national security, and 
how to react to this threat.  
However, it is suggested that the phrase ‘it considers’ is not a shield 
from review. As above explained, this language originates from Article 99 
of the ITO Charter, where the phrase ‘action which it considers necessary’ 
meant that, ‘whether a measure adopted under the security exception 
violated the Charter because it did not relate to any of the enumerated 
topics, is open to review’, including the question whether the measure was 
in fact ‘taken in time of war’.842 The prevailing understanding at the time 
security exceptions were first introduced to investment treaties was that no 
State has the right to take non-reviewable actions under the national 
security exception. In fact, the American position was that ‘it would be far 
better to abandon all work on the Charter’ than to incorporate self-judging 
provisions into the Charter that will ‘provide a legal escape from compliance 
with the provisions of the Charter’.843  
The notion that security exceptions are by no means self-judging 
pervaded the negotiations and drafting of US instruments, at least until the 
mid-1980s. The US explicitly objected to the inclusion of self-judging 
language (eg: ‘in its own judgment’) and/or any such an understanding of 
the language of security exceptions in its negotiations with Lebanon,844 the 
 
841 Article 26.6, CETA; emphasis added. 
842 Vandevelde – The first BIT (n 703) 148. On the significance of this historical context to 
the interpretation of the provision see Russia – Traffic in Transit, paras 7.90-7.100. 
843 UN Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Trade and Development 
in Geneva, Second Meeting, Minutes of Staff Meeting of US Delegation (2 July 1947) cited 
in ibid, 147. 
844 Lebanon proposed the insertion, of the phrase ‘to be determined solely by the Lebanese 
Republic’ after the phrase ‘essential security interest’. This was rejected by the State 





Philippines,845 Costa Rica,846 Egypt,847 Germany,848 Pakistan,849 and the 
Netherlands,850 to name but a few.851 Overall, the historical development of 
the provision demonstrates that the language ‘it considers’ meant that the 
State’s discretion concerns only the necessity of the measure, which is not 
subject to review; the relationship of such action to the subjects referred to, 
including the question whether there was an armed conflict at the relevant 
time to merit exceptions, is subject to review.852 Most recently (April 2019), 
this proposition was adopted by the WTO in Russia – Traffic in Transit.853 
Even if this position is not accepted, the general principle of good 
faith, which governs the exercise of treaty rights, including exceptions, 
 
whatsoever that Lebanon might make’ (US State Department, Memo: ‘Proposed 
Lebanese- American Treaty of Friendship. Commerce and Navigation’ (21 November 
1947), cited in ibid, 511). 
845 The US rejected the inclusion of self-judging language that would have a ‘possibly 
undermining effect on the whole treaty’ (Telegram from the US embassy in Manila to the 
Department of State (20 July 1948), cited in ibid, 508). 
846 Costa Rica asked to add language that would have given it sole discretion to take certain 
security measures (determine whether to impose exchange controls). The State 
Department objected. While it agreed that Costa Rica had discretion to decide whether to 
impose controls it stressed that, ’if action taken by Costa Rica were of a kind which the 
United States considered to be in violation of the provisions of this paragraph, it would be 
entitled to seek the same remedies that it would seek in the event of a violation of any other 
provision of the treaty’ (US State Department, Memorandum: ‘Negotiation of Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Costa Rica: First Meeting’ (5 June 1951), cited 
in ibid, 522). 
847 Egypt asked to clarify that the exception is self-judging. The US embassy objected to 
any such change and argued that this ‘would practically destroy the value of the provision’ 
(ibid, 521). 
848 The German negotiators ‘asked whether the clause was justiciable’, to which the US 
responded that it clearly was (Despatch from the US High Commissioner in Bonn to the 
Department of State (17 February 1954), cited in ibid, 514). 
849 Pakistan asked to add language that clarifies that each State is the sole judge of its 
security measures. This proposal was rejected by the US, who maintained that, ‘the 
technical effect [of this language] would be to remove the affected provision from the 
treaty.’ (Telegram from the Department of State to the US embassy in Karachi (27 
November 1954), cited in ibid, 512). 
850 Despatch from the US embassy in The Hague to the Department of State (15 
September 1954), cited in ibid, 397 (the States concurred that the exception is to be 
construed narrowly and in a manner that allows for future review of potential abusive 
invocation). 
851 See more on the above and other States in ibid, 510-26. 
852 The response of the US State Department to questions by the Senate, Memorandum 
headed “Questions Asked in Senate Finance Committee,” NARA, Record Group 43, 
International Trade Files, cited in ibid, 152.  





applies irrespective of treaty language854 and mitigates the concern that the 
exception will be used in an abusive manner.855 To be sure, what is meant 
by this is that a good faith analysis would require tribunals to distinguish 
between justified national security concerns on the one hand, and measures 
constituting a disguised form of protectionism on the other.856 
Arguably, it is because even the ‘self-judging’ language ‘it considers 
necessary’ is not fully ‘self-judging’, in that it confers broad autonomy to 
invoke the exception but does not bar judicial review of this invocation, that 
another drafting trend emerged. In recent years, States have begun to 
include explicit stipulation on the non-reviewability of security measures. 
Depending on their language, such provisions tackle reviewability through 
treaty interpretation, the exercise of judicial power, or jurisdictional carve-
outs, and in so doing limit or exclude altogether judicial review.  
One of the earliest attempts to exclude reviewability is found in the 
US – Peru FTA. Article 22.2 provides that ‘nothing’ in the agreement 
precludes the State from ‘applying measures that it considers necessary for 
the protection of its own essential security interests’. The accompanying 
footnote 2 elucidates that, ‘for greater certainty, if a Party invokes Article 22 
in an arbitral proceeding… the tribunal or panel hearing the matter shall find 
that the exception applies’.857 Perhaps because this language does not 
exclude the judicial power to hear submission on emergency measures but 
rather instructs the tribunal how to apply its judicial power, the US forsook 
this practice in 2007 or thereabouts.858  
 
854 However, see: Burke-White and von Staden, who mistakenly proposed that good faith 
review applies only when the treaty uses self-judging language (Burke-White and von 
Staden (n 834) 378-81. To be fair, what they had in mind under ‘good faith’ is a 
proportionality assessment). 
855 Article 23, VCLT and see generally: Salacuse – The law of investment treaties (n 17) 
381; U Linderfalk, ‘Good Faith and the Exercise of Treaty-Based Discretionary Powers’ in 
(n 789). 
856 However, see Burke-White and Von Staden who proposed that a good faith review 
entails margin of appreciation or proportionality analyses (Burke-White and von Staden (n 
834) 376-80). This proposition goes beyond what is intended here by ‘good faith review’. 
857 Article 22.2, US – Peru FTA. 





Other States have picked up where the US left off. For instance, 
Article 6.12(3) of the Singapore – India Comprehensive Economic 
Agreement reserves the State’s right to take ‘any action which it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests’. The next sub-
paragraph (4) elucidates that the cited language ‘shall be interpreted in 
accordance with the understanding of the Parties on non-justiciability of 
security exceptions’.859 Recent Indian practice drives the point of non-
reviewability home. Article 33 of the 2016 Model BIT annunciates the State’s 
right to take ‘any action which it considers necessary for the protection of 
its essential security interests.’860 Annex 1 to the Model BIT instructs that 
the decision to invoke ‘Article 33 at any time, whether before or after the 
commencement of arbitral proceedings shall be non-justiciable. It shall not 
be open to any arbitral tribunal… to review any such decision’.861  
Other instruments aim at non-reviewability by carving out security 
exceptions from the subject-matter jurisdiction of the tribunal. For instance, 
Article 12 of the Mexico – Netherlands BIT instructs that, ‘the dispute 
settlement provisions [investor-State arbitration] … shall not apply to the 
resolutions adopted by a Contracting Party for national security reasons’.862 
Notably, this provision does not clearly negate the review of security 
measures. While this drafting prevents investment tribunals from assessing 
emergency measures, it does not prevent national courts from reviewing 
the invocation of security exceptions.  
Overall, in the context of armed conflict, security exceptions leave 
States ample room for appraisal with respect to emergency measures. This 
 
859 Article 6.12(4), India – Singapore– India Comprehensive Economic Agreement; 
emphasis added.  
860 Article 33, India Model BIT (drafted 2015; revised version 2016). 
861 Annex 1: Security exceptions. The Annex also clarifies that, assessment of security 
measures cannot be done as an ancillary to the claim either (‘even where the arbitral 
proceedings concern an assessment of any claim for damages and/or compensation, or 
an adjudication of any other issues referred to the Tribunal’) 
862 Article 12, Mexico – Netherlands BIT. See also Article 23, Mexico – Iceland BIT, which 
excludes ISDS only with respect to measures concerning the acquisition of a domestic 





is only right. To effectively safeguard its national security the State must be 
allowed to adopt policies that impinge upon its trade and investment 
relations. At the same time, the ability of the State to use the security 
exception so as to take measures that would otherwise breach investment 
standards of protection does not apply equally to all treaty standards. Put a 
different way: some treaty standards continue to apply in armed conflict 
notwithstanding the security exception. 
One notable example, it is suggested, concerns war clauses – the 
PWC (as further explored in chapter 7) and the EWC.863 The EWC, as 
suggested in chapter 3 above, effectively incorporates customary rules of 
war law on the treatment of private property. Namely, it was argued that the 
language ‘requisition by the armed forces’ and ‘destruction that is not 
required by the necessity of war’ (and like formulations), has a recognized 
meaning under IHL, and therefore, the meaning of the EWC is to be 
ascertained by an examination of the content of war law.  
This discussion of security exceptions raises the question of whether 
the conflict-ridden host State may, in pursuit of national security, take 
measures which breach the EWC. Put simply, the issue here concerns the 
interaction between the EWC and the security exception. On this point, it is 
argued that as a matter of existing and desired law, the security exception 
does not derogate, or exempt from, the treatment prescribed under the 
EWC.  
To understand the logic of this proposition it is necessary to carefully 
reflect on the rules of the EWC and their rationales. Essentially, to propose 
that, for reasons of national security in relation to armed conflict, the State 
may conduct wanton or excessive destruction or appropriation of the 
investor’s property in violation of the EWC, would leave very little of the law 
that was created to regulate armed conflicts. Primary IHL rules on 
appropriation (and destruction) of property, as referenced by the wording of 
 
863 The interaction of the security exception with a different type of a war clause, the PWC, 





the EWC, were created by States to reflect the balance between military 
and humanitarian considerations and to reserve the State’s ability to adopt 
measures in pursuit of military interests and security concerns in armed 
conflicts. Hence, the qualifications on appropriation (and destruction) of 
property (such as the requirement that any such measure be military 
necessary and proportionate) already reflect the limits to what a State may 
do to private property in order to protect its security in armed conflict.  
Furthermore, to propose that under the security exception States 
may take measures contrary to the EWC is to effectively propose that 
investment treaties allow States to perform grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and even war crimes.864 Put this way, the proposition that 
security exceptions reserve the State’s right to take measures in breach of 
the EWC is absurd. Perhaps it is for this clear absurdity that, while States 
include stipulations on the interaction between the PWC and the security 
exception (as further explained in chapter 7, section 3), there are no explicit 
references in existing BITs as to the interaction between the EWC and the 
security exception (according to readily available information).  
Overall,the ability of the State to respond to modern forms of conflict 
and threats on national security must be commensurate with the ever-
evolving nature of these concepts and their effects. This proposition is 
consistent with IHL, which recognizes the right of the parties to the conflict 
to prioritize the allocation of their resources in accordance with domestic 
law and policy insofar as these do not violate IHL. However, while broad in 
scope, the State’s discretion is not unlimited. Unless explicitly excluded by 
treaty language, security exceptions are open for limited review. It is left 
open for tribunals to find that the measure at issue was not taken in 
pursuance of security interests in the context of armed conflict but was a 
 
864 ‘Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity 
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly’, is a grave breach under the Geneva Conventions 
Article 50, GC I; Article 51, GC II, Article 147, GC IV. See also Articles 8(2)(a)(iv) and 





protectionist measure that used the occurrence of the armed conflict as a 
fig leaf.  
3. Hostilities-based Excuses and Justifications for Violations of 
Investment Standards in Armed Conflict 
This section deals with CPW. Following the footsteps of De Brabandre, who 
suggested that, at least in principle, the host State’s human rights 
obligations may be crafted as a defense against investment treaty claims 
using the plea of necessity,865 this section examines whether a host State 
can use the outbreak of armed conflict, the conditions of hostilities, and 
military aims, to defend against an investment claim that arises out of, or in 
relation to, hostilities. It might be argued that because conflicts involve 
emergency conditions and extreme circumstances that tend to affect the 
State’s institutions and population, conflict-oriented CPW have greater 
potential to ‘succeed’, where De Brabandre found that human rights-based 
arguments have not,866 in defending against an investment claim.  
To investigate this hypothesis, the pleas of necessity, distress, self-
defense, and force majeure are identified as potential tools through which 
the State may attempt to introduce the circumstances of hostilities in order 
to excuse or justify a violation of an investment obligation.867 Then, the 
analysis deals with the constraints on the invocation of these conflict-based 
defenses in investment arbitration proceedings that concern hostilities. 
Overall, this section demonstrates that the outbreak of armed conflict limits 
 
865 De Brabandre – Human Rights Considerations in International Investment (n 102) 202-
09; De Brabandre – Investment Treaty Arbitration (n 135) 141-47. 
866 ibid; ibid. 
867 The proposition that countermeasures may be taken by the conflict-ridden host State 
against the investment in response to a prior breach by the investor’s home State is not 
examined in this discussion. On the development of the rules on countermeasures by the 
ILC and ARSIWA, and the substantive and procedural limitations to countermeasures, see:  
C Tams, ‘All’s well that ends well? Comments on the ILC’s articles on state responsibility’ 
(2002) 62 Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 759, 783-90. 
On the prohibition to take countermeasures that breach humanitarian rules, see: M Sassòli, 
‘State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law’ (2002) 84(846) IRRC 






rather than expands the host State’s arsenal of available arguments against 
investment claims.  
To understand the context in which the issue of hostilities-based 
CPW may arise in investment arbitration it is useful to resort again to the 
hypothetical case of MCC v Afghanistan from chapter 5. Here, assume that 
the foreign investor argues that the State breached FPS by failing to take 
better or other measures to protect the mine from the Taliban’s repeated 
attacks. This time, aside from submission based on IHL norms (as proposed 
in chapter 5) the issue is whether Afghanistan can argue that even if it 
breached FPS, this violation of international law is precluded due to the 
circumstances of hostilities.  
Potentially, Afghanistan may argue that the protracted internal 
hostilities with several different insurgent groups, including the Taliban, 
imperiled the entire survival of the State, and left it with no choice but to take 
measures that do not conform to its treaty obligations to protect the 
investment.868 This argument follows the lines of Argentina’s submission in 
Sempra v Argentina and relies on the plea of necessity to introduce IHL-
considerations in defense against an investment claim.869 Similar 
circumstances may also be used to argue that the failure of the armed 
 
868 Eg: To deploy armed forces elsewhere or to instruct its forces not to focus on the security 
of the mine but on the protection of another asset. See: Sempra v Argentina (Award), para 
98. For sake of accuracy, this decision was entirely annulled on the ground of manifest 
excess of powers (Sempra v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16, Decision on Request 
for Annulment of the Award, 29 June 2010). 
869 Similarly, take the example of the American investment in Israel and the State’s decision 
to cease the operation of the investment in Haifa in the wake of Hezbollah’s threats to 
target the investment. Potentially, Israel may argue along the lines of the Tanzanian 
argument in Biwater v Tanzania, that the risk of an attack on the ammonia tank creates 
‘real threat to the public’, which requires the closure of the investment, and that in such a 
case Israel ‘has more than a right to protect the civilian population: it has a moral and 
perhaps even a legal obligation to do so’. Biwater v Tanzania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, 
Award, 24 July 2008, paras 434-36 and 515. There, citing human right-considerations, 
Tanzania cancelled the investor’s concession contract to operate the water and sewerage 
services of Dar es Salaam and regained possession of assets previously leased to the 
investors. Arguably, the Tribunal assessed Tanzania’s human rights-based arguments 
under the necessity defense, finding that ‘there was no necessity or impending public 
purpose to justify the Government’s intervention in the way that took place’. For an analysis 
of the way in which human rights arguments may be construed and introduced through the 





forces to protect the mine is precluded by the defense of distress, since to 
save their own lives from the attacks of the insurgents, the Afghan forces 
had no choice but, say, to abandon the area of the investment, which they 
were entrusted to protect.  
Further, the occurrence of hostilities may be presented as ‘an 
irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, 
making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the 
obligation’.870 If this is the case, then the State’s failure to protect the 
investment from the effects of hostilities is excused by force majeure. Next, 
the State may attempt to argue that MCC and/or China dispensed with the 
performance of the FPS obligation (or the EWC) or permitted Afghanistan 
not to comply with these standards. Here, consent precludes the 
wrongfulness. Finally, Self-defense may be relevant in the context of 
hostilities when, say, the State’s armed forces inflicted damage upon the 
investment in breach of FPS (or the EWC) while acting, during the 
hostilities, in lawful self-defense.871 
If so, the reality of hostilities generates, at least ostensibly, an arsenal 
of potential defenses capable of precluding international responsibility for 
violations of investment law. However, the nature of investment law and IHL 
is such that it effectively limits, if not excludes altogether, the availability of 
these excuses and justifications when the violation at issue is of an 
investment standard of protection with humanitarian aspects. In this regard, 
the notion of ‘investment standards with humanitarian aspects’ entails 
investment norms that explicitly incorporate humanitarian rules and 
investment norms that assume relevance in armed conflict because the 
treatment that they prescribe is of particular relevance to the reality of 
hostilities. An example of the former is the EWC which includes primary 
 
870 Article 23, ARSIWA. 
871 Article 21, ARSIWA. Putting to one side the question whether self-defense can even be 
taken against non-State actors (see generally:  J Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-
State Actors And Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan (2010) 19(2) Journal of 





rules on the protection of foreign property in armed conflict, and an example 
of the latter is the FPS standard that requires the State to take precautions 
to protect the investment from the effects of hostilities.872 It is suggested 
below that the violations of these bases of liability cannot be excused or 
justified in the context of armed conflict.  
First, the availability of necessity as a CPW to violations of the 
investment treaty in the context of armed conflict is limited by the laws that 
regulate hostilities. Namely, the host State cannot invoke necessity to justify 
or excuse conduct that violates IHL norms.873 The ILC observed in this 
respect that, ‘certain humanitarian conventions applicable to armed conflict 
expressly exclude reliance on military necessity’.874 Arguably, if the State 
conducts wanton or excessive destruction or appropriation of the investor’s 
property in violation of the EWC, which incorporates humanitarian rules on 
the treatment of private property, it will not be able to invoke necessity to 
preclude this violation of an investment standard for its humanitarian 
aspects.  
Further, IHL may be said to exclude the plea of necessity by its object 
and purpose.875 This is because IHL norms are tailored ‘to apply in 
abnormal situations of peril for the responsible State and plainly engage its 
essential interests’.876 If IHL is the law that is made specifically for armed 
conflicts, which are ‘by definition emergency situations’,877 then the entire 
IHL regime may be said to implicitly exclude the defense of necessity, 
except where explicitly stated otherwise.878 By this logic, the outbreak of 
armed conflict cannot be used to justify or excuse violations of investment 
 
872 Another relevant mechanism is the clause that mandates nondiscriminatory war 
reparations. This mechanism is addressed in chapter 7.  
873 Article 25(2), ARSIWA. 
874 ARSIWA Commentaries Article 25, para 19. 
875 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, 23 April 
- 1 June and 2 July - 10 August 2001, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth 
session, Supp No 10 83, 84; A Tanzi, ‘State of Necessity’, in (n 31). 
876 ARSIWA Commentaries Article 25, paras 19-21. 






standards that assume relevance mostly or only in armed conflict, such as 
the war clauses and FPS. 
Moreover, because military  necessity, as explained,  has  already  
been  factored  into  each  rule  of  IHL, ‘one cannot  plead  necessity  as  a  
justification for transgressions of IHL’.879 Notable in this regard is the explicit 
and unambiguous rejection of the old maxim of Kriegsrason geht vor 
Kriegsmanier, whereby any military action that is necessary for the 
successful prosecution of war overrides and renders inoperative any 
provisions of the laws and customs of war to the contrary.880 Arguably, 
because the EWC incorporates customary law on the dispossession and 
destruction of foreign property, the EWC already accounts for military 
necessity. Just as a State cannot invoke necessity as a defense against a 
violation of Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations, which prohibits 
destruction of property unless when required by imperative necessity, the 
plea of necessity cannot be invoked as a defense against the violation of 
the EWC.881  
At any rate, it is doubtful that necessity is a useful defense for a 
conflict-ridden State in investment arbitration, especially where the 
investment instrument contains a security exception and the host State 
 
879 NCH Dunbar, ‘Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials’ (1952) 29 British Ybk Intl L 442, 
444-45; L Hill-Cawthorne, ‘The Role of Necessity in International Humanitarian and Human 
Rights Law’ (2014) 47 Israel Law Review 225-55. See also: ILC, Addendum – Eighth 
Report on State Responsibility by Mr Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur – The International 
Wrongful Act of the State, Source of International Responsibility (1980) 2(I) YBILC, UN 
Doc A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7, 34. 
880 Lauterpacht – International Law Reports (n 415) Vol 16, 543; Schmitt – Military necessity 
(n 412) 798; Melzer (n 411) 279-80; Hayashi – Military necessity (n 411) 52. 
881 To be sure, it is not argued that the principle of military necessity is a lex specialis norm 
that excludes the application of the secondary plea of necessity. As a matter of law, military 
necessity and the plea of necessity are norms of a different order that serve different 
functions. Military necessity is a primary rule that is exceptional in nature while the state of 
necessity is a secondary rule that serves a justificatory function. Additionally, both legal 
concepts entail distinct requirements. Whereas necessity may be invoked only when the 
measure in questions is ‘the only means available’ to safeguard the State’s ‘imperilled 
interests’, there is no such requirement with respect to military necessity. It is not because 
military necessity is the same as secondary necessity that the former excludes the latter, 
but because any other results devalues IHL norms of content and distorts the delicate 





already tried to rely on it as a defense.882 What is more, the case law on the 
invocation of the plea of necessity as a defense against investment claims 
is inconsistent and unhelpful. This reality, in turn, seems to have led States 
to include detailed security exceptions in their investment treaties so as to 
preserve their right to take emergency measures in the face of a threat to 
their security interests through primary rules rather than to rely on vague 
secondary rules of international law.  
Essentially, distress is inapplicable to violations of IHL for the same 
considerations that lead to the unavailability of necessity as a CPW to 
violations of IHL. In the case of distress, contrary to necessity, the peril 
affects the individual and not the State. It is the individual, not the State, 
who has no other reasonable way of saving his life or the lives of other 
persons entrusted to his care, but to violate international law.883 The 
difficulty with applying this defense to situations of armed conflict is that 
armed conflicts, by their very nature and essence, are situations when 
individuals, and the armed forces in particular, are in distress. As Sassòli 
explained, ‘to consider, for example that a State is not responsible if its 
soldiers injure civilians to save their own lives would be leaving little space 
for that law’.884  
 
882 As with military necessity, the availability of the plea necessity as a defense to violations 
of investment standards turns on the interaction between the security exception (if one 
exists) and the general customary rule. While there is ‘some analogy’ between security 
exceptions and the defense of necessity, as the CMS v Argentina annulment Committee 
observed, these are different norms that entail ‘a different operation and content’ (CMS v 
Argentina (Annulment), paras 130-31). Because security exceptions and the defense of 
necessity operate on different legal planes and hierarchies, security exceptions do not 
principally exclude the availability of necessity as a lex specialis. A measure by the host 
State that falls within the security exception does not violate the primary treaty rule; this 
conduct is not wrongful, and it does not principally result in liability for compensation 
(Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v US) (Preliminary Objections) 2019 <https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/164/164-20190213-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf> (accessed 10 March 
2019) para 42). In contradistinction, the plea of ‘necessity’ assumes relevance only with 
respect to wrongful State conduct, i.e., one that is not authorized the scope of the security 
exception (ARSIWA Commentaries to Article 25, para 2; Paddeu – Excuses and 
justifications (n 155) 53-61; Henckels – Security Exceptions and Armed Conflicts (n 789)). 
See further: R Sloane, ‘On The Use and Abuse Of Necessity in The Law Of State 
Responsibility’ (2012) 106(3) AJIL 447-508.  
883 Article 24, ARSIWA. 





For this reason, it is difficult to see how excessive or wanton 
dispossession or destruction of property, in violation of the EWC, may be 
excused or justified by distress. It is also challenging to think that the host 
State may be excused from the obligation to protect investments during 
armed conflict on grounds of distress that affected its armed forces and law 
enforcement agents. Even if distress is an available CPW in the context of 
investment claims, it is hardly a winning argument, or at least this is how it 
is perceived by States, which have not, according to available records, 
invoked it as a defense in investment arbitration. 
Just as States may not invoke the occurrence of hostilities as 
a CPW so as circumvent to the entire corpus of international obligations that 
were created to regulate the conduct of hostilities, the defense that the 
armed conflict itself is a force majeure event that precludes violations of IHL 
cannot stand.885 In fact, Paddeu’s study demonstrates that the concept of 
force majeure as a sweeping force, doing away with any obligations of the 
State towards foreigners, as it was employed in the 19th century, was 
harshly criticized at the turn of the 20th century.886 Eventually, this criticism 
developed the notion of what is force majeure and by the second half of the 
20th century, the plea of force majeure required the existence of a situation 
of ‘material impossibility of performance’ for the State that is caused by an 
 
885 Arguably, situations, such as – tsunami, volcanic eruption, or a terror attack, which are 
concomitant to, but independent from, the armed conflict may be invoked as force majeure 
to preclude a violation of IHL. For instance, if a military aircraft crashes on civilians due to 
an unforeseen event beyond the control of the force. Condorelli and Boisson De 
Chazournes argue that in such circumstances force majeure remains an available defense 
since the ‘non-compliant behavior has been determined by objective causes’ that were 
beyond the control of the State (L Condorelli and L Boisson De Chazournes, ‘Quelques 
remarques à propos de l’obligation des États de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit 
international humanitaire en toutes circonstances’ in C Swinarski (ed) Studies and Essays 
on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet 
(ICRC, Martinus Nijhoff 1984) 22). Compare: Sassòli – State responsibility (n 867) fn 38, 
who suggests that in such a situation no breach of IHL occurs and there is therefore no 
violation to preclude. 
886 F Paddeu, ‘The Impact of Investment Arbitration on the Development of State 
Responsibility Defences’ in R Hofmann, S Schill, and C Tams (eds) ICSID at 50: 
Investment Arbitration as a Motor of General International Law? (Edward Elgar 






‘irresistible force or unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State’. 
Whether there was in fact a ‘material impossibility of performance’ is 
assessed, in turn, by reference to the particular circumstances of the State 
and the specific obligation in question.887 Construed this way, it is doubtful 
that it can be said that in the modern reality of warfare the outbreak of 
hostilities (in conflict-ridden States in particular) meets the contemporary 
meaning of the plea. Perhaps for this reason, States do not seem to rely on 
this argument. In investment jurisprudence, this defense was mostly 
discussed in reference to the important distinction between force majeure 
on the international level (as a CPW) and on the domestic level.888  
The availability of consent as a defense against violations of 
international law during armed conflicts turns on the question whether 
investment treaties codify inalienable rights of investors or rights that are 
shared by the investor with his home State and enjoyed by the investor only 
under sufferance, or whether investment treaties merely grant investors 
recourse to ad hoc procedural mechanisms that provide for ‘the public 
international law equivalent of subrogation’.889 If all investment treaties do 
is to institutionalize and reinforce the system of diplomatic protection then 
the host State, and not the investor, can validly consent to conduct that is 
otherwise not in compliance with the host State’s primary obligations vis-à-
vis the home State.890  
 
887 ibid. 
888 Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela CA v Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/00/5, 
Award (23 September 2003) para 108; Sempra v Argentina (Award), para 246. 
889 See: Volterra (n 32) 18-23; M Paparinsiks, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration and the (New) 
Law of State Responsibility’ (2013) 24(2) EJIL 617-647; Paparinskis – Circumstances 
Precluding (n 170) 484-503 
890 This also means that countermeasures may also be invoked, provided that all necessary 
preconditions are met .The availability of countermeasures as a CPW in investment 
arbitration was addressed by three investment tribunals that were constituted under 
NAFTA in the context of the Sugar War between Mexico and the US, which concerned 
Mexico’s imposition of tax on beverages containing high-fructose corn syrup: Archer 
Daniels v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/04/5, Award, 21 November 2007, para 161-
80; Corn Products v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/04/1, Decision on Responsibility, 15 
January 2008, para 161-79; Cargill v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/05/2, Award,18 
September 2009, paras 420-428. The majority of the Archer Daniels Tribunal held that 
NAFTA Chapter 11 contains only primary obligations at the inter-State level, and thus, 





But it is difficult to frame an argument on valid consent by the home 
State without collapsing back into the question whether the investment 
instrument was effectively suspended (or terminated) by the outbreak of 
hostilities. In other terms, if the defense relies on, say, the contention that 
China agreed that Afghanistan will not take measures to protect MCC as 
required by FPS during the hostilities or that Afghanistan may dispossess 
MCC of its property without compensation in times of hostilities, then the 
question at hand is more about lawful suspension of treaties under the 
primary rules of the VCLT (and subject to the discussion in chapter 2) than 
about the application of the secondary rules on CPW.  
Conversely, if the investor holds direct rights, then it is the investor, 
and not his State of nationality, who can validly consent to what would 
otherwise be conduct that is not in compliance with the investment treaty.891 
Yet, it is difficult to frame a defense based on consent in a manner that can 
be reconciled with practice. This would mean that, say, MCC specifically 
agreed (perhaps for economic motivation) that during 2014, the government 
will not provide it the protection required under the law. However, logically, 
investors that operate in conflict-ridden host States do not give any such 
consent.  
Arbitral practice does not add much to the discussion. When 
investment tribunals have addressed consent, albeit indirectly, they have 
reached contradictory determinations on whether ‘a private party can by 
contract waive rights or dispense with the performance of obligations 
imposed on the States parties to those treaties under international law’.892 
 
the host State. For the other two Tribunals (and a separate opinion in Archer Daniels) 
NAFTA confers direct rights upon investors, and countermeasures concerning measures 
by their home State could not be opposed to these rights). For detailed analysis of the 
awards see: K Parlett, ‘The application of the rules on countermeasures in investment 
claims’ in C Chinkin and F Baetens (eds) Sovereignty, Statehood and State Responsibility 
Essays in Honour of James Crawford (CUP 2015) 398-403. 
891 This also means that these direct rights cannot be opposed by countermeasures that 
are directed in response to an anterior breach of international law by the home State. 
Paparinskis – Circumstances precluding wrongfulness (n 170) 488.  
892 SGS v Philippines, ICSID Case No ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 





The dearth of recent case law on consent is indicative of the impracticability 
of this defense in investment arbitration.  
At any rate, be it the investor or his home State who may principally 
give consent, IHL excludes the possibility of consent or waiver of 
humanitarian rights and entitlements. Common Article 1 to the Geneva 
Conventions enunciates that States are obliged to ‘respect and ensure 
respect of humanitarian law in all circumstances’.893 There is a wide 
consensus among commentators and judicial forums that what emanates 
from this obligation is that a State cannot consent to a violation of the rules 
of IHL that protect victims’ rights, and that consent as a CPW is not 
applicable to violations of IHL.894 Arguably, neither the home State nor the 
investor can consent-away humanitarian protections, including those 
included in the FPS standards and the EWC. 
Similar notions limit the availability of self-defense as a CPW. The 
2016 ICRC Commentaries to GC Common Article 1 clarify that another 
implication of the obligation to respect IHL ‘in all circumstances’ is that self-
defence ‘does not preclude the wrongfulness of violations of the 
Conventions’.895 On this point, Sassòli explains that, a ‘necessary 
consequence’ of the absolute separation between jus ad bellum on the 
legality of the use of force and jus in bello, to which IHL belongs, is that self-
defence does not, nor can it, exonerate a State from a breach of 
humanitarian law.896  
 
However, see Hochtief v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/07/31, Decision on Liability, 29 
December 2014, para 191. See Paparinsiks - Circumstances precluding wrongfulness (n 
170) 491. 
893 CA1, GC. 
894Condorelli and Boisson De Chazournes (n 885) 22-23; Sassòli – State responsibility (n 
867) 414 (also referring to Articles 51, 52, 132, and 148, GCI, GCII, GCIII, GCIV, 
respectively). 
895 ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, 2016 (CUP 2016) para 186.  
896 Sassòli – State Responsibility (n 867) 414-15; Prosecutor v Martić (Decision) IT-95-11-
T (8 March 1996) para 268; Kordić and Čerkez (Trial Judgement) IT-95-14/2 (26 February 






An analogous position seems to have been adopted by the ILC. 
Special Rapporteur Crawford suggested to exclude from the scope of self-
defence obligations of ‘total restraint’, namely IHL obligations and certain 
norms of human rights that are couched as applicable to, or are intended to 
apply as definitive constraints even to States in armed conflicts.897 Although 
this proposition was left out of the explicit wording of ARSIWA Article 21, 
the commentaries to Article 21 clarify that ‘as to obligations under 
international humanitarian law and in relation to non-derogable human 
rights provisions, self-defence does not preclude the wrongfulness of 
conduct.’898 
While it cannot be invoked to preclude violations of humanitarian 
rules (including the EWC), self-defense is arguably an available defense for 
violations of other investment norms in the context of armed conflict. In fact, 
Paddeu suggests that the value of self-defense, as a CPW, lies in its ability 
to preclude breaches of international law that are collateral to the use of 
force.899 In support, Paddeu references Nicaragua v US, where Nicaragua 
argued that the mining and the attacks on its main ports breached the FCN 
treaty with the US and that the preconditions for lawful self-defense were 
not met by the US. At the same time, Nicaragua arguably acknowledged 
that self-defense may preclude these ancillary violations. Similarly, Paddeu 
relies on the Oil Platforms case, where Iran argued that the 1955 FCN treaty 
was breached by the US through the latter’s attacks on offshore oil assets, 
while the US submitted that self-defense precludes such violations.900  
 
897 Second report on State responsibility, by Mr. James Crawford, Special Rapporteur Doc 
A/CN.4/498 and Add.1–4 (1999) para 301. 
898 ARSIWA Commentaries Article 21, para 3. 
899 Paddeu – Self defence (n 193) 26-39; K Trapp, ‘Back to Basics: Necessity, 
Proportionality, and the Right of Self-defence against non-State Terrorist Actors’ (2007) 56 
ICLQ 141, 146. 
900 Letter Dated 19 October 1987 from the Permanent Representative of the USA to the 
UN Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/19219 (1987) and Oil 
Platforms Case, para 67. See further in W Taft IV, ‘Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms 





Theoretically, Paddeu’s arguments are sound. However, there is 
nothing explicit in the case law of the ICJ901 or in the responses of States 
and academics to these judgments to support the viability of this defense 
against investment claims.902 At any rate, it seems difficult to think of a 
defense that relies on lawful defensive measures in armed conflict that is 
not essentially predicated on the argument that the conduct at issue is a 
lawful ‘attack’ under IHL in the sense of API Article 49, which comprises 
acts of violence ‘whether in offense or defence’.903 Construed this way, the 
discussion moves away from secondary rules and returns back to the 
sphere of the interaction between primary norms of IHL and investment law, 
as set out above. 
In sum, because armed conflicts, by their very nature and essence, 
entail extreme and dynamic conditions, States have developed primary 
rules that are tailored for this reality. Such international norms include not 
only rules of IHL but also other investment treaty mechanisms, such as 
security exceptions, war clauses, and precautionary obligations. Each of 
these rules reflects an account (or a balance) of the State’s military and 
security priorities in hostilities and other, potentially conflicting, 
humanitarian considerations. The creation of such primary norms to deal 
with extreme conditions and threats to national security, in turn, resulted in 
a limitation on the application of secondary defenses, whereby States 
cannot use the extreme conditions of hostilities to excuse, justify, or 
circumvent the special primary norms that were created specifically for the 
regulation of the extreme conditions of hostilities. To put it colloquially: A 
State cannot ‘double-dip’ an armed conflict. Coupled with the ambiguities 
over the nature of investors’ rights and the conflicting interpretations and 
 
901 For instance, while explicit submissions on self-defense were made by Crawford on 
behalf of Iran, these were not regarded as substantive in the case as evidenced by the fact 
that with the exception of the separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Rigaux, the issue was not 
addressed by the Court (Oil Platforms Case, 362, 383-84.  
902 See: SB Roberts, ‘US Reaction to ICJ Judgment in Iranian Oil Platforms Case’ (2004) 
98(3) AJIL 597-601; Taft (n 900) 295-306; Paparinskis – Circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness (n 170) 492-93; 





applications of excuses and defenses in investment arbitration, this notion 
leaves little practical value to customary defenses in the context of 
investment claims that arise out of, or in relation to, armed conflicts.  
4. Denial of Benefits on Security-Related Grounds  
This section focuses on another treaty mechanism that safeguards security 
interests: The DoB clause. For the purposes of this analysis, the main 
debates over the operation of DoB clauses, namely whether the DoB affects 
the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals or the substantive protections of the 
investment treaty and, whether the host State can invoke the DoB clause 
after the investor has initiated arbitration proceedings, are put to one side.904  
Principally, DoB clauses serve two functions in investment 
instruments. First, and famously, DoB prevent third country nationals, who 
own or control the investor, from gaining access to treaty protection when 
they would otherwise not benefit from such protection due to their 
nationality.905 This function of DoB was developed in postwar US FCN 
treaties.906 Such clauses are particularly useful for States that seek to confer 
investment protection to a wide array of companies that operate within their 
territory so as to attract investment inflows, and at the same time, address 
the risk of investment claims by shell companies.907 In this respect, DoB are 
a safety measure for ensuring the reciprocity embodied in investment 
 
904 See on these issues: L Mistelis and C-M Baltag, ‘Denial of benefits and Article 17 of the 
Energy Charter Treaty’ (2009) 113(4) Penn State Law Review 1301 – 1321; L Gastrell and 
P-J Le Cannu, ‘Procedural Requirements of ‘Denial-of-Benefits’ Clauses in investment 
treaties: A review of Arbitral Decisions’ (2015) 30(1) ICSID Review 78 – 97; Y Banifatemi, 
‘Taking into Account Control Under Denial of Benefits Clauses’ in Y Banifatemi (ed) 
Jurisdiction in Investment Treaty Arbitration, IAI Series on International Arbitration (2018). 
223-58. 
905 M Sornarajah, ‘Good Faith, Corporate Nationality, and Denial of Benefits’ in A Mitchell 
et al, Good Faith and International Economic Law (OUP 2015) 136-3; Dolzer and Schreuer 
(n 16) 55; A Sinclair, ‘The Substance of Nationality Requirements in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration’ (2005) 20 ICSID Review-FILJ 388; AMTO v Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, 
Award, 26 March 2008, paras 62-70. 
906 Vandavelde – US Investment agreements (n 703) 150. 





treaties and a method to ‘counteract nationality planning’.908 This function is 
mostly irrelevant for the purposes of the present discussion. 
Second, and pertinently, DoB serve to deny treaty protection to 
investors whose home State does not maintain diplomatic or normal 
economic relations with the host State. This too is an American creation. 
Such provisions were added to the US Model BIT in 1984 and modified to 
their more modern language in the 2004 Model BIT.909  In contrast to the 
context in which DoB clauses are often discussed, here the DoB clause is 
not directed at treaty shopping, but rather as a means of furthering certain 
foreign policy goals.910 On this point, the US State Department explained 
that the DoB clause is not intended to: 
prescribe what policies the States or the Federal Government should or 
should not follow with respect to third-country controlled corporations, but 
is merely concerned with assuring that the treaties do not interfere with 
policies that the competent organs of government wish to formulate and 
enforce […] [It preserves to the States] the same freedom of action as they 
have in the absence of the treaty, to deal as they see fit with such 
corporations. That is, the clause makes it clear that such corporations 
cannot claim treaty rights as against domestic legislation now or hereafter 
enacted.911 
Arguably, this function of the DoB is closely related to that of security 
exceptions, which raises the question whether security exceptions have ‘the 
same effect as would application of the treaties denial of benefits clause’ 
and if not, how do these mechanisms interact.912 It is suggested that while 
security exceptions and DoBs share several commonalities, these are 
 
908 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 16) 55; Mistelis and Baltag (n 904) 1303; Gastrell and Le Cannu 
(n 904) 79-80.   
909 See a detailed analysis of the development in: Vandavelde – US Investment 
agreements (n 703) section 4.3. 
910 US State Department, ‘Meeting with the Argentine Delegation to Discuss FCN Treaty’, 
4 April 1950, cited in ibid, 394. 
911 Letter from Assistant Legal Adviser Stanley Metzger to James W. Gould, 27 February 
1953, cited in: Vandevelde – The first BIT (n 703) 394. 
912 This question was debated on the margins of the referenced Argentinian financial crisis. 
See: Sempra v Argentina (Award), Opinion of J Alvarez, para 67 responding to Sempra v 
Argentina (Award), Opinion of Slaughter and Burke-White, para 62. See decisions in: CMS 
v Argentina (Award), para 341; Enron v Argentina (Award) para 328; Sempra v Argentina 





distinct mechanisms that are not mutually exclusive in application, since 
they are conceptually and practically distinct. First, ‘essential security’ 
provisions are exceptions that render the investment treaty ‘inapplicable’ to 
the emergency measures.913 By contrast, the DoB carves-out from the 
definition of ‘investor’ shell companies owned by nationals of a third-country, 
the host State, or relevantly, companies owned by enemy aliens.914 Thus, 
under the DoB the State is under an obligation to grant certain benefits to 
the investment, but subject to certain conditions, it may ‘deny’ these 
benefits, whereas under the security exception, no treaty obligation arises 
with respect to any such investment.915 
Second, these mechanisms are tailored for slightly different security 
concerns and entail different scopes. To apply the DoB to security-related 
concerns would seem to require that such concerns will be reflected in the 
absence of diplomatic relations with the third country that controls the 
investment at bar.916 The same cannot be said of the scope of the security 
exception. In fact, the relationship between the home and host States need 
have nothing to do with the host State’s decision to invoke the security 
exception. Importantly, in practice, situations of hostilities, which are 
capable of triggering emergency measures, are more abundant than the 
official absence of diplomatic relations or an economic embargo, which is 
required to invoke the DoB. Thus, the DoB and the security exception do 
not fully overlap, and they are not mutually exclusive.  
 
913 Continental Casualty v Argentina, paras 164-65; Henckels – Security Exceptions and 
Armed Conflict (n 789). 
914 C Henckels ‘Should Investment Treaties Contain Public Policy Exceptions?’ (2018) 
59(8) Boston College Law Review 2825, 2828 (explaining that carve-outs ‘exempt an entire 
policy area or sector from the obligation or obligations’); B Legum, Defining Investment and 
Investor: Who is Entitled to Claim (2006) 22 Arbitration International 524, 525; Feldman (n 
907) 464. 
915 Alvarez – Expert Opinion (n 912) paras 67-9; Henckles – Scope Limitation or Affirmative 
Defence (n 789); Vandevelde – Bilateral investment treaties of BITs (n 502) 179-81. 
916 Illustratively, the DoB would allow the US to deny the benefits of a treaty to a company 
that is incorporated in the territory of, say, Uruguay, but is owned or controlled by nationals 





Overall, the limited scope of the DoB coupled with the realization that 
modern hostilities do not automatically trigger severance of diplomatic 
relations means that in practice, this mechanism is likely to be of little use 
as a defense against investment claims relating to armed conflict.  
5. Conclusion  
Chapters 3 – 5 dealt with the substantive international norms that regulate 
the treatment of investments in armed conflict. These analyses established 
that the interaction between investment law and IHL norms may affect the 
standards of treatment under an investment treaty and shield against a 
claim that the treaty was breached. For instance, where the conduct at issue 
was, in principle, in breach an investment standard, but it was also 
compliant with an IHL norms that take precedence as the lex specialis, the 
international responsibility of the State is not engaged. In continuance, this 
chapter 6 examined whether the reality of armed conflict and the 
circumstance of hostilities may be invoked to defend against an investment 
treaty claim.  
To that end, the chapter assessed three main avenues: security 
exceptions in investment treaties, customary defenses (CPW), and DoB 
clauses. It is submitted that none of these mechanisms is a silver bullet 
capable of guaranteeing a defense against an investment claim. On the 
contrary, the broader implications of the invocation of these mechanisms 
against investment claims turns them into a double-edge sword in the 
context of armed conflict, thereby counterbalancing at least some of the 
concerns of abusive or excessive invocation of treaty and customary 
defenses during conflict. 
First, security exceptions entail a self-limiting aspect. While 
emergency measures for military aims are likely to be taken in the context 
of armed conflicts, the inclusion of treaty language that negates review of 
security measures and the repeated invocation of such emergency 
measures, possess the potential of negatively depicting the regulatory 





exceptions in times of conflict might cause foreign capital to flee; foreign 
capital that is often a prerequisite for the transition from conflict to 
sustainable peace.  
The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for the invocation of CPW in the 
context of armed conflict, assuming such invocation is at all possible. 
Conflict-ridden host States that construe the reality of conflict as an excuse 
or a justification to breach investment standards of protection risk hurting 
their (already damaged) attractiveness as a destination for investment 
inflows. As for DoBs, their scope renders them mostly irrelevant for modern 
hostilities. While the severance of diplomatic and economic ties is a 
prerequisite for the invocation of the DoB on security-related grounds in 
investment claims, it is not a necessary condition for armed conflict. This 
may explain why the function of the DoB as a protection against security-
related concern is mostly overlooked in practice and doctrine.  
The conclusion of this chapter, that armed conflicts potentially limit, 
rather than expand, the scope of defences available to States is consistent 
with the development of international law. Because armed conflicts, by their 
very nature and essence, entail extreme and dynamic conditions, over time 
States have developed primary rules that are tailored for this reality. Such 
international norms include not only rules of IHL but also other investment 
treaty mechanisms, such as security exceptions, war clauses, and 
precautionary obligations (including FPS). Each of these rules reflects an 
account (or a balance) of the State’s military and security priorities in 
hostilities and other, potentially conflicting, humanitarian considerations.  
The creation of such primary norms to deal with extreme conditions 
and threats to national security, in turn, resulted in a limitation on the 
application of certain defenses, whereby States cannot use the extreme 
conditions of hostilities to excuse, justify, or circumvent the special (in the 
broad sense of the term) primary norms that were created specifically for 
the regulation of the extreme conditions of hostilities. The relative length of 
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Chapter 7  
Compensation for Losses to Foreign Investors Owing to Armed 
Conflict 
1.   Introduction 
This chapter focuses on compensation to foreign investors for losses to their 
property owing to hostilities. For the sake of convenience, such payments 
are referred to as ‘war reparations’ or ‘war losses’ throughout the 
discussion. 
The point of departure for this analysis is that acts and omissions of 
a State in denying an investment the treatment guaranteed under the 
applicable investment treaty are internationally wrongful acts. The previous 
chapters laid out the pertinent customary and treaty bases of liability 
capable of giving rise to a cause-of-action in relation to armed conflict in 
investment arbitration. These mostly comprise unlawful appropriation and 
destruction of property (including, as explained in Chapter 3,  what may be 
claimed by the investor to constitute unlawful expropriation but is in fact a 
different form of property dispossession), and failure to take precautions in 
and against attacks (i.e., a violation of FPS standard and/or the IHL 
obligation to take precautions as per the discussion in chapter 5) .  
A State responsible for any such internationally wrongful act is ‘under 
an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by [its] 
internationally wrongful act’.917 The aim of reparation is to eliminate, as far 
as possible, the consequences of the illegal act and to restore the situation 
that would have existed if the act had not been committed.918 While 
reparation may include restitution and satisfaction ‘of the various forms of 
reparation, compensation is perhaps the most commonly sought in 
international practice’.919 Compensation, in turn, entails a monetary 
 
917 Article 31(1), ARSIWA. 
918 ARSIWA Commentaries, Article 31, paras 2-5; Chorzow Factory, 47. 





payment for financially assessable damage arising from the violation and 
covers material and moral injury.920  
How to assess compensation for the enumerated bases of liability is 
not clear since like most investment treaty standards, war clauses and the 
FPS provision are silent with respect to the consequences of their violation. 
Arguably, some guidance may be derived from the practice of investment 
tribunals who routinely deal with reparations for non-expropriation 
standards. The SD Myers v Canada Tribunal, for instance, which was 
among the early tribunals to address the calculation of compensation for 
violations of non-expropriation investment standards such as FET and 
national treatment noted that, ‘by not identifying any particular methodology 
for the assessment of compensation in cases not involving expropriation… 
the drafters of NAFTA intended to leave it open to tribunals to determine a 
measure of compensation appropriate to the specific circumstances of the 
case’. To fill in the gap, the SD Myers Tribunal, like many others, relied on 
the ‘full reparation’ principle of the Chorzów Factory case,921 which requires 
to wipe-out, as much as possible, the consequences of the internationally 
wrongful act.  
Yet, however aware investment tribunals are that they are not bound 
by the expropriation standard of compensation when assessing reparations 
for non-expropriation provisions, arbitral practice is dominated by an 
expropriation mind-set922  that focuses mostly, if not only, on the FMV of the 
affected property at the relevant time. Thus, tribunals reflexively cite the 
Chorzów Factory pronouncement on full reparation and proceed to use the 
 
920 Article 36, ARSIWA.  
921 SD Myers v Canada, First Partial Award, UNCITRAL, IIC 249 (2000) paras 309-311; 
emphasis added. 
922 This expropriation-mind set results from the fact that investment treaties do not 
reference the obligation to make reparations to injured investors and the historical 
experience of arbitral tribunals which was shaped by claims concerning takeovers of 
Communist regimes, regimes changes following decolonialization that resulted in 
appropriation, NIEO policies that affected foreign property rights, etc. Additionally, litigants 
mostly craft their submissions on compensation for non-expropriation violations using 
expropriation-related standards. Salacuse – The law of investment treaties (n 17) 436; 





FMV-treaty standard for lawful expropriation to assess damages for non-
expropriation violations, such as FET.923 However, there may be more to 
the award of compensation to investors whose investments were damaged 
as a result of the host State’s violations of international law during armed 
conflict. 
Accordingly, this chapter proceeds as follows. First, the discussion 
addresses the scope and content of the State’s obligation under IHL to 
compensate individuals, including foreign investors, for losses owing to 
armed conflict. In this respect, it is established that under customary law, as 
reflected in the provisions of The Hague and Geneva instruments, States 
are obliged to pay compensation for all violations of IHL, including for the 
unlawful appropriation or destruction of property. Next, it is demonstrated 
that although the obligation to compensate for IHL breaches traditionally 
applied between States, today it is widely recognized that individuals have 
a right to reparations for violations of IHL, albeit there are many procedural 
difficulties to exercise this right. Then, the section deals with the customary 
standard of compensation for violations of IHL – ‘adequate, effective, and 
prompt’ as reflected in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to 
a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Violations of International Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law (Basic Principles on the Right to 
Reparation),924 focusing mainly on the notion of ‘adequacy’.   
Section 3 deals with the obligation to pay compensation under 
investment law, focusing mainly on Plain War Clauses (PWC). It is argued 
that the PWC prescribes an obligation of nondiscrimination with respect to 
 
923 Some tribunals attempted to analogize violations to expropriation of property and in so 
doing used the FMV standard (Wena Hotels v Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/98/4, Award, 8 
December 2000, para 118; CMS v Argentina (Award), para 410). See further: MDT v Chile, 
ICSID Case No ARB/01/17, Award, 25 May 2004, para 238; Feldman v Mexico, para 195; 
Enron v Argentina (Award) para 360-61; LG&E v Argentina (Award) para 30; Sempra v 
Argentina (Award) para 403; BG Group v Argentina, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 24 
December 2007, paras 419–429; National Grid v Argentina (Award) paras 269–7; PSEG v 
Turkey, paras 308-15, 353; Lemire v Ukraine, paras 149-52, 243-49. 
924 The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, UN Doc 





war reparation, which guarantees that covered foreign investors will be 
compensated for their losses owing to hostilities whenever the host State 
compensates its own investors or the investors of other countries, for 
whatever moral or legal reason.  Section 4 returns to the analysis of the 
EWC. Building on the discussion in chapter 3, this section focuses on the 
obligation to award ‘prompt, adequate, and effective’ compensation under 
the EWC. It is argued that the interpretation and assessment of what is 
‘adequate’ compensation for the appropriation or destruction of foreign 
investments in armed conflict under the EWC ought to have regard to the 
meaning of ‘adequate’ compensation under IHL, including as expressed in 
the Basic Principles on the Right to Reparation, and not only to the treaty 
standard of ‘adequate’ compensation for lawful expropriation which entails 
FMV. 
Finally, section 5 deals with the occurrence of armed conflict as 
factual circumstances capable of affecting the assessment of compensation 
to foreign investors whose property was injured in the context of armed 
conflict. Overall, this chapter demonstrates that normative and factual 
considerations of hostilities could and should be accounted for in the 
assessment of reparation in investment arbitration.  
2. The Obligation to Pay Compensation for War Losses under IHL 
This analysis deals with the compensation regime under IHL. First, the 
section addresses the scope and content of the obligation to make 
reparation for violations of IHL. Second, the identity of those who may claim 
for compensation for violations of IHL is examined. Third, the section 
analyzes the standard of compensation for IHL violations: ‘adequate, 
prompt, and effective’, focusing mainly on the meaning of ‘adequate’.  
Overall, it is argued that States are under an obligation, vis-à-vis States and 
individuals, to pay ‘adequate’ compensation for violations of IHL. Such 
‘adequate’ compensation ought to be awarded for any economically 
assessable damage, including moral damages and mental harm, insofar as 





damage caused, and the prevailing circumstances of hostilities, including 
the socioeconomic abilities of the wrongdoing State.  
The first step concerns the content and scope of the obligation to 
make reparation under IHL. Article 3 of Hague Convention IV (HC-IV) 
provides that ‘a belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said 
Regulations shall if the case demands be liable to pay compensation’.925 
This rule is repeated in API Article 91 which mandates that ‘a Party to the 
conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol, 
shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation.’926 The express 
language of HC-IV Article 3 and API Article 91 seems to instruct that the 
State is obligated to make reparations, only in the form of compensation, 
when the provisions of the HC or API, and these instruments alone, are 
breached. As regards their status, both provisions ‘are generally held to 
have long since entered into the domain of customary international law’.927  
It is suggested however that the scope of the obligation is broader 
than a cursory reading of these provisions reveals. First, while HC-IV and 
API form part of the rules that regulate international armed conflicts and 
although IHL instruments that regulate NIACs do not mention compensation 
or any other form of reparations as a legal consequence of IHL breaches,928 
the customary obligation to ‘pay compensation’ for violations of IHL applies 
 
925 Article 3, HC-IV.  
926Article 91, API. 
927 G Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 
The Law of Armed Conflict Vol II (Stevens & Sons Ltd. 1968) 448; F Kalshoven, ‘State 
responsibility for warlike acts of the armed forces: from Article 3 of the Hague Convention 
IV of 1907 to Article 91 of the Additional Protocol I of 1977 and beyond’ (1991) 40(4) ICLQ 
827, 836; F Kalshoven, ‘Expert Opinion submitted in 1997 to the Tokyo District Court, 
Japan, in Dutch POW and civilian detainees cases as well as in Philippine “comfort women” 
cases’ published in H Fujita et al (eds), War and the Rights of Individuals: Renaissance of 
Individual Compensation (Nippon Hyoron-sha 1999) 31-48, reprinted: Kalshoven – 
Reflections on the Law of War (n 729) 637 (stating that HC-IV Article 3 was understood to 
be customary at the time The Hague Law was adopted, and at any rate it attained 
customary status by the 1970s as evidences by the discussions of the Diplomatic 
Conference on the Reaffirmations and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts (1974-77)). see: F Kalshoven, ‘Supplementary Expert 
Opinion submitted in 1999 to the Tokyo District Court of Appeals in Dutch POW and civilian 
detainees’ cases as in Philippine ‘comfort women’’, in (ibid) 651-52. 





to international and non-international armed conflicts.929 What also 
emanates from the applicability of this rule to NIACs is that the obligation to 
‘pay compensation’ for IHL breaches applies also to armed groups, and not 
only on States.930 
Second, while the payment of compensation under HC-IV Article 3 
and API Article 91 is notionally restricted to violations of ‘said Regulations’ 
and ‘the Conventions and the Protocol’, respectively, the obligation to make 
reparations covers all violations of IHL norms. To put this another way, the 
obligation to make reparations arises ‘automatically’931 as a consequence 
of the unlawful act, regardless of whether the obligation is codified in these 
treaties.932 Also of note is that although in certain respects IHL distinguishes 
between ‘breaches’, ‘grave breaches’,933 and ‘serious violations’,934 
violations of all rules of IHL, and not only violations of the provisions for 
which there is individual criminal responsibility, give rise to an obligation to 
make reparation.935 
Third, reparation for IHL violations are not limited to compensation 
and can take various other forms, including restitution and 
satisfaction.936 While HC-IV Article 3 and API Article 91 require the violating 
 
929 ICRC – Customary IHL Study (n 38) Rule 150. 
930 Eg: The agreement between the Philippines government and the National Democratic 
Front of the Philippines where expressly required both parties to pay reparations to the 
victims of IHL violations (Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines 
and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (concluded 16 March 1998). 
931 EC Gillard, ‘Reparations for violations of international humanitarian law’ (2003) 85(851) 
IRRC 529, 532-33. 
932 API Commentary (n 509) paras 3652-3653; Bothe et al – New Rules for victims of armed 
conflicts (n 42) 620-22; M Frulli, ‘When Are States Liable towards Individuals for Serious 
Violations of Humanitarian Law? The Marković Case’ (2003) 1 JICJ 406–27, 416; 
Kalshoven – State responsibility for warlike acts (n 927) 830-33; L Zegveld, ‘Remedies for 
victims of violations of international humanitarian law’ (2003) 85(851) IRRC 497, 506-7. 
933 Articles 50, 51, 130, 147 of GC I, II, III and IV respectively and Articles 11 and 85 of API. 
934 These include grave breaches, war crimes as specified under Article 8 of the Rome 
Statute, and other war crimes in IAC and NIAC under customary IHL. 
935 On the broader question whether international law distinct between serious breaches 
and ‘ordinary’ wrongful acts in terms of the practical consequences that each entails, see: 
C Tams, ‘Do serious breaches give rise to any specific obligations of the responsible state?’ 
(2002) 13(5) EJIL 1161-1180. 
936 Eg: Article 3, Protocol to the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 





party only to ‘pay compensation’, this choice of language should not be read 
literally as restricting the available forms of reparation. The use of the term 
‘compensation’ in these provisions reflects the linguistic differences 
between French and English in the early 20th century. While the French text 
of HC-IV Article 3 used the term ‘indemnité’, the drafters preferred 
‘compensation’ in lieu of ‘indemnity’ for the English translation since the 
then-accepted ordinary meaning of the English term ‘indemnity’ denoted 
either an ‘exemption’ from reparations or a sum of money demanded by the 
‘victorious belligerent’.937 The chosen English language (‘compensation’) 
was designated to express the idea that the obligation to make reparations 
is incumbent upon vanquished and victors alike, not to limit the type of 
reparations for IHL violations to compensation specifically.  
Sassòli proposes in this regard that the requirement to ‘pay 
compensation’ is to be read and interpreted in conjunction with – not 
disconnected from – the phrase ‘if the case demands’. For him, since 
compensation under HC-IV Article 3 and API Article 91 ‘has to be paid only 
“if the case demands”, it may be seen, as in general international law, as 
subsidiary to “restitutio in integrum”’.938 Similarly, the ICRC Commentaries 
to API Article 91 clarify that ‘if the case demands’ means that compensation 
will be due only if restitution in kind or the restoration of the situation existing 
before the violation, are not possible.939 If so, the language ‘if the case 
demands’ projects on the meaning of ‘compensation’; it reiterates the 
Chorzow Factory pronouncement on the primacy of restitution as a form of 
reparation.940 Put differently, the requirement to ‘pay compensation if the 
case demands’ under IHL is tantamount to the pronouncement of ARSIWA 
 
937OED ‘indemnity’ <http://www.oed.com> (accessed 17 October 2017). API Commentary 
(n 509) paras 3653-56. 
938 Sassòli – State responsibility (n 867) 418. 
939 API Commentary (n 509) para 3655. 
940 M Reisman, ‘Compensating collateral damage in elective international conflict’ (2013) 8 
Intercultural Human Rights Law Review, 2-3. Kalshoven – State responsibility for warlike 





Article 36 whereby the State is under an obligation to compensate ‘insofar 
as such damage is not made good by restitution’.941 
Without derogating from the argument that States are obliged to 
compensate individuals for violations of IHL, it should be stressed that in 
practice payments for damages suffered in the context of armed conflict are 
not limited to violations of IHL. Already in 1915 Brochard observed a 
‘growing practice for nations to alleviate the individual losses sustained 
during war, for which no legal liability is incurred, by making voluntary 
awards of indemnity as a matter of grace and favor’.942 This practice began 
in 1792 by France and was promoted by other States that ‘have from time 
to time followed this worthy example’.943 Voluntary award of indemnity is as 
prevalent in modern warfare. For instance, the 2017 US Operational Law 
Handbook instructs: 
If a unit deploys to the Far East or other parts of the world where payments 
in sympathy or recognition of loss are common, JAs should explore the 
possibility of making solatia payments to accident victims. Solatia 
payments are not claims payments. They are payments in money or in-kind 
to a victim or to a victim’s family as an expression of sympathy or 
condolence. These payments are immediate and, generally, nominal. The 
individual or unit involved in the damage has no legal obligation to pay; 
compensation is simply offered as an expression of sympathy in 
accordance with local custom... Prompt payment of solatia ensures the 
goodwill of local national populations, thus allowing the U.S. to maintain 
positive relations with the host nation...944  
Hence, from a strategic point of view and for any number of motives 
ranging from sympathy through political embarrassment to diplomatic 
goodwill,945 it may be essential that civilians be compensated following an 
event leading to casualties or proprietary damage even when there was no 
violation of IHL, or when any such violation was not yet established.946 
 
941 ARSIWA, commentaries to Article 36. 
942 Bochard – Diplomatic Protection (n 385) 279. 
943 ibid, see nn 5 for the original French laws and the subsequent practice. 
944 2017 US Operational Law Handbook (n 400) Chapter 20 – Foreign and Deployment 
Claims, Section M(1); emphasis in the original.  
945 Borchard – Diplomatic Protection (n 385) 279; Boothby (n 505) section 25.2.  
946 The US stressed this point in the matter of the sinking of a Japanese vessel. US 





Accordingly, such payments are often accompanied by a declaration 
making it clear that no legal liability is recognized by the payer.947 
Importantly, because these payments are ex gratia, such practice, even if 
shared by many States, is attributed to a moral rather than to a legal 
obligation;948 it is completely discretionary and as such, it cannot, and does 
not, evince the development or existence of an obligation to compensate in 
like situations.949 This is an important point to which the discussion returns 
in section 3 below.  
While it was established above that a violation of IHL imposes an 
obligation to make reparations on behalf of the State, the identity of those 
who may seek redress for violations of IHL is disputed.950 Accordingly, and 
without pretence to exhaust the issue, for its breadth,951 the following 
discussion examines whether individuals have a right to press a claim for 
compensation for violations of IHL.  
The rules of general international law stress that reparations may be 
owed to persons or entities other than States.952 Yet, whether and to what 
extent private persons are entitled to invoke responsibility on their own 
account depends on each applicable primary rule. This determination is not 
easy in the context of IHL since the primary rules that prescribe the 
 
Bulletin 249, 249-50. See additional examples in: US DoD LOAC Manual (n 34) Section 
18.16.3. 
947 Eg: Section 2, Financial Administration Act (R.S., 1985, c. F-11) (Canada); DAOD 7004-
1, Claims and Ex-Gratia Procedures (2003) (Canada); Section 3, Directive on Claims and 
Ex-Gratia Payments (2009) (Canada); Memorandum, Deputy General Counsel 
(International Affairs), US DoD to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: Solatia, (26 
November 2004). See also: NM Leich, ‘Denial of Liability: Ex Gratia Compensation on a 
Humanitarian Basis’ (1989) 83(2) AJIL 318, 322-23; H Maier, ‘Ex Gratia Payments and the 
Iranian Airline Tragedy’ (1989) 82(2) AJIL 325, 325-30; S Murphy, ‘Contemporary Practice 
of the United States Relating to International Law (2000) 94 AJIL 102, 102-103 
948 J Joseph, ‘Mediation in War: Winning Hearts and Minds Using Mediated Condolence 
Payments’ (2007) 23 Negotiations Journal 219, 223-24. 
949 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, para 27; Nuclear Weapons, para 64. 
950 L Cameron and V Chetail, Privatizing War: Private Military and Security Companies 
Under Public International Law (CUP 2013) 546, 
951 M-C Bassiouni, ‘International recognition of victims’ rights’ (2006) 6(2) Human Rights 
Law Review 203-79 and T Van Boven, ‘Victim-Oriented Perspectives: Rights and Realities’ 
in T Bonacker and C Safferling (eds) Victims of International Crimes: An Interdisciplinary 
Discourse (Springer 2013) 17 – 27. 





obligation to make reparation, HC-IV Article 3 and API Article 91, are 
unhelpfully silent with respect to their ratione personarum. In the absence 
of a clear stipulation, to ascertain whether individuals have a right to remedy 
and reparations under IHL it is necessary to determine if the interests of 
individuals are directly laid down and protected by IHL norms. The doctrinal 
assumption here is that the victim’s right to remedy is a secondary right that 
emanates from his primary substantive right being breached. Therefore, 
where there is no primary substantive right, there can in principle be no 
secondary right to remedy.  
Historically, IHL norms developed between States in the form of 
restrictions on the conduct of the ‘belligerent Parties’. The content and 
scope of the obligation to pay compensation for IHL violations was strongly 
influenced by the doctrine of diplomatic protection and traditionally 
conceived as an obligation to pay compensation to the State of nationality 
of the injured persons to which they had to refer their claim.953 The notion 
of individual ‘rights’ was introduced only in the 20th century, arguably with 
the 1929 Prisoners of War Convention, which addresses the ‘right’ of 
prisoners to complain of their conditions.954 The idea that individuals are 
rights holders in international law was increasingly recognized by States 
after WWII.955 By the time the Diplomatic Conference drafted the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, it had been acknowledged not only that individuals 
are, in some instances, rights holders, but that ‘it is not enough to grant 
rights to protected persons and to lay responsibilities on the States; 
protected persons must also be furnished with the support they require to 
obtain their rights’.956 Indeed, the Geneva Law uses the jargon of ‘rights’ 
 
953 Sassòli – State responsibility (n 867) 419. 
954 Articles 42 and 67, GC III. 
955 For a detailed analysis of the relevant factors that led to this change and the 
manifestation thereof, see: Bassiouni (n 951) 206-10, 218-23 and R Portmann, Legal 
personality under international law (CUP 2010) 134-38 and ch 9. 
956 ICRC, ‘Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of War 
Victims Geneva’ (21 April - 12 August 1949) Vol II – A (Geneva 1949) 822. This statement 





and ‘entitlements’ of individuals, by that evincing the intention of States to 
grant at least some rights to individuals.957  
Moreover, some provisions of the Geneva Conventions specifically 
concern the right of the individual to have recourse to a complaint procedure 
for IHL violations,958 thereby demonstrating that IHL instruments intend to 
accord individuals the right to seek redress. Aside from these stipulations, 
IHL comprises many other rules that contain ‘implicit’ elements of individual 
benefits.959 On this point, Zegveld suggests that the grave breaches 
provisions could be construed as ‘conferring individual humanitarian rights’ 
against acts, such as wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment.960 
Considered this way, the obligations of belligerent parties are mirrored by 
the rights of war victims and their cause-of-action against a warring party 
who violated their rights.961  
Nevertheless, even if, substantively, individuals hold rights or 
entitlements under IHL, procedural challenges may still prevent them from 
exercising their rights. To address this problem, belligerents sometimes 
established special tribunals postbellum to adjudicate the claims of former 
enemy individuals against them.962 But aside from such tribunals, the 
practice on the right to reparation under IHL has mostly been limited to inter-
State claims until the mid-20th century.963 In 1952, in what is commonly 
 
957 Article 7, GC I; Articles 6 and 7, GC II; Articles 7, 14, 84, 105, and 130 GC III; Articles 
5, 7, 8, 27, 38, 80, and 146, GC IV; Articles 44(5), 45(3), 75, and 85(4), API; and, Article 
6(2), APII. 
958 Article 78, GC III; Article 30, GC IV. 
959 Zegveld (n 932) 504. 
960 ibid. 
961 True, many IHL instruments also address the ‘rights’ of States, and not only their 
obligations (eg: Articles 14, 31, 38 GCI). Nonetheless, an instrument can confer rights upon 
different entities and can be partly non-self-executing for one purpose but still be directly 
operative for another (J Paust,’ Judicial power to determine the status and rights of persons 
detained without trial’ (2003) 44(2) Harvard International Law Journal 503, 515; Zegveld (n 
932) 510). 
962 For instance, the tribunals constituted under Article 304 of the Treaty of Versailles and 
the claims commissions established by the US, the UK, and France in their respective 
occupation zones in Germany after WWII (Freeman (n 657) 375-389 and Sassòli – State 
responsibility (n 867) 419). 
963 C Tomuschat, ‘Reparation in Favour of Individual Victims of Gross Violations of Human 





referred to as the first time an adjudicative instance recognized the 
existence of an individual right under HC-IV Article 3,964 the Higher Regional 
Court of Münster accepted a claim based on the individual’s right to invoke 
violations of IHL. For many years this case remained an outlier. Few claims 
have been filed by individuals until the early 2000s and even fewer claims 
succeeded.965  
While the consistent rejection of such claims outwardly casts doubt 
on the proposition that individuals hold rights under IHL, a careful 
assessment of this national jurisprudence reveals that claims by individuals 
for war reparation failed worldwide mostly on procedural, rather than 
substantive grounds, such as – State immunity,966 signed peace treaties,967 
standing and lack of procedure,968 or policy considerations.969 It is also 
important that practically none of the domestic instances that dismissed 
claims for reparations unequivocally denied the underlying right of the 
 
Rights and Conflict Resolution through International Law: Liber amicorum Lucius Caflisch 
(Leiden: Brill, 2007) 576. 
964 Higher Administrative Court Münster, Münster (Oberverwaltungsgericht Münster) 
(1952): Judgment of 9 April III A 1279/51, NJW 1952, 1030 
965 In the 1990s, the question whether individuals can invoke the right to remedy for IHL 
violations re-emerged in the framework of the ‘comfort-women’ claims. The claimants in 
these cases, namely women who were used as sex-slaves during WWII, argued that they 
have a right to compensation under customary law and under HC IV Article 3. Their claims 
were mostly rejected. See: M Igarashi, ‘Post-War Compensation Cases, Japanese Courts 
and International Law’ (2000) 43 The Japanese Annual of International Law 45-82; T Yu, 
‘Reparations for Former Comfort Women of World War II (1995) 36 Harvard Journal of 
International Law 528; S Lee, ‘Comforting the Comfort Women: Who Can Make Japan 
Pay?’ (2003) 24(2) U Penn Journal of Int Econ Law 509-547. For a review of the caselaw 
preceding these claims, see: Kalshoven (n 729) and Expert Opinion by E David, ‘The direct 
effect of Article 3 of the Fourth Hague Convention of 18th October 1907 respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land’, and Expert Opinion by C Greenwood, ‘Rights to 
compensation of former prisoners of war and civilian internees under Article 3 of the Hague 
Convention No. IV, 1907’, both in (n 927). 
966 Eg: President of the Council v Markovic, Corte di Cassazione, Decision 5 June 2002, 
No 8157/2002; Margellos and others v Federal Republic of Germany, Anotato Eidiko 
Dikastirio (Special Supreme Court), Judgement, 17 September 2002. 
967 Gillard (n 931) 537-38. 
968 Eg: President of the Council v Markovic, Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Decision 11 
March 2004, No 8157/2002, 2006 ILR 652 (656); Chinese victims of sexual violence v 
Japan, Tokyo District Court, Judgment, 24 April 2003. 
969 Handle v Artukovic, US District Court of the Central District of California, US 601 Supp. 





individual to compensation.970 In other words, the grounds for the rejection 
of these claims go to the exercise of a right to reparations, and not to the 
existence of that right.  
Additionally, the practice, jurisprudence, and the constitutive 
instruments of specialized bodies that were established in the aftermath of 
hostilities, such as the UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) and the 
EECC, support the notion that individuals are right holders under IHL.971 
Furthermore, the recognition of the individual’s right to remedy for IHL 
violations is demonstrated in a consistent record of international authorities. 
Most notably, at the close of 2005, and at the desire of the ‘majority of States 
that a UN normative instrument on the right to reparations for victims of 
human rights and humanitarian law violations be adopted’,972 the UN 
 
970 For instance, the Netherland breached IHL and sought compensation for their losses. 
The Appeals Court of Amsterdam rejected a claim by nationals of the former FRY, who 
argued that in participating in the NATO bombardment campaign, the Netherland breached 
IHL and sought compensation for their losses. The Court recognized the possibility of 
deriving individual rights from IHL norm but it did not consider that the Appellants, 
personally, were the victims of violations of IHL, even assuming IHL norms were violated 
(Appeals Court of Amsterdam, Dedovic vs Kok, Case No 759/99 SKG, 6 July 2000, 
Judgment). See also: German Federal Court of Justice Compensation for Distomo 
Massacre (Greek citizens v Germany), Appeal judgment, 42 ILM 1030 (2003). For an 
analysis of case law, see: Gillard (n 931) 538.  
971 The UNCC was established in 1991 to implement Iraq’s liability, ‘under international 
law’, for any direct loss or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a 
result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait (UNSC Resolution 687 (1991) 
of 8 April 1991, para 16). The vast majority of the 2.6 million claims received were from 
individuals (legal and natural). For an example of a UNCC decision recognizing the rights 
of the individual, see Decision No 7, UN Doc S/AC.26/1991/7, para 6. The EECC was 
established in 2000 to decide ‘through binding arbitration’ all claims for loss, damage or 
injury by nationals (including both natural and juridical persons) of one party against the 
Government of the other part that ‘result from violations of IHL, including the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions’ (Article 5(1), Agreement between the Government of Ethiopia and the 
Government of Eritrea, 12 December 2000, 40 ILM 260 (2001)). Some 400,000 claims by 
individuals of each of the two States were filed with the EECC for violations of IHL by the 
States. Of course, the need to create bodies such as the UNCC and the EECC for the 
purpose of enabling individuals to press claims against States demonstrates, arguably, that 
individuals have no right to remedy under IHL unless such has been first created for them 
in the constitutive instruments of a special instance. However, the treaties establishing 
post-conflict bodies did not, as Kalshoven explained, ‘create rights individuals did not 
already possess: they merely transposed those rights to another, international, level of 
procedure’ (Kalshoven – Expert opinion (n n 729) 644-45). 
972 Bassiouni (n 951) 249. See: Common Position Paper, ‘The Draft Basic Principles And 
Guidelines On The Right To A Remedy And Reparation For Victims Of Violations Of 





Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) recognized the interests and rights 
of victims of IHL violations in the Basic Principles on the Right to Reparation. 
The Basic Principles are the result of more than 20 years of research work 
and a broad consultative process with States,973 international organizations 
such as the ICJ and the ICRC.974  
The Basic Principles on the Right to Reparation do not prescribe new 
international legal obligations. They do not address the substantive claims 
of human rights and IHL and they do not enumerate what falls under their 
respective ambit. The Basic Principles simply say that ‘violations require 
remedies.’975 Accordingly, these Principles ‘identify mechanisms, 
modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of the existing 
legal obligation’ to make ‘adequate’ war reparations976 to individual victims 
for ‘gross’ violations of human rights law and ‘serious’ violations of IHL.  
The different adjectives, ‘gross’ and ‘serious’, represent an attempt 
of certain States to limit the scope of the Basic Principles and to 
demonstrate the difference between human rights law and IHL. However, 
this attempt should not be understood to imply a separate legal regime for 
reparations according to the particular right violated, but rather taken to 
qualify situations ‘with the view of establishing a set of facts that may figure 
as a basis for claims adjudication’.977 It ought to be borne in mind that the 
Basic Principles on the Right to Reparation are drafted from the view point 
of the victim. And for the victim, it is ‘artificial and counterproductive’ to make 
a separation on the basis of legal definitions,978 since victims are indifferent 
 
content/uploads/2018/01/NGO_common_position_paper.pdf> (accessed 20 November 
2018 (accessed 20 November 2018). 
973 For a detailed account of the development of the Principles see: Bassiouni (n 951) 247-
51. 
974 See the introductory note and procedural history at <http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_60-
147/ga_60-147.html> accessed 20 December 2017.  
975 Bassiouni (n 951) 253. 
976 Annex, Recital 7, UNGA Res 60/147. 
977 Bassiouni (n 951) 251.  





to whether their losses in hostilities are properly pigeonholed as the 
consequences of violations of IHL or of breaches of human rights obligation.  
In the wake of the adoption of the Basic Principles on the Right to 
Reparation, several specialized international bodies recognized the right of 
the individual to receive direct compensation from the State for IHL 
violations.979 In 2005, for instance, the Report of the UN Commission of 
Enquiry on Darfur noted that, even if originally the obligation to make 
reparation for violations of IHL was ‘conceived of as an obligation of each 
contracting State towards the other contracting State’, it has evolved so that 
today it is owed to individuals. On this point, the Report cited the Basic 
Principles.980 Also notable are the Report of fact-finding mission to Beit 
Hanoun by the UN Human Rights Council (2008),981 the Report of the 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 
(2009),982 the ILA Declaration of International Law Principles on Reparation 
for Victims of Armed Conflict (2010),983 and the 2016 Commentaries to the 
Geneva Conventions.984 All of these authorities recognized that individuals 
have a right to reparations for IHL violations from the violating State and 
 
979 Eg: Hague Agenda for Peace and Justice, Recommendation 13, The Agenda for Peace, 
UN Doc. A/54/98; Amsterdam Centre for International Law cited in Zegveld (n 932) 499-
500; UNCHR, ‘Updated sets of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights 
through action to combat impunity’, 61st Session, 8 February 2005, 
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1; International Human Rights Law Institute, Chicago Council on 
Global Affairs, The Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice (2007) Principle 3. 
980 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary-General, Geneva 25 January 2005, paras 593-600 <f (accessed 18 October 
2018). That same year the ICRC affirmed the individuals’ right to reparation and referenced 
the Basic Principles (Customary IHL Study (n 38) Rule 50). 
981 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the High-Level Fact-Finding Mission to Beit 
Hanoun established under Council resolution S-3/1’ 1 September 2008, A/HRC/9/26, para 
67. 
982 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Vol 1 (2009) 
1-33.  
983 Committee on the Reparation for victims of armed conflict, ‘Draft Declaration of 
International Law Principles on Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict (Substantive 
Issues)’ in International Law Association Report of the Hague Conference (2010) 
(International Law Association, The Hague 2010) 293. The principles of the Hague 
Declaration were reaffirmed by the ILA in the 2014 Washington Conference (Committee 
on the Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict, in International Law Association Report of 
the Seventy-Sixth Conference (Washington 2014) (International Law Association, 
Washington 2014)).  





referenced the Basic Principles on the Right to Reparation as a codification 
and reflection of this right. 
The jurisprudence of the ICJ also reflects a recognition of the 
individual right to remedy for violations of IHL. In the 2004 Wall Advisory 
Opinion, for instance, the Court recognized the ‘obligation to make 
reparation for the damage caused to all the natural and legal persons 
concerned’.985 Likewise, while settling an inter-State dispute, the Court 
acknowledged the responsibility of Uganda for injuries suffered by persons 
in the DRC.986 Some commentators suggest that in so doing, the Court 
implicitly recognized the State’s obligation to repair individual damage.987 
Finally, parallel developments in other fields of international law, namely 
human rights and criminal law, reinforce the view that today individuals have 
a right to remedy for IHL violations.988 Overall, it is argued that while some 
contemporary authorities, such as the 2016 US DoD LOAC manual, still 
maintain that individuals have ‘no private right to compensation under 
customary international law or the 1949 Geneva Conventions’,989 these 
views are overshadowed by a growing amount of consistent modern 
authorities to the contrary.  
Having established that individuals have a right to be compensated 
for the harm caused to them by the violating State, the discussion moves to 
ascertain the standard and form of any such compensation. IHL follows the 
general maxim that the violating State must make ‘full reparation’ ‘in an 
adequate form’ for the injury caused by the violation of IHL, such that the 
consequences of the wrongful act will be wiped out.990 Yet, it remains 
 
985 Wall Advisory Opinion, para 152. 
986 DRC v Uganda, paras 259-60. 
987 See C McCarthy, ‘Reparation for Gross Violations of Human Rights Law and 
International Humanitarian Law at the International Court of Justice’ in C Ferstman et al 
(eds) Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (Brill 
2009) 283-84. 
988 For an overview of the cross fertilization on this point, see: Gillard (n  931) 544-48, and 
Zegveld (n 932) 514-23. 
989 DoD LOAC Manual (n 34) Section 18.16.4. 
990 Factory at Chorzów, 21; ICRC – Customary IHL Study (n 38) Rule 150; Sassòli – State 





unclear what might ‘full’ reparations look like in respect of acts that violate 
IHL and how would the consequences of such acts be ‘wiped out’ in an 
‘adequate form’? In reality, ‘it would be callous and naïve’991 to think that an 
award of compensation would restore war victims to the situation they were 
in prior to the violation. Since the adverse effects of war are widespread and 
lasting, the consequences of IHL violations cannot be fully ‘wiped out’. 
Nevertheless, the receipt of prompt, effective, and adequate 
compensation992 is an important element in enabling victims to try to rebuild 
their lives.993  
To elucidate what is meant by ‘adequate compensation’ for violations 
of IHL the discussion returns to the Basic Principles on the Right to 
Reparation, which make repeated use of the adjective ‘adequate’ to qualify 
the standard of reparation.994 Notably, Principle 15 explains that the 
promotion of justice requires that ‘adequate, effective and prompt’ 
compensation ‘should be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the 
harm suffered’.995 Principle 20 goes on to explain what damages merit 
‘adequate, effective and prompt’ compensation and, that what is adequate 
 
(Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Compensation Owed by the Republic of Nicaragua to the 
Republic of Costa Rica, Judgment) 2018 <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/150/150-20180202-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2018) paras 30-32, 
40-42, 148-55. 
991 Gillard (n  931) 530. 
992 The notions of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘promptness’ are not analyzed below. In the context 
of IHL, as with investment law and general international law, ‘effective payments’ mostly 
entail convertible currency while what is ‘prompt’ is determined on a case-by-case basis. 
‘Prompt compensation’ does not denote ‘immediate’, but rather ‘timely’ payments within a 
reasonable period. See: J Barker, ‘Compensation’ in J Crawford et al The Law of 
International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 602 and DRC v Uganda, Order of 1 July 2015, 
para 3.  
993 Gillard (n 931) 530; Zegleb (n 932); ICRC – Customary IHL Study (n 38) Rule 150; API 
Commentary (n 509)  para 3655. 
994 Principle 1, 11, 15, 15, and 20, Basic Principles on the Right to Reparation. Notably, the 
Principles were revised several times, but the requirement to accord ‘adequate remedies’ 
remained constant throughout 15 years of drafting (UNCHR, ‘Report of the independent 
expert on the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of grave 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, Mr. M. Cherif Bassiouni, submitted 
pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/43’, UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/65 
(8 February 1999) paras 11 and 36 (describing the changes between the 1993 and 1996 
drafts and the proposed amendments of 1997)).  





is to be determined per the circumstances of each case. The implication of 
conditioning the award of compensation by what is ‘appropriate’ in light of 
the ‘circumstances’ of each violation is that the resources, abilities, and 
concomitant obligations of the wrongdoing State are also taken into account 
in the assessment of compensation. Arguably, this suggests that the 
potentially crippling effect of a compensation payment should be considered 
in determining its quantum. Principle 20 reads:   
20. Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable 
damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and 
the circumstances of each case, … such as: 
(a) Physical or mental harm; 
(b) Lost opportunities, including employment, education and social 
benefits; 
(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning 
potential; 
(d) Moral damage; 
(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical 
services, and psychological and social services.996 
For the investment lawyer, the use of the trinity ‘adequate, effective 
and prompt’ to qualify the obligation to compensate might call to mind the 
well-known Hull formula from the 1928 note of US Secretary of State, Hull, 
to the Mexican ambassador, where the US ‘recognize[d] the right of a 
sovereign State to expropriate property for public purposes’ subject to 
‘adequate, effective, and prompt compensation’.997 Today, as mentioned, 
the vast majority of investment instruments contain the Hull formula.998 But 
the materials and discussions leading up to the adoption of the final text of 
the Principles indicate that the language of the Principles and their 
pronouncement of the obligation to award ‘adequate, effective and prompt’ 
compensation does not originate from any form of American practice, let 
 
996 Principle 20,  
997 M Whiteman, Digest of international law, Vol 8 (Washington: Government Printing Office 
1967) 1020. 
998 See discussion in chapter 3 and B Sabahi, Compensation and Restitution in Investor-
State Arbitration: Principles and Practice (OUP 2011) 92-102; I Marboe, Calculation of 





alone Hull’s note. Rather, the standard ‘adequate, effective, and prompt’ 
that qualifies the obligation to compensate for violations of IHL originated 
predominantly from human rights instruments and was introduced in 1993 
to the Basic Principles with a human rights-driven meaning.999 That the 
trinity ‘prompt, adequate, and effective’, which qualifies the obligation to pay 
war reparations to individuals under the Basic Principles, is detached from 
the Hull formula, which the US perceives as customary, and denotes a 
different meaning is evinced by the consistent American opposition to the 
adoption of this standard, arguing it reflects ‘soft law’, and by the attempts 
of the US to prevent the Principles form being adopted by the UNGA.1000   
Nonetheless, the American position was successfully disputed by the 
consensus among ‘scholars and government representatives [that] 
international humanitarian law and human rights law largely overlap’ on the 
point of compensation for violations.1001 In December 2004, this non-
 
999 While the first set of principles that Van Boven prepared (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 of 2 July 
1993, section IX (first draft) did not include the qualifier ‘adequate’ in the text of the 
principles, he explained that the obligation itself substantively relies on the standard of 
‘adequate’ compensation as it appears in human rights instruments. Namely: Article 2(3)(a) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) and UNGA Res 1904 (XVIII) 
November 20, 1963. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 
Article 21(2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 21 ILM 58 (1982) (ibid, 
para 27); Article 14(1), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 
1465 UNTS 85 (ibid, para 28); Article 6, International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 
1965) 660 UNTS 195 (ibid, para 30); Articles 15(2), 16(4), 16(5), Convention No 169 
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (adopted 27 June 
1989, entered into force 5 September 1991) 1650 UNTS 383 (ibid, ibid); Articles 63(1) and 
68, The American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into 
force 18 July 1978) 144 UNTS 123 (ibid, para 31); and, Article 39, The Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 
1577 UNTS 3 (ibid, para 32). The second and third drafts that Van Boven prepared included 
explicit use of ‘adequate’ (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17 of 24 May 1996 (second version); 
E/CN.4/1997/104 of 16 January 1997 (third version). 
1000 K McCracken ‘Commentary on the basic principles and guidelines on the right to a 
remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of international human rights law and 
serious violations of international humanitarian law’ (2005) Revue internationale de droit 
penal, 77-79 and Bassiouni (n 951) 252, see note 255 for the objections and reservations 







American meaning of ‘adequate’ compensation was put before States for 
comments and corrections; it was reaffirmed.1002 On 13 April 2005, the 
Commission on Human Rights adopted the Basic Principles by a roll-call 
vote (at the request of the US)1003 of: 40 Yes; 0 No; and, 13 abstentions.1004 
Eventually, in December 2005, the Principles were adopted by the UNGA 
without a vote.1005  
From the foregoing, it is suggested that there is an international 
consensus over the notion that the ‘adequacy’ of compensation for 
violations is assessed through the perspective of the victim and his need to 
reconstruct his life. War compensation under IHL are payments that reflect 
not only the economically assessable damages, but also the gravity of the 
violation, and the circumstances of the breach, including the resources and 
abilities of the wrongdoing State and its concomitant international 
obligations during and post hostilities.  
3. Nondiscriminatory Compensation for Losses to Investments 
Owing to Armed Conflict 
In contrast to IHL, which confers certain substantive rights upon individuals 
but does not (necessarily) create a procedure to exercise them, investment 
treaties generally grant investors direct recourse to international 
adjudication and the ability to press a claim for compensation owing to, say, 
 
1002 See discussions and list of the participating 50 States in: UNCHR, ‘Report of the third 
consultative meeting on the “basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and 
reparation for victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law”’ 
(Geneva, 29 september-1 October 2004) and Note by the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Mr Alejandro Salinas, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/59 (21 December 2004). 
1003 Bassiouni (n 951) 250. 
1004 States voting in favour: Austria, Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina 
Faso, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The obtaining 
States: Australia, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Mauritania, Nepal, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Togo, and the US. 
1005 According to the UN: ‘When consensus on the text is reached all of the Member States 
agree to adopt the draft resolution without taking a vote. Adopting a draft without a vote is 
the most basic definition of what consensus means’ 
<https://outreach.un.org/mun/content/how-decisions-are-made-un> (accessed 20 October 





the unlawful destruction of the investment in armed conflict.1006 Accordingly, 
this section deals with the first principle on the award of war reparations in 
investment treaties: nondiscrimination. 
Over 1500 investment instruments,1007 starting from the very first 
Germany – Pakistan BIT (1959) through the modern treaties of conflict-
ridden States,1008 contain provisions referring to compensation for ‘war’ or 
‘other forms of armed conflict or similar events’ (plain war clauses (PWC)). 
For example, Article 4(3) of the Turkey – Afghanistan BIT provides:  
Investors of either Party whose investments suffer losses in the territory of 
the other Party owing to war, insurrection, civil disturbance or other similar 
events shall be accorded by such other Party treatment no less favourable 
than that accorded to its own investors or to investors of any third country, 
whichever is the most favourable treatment, as regards any measures it 
adopts in relation to such losses.1009 
Notwithstanding the ubiquity of PWCs, many questions concerning 
their meaning and scope remain. First, the function of these provisions is 
not clear. According to some investment tribunals, PWCs prescribe a 
special standard of treatment for instances of hostilities, which derogates 
and exempts from other general standards, such as FPS. Under another 
view, the PWC merely duplicates part of the general nondiscrimination 
obligation with respect to reparations; it does not prescribe a substantive, 
let alone, a special standard of treatment. Further, the qualifications for a 
valid invocation of the PWC are contested. Namely, it is not clear what type 
of emergencies invoke the PWC and how severe such emergencies should 
be. Likewise, the identity of the party whose actions during an emergency 
 
1006 What remains unclear but does not require resolution for the purpose of the present 
discussion, is whether these investment treaties grant rights to investors and, if so, whether 
these are substantive and/or procedural in nature (See discussion in chapters 1 and 6).  
1007 According to UNCTAD, some 1539 investment instruments, some of which are not yet, 
or no longer, in force, contain analogous provisions.  
1008 Eg: Article 5(1) Pakistan – Bahrain BIT; Article 3(2) Pakistan – Bosnia – Herzegovina 
BIT; Article 5(1), Austria – Libya BIT; Article 5(1), Libya – Croatia BIT; Article 5, Libya – 
Ethiopia BIT; Article 4(1) Ukraine – Israel BIT; Article 4(3), Germany – Afghanistan BIT; 
Article 7(1), Syria – Azerbaijan BIT; Article 5(1), Syria – Slovakia BIT. 





result in the ‘losses’ which form the subject-matter of the PWC is debated. 
The analysis below takes these three ambiguities in turn.  
Arbitral and scholarly jurisprudence attributes different functions to 
the PWC. According to one view, which was expressed by the dissenting 
opinion in AAPL v Sri Lanka1010 and by the LESI v Algeria Tribunal,1011 
PWCs prescribe a special standard of treatment for hostilities which 
conflicts with and derogates from the FPS obligation.1012 The LESI Tribunal 
postulated that Italy and Algeria included a PWC in their BIT with the 
intention to be held to a more relaxed, relative standard of nondiscrimination 
during armed conflict instead of the due diligence standard of the FPS 
provision.1013 Accordingly, the Tribunal explained that where the conditions 
for the invocation of the PWC had been met the State is exempt from the 
obligation to accord FPS to foreign investments.1014 The Tribunal went on 
to clarify that, because the PWC operates as an exception that effectively 
limits the protection accorded to foreign investments, the scope of the PWC 
and the emergencies capable of invoking it should be interpreted 
restrictively.1015  
Methodologically, the LESI reasoning is sound. It rests on the 
principle of effet utile, whereby each provision in the treaty performs a 
function. This is to say, if all the PWC does is to prescribe non-discrimination 
(treatment that is no less favorable than) as the treaty language seems to 
 
1010 AAPL v Sri Lanka – Dissent, 582, stating that the PWC ‘must prevail over’ the FPS 
provision ‘as the applicable provision. This means that [the PWC] exhausts all the possible 
grounds of liability. Consequently, it is not open to the Tribunal to invoke [FPS] as the basis 
for the Respondent’s liability after a definitive ruling that the Respondent a not liable under 
[the PWC]’ 
1011 L.E.S.I. S.p.A. v Algeria, ICSID Case No ARB/05/3, Award, 12 November 2008. 
1012 On the content of FPS, see chapter 5 above. 
1013 LESI v Algeria, paras 174-75 (‘d’une clause générale de protection pleine et entière et 
d’une clause spéciale en cas de troubles politiques prévues par un traité bilatéral 
d’investissement’). 
1014 ibid (‘lorsque ses conditions d’application sont réunies, l’Etat contractant n’est pas tenu 
de garantir aux investisseurs de l’autre Etat une protection et une sécurité « constantes, 
pleines, et entières…’) 
1015 ibid (‘S’agissant d’une exception au principe général de pleine et entière protection… 
qui ont pour conséquence d’amoindrir substantiellement le niveau de protection de 





imply, then the general nondiscrimination obligation in the treaty renders it 
redundant.1016 This interpretation of the PWC is also appealing since it is 
functional and cohesive. In proposing that the PWC operates as an 
exception to the FPS standard that may be invoked only under limited 
circumstances, the LESI Tribunal accounted for other contested elements 
of the PWC, namely the level of severity of the emergencies capable of 
invoking the PWC and for the interaction of the PWC with other standards 
of treatment, namely FPS.  
However, the contention that the PWC is a special standard of 
protection for times of hostilities that operates as an exception to the FPS 
standard and the doctrinal underpinnings of this argument are erroneous. 
First, the principle of effectiveness essentially means that treaty provisions 
are intended to have some significance and to achieve some end; 
effectiveness does not mean that each provision has a unique ‘one-off’ 
meaning.1017 On this point, Fitzmaurice noted that the principle of 
effectiveness is ‘all too frequently misunderstood as denoting that 
agreements should always be given their maximum possible effect, 
whereas its real object is merely…  to prevent them failing altogether’.1018  
In the case of PWC, the interpreter must choose between the 
express treaty language, ‘treatment no less favorable than’, which means 
that the PWC duplicates a portion of the national or MFN treatment clause 
on the one hand, and a reading whereby the PWC is an exception to other 
obligations, and in so doing allocates a unique meaning to the PWC, on the 
other. ‘In such cases’ – Lauterpacht observed – ‘there is really… no 
question of choosing between valeat and pereat – the question is one of 
less or more valeat.’1019  In other words, the reliance on the principle of 
 
1016 AAPL v Sri Lanka, Dissent, para 2; ibid, para 175. 
1017 T Gazzinni, Interpretation of Investment Treaties (Hart 2016) 170. 
1018 GG Fitzmaurice, ‘Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators! Your Treaty or Our 
“Interpretation” of It?’ (1971) 65 AJIL 358, 373 
1019 H Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the 





effectiveness to award the PWC a meaning that differs from the express 
treaty language is misplaced.1020 
Moreover, the principle of effectiveness is an interpretive technique; 
it is not a mandatory rule of treaty interpretation.1021 Therefore, the concept 
of effet utile cannot be invoked to introduce an interpretation that does not 
arise from the ordinary meaning. Nor can effectiveness justify the 
preference of an interpretation that finds no support in the express treaty 
language. Indeed, Fitzmaurice warned that a mistaken application of 
effectiveness will ‘result in parties finding themselves saddled with 
obligation they never intended to enter into, in relation to situations they 
never contemplated, and which often they could not even have 
anticipated’.1022 Arguably, it is the incorrect application of the principle of 
effectiveness that led the LESI Tribunal to erroneously postulate that PWC 
were included in investment treaties so as to exempt from FPS in wartime. 
As further explained below, the drafting history of PWCs and the 
circumstances of their inclusion into investment treaties far from corroborate 
this assumption.  
Additionally, there is nothing in the explicit wording to support the 
proposition that PWCs derogate from FPS. The PWC is not drafted using 
language that is characteristic of investment treaty exceptions (e.g.: 
‘notwithstanding the FPS obligation, nothing shall preclude’. etc.).1023 
Instead, the provision is crafted using language that is typical of national or 
MFN treatment provisions (‘no less favorable than’). In fact, it stands to 
 
1020 In contrast, in CEMEX v Bolivia, the Tribunal held that ‘this principle does not require 
that a maximum effect be given to a text. It only excludes interpretations which would 
render the text meaningless, when a meaningful interpretation is possible’ (CEMEX v 
Bolivia, ICSID Case No ARB/08/15, Jurisdiction, 30 December 2010, para 144). 
1021 Effectiveness does not appear in Article 31 VCLT. The principle found a place in 
Waldock’s Third ILC Report but was removed in subsequent ILC drafts (for a comparative 
analysis on these drafts see Annex III in Weeramantry (n 466) 226 and Pauwelyn (n 62) 
248-49. Arguably, effectiveness is implicit in the VCLT through the principles of good faith 
and the ‘object and purpose’ criteria (YILC (1966-II), para 6; Gazzinni (n 1017) 170). This 
proposition is mostly considered unconvincing (Wälde (n 457) 738-40; Gardiner (n 456) 
150; Weeramantry (n 466) 143-44). 
1022 Fitzmaurice (n 1018) 373. 





reason, as the Suez v Argentina Tribunal noted, that if States wanted PWCs 
to serve as an exception to other BIT provisions and not to prescribe 
nondiscrimination obligations, ‘they certainly would have so stated 
specifically’.1024    
The prevailing interpretation of PWCs in doctrine and arbitral practice 
is that PWCs ‘provide a floor treatment for the investor in the context of the 
measures adopted in respect of the losses suffered in the emergency’.1025 
The CMS v Argentina Tribunal explained that the function of this rule is to 
ensure that ‘any measures directed at offsetting or minimizing losses will be 
applied in a nondiscriminatory manner’; the clause does not derogate or 
exempt from any other treaty provision.1026 The PWC only ‘duplicates a 
portion’ of the protection otherwise provided by the general right to national 
and MFN treatment.1027 This proposition finds support in drafting practice 
that includes the PWC as a sub-paragraph in the MFN or nondiscrimination 
provision, thereby clarifying the PWC as a specification of the broader 
principle.1028 In contradistinction, the PWC is never included as a sub-
paragraph of the security exception provision.1029  
While the proposal that the PWC reproduces a part of the 
nondiscrimination standard does not deem the provision completely 
ineffective, it does however raise an interpretive question: ‘What difference 
would it make if that provision did not figure in the instrument at all’?1030 To 
resolve this question, the discussion takes a step back and looks at the 
historical development of the rule on nondiscrimination in relation to war 
reparations and the circumstances of its inclusion into investment treaties. 
 
1024 Suez v Argentina Award) para 270.  
1025 CMS v Argentina (Award) para 375; LG&E v Argentina (Award) paras 243, 261; BG 
Group v Argentina (Final Award) para 381-87; Enron v Argentina (Award) paras 320-21; 
National Grid v Argentina (Award) para 253; Suez v Argentina (Award) paras 269-71. 
1026 CMS v Argentina (Award) para 375. 
1027 Vandevelde – US Investment Agreements (n 703) 432. 
1028 Article 3, Bosnia – Herzegovina – Pakistan BIT; Article 5, Syria – Indonesia BIT; Article 
6(2), Switzerland – Algeria BIT. 
1029 See discussion in chapter 6. 
1030 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Art 27, paragraph 2 of the Charter) (Advisory 





This analysis demonstrates that the obligation to grant investors 
nondiscriminatory treatment with respect to war reparations served to 
create a legal basis for an obligation to compensate for losses owing to war 
where war law imposed no such obligation.  
Briefly put, the prevailing view concerning the obligation to 
compensate for losses to private property owing to war during the 19th 
century was that, first, the obligation arose only when the laws of war had 
been breached and, second, that this obligation was not owed to individuals. 
Importantly, internal insurrections, riots, and civil strife, were regarded as 
criminalities that were regulated by domestic legislation, not as hostilities 
governed by war law.1031 In practical terms this meant that States hardly 
ever compensated their own nationals, as a matter of a legal obligation (not 
ex gratia) for losses owing to attempts to quell an internal strife or due to 
attack by the adversary. In turn, the treatment of foreign nationals in such 
instances was, at best, as of the State’s own nationals. The result was, as 
Bluntschli conveniently explained in 1874, that, ‘States are not obliged to 
compensate for losses or injuries suffered by aliens or nationals resulting, 
from hostilities, internal disturbances or civil war.’1032  
While international law did not impose an obligation to compensate 
individuals for losses owing to internal hostilities, civil strife, etc. such 
compensation payments were often obtained in practice by way of force, 
courtesy, or both. For instance, the British Government demanded 
indemnification from the Grand Duke of Tuscany on account of damages 
sustained by British subjects during the revolutionary movements in Naples 
and Tuscany (1849 – 50) and sent an English fleet to Naples to expedite its 
claim. In an attempt to avoid war, the Grand Duke, who opposed the British 
demand, asked Austria, which assisted to quell the revolution in Naples, to 
 
1031 See: Borchard – Diplomatic Protection (n 385) 246-70 and the references therein to 
other contemporaneous scholarship.  
1032 JC Bluntschli, Le droit international codifié (Paris Guillaumin et cie. 1874) para 380 bis. 
See also: P Pradier-Fodéré and C Pradier-Fodéré Traité de droit international public 
européen & américain Tom 1 (Paris,A Pedone 1906) 348-49 and A Pillet, Les lois actuelles 





submit its opinion on the obligation to compensate in such cases and 
requested the court of Russia to serve as arbitrator. Together the views of 
these States assist to understand the prevailing legal position.   
While Russia refused to take up the role of arbitrator, the Russian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to London stating that, ‘according to the 
rules of public law as they are understood by Russian policy’, since law does 
not mandate compensation to national or aliens for such losses, the British 
Government has no claim. He opined that an award of compensation in this 
case will ‘result in giving to British subjects an exceptional position abroad, 
far beyond the advantages enjoyed by the inhabitants of other countries and 
would create for the governments which welcome them an intolerable 
situation’.1033 The Austrian position was that, if during hostilities the property 
of ‘foreigners established in the country is injured, it is a public misfortune 
which foreigners must share with nationals’.1034 Officially, these views led 
the British Government to withdraw its claim.1035 However, in the course of 
a debate in the House of Commons two months after the Austrian and 
Russian dispatches had been received in London, Lord John Russell stated 
that the British Government managed to convince (likely with its fleets) the 
Neapolitan Minister of Foreign Affairs to offer compensation ‘as a measure 
of hospitality’.1036 
Another indicative incident is addressed in Baty’s International 
Law.1037 In 1834, Belgium was ‘about to pass legislation decreeing 
indemnities to natives who had sustained losses during the revolution of 
1830’.1038 At that time, it was common that such voluntary payments ‘may 
limit the classes of the beneficiaries as the state deems best’, and that as a 
 
1033 H Arias Madrid, ‘The non-liability of States for damages suffered by foreigners in the 
course of a riot, an insurrection, or a civil war’ (1913) 7(4) AJIL, 724, 743. 
1034 ibid. 
1035 Calvo mentioned this incident in his writing noting that GB withdrew its claim (Calvo C, 
Le droit international theorique et pratique, Vol III (5th edn. Paris, 1896) 145). 
1036 TC Hansard (ed) Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol CXII (Cornelius Buck 1850) 
701-02 (debate dated 28 June 1850).  
1037 T Baty, International Law (London J Murray, 1909). 





result, ‘occasionally foreigners have not been included among those 
indemnified’.1039 In Belgium’s case, Baty reported that ‘foreign nations put 
in claims to participate’ in the indemnities that it considered offering to its 
own nationals.1040 Specifically, in 1836, GB declared that:  
As long as Belgium took no steps to indemnify its own subjects for similar 
losses, His Majesty’s Government did not feel justified in pressing for a 
decision in favour of British subjects, who could only be entitled to be 
placed on the same footing as Belgian subjects.1041  
It was the concern that a voluntary gesture will turn into a financial 
burden or a war with GB that ‘effectually stopped the matter from 
proceeding further’ and Belgium withdrew the idea of any voluntary 
compensation altogether.1042  
Latin American States were even more susceptible to pressure by 
other States and ‘have at times been compelled by the nations of Europe to 
assume a heavy liability, beyond that required by the strict rules of law, for 
injuries sustained by aliens during war’.1043 In 1877, for instance, Colombia 
passed law No 67 by which, as a matter of ‘liberality’, the State chose to 
compensate nationals and foreigners for the losses caused by the rebellion 
of 1866.1044 Later, the Colombian Government decided that foreigners 
should receive payment in the form of drafts on the custom houses while 
Colombian nationals shall receive monetary payments. Following British 
pressure to accord its nationals nondiscriminatory treatment, Colombia 
passed a new law in 1878 whereby payments to British nationals should be 
paid in cash or in documents of public credit, ‘as may be agreed upon 
between the executive power and the party interested’.1045 ‘In this incident’, 
Arias Madrid explained, ‘we find an example of the unjustifiable pressure 
 
1039 Borchard – Diplomatic Protection (n 385) 279. 
1040 Baty (n 1037) 97-8. 
1041 ibid; emphasis added. 
1042 Arias Madrid (n 1033) 743. For further similar practice (ibid, 744-45). 
1043 Borchard – Diplomatic Protection (n 385) 280. 
1044 GB, British and Foreign State Papers Vol 68 (1876-1877) (London HMSO) 776. 





that sometimes is brought to bear by the powerful states on the Central and 
South American republics’.1046  
To ‘counteract the unwarrantable claims’ of more powerful States 
that discretionary payments that were accorded to the nationals of the State 
should be extended to aliens, Latin American countries began to include in 
their FCN treaties the co-called ‘clause de non-responsabilité’.1047 
Essentially, these clauses prescribed the non-liability of the State for losses 
suffered by foreigners as a result of insurrections, strife, and like 
hostilities.1048 Arias Madrid explained the prevalence and effect of such 
practice: 
According to agreements now existing [1913], Belgium cannot demand 
compensation for her subjects injured by revolutions in Mexico and 
Venezuela. France, Holland, Sweden and Norway have bound themselves 
individually not to prosecute claims of this nature against Mexico. Germany 
and Italy have also signed treaties containing the same provision in favor 
of Colombia and Mexico. Spain will no longer claim the privilege for her 
subjects in Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Peru.1049 
While growing in popularity during the last decade of the 19th century, 
the practice on non-liability clauses also encountered significant opposition. 
The IDI, for one, considered these provisions to be ‘mischievous’, since 
‘they excuse States from the performance of their international duty to 
protect their national abroad and their duty to protect foreigners within their 
own territory’.1050 Further, Russia, Austria-Hungary, the US, and GB did not 
 
1046 Arias Madrid (n 1033) 751-52. 
1047 ibid, 755. 
1048 Eg: Article XI, France – Mexico Treaty of 1886 provided that, ‘excepte les cas dans 
lesquels il y aura faute ou manqué de surveillance de la part des autorites du pays ou de 
ses agents, ne se rendront pas reciproquement responsables pour les dommages, 
oppressions ou exactions que les nationaux de l'une viendraient a subir sur le territoire de 
l'autre en temps d'insurrection ou de guerre civile de la part des insurges ou par le fait de 
tribus ou hordes sauvages qui refusent leur obeissance au gouvernement’. (GB, British 
and Foreign State Papers Vol 77 (1885-1886) (London HMSO) 1094); Article 4, Colombia 
– Spain treaty of 1894 (reported in: P Olivart, Colección de tratados de España Vol 11 
(Madrid 1890) 64. See Arias Madrid (n 1033) 755-56 for further examples. 
1049 Arias Madrid (ibid) 755-56. 
1050 Institut De Droit International, ‘Règlement sur la responsabtltté des États a raison des 
dommages soufferts par des étrangers en cas d’émeute, d’insurrection ou de guerre civile, 
adopté par l’Institut de Droit International en séance du 10 septembre 18 1900’, Annualrs 





accept this practice. None of their FCN treaties included such non-liability 
provisions. Not only did the US not accede to this practice, it introduced 
FCN treaty clauses that prescribed national treatment with respect to war 
reparations to guarantee compensation for losses to its nationals whenever 
the host State compensated its nationals, even when such compensation 
payments were a ‘liberty or bounty, and not an indemnity’.1051 For instance, 
Article 2(3) of the Swiss-American FCN treaty instructed: 
In case of war or of expropriation for purposes of public utility, the citizens 
of one of the two countries residing or established in the other shall be 
placed upon an equal footing with the citizens of host State with respect to 
indemnities for damages they may have sustained.1052  
The cited provision ensured that Swiss individuals receive war 
reparations whenever American nationals were compensated for war 
losses for whatever extra-judicial reasons, whilst Spanish nationals or even 
other Americans were not entitled to such compensation as a matter of law. 
Thus, during the 19th century nondiscrimination obligations with respect to 
war reparations, whether in the form of a treaty provision or gunboat 
diplomacy, served powerful States to effectively guarantee a standard of 
treatment to foreigners that went beyond what was mandated by war law.  
But international war law changed in the wake of the adoption of The 
Hague Conventions and Regulations (1907) and with it changed the law on 
State responsibility for losses to foreign property owing to hostilities. 
Pertinently, and as explained in chapter 3, The Hague instruments included 
explicit qualifications on the State’s right to dispossession of property, such 
as the requirement to compensate for the taking of property for military 
needs and the prohibition on the destruction of property, unless required by 
imperative military necessity. HC-IV Article 3, in turn, instructed that a 
breach of (these) IHL rules denotes compensation. Nonetheless, internal 
 
1051 Arias Madrid (n 1033) 763-64. 






hostilities involving non-State actors were principally not treated as war and 
remained unaffected by these developments. 
To illustrate the development in international law and the prevailing 
position, it is useful to recall the materials of the 1930 Hague Conference 
on the Codification of International Law. The participating States agreed that 
the State must ‘make good damage to foreigners by the requisitioning of 
their property by its armed forces or authorities’ and, that it must ‘make good 
damage caused to foreigners by destruction of property by its armed forces 
or authorities… unless such destruction is the direct consequence of 
combat acts’.1053 These notions essentially reproduce the language of The 
Hague Regulations.1054 At the same time, as civil strife was not construed 
as war, the responsibility of the State for ‘damage done to the person or 
property of foreigners by persons engaged in insurrections or riots, or 
though mob violence’, remained contested.  
In an attempt to distil and advance a legal position on the latter point, 
governments were asked by the Codification Committee whether the State 
must compensate aliens for losses to property during internal 
disturbances.1055 Having reviewed the responses, the Committee 
concluded that ‘in principle, the replies do not admit that a State is 
responsible for damage caused to foreigners by insurgents, rioters or mob 
violence’.1056 Based on this conclusion and mindful of the practice on ex 
gratia payments, ‘a second question [was] raised in the request for 
information’. This time, States were asked ‘what is the position: Where the 
Government pays compensation for damage done in such cases to its own 
nationals or to other foreigners?’1057 Most States, while maintaining that 
there is no obligation as a matter of law to compensate for losses owing to 
 
1053 This agreement is deduced from the responses of States as submitted and summarized 
in Basis of Discussion No 21 (Rosenne (n 445) 529). See also: Conclusions Annexed to 
the Report of M Guerrero, Rapporteur of the Committee of Experts for the Progressive 
Codification of International Law, Conclusion 9 (ibid, 252-53). 
1054 See discussion in chapter 3. 
1055 Rosenne (n 445) 161-253, 529-533. 
1056 Observations on Point IX(a) and Basis of Discussion No 22 (ibid, 533). 





the referenced events, agreed that, if ‘the Government pays compensation 
to its own national or other foreigners’ then it is required to compensate 
foreigners for losses owing to insurrections, riot, or mob violence.1058 This 
position rested mostly on the notions that, ‘it is important to avoid 
discrimination… between foreigners of different nationalities’ and that 
‘foreigners are entitled at least to the same protection in respect of their 
property as afforded to nationals’.1059 
Accordingly, the Codification Committee concluded that, ‘a State 
must accord to foreigners to whom damage has been caused by persons 
taking part in an insurrection or riot or by mob violence the same indemnities 
as it accords to its own national in similar circumstances’.1060 For sake of 
convenience, the Codification Committee proposed that this conclusion ‘be 
combined in a single text’ with the consensus over the obligation to 
compensate for appropriation and destruction of property for military 
necessities.1061 And so, the prototype of modern war clauses in investment 
treaties was born. Basis of Discussion No 21 read: 
A State is not responsible for damage caused to the person or property of 
a foreigner by its armed forces or authorities […] The State must, however: 
(1) Make good damage to foreigners by the requisitioning… their property 
by its armed forces or authorities; 
(2) Make good damage caused to foreigners by destruction of property by 
its armed forces or authorities…, unless such destruction is the direct 
consequence of combat acts; 
(3) […] 
(4) Accord to foreigners to whom damage has been caused by its armed 
forces or authorities in the suppression of an insurrection, riot or other 
disturbance the same indemnities as it accords to its own nationals in 
similar circumstances.1062  
 
1058 See response by South Africa (letter of 11 December 1928; ibid, 165), Australia (letter 
of 9 June 1929; ibid, 175), Belgium (letter 12 March 1929; ibid, 181), Finland (31 October 
1928; ibid, 195), GB (letter 14 November 1928; ibid, 204), Hungary (29 October 1928; ibid, 
208), Japan (ibid, 213); Norway (ibid, 216), Holland (ibid, 223) 
1059 ibid, Vol II, 223. 
1060 Basis of Discussion No 22(b) (ibid, 538). 
1061 Observations on Point IX(b) (ibid). 





Against this backdrop, in 1959, the first-ever BIT between Germany 
and Pakistan was concluded. Article 3(3) of the Germany – Pakistan BIT 
instructed that: 
Nationals or companies of either Party who owing to war or other armed 
conflict, revolution or revolt in the territory of the other Party suffer the loss 
of investments situate there, shall be accorded treatment no less 
favourable by such other Party than the treatment that Party accords to 
persons residing within its territory and to nationals or companies of a third 
party, as regards restitution, indemnification, compensation and other 
considerations…1063  
Because the role and effect of nondiscrimination with respect to war 
reparations was traditionally circumscribed by war law, the present function 
of the PWC should also be assessed against modern IHL. Indeed, since 
1930, the law regulating the conduct of hostilities has developed to 
encompass protracted internal hostilities and conflicts involving non-State 
actors, which were traditionally left outside the scope of war law. 
Correspondingly, States that inflict damage to private foreign property 
during, say, a NIAC, are obliged to make reparation. At the same time, 
notwithstanding the developments in the law regulating the conduct of 
hostilities, the purpose and effect of instructions on nondiscrimination in war 
reparation remain unchanged. Today, as in the 18th and 19th centuries, the 
need for the repeated specification of the nondiscrimination obligation in the 
context of war compensation mostly lies with ex gratia payments.  
In a reality where war reparations are not limited to violations of 
international law and legal obligations, the PWC performs an important 
function: It effectively guarantees that the host State will be obliged to 
compensate the foreign investor whenever it pays war compensation for 
whatever legal or moral reason to its own investors or to the investors of 
third parties.1064 And this is important since it is unclear whether the general 
nondiscrimination and/or MFN treatment obligation achieves this outcome. 
In other terms, the express language of the PWC negates the debate over 
 
1063 Article 3(3) Germany – Pakistan BIT; emphasis added. 





one of the more contested questions in investment law regarding the types 
of measures or behaviors by the host State that can be called ‘treatment’ 
within the meaning of nondiscrimination obligations. Whether discretionary 
ex gratia payments are a ‘treatment’ for the purposes of the national and/or 
MFN treatment clauses or not, the PWC mandates nondiscrimination.  
At the same time, the conclusion from the previous paragraph raises 
the concern that the PWC will effectively de-incentivize States from making 
ex gratia payments, a desired practice that assists those who suffer losses 
in the context of hostilities to reconstruct their lives, so as to avoid 
compensation claims by foreign nationals who demand ‘to be placed on the 
same footing’.1065 However, this concern is easily resolved with appropriate 
treaty language. States that wish to exclude certain special or national 
reparation programs from the nondiscrimination obligation of the war clause 
can carve-out these programs. Such is the case, for instance, with the 9/11 
compensation programs, which are carved-out of US treaties and their 
nondiscrimination obligations.1066  
 Two more remarks are required regarding the interaction between 
the nondiscrimination and/or MFN treatment provision and the PWC. First, 
the nondiscrimination standard of the PWC assumes relevance when the 
investment treaty contains a security exception. For instance, a security 
exception may guarantee that a host State will not violate the investment 
treaty when it restricts the activities of an investor or imposes special 
reporting requirements on his investments due to security concerns 
regarding, say, his State of nationality or country of residence.1067 However, 
the security exception does not seem to allow derogation from the specific 
nondiscrimination obligation of the PWC.  
UNCTAD explained in this respect that, since the PWC establishes 
obligations ‘expressly in a situation where the national security is at stake, 
 
1065 Baty (n 1037) 97-8; Arias Madrid (n 1033) 743. 
1066 Eg: Article 5(4), 2004 US Model BIT, Article 5(4), 2012 US Model BIT. The aim of these 
provisions was addressed by Vandevelde – US investment agreements (n 703) 435-36.  





it would be contradictory to dispense the parties from their fulfilment for 
national security reasons’.1068 Thus, subject to treaty language to the 
contrary, a State cannot refuse to offer foreign investors the same war 
reparations it offers its nationals or investors of third parties under the 
pretense that such payments were made as an exceptional measure for the 
protection of essential security interests and as such, these payments are 
exempted from the PWC.1069  
That the PWC remains unaffected by the invocation of the security 
exception is supported by a growing trend in treaty drafting practice 
whereby States explicitly carve-out war clauses from the scope of the 
security exception. For instance, Article 19 of the 2015 Japan – Ukraine BIT 
provides that, ‘notwithstanding any other provisions in this Agreement other 
than the provisions of [the PWC], each Contracting Party may take any 
measure which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests’.1070 Similarly, Article 12 of the 2017 Israel – Japan BIT 
instructs that, ‘neither Contracting Party shall be derogated from its 
obligation under [the PWC] by reason of its measures taken pursuant to 
paragraph 2 of Article 15’. Article 15(2), in turn, provides that, ‘subject to 
[the PWC], nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a 
Contracting Party from adopting or enforcing measures which it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests’.1071 
Having established the function of the PWC, it is necessary to 
address the spectrum of situations covered by this obligation. Typically, the 
clause enumerates a list of situations using ascertainable expressions, such 
as war, armed conflict, revolution, revolt, insurrection, or riot. Alongside this 
list, some provisions use more open-ended terms, such as ‘a state of 
 
1068 UNCTAD – Security exceptions (n 820) 112. 
1069 However, see: Vandevelde – US Investment Agreements (n 703) 433 (‘To the extent, 
however, that a host state’s payment of compensation were a measure necessary for the 
maintenance of public order or the protection of that state’s own essential security interests, 
it would be exempted from the obligations imposed by this provision’). 
1070 Articles 14 and 19, Ukraine – Japan BIT; emphasis added. See also Articles 12(1) and 
15 (2)(b)(ii), Japan – Colombia BIT; 





national emergency’ or ‘like situations’.1072 Such language indicates that the 
list of events covered by the clause is not exhaustive. Potentially, this 
means that the PWC covers not only inter-State conflicts or other modern 
forms of hostilities, and even economic and social tribulations.  
It is suggested, subject to treaty language to the contrary, that PWCs 
cover international and non-international armed conflicts as well as 
hostilities and violence that do not rise to the level of a NIAC. PWCs do not, 
however, encompass economic crises unless specified otherwise. First, the 
plain language of the provision implicitly excludes economic emergencies. 
To be covered by the clause, any ‘similar’ situation or ‘other emergency’ 
must have a certain nexus to the characteristics of the stipulated 
situations.1073 The common denominator of the enumerated emergencies 
(i.e., riots, armed conflicts, and revolts) is physical turmoil, albeit of 
potentially different scale or duration, which usually takes the form of 
violence. Put differently, the stipulated situations project onto the more 
open-ended terms,1074 leaving financial and socioeconomic crises that have 
no physical manifestations outside the scope of the provision.1075  
Second, while Sates have occasionally revised the common 
formulation of the PWC since it was first introduced to BITs in 1959 and 
have made sure to include modern challenges such as ‘terrorism’1076 and 
even non-violent emergencies like ‘natural disasters’,1077 economic 
 
1072 Eg: Article 5(1), Kazakhstan – UAE BIT (signed 8 March 2018, not in force); Article 
8(1), Brazil – Ethiopia BIT (signed 11 April 2018, singed not in force); Article 7, Singapore 
– Kazakhstan BIT (signed 21 November 2018, not in force).  
1073 Newcombe and Paradell (n 30) 173.  
1074 In RFCC v Morocco, the Tribunal was required to ascertain whether bad weather 
conditions are ‘other similar events’ that are covered by the scope of the PWC. The Tribunal 
assessed the common features and outcomes of the emergencies enumerated in the PWC 
and determined that weather conditions, even if exceptional, do not fall within the ambit of 
the provision (ICSID Case No ARB/00/06, Award, 22 December 2003, paras 55, 80-1. 
1075 BG Group v Argentina (Award) para 377; National Grid v Argentina (Award), para 250-
53; LESI v Algeria, para 175. For treaty practice see: Article 4, Israel – Belarus BIT; Article 
12, Israel – Japan BIT. 
1076 US Treaties are indicative of this fluctuation, by inserting and deleting, for eg, the 
reference to ‘terrorism’ in the provision. See: Vandevelde – US Investment Agreements (n 
703) 437.  





emergencies have not been explicitly enumerated in PWCs. It is noteworthy 
that even the Kenya – Slovakia BIT, the only treaty to reserve the State’s 
right to take any measure that ‘it considers necessary for the protection of 
its essential security interests in time of war or armed conflict, financial, 
economic, [or] social crisis’,1078 left economic and social crisis outside the 
scope of the war clause.1079 Also of note is that States that underwent 
significant financial crises in recent years, such as Argentina and Iceland, 
‘whose interests’ are thereby ‘specially affected’,1080 have not introduced 
economic emergencies into their post-crises war clauses.1081  
At the same time, the provision is not limited to ‘armed conflicts’; 
lesser forms of collective violence, such as civil unrest, riots, isolated acts 
of terrorism, or other sporadic acts of violence are explicitly covered by the 
provision. This is important, because it means that the application of the war 
clause is not conditioned by ‘classification of conflict’, i.e., the identification 
of the type of conflict to which particular hostilities amount as a matter of 
law;1082 One of the most complex questions in IHL. A related, yet separate, 
point concerns the juxtaposition of ‘war’ and ‘armed conflict’ in most PWCs 
(‘losses owing to war or armed conflict’). Since in contemporary 
international law the concept of ‘war’ is supplanted by the term ‘armed 
conflict’,1083 the stipulation of both ‘war’ and ‘armed conflict’ with the 
disjunctive ‘or’ is superfluous. Indeed, modern investment instruments have 
gradually omitted ‘war’ from the wording of the provision.1084 
 Finally, to grasp the scope of the PWC, it is necessary to resolve the 
question whether the ‘losses’ subject-matter of the provision encompass 
damage that results from State measures or only damage that is the result 
 
1078 Article 14(1), Slovakia – Kenya BIT (signed 14 December 2011, not in force). 
1079 Article 6, ibid. 
1080 North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 74. 
1081 Eg: Article 6(1), Argentina – Qatar BIT (signed 6 November 2016, not in force); Article 
5(1) Iceland – Egypt BIT. 
1082 See discussion in chapter 1. 
1083 GC CA II. 
1084 See Article 12, Israel – Japan BIT; Article 12, Iraq – Japan BIT; Article 12 Japan –





of the conduct of third parties.1085 While some practitioners are of the view 
that the PWC deals only with losses owing to the conduct of third parties,1086 
it is suggested that the PWC applies regardless of the person or entity that 
is responsible for the losses. First, there is nothing in the language of the 
clause to explicitly exclude State measures from its scope. Further, the 
historical development of the rule clarifies that it was designed to guarantee 
nondiscriminatory compensation to foreigners ‘to whom damage has been 
caused’ by the State’s ‘armed forces or authorities’ and, subject to failure to 
act in due diligence, ‘by insurgents, rioters, or mob violence’.1087  
In sum, whether the PWC guarantees national and MFN treatment 
or only MFN treatment, it does not require that compensation be paid. If, 
however, the host State pays compensation in like situations to its nationals, 
for whatever legal or moral reason, it will be required to offer such payments 
to the foreign investor. Likewise, if the State is obliged to compensate the 
investor because the ‘losses owing to armed conflict’ result from a breach 
of an investment treaty standard, or if the host State elects to make solatia 
payments to the investors, such payments must be on a nondiscriminatory 
basis.  
4. ‘Adequate’ Compensation for Requisition and Destruction of 
Property  
This section focuses on another criterion that investment treaties prescribe 
in relation to war reparations: The standard of ‘adequate compensation’ for 
losses owing to destruction and appropriation of property.  
As explained in chapter 3, some investment instruments, including 
the instruments of conflict-ridden States1088 add to the relative obligation of 
the PWC an absolute right to compensation under certain circumstances 
 
1085 This was the position of the investor in National Grid v Argentina (Award) para 217.  
1086 G Bottini, ‘Reflections on the origins and evolution of war and civil disturbance clauses’, 
ESIL – SEDI Colloquium International Investment Law & the Law of Armed Conflict 
(Athens, 5-6 October 2017). 
1087 Rosenne (n 445) 529-30; J Goebel, ‘The International Responsibility of States for 
Injuries Sustained by Aliens on Account of Mob Violence, Insurrections and Civil Wars’ 
(1914) 8(4) AJIL 802, 813-14, 830-45.  





(‘extended war clauses’ (‘EWC’)).1089 For instance, Article 4 of the Israel – 
Ukraine BIT reads:  
1. Investors of the Home Contracting Party whose investments in the 
territory of the Host Contracting Party suffer losses owing to war or other 
armed conflict… shall be accorded by the Host Contracting Party 
treatment, as regards restitution, indemnification, compensation or other 
settlement, not less favourable than that which the Host Contracting Party 
accords to its own investors or to investors of any third state… 
(2) …Investors of the Home Contracting Party who suffer losses in the 
territory of the Host Contracting Party, resulting from:  
(a) requisitioning of their property by the State authorities of the Host 
Contracting party 
(b) destruction of their property by the State authorities of the Host 
Contracting Party, which was not caused in combat action or was not 
required by the necessity of the situation,  
shall be accorded restitution or adequate compensation...1090 
Chapter 3 suggested that aside from secondary rules on 
remedies,1091 the EWC prescribes primary rules on the treatment of foreign 
property in armed conflict. First, the EWC includes a pronouncement of the 
State’s right to appropriate private property in armed conflict subject to 
certain qualifications. Second, the EWC codifies the customary prohibition 
on the destruction of private property unless when required by ‘the necessity 
of war’. Finally, the provision goes on to instruct that the addressed 
conducts denote ‘adequate’ compensation. As the former two elements of 
the EWC were addressed in Chapter 3, this section focuses on the meaning 
and scope of the requirement to accord ‘adequate compensation’. 
First, the common construction of the EWC suggests that the 
obligation to accord ‘adequate’ compensation modifies both the rule on 
lawful requisition and the consequences for unlawful destruction of foreign 
property. In almost every instance, the EWC comprises two sub-paragraphs 
that deal with requisition and destruction of property, respectively, which are 
 
1089 According to UNCTAD, over 1000 instruments contain EWC. 
1090 Article 4, Israel – Ukraine BIT; emphasis added. 
1091 EWCs are often titled ‘compensation for losses’ in treaties. Eg: Article 4, Angola – UK 
BIT (signed 7 July 2000, not in force); Article 5, Libya – Croatia BIT; Article 5, Libya – 





followed by a separate, and final, sentence that requires the States to 
accord ‘adequate compensation’.1092 The placement of the language ‘shall 
be accorded adequate compensation’ (and like formulations) in a separate 
sentence below both sub-paragraphs demonstrates that it modifies both 
conducts. This is the logical consequence of the two-fold use of the phrase, 
which acts as part of the primary or secondary rule depending on the sub-
paragraph to which it relates.1093 
A related, separate question concerns the meaning of the yardstick 
‘adequate compensation’. Given that most investment instruments include 
an obligation to pay ‘adequate compensation’ against expropriation, the 
interpretive question here is whether the expression ‘adequate 
compensation’ in the EWC is effectively a cross-reference to the 
expropriation provision and thus entails the FMV of the destroyed or 
appropriated property at the relevant time? Or, is ‘adequate’ also informed 
by IHL-considerations, namely the obligation to accord ‘adequate’ 
compensation under Principles 15 and 20 of the Basic Principles on the 
Right to Reparations, and if so, what would be the practical effect of that? 
Since this is essentially a question of treaty interpretation, the 
response to it ought to arise, in the first place, from the language of the EWC 
and its ordinary meaning in context. To the end, it is useful to compare the 
language of the expropriation provision and the EWC, within the same 
instrument. But this exercise does not yield a clear result.  
Some American treaties explicitly cross-reference the compensation 
standard under the EWC with the expropriation clause. Article 4 of the US 
– DRC BIT, for instance, instructs that, ‘the national or company shall be 
accorded restitution or compensation in accordance with Article III’ for 
damages resulting from requisition or destruction of property. Article III, in 
turn, mandates that ‘compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market 
 
1092 Eg: Article 5, Austria – Libya BIT; Article 5(5), US – Rwanda BIT; Article 7(2), Syria – 
Azerbaijan BIT; Article 9, Nigeria – Morocco BIT (signed 3 December 2016, not in force). 





value of the expropriated investment’.1094 Modern Austrian treaties1095 and 
some Swiss instruments1096 follow a similar practice. Such treaty language 
leaves no room for doubt that compensation for losses owing to armed 
conflict under the EWC shall be equivalent to the FMV of the investment 
before it was requisitioned or destructed. 
A different category of treaties may be said to articulate the linkage 
between the expropriation provision and the EWC implicitly. For instance, 
Article 5 of the Albania – Cyprus BIT prescribes ‘prompt, adequate, and 
effective’ compensation for expropriation, explaining that ‘[s]uch 
compensation shall amount to the fair market value of the investment’.1097 
The subsequent Article 6, the EWC, prescribes ‘prompt, adequate, and 
effective’ compensation for requisition and destruction of foreign 
investments in armed conflict. Arguably, the use of the exact same 
language in two adjacent provisions, in the context of compensation, within 
the same treaty, establishes, in the aggregate, that the parties intended to 
award the trinity ‘prompt, adequate, and effective’ a single meaning: FMV. 
Yet another group of treaties uses drafting that demonstrates an 
intention to account for considerations that go beyond the FMV standard in 
the assessment of compensation under the EWC. For instance, the 
Azerbaijan – Syria BIT requires that compensation for requisition and 
destruction of property shall be ‘adequate compensation in the light of the 
particular circumstances.’1098 Thus, even if ‘adequate’ is used in the EWC 
to reference FMV, the language ‘in light of the particular circumstance’ not 
 
1094 Articles 3-4, US – DRC BIT. See also: Article 3(2), OECD, The Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment: The MAI Negotiating Text as of 24 April 1998, DAFFE/MAI/NM(98)2/REV1; 
Article 5(5), 2004 US Model BIT and Article 5(5), 2012 US Model BIT. 
1095 Articles 4-5, Austria – Libya BIT. See also: Articles 4-5, Austria – Oman BIT; Article 5-
6, Austria – Uzbekistan BIT; Articles 5-6, Austria – Lebanon BIT; Articles 5-6, Austria – 
Georgia BIT. 
1096 Eg: Article 7, Switzerland – Tunisia BIT. 
1097 Articles 5-6, Albania – Cyprus BIT (‘prompt, adequate, and effective’); Article 5-6, 
Albania –  San Marino BIT; Article 8-9, Nigeria – Morocco BIT (‘adequate compensation’); 
Articles 4-5, Israel – Ukraine BIT (‘adequate compensation’); Articles 5,7, Libya – Croatia 
BIT (‘adequate compensation’); Articles 5-6, Pakistan – Bahrain BIT (‘prompt, adequate, 
and effective’). 





only allows, but requires, the tribunal to adjust FMV to the prevailing reality 
of hostilities. Similarly, the EWC in the US – Australia FTA provides that, 
‘any compensation shall be prompt, adequate, and effective in accordance 
with [the expropriation provision], mutatis mutandis.1099 This wording 
mandates the application of FMV subject to the necessary alternations as 
required by the situation of hostilities. 
At the same time, many investment instruments point to no nexus 
between the standards of reparation. For instance, while Article 6 of the 
Angola – South Africa BIT includes a clear stipulation that expropriation 
denotes FMV compensation, the EWC instructs that ‘compensation shall be 
paid’ referencing no standard.1100 With such treaties it cannot be 
presupposed that the States intended to assess compensation for, say, 
destruction of property during hostilities at a scale that is close, or equal to, 
the FMV of the investment right before its destruction.  
The 2018 Singapore – Kazakhstan BIT is also indicative. Article 6 
prescribes ‘adequate’ compensation, which ‘shall be equivalent’ to FMV, 
against expropriation. The subsequent Article 7, the EWC, prescribed 
compensation for losses owing to destruction and requisition ‘as 
appropriate for such loss’.1101 There is nothing in this language to 
demonstrate an intention to incorporate implicitly or explicitly the FMV 
standard of the expropriation provision; certainly so if it is also considered 
that Article 7 instructs that, ‘compensation shall be made…in accordance 
with Article 8 (Transfers) of this Agreement’, but it does not cross-reference 
Article 6 (expropriation) in a like manner.1102 
It follows that a sweeping conclusion that the adjective ‘adequate’ in 
the EWC necessarily means FMV in all instances cannot be reached. 
Nonetheless, it might still be argued that States aspire for unity with respect 
to the standard of compensation for lawfully appropriated property, whether 
 
1099 Articles 11.6 and 11.7.2-4, US –Australia FTA. 
1100 Articles 5-6, Angola – South Africa BIT. 
1101 Articles 6-7, Singapore – Kazakhstan BIT. 





during peace or war, and that the use of the same adjectives (‘adequate’) 
is indicative of the intention to assess losses against the FMV benchmark. 
This contention however is not convincing. At its highest it justifies the 
application of the FMV standard only for lawful takings in armed conflict. It 
does not however explain why FMV applies to compensation for unlawful 
appropriation and destruction of property.   
In fact, the differences between expropriation in peacetime and 
appropriation in armed conflict justify a context-based assessment of what 
are ‘adequate’ payments under the EWC that is not limited to FMV. As 
explained in chapter 3, while expropriation may be grounded in various 
kinds of public purpose, takings in armed conflict are lawful only for military 
needs. Additionally, in contrast to expropriation, IHL places limitations on 
the types of property that may be lawfully appropriated for military needs 
during hostilities. Further, unlike expropriation, dispossession of property in 
armed conflict is not conditioned upon compliance with due process. Seeing 
as expropriation differs from other forms of appropriation in hostilities in 
most qualifications, it is logical that the assessment of ‘adequate’ payments 
for such takings will too differ.  
What then is the compensation standard represented by the treaty 
language ‘adequate’ and where would the interpreter find its meaning 
outside the expropriation provision that contextualizes the EWC? The 
response is primarily found in the VCLT, which instructs that ‘together with 
the context’, the interpretation of the ‘adequate compensation’ under the 
EWC will also be informed by ‘any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties.’1103 Indeed, investment 
tribunals have invoked VCLT Article 31(3)(c) when assessing reparation. 
For instance, in his separate opinion in CME v Czech Republic Brownlie 
stated in relation to compensation that, ‘in case the treaty provisions are not 
 





in themselves clear, the Vienna Convention justifies reference to the 
position in general international law’.1104 
Relevantly, IHL prescribes ‘adequate’ compensation for war 
reparation, with the Basic Principles on the Right to Reparation elucidating 
that ‘adequate’ compensation ‘should be proportional to the gravity of the 
violations and the harm suffered’ (Principle 15).1105 Principle 20 instructs:   
20. Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable 
damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and 
the circumstances of each case, … such as: 
(a) Physical or mental harm; 
(b) Lost opportunities, including employment, education and social 
benefits; 
(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning 
potential; 
(d) Moral damage; 
(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical 
services, and psychological and social services.1106 
But the Basic Principles on the Right to Reparation should be treated 
with care. To be taken into account in the interpretation of the EWC, the 
Basic Principles ought to pass the admissibility hurdles of VCLT Article 
31(3)(c), including the requirement that the instrument be a ‘rule of 
international law’.1107 The notion of ‘rules’ implies that ‘binding’ instruments, 
such as treaties, customary law, and general principles of law, are 
admissible while acts of international organizations, such as the UNCHR, 
and their implementation by other specialized bodies are left out.1108  
In fact, when the Basic Principles were adopted by the UNGA, 
several States argued that they were not legally binding. On this point, they 
relied on the seventh preambular recital that stipulates that the Principles 
do not entail new international legal obligations but identify mechanisms for 
the implementation of existing legal obligations under international human 
 
1104 CME v Czech Republic, para 309. 
1105 Principle 15, Basic Principles on the Right to Reparation. 
1106 Principle 20, Basic Principles. 
1107 For an analysis of the other admissibility hurdles, see discussion in chapters 3 and 5. 





rights law and IHL.1109 But the argument actually yields an opposite 
conclusion. Indeed, the Principles are not intended to create new or 
additional obligations. This is because they are ‘declaratory of legal 
standards in the area of victims’ rights’ and were meant to ‘to serve as a 
tool, a guiding instrument for States in devising and implementing victim-
oriented policies and programmes’, as Van Boven, who drafted the 
Principles, explained. 1110  
Even if the Basic Principles do not reflect customary law, they may 
still be construed as a ‘rule’ in the sense of VCLT Article 31(3)(c), since in 
practice, international tribunals have exhibited readiness to ‘apply this 
condition somewhat less restrictively.’1111 For instance, in the interpretation 
of the ECHR, the ECtHR considered UNSC resolutions, recommendations 
and resolutions of the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary 
Assembly or reports by various independent commissions, the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, and Guidelines and ‘Conclusions’ published 
by the UN High Commissioner on Refugees.1112 Similarly, the jurisprudence 
of investment tribunals demonstrates an inclination to read the ‘rule’ 
condition of VCLT Article 31(3)(c) to include ‘soft’ concepts such as 
separability and rules on evidence and procedure.1113 Wälde and 
Weeramantry suggested in this respect that the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts may be considered as ‘rules of 
international law’ in the sense of VCLT Article 31(3)(c).1114  
Hence, although the Basic Principles on the Right to Reparation are 
not a treaty and even if Principles 15 and 20 are not considered as 
 
1109 Preamble, Basic Principles on the Right to Reparations. For a description of the 
adoption process see (n 951). 
1110 Van Boven (n 951) 32.  
1111 Dörr (n 456) 564. 
1112 Eg: Demir and Baykara v Turkey [GC] Merits and just satisfaction, App No 34503/97, 
(2009), paras 74–75; Bayatyan v Armenia [GC] App No 23459/03, Judgment (2011), para 
107; Al-Adsani v UK [GC] App No 35763/97 Judgment (2001), para 60.  
1113 Eg: Plama v Bulgaria, Jurisdiction, para 212 (while not citing the VCLT, these Tribunal 
referenced the ‘nowadays generally accepted principle of the separability (autonomy) of 
the arbitration clause’ in the interpretation of the MFN clause). 





customary, their meaning of ‘adequate compensation’ may nonetheless be 
taken into account in the assessment of what are ‘adequate’ compensation 
under the EWC. Indeed, the Basic Principles have been consistently 
referred to or invoked by domestic and international fora as a source of 
reference when faced with issues of victims’ rights and reparations, even 
before they received final approval by the UNGA.1115 
Further, supplementary means of interpretation support an IHL-
informed reading of ‘adequate compensation’ in the context of the EWC. As 
explained, the language of the EWC is traced verbatim to the above cited 
Basis 21 of the Hague Conference. Basis 21, in turn, sought to codify the 
customary rules on the treatment of private property during war, as reflected 
in The Hague Law in the context of State responsibility for losses to foreign 
nationals. If the EWC essentially incorporates primary IHL rules, and 
chapter 3 suggested that it does, then it is only logical that, correspondingly, 
the standards of reparation for the violation of these said rules will also be 
informed by IHL.1116 
Of course, even if parts of the EWC incorporate customary 
international law on the treatment of private property in hostilities, it may be 
that by using the language ‘adequate compensation’, which is characteristic 
of FMV in investment treaties, States intended to award the qualifier a 
special, expropriation – rather than IHL – oriented, meaning. However, if the 
ordinary meaning of the language of the EWC is a reference to customary 
IHL (as suggested), then to preclude this reference only for the last 
sentence of the EWC and to provide only the language ‘adequate 
compensation’ a special non-IHL meaning, it ought to be ‘established that 
the parties so intended’.1117 However, there is nothing to support such an 
intention. And so, absent explicit language to the contrary, it cannot be 
presumed that by prescribing ‘adequate compensation’ for dispossession 
 
1115 See (n 974) and the authorities mentioned there. 
1116 On the correlation between the primary rules and the remedies for their breach, see: 
Ratner (n 361) 23-6. 





of property in armed conflict, States wished to create a special regime of 
reparation for violations of war law that is detached from customary IHL.  
  It should be clarified that by suggesting an IHL-oriented meaning of 
‘adequate compensation’, the argument does not propose to supplant the 
treaty language of the EWC with the Basic Principles on the Right to 
Reparation. Rather, it is suggested that investment tribunals ought not to 
take lightly the differentiations that States make between the expropriation 
provision and the EWC and should not assume that the ostensible similarity, 
where it exists, between these clauses suffices to ‘automatically’ read FMV 
into the EWC.1118 Likewise, the apparent resemblance between the 
language of the EWC and that of the Basic Principles (‘adequate 
compensation’) should not be overstated. It is highly unlikely, put mildly, that 
States intend to incorporate the Basic Principles on the Right to Reparation 
in their investment treaties by using the adjective ‘adequate’.  
By taking the IHL standard into account in assessing what is 
‘adequate’ compensation under the EWC the interpreter must look beyond 
the FMV of the investment at the time of the injuring measure, and rather 
assess the ‘adequacy’ of the compensation in proportion to the gravity of 
the violation and the circumstances of each case, including the State’s 
resources, abilities, concomitant international obligations, and the severity 
of the violation. Granted, accounting for these considerations does not yield 
a clear valuation methodology, but ‘it helps in avoiding unlikely or absurd 
conclusions’ that may lead to the award of unreasonable compensation.1119 
In turn, preventing absurd awards is important for maintaining (and 
restoring) the legitimacy of the regime. 
  
 
1118 D Desierto, ‘The Outer Limits of Adequate Reparations for Breaches of Non-
Expropriation Investment Treaty Provisions: Choice and Proportionality in Chorzów’ (2017) 
55 Colombia Journal of Transnational Law 395, 426. 





5. War Reparations in Investment Arbitration: FMV and IHL-
Considerations  
Having outlined the main aspects of the obligation to pay war reparations 
under IHL and investment law, this section hones in on the assessment of 
compensation in investment arbitration for losses to property owing to 
armed conflict. Accordingly, the analysis briefly lays out the bases of liability 
capable of giving rise to a cause-of-action in international investment 
arbitration concerning the conduct of the State in armed conflict. Next, the 
section outlines the approach that investment tribunals have adopted in 
such instances and its impediments. Finally, it is proposed that the 
occurrence of armed conflict is a circumstance that affects the assessment 
of damages for war losses in investment arbitration and suggest the 
possible doctrinal ways to account for it.  
Overall, this section proposes that investment tribunals ought to 
adopt a nuanced approach to the assessment of compensation for losses 
to the investor’s property in the context of armed conflict that goes beyond 
the existing expropriation-oriented methodology. Well-reasoned awards 
that take armed conflicts and the law regulating armed conflict, IHL, into 
consideration in the assessment of war reparations not only prevent 
crippling and unreasonable burdens on the limited budget of the war-torn 
host State, but they also contribute to the acceptance of arbitral decisions 
by the disputing parties and more widely.  
As a preliminary to the discussion below, it should be stressed that 
this discussion does not presume to offer a formula for the assessment of 
war reparations in international law that is to be applied across doctrinal 
areas. This examination does not aim at, nor is it predicated on, the notion 
of unity of remedies. On the contrary, the following analysis assumes that 
different institutions have adopted distinct approaches to the award of 
reparations for violations of international law in the context of hostilities. This 
is only logical given that ad hoc tribunals, regional human rights bodies, 





institutional rules, aim at different purposes, apply specific fields of 
international law, and adopt distinct procedures. Mindful of these 
differences, proposing uniformity of remedies for its own sake risks ignoring 
regime specific goals thereby leading to incorrect outcomes.1120  
Normally, investment claims that arise out of, or in relation to, armed 
conflict concern losses owing to the appropriation or destruction of the 
investor’s property. In practice, the investor’s property may be destroyed as 
a result of the State’s breach of the FPS obligation by failing to take 
precautionary measures in and against attack. If the investor’s property is 
destroyed because the State’s armed forces failed to take precautions in 
their attack against the adversary, the consequences of this FPS breach will 
be covered by the EWC that prescribes ‘adequate’ compensation for 
destruction that was caused by the State’s ‘authorities’. However, if the 
property is destroyed by the adversary, and the State’s authorities failed to 
take feasible precautions to protect the property from the adversary’s attack, 
the consequences of this breach of FPS will not covered by the EWC, which 
does not encompass conduct of third parties. 
Additionally, the obligations of the war clauses themselves may be 
breached. If, for instance, the State refuses to grant foreign investors 
compensation for losses owing to hostilities at a similar scale or at the same 
form as it grants its domestic investors or the investors of third parties in like 
situations, this State likely breaches the PWC. Similarly, if the investor’s 
property was destroyed by the State’s armed forces wantonly (i.e., 
destruction that is not required by military necessity) and the State blatantly 
refuses to accord to the investor ‘adequate compensation’, or any 
reparation for that matter, it is likely breaching the EWC.  
How to assess compensation for the above cases is not clear since 
like most investment treaty standards, war clauses and the FPS provision 
are silent with respect to the consequences of their violation. Historically, 
 





because most investment disputes arose with regards to expropriation, the 
assessment of damages in investment arbitration developed as an 
expropriation-oriented exercise. However, in a growing number of recent 
disputes claimants have sought, and tribunals have awarded, 
compensation for damage arising out of State conduct other than 
expropriation, that constitutes a breach of investment treaty standards, such 
as FET, FPS, ‘umbrella clauses’, and national treatment and/or MFN 
treatment. Hence, some guidance on this point may be found in the practice 
of investment tribunals that routinely deal with reparations for non-
expropriation standards. 
Arbitral tribunals that were confronted with non-expropriation 
violations have typically referred to the customary rules on the award of 
reparations as reflected in ARSIWA,1121 which require ‘full reparation’ for 
damage resulting from an internationally wrongful act, including in the form 
of compensation that shall cover ‘any financially assessable damage’1122 
and to the dictum of the PCIJ in the Chorzów Factory judgment, whereby 
reparation must as far as possible ‘wipe-out all the consequences of the 
wrongful act’ and ‘re-establish the situation’ which would have existed if the 
wrongful act would have not been committed.1123 The application of these 
authorities to non-expropriation cases mostly led tribunals to maintain that 
the investors should be fully compensated for their losses.1124  
But stating that the compensation ought to be ‘full’ does not quite 
explain how to measure any such compensation. It is on this point that 
investment tribunals usually collapse back into an expropriation-dominated 
thinking that focuses mostly, if not only, on the FMV of the affected property. 
In other terms, tribunals reflexively cite the Chorzów Factory 
pronouncement on full reparation and proceed to use the FMV-treaty 
 
1121 Eg: SD Myers v Canada, paras 309-311. 
1122 Articles 31 and 36, ARSIWA. 
1123 Chorzów Factory, 47. 
1124 For a review of case law, see: S Ripinsky, ‘Assessing damages in investment disputes: 





standard for lawful expropriation to assess ‘full compensation’ for non-
expropriation violations.1125  
Pertinently, investment tribunals that were faced with disputes that 
arose out of, or in relation to, the destruction of property, assessed 
compensation by focusing on the market value of the investment lost.1126 In 
AAPL v Sri Lanka, for example, the Tribunal found that the destruction of 
the investment resulted from the State’s failure to take precautions in favour 
of the investment during a counter-insurgency operation against the LTTE, 
in breach of the FPS standard. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the 
amount of awarded compensation ought to reflect ‘the full value of the 
investment lost’.1127 This approach may be explained by the fact that in such 
cases the non-expropriation violation results in effects tantamount to the 
total dispossession of the investment or to significant diminution in the value 
of the investment, 
However, assessing compensation in the context of armed conflict 
through the prism of FMV, and it alone, is problematic. FMV is not 
synonymous with the notions of ‘full reparation’, ‘adequate remedy’, or 
‘adequate compensation’, as the ICJ emphasized in Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v US).1128  There, the Court explained that ‘the 
general principle on the legal consequences of the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act’, as articulated in the Chorzów Factory case, ‘is 
that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation 
in an adequate form’. As for ‘what constitutes ‘reparation in an adequate 
form’’, the Court stressed that the notion of wiping-out the consequences of 
the wrongful act denotes a contextual assessment of the adequacy of 
reparations, through the examination of the actual violation and its 
characterization on the one hand, and the full scope of the resulting injury, 
 
1125 See authorities in (n 923). 
1126 Ripinsky - Practice in search of perfect (n 1124) 6. 
1127 AAPL v Sri Lanka, paras 67, 88-96. In AMT v Zaire, the Tribunal held that it is necessary 
‘to assess the true value or the actual market value of the properties destroyed, or the loss 
suffered by AMT’ (para 7.13). 





on the other.1129 Hence, under customary law, ‘adequate remedy’ or ‘full 
reparation’ for violations of, say, FPS in the context of armed conflict do not 
require providing the aggravated investor with FMV of the investment 
immediately before its dispossession or destruction. Rather, international 
law mandates considering the broader normative and factual reality in which 
the violation occurred.1130  
Further, a methodology that assesses damages and compensation 
in the context of hostilities based on the value of the investment alone risks 
over-compensation. In armed conflict, it may be difficult to ascertain whether 
the diminution in the value of the investment occurred solely as a result of 
the State’s wrongful act (eg: failure to take precautions in favor of the 
investment in the face of an attack) or also by the reality of armed conflict 
that affects the state of the market, the value of assets, and, in itself, is 
damaging to property.1131 In other terms, the existence of hostilities, in and 
of itself, entails adverse implications (and losses) on the entire civilian 
population. A certain amount of these implications and losses must be 
absorbed by each affected individual, including the foreign investors.1132 
Investment tribunals often account for several factors capable of 
reducing compensation, such as contributory fault and the investor’s risk. 
Contributory fault relates to the broader notion of causation by proposing 
that the acts or omissions of the injured party have played a role in the 
 
1129 ibid, para 119, citing Chorzow Factory (Jurisdiction), 21; Desierto (n 1118) 402. 
1130 Ripinsky – Practice in search of perfect (n 1124) 4-6. 
1131 This concern was somewhat addressed in CMS v Argentina (Award) para 3. But, see: 
BG v Argentina (Award), paras 438-444, where the Tribunal did not seem to consider that 
the diminution in value may also stem from the economic crisis in Argentina for which the 
State is not responsible. See further: Ripinsky (ibid) 7.  
1132 This notion is well-established under IHL. Since IHL does not deal with the lawfulness 
of the hostilities as such, but with their regulation, the occurrence of the armed conflict, as 
such, is outside the scope of IHL. What this means is that, IHL confers rights upon 
individuals to be protected from certain conducts during war, but IHL does not grant 
individuals a right to peace. Likewise, IHL does not protect persons against stresses and 
tensions that are the ‘normal’ consequences of air strikes and land operations unless where 






ultimate damage suffered.1133 The concept of contributory fault, in turn, is 
linked with notions of inadequate risk assessment and/or the voluntary 
assumption of risk. As for risk, it forms part and parcel of any economic 
endeavor including investment abroad. Essentially, the notion of risk relates 
to the possibility that future occurrences will adversely affect anticipated 
financial gains.1134 Accordingly, vigilant investors are expected to, and do in 
fact, research the investment climate in the designated host State and 
asses the risks of investing there so as to locate the potential sources of 
risk and project the probability of losses, before making the investment 
abroad.1135 
In practice, investment tribunals have reduced the awarded 
compensation when the investor conducted an inadequate risk assessment 
and when the investor assumed risk voluntarily. This practice is essentially 
grounded in the idea that the State should not be held liable for losses that 
were produced, in whole or in part, by the investor’s poor business 
judgment.1136 If the risks that materialized and led to losses were known to 
the investor and voluntarily assumed by him, they should be reduced from 
the awarded compensation, for ‘it would be unjust to attribute the whole of 
the loss to a governmental action’.1137  
Ripinsky takes the notion of compensation-reducing elements one 
step further. He suggests that compensation should be reduced even if the 
risk of a particular event was ‘unforeseeable and beyond the investor’s 
control, was not a result of flawed business judgment, and assumption of 
 
1133 Article 39, ARSIWA. See eg: MTD v Chile (Award), paras 239-43; MTD v Chile, ICSID 
Case No ARB/01/7, Decision on Annulment, 21 March 2007, para 101. 
1134 See further in: A Komarov, ‘Mitigation of Damages’, in Y Derains and R Kreindler (eds) 
Evaluation of Damages in International Arbitration (ICC, Paris, 2006), 37-56; Y Taniguchi, 
‘The Obligation to Mitigate Damages’, in ibid, 79-99; Ripinsky – Practice in search of perfect 
(n 1124) 18-9. 
1135 LD Howell, ‘Evaluating political risk forecasting models: What works?’ (2014) 56(4) 
Thunderbird International Business Review 305-16; Oscar Chinn (UK v Belgium), 
Judgment [1934] PCIJ Rep, Ser A/B, No 63, 65. 
1136 Eg: Azurix v Argentina (Award), paras 424-29; Biwater v Tanzania, paras 789-792. 





the risk did not constitute contributory fault on the part of the investor’.1138 
Arguably, the AMT v Zaire Award supports this suggestion. There, the 
Tribunal held that, ‘it would neither be practical nor reasonable to apply the 
method of assessment of compensation in a way so far removed from the 
striking realities’ of the prevailing volatile political climate in the State.1139 In 
so doing, the Tribunal arguably accounted for the investor’s own choice to 
operate in Zaire.  
But such a view is not without flaws in the reality of hostilities. While 
it is true that the obligation to absorb some costs of the hostilities arises 
from the investor’s business risk,1140 this notion should not be applied too 
expansively lest investment tribunals set a policy that effectively 
disincentivizes investment inflows into conflict-ridden States, thereby 
frustrating post-conflict reconstruction, which often depends in great part on 
the inflows of foreign capital. Tribunals should be careful not to effectively 
‘penalize’ investors for investing in war-torn countries.  
For instance, making an investment in gas exploration in the east-
Mediterranean basin off-shore Israel is not, in and of itself, a compensation-
reducing element just by virtue of Israel’s geopolitical history. Nor can it be 
said that carefully planned and heavily guarded exploration activities by 
ExxonMobil in contested waters offshore Cyprus or by ENI in contested 
waters offshore Turkey,1141 necessarily evidence poor risk assessment just 
for being conducted. In contrast, making an investment in arms and 
munition in the western countryside of Damascus during the civil war in 
Syria and the coalition operations against Daesh, in an attempt to profit from 
 
1138 ibid. 
1139 AMT v Zaire, paras 7.14-7.15. 
1140 S Ripinsky, ‘Damages assessment in the Spanish renewable energy arbitrations: First 
awards and alternative compensation approach proposal (2018) TDM, 12. 
1141 Z Weise, ‘Med natural gas find brings conflict dividends’ (Politico, 3 June 2018) 
<https://www.politico.eu/article/natural-gas-mediterranean-cyprus-turkey-more-gas-more-
problems/>; Daily Sabah, ‘US Navy denies reports of bolstering East Med presence to 
guard Exxon Mobil exploration off Cyprus (Daily Sabah 9 June 2018) 
<https://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2018/03/08/us-navy-denies-reports-of-bolstering-






the sale of arms to the belligerents, may-well be construed as a voluntary 
assumption of risk. Likewise, the decision to invest in a conflict-area in 
Afghanistan is not, of itself, indicative of poor business judgment insofar as 
the investor and the State allocate risks and responsibilities for the security 
of the project in advance and take proper arrangements and precautions. 
However, poor business judgment is likely present in instances when 
American investors make no security arrangements, relaying on investment 
treaties and the support of the State, while ignoring consistent official 
warnings by the State Department that:  
Anti-government and political violence are common and public concerns 
regarding security constrain economic activity. Security is a primary 
concern for investors. Foreign firms operating in country report spending a 
significant percentage of revenues on security infrastructure and operating 
expenses.1142 
At the same time, while the act of investing in a war-torn State, in 
and of itself, does not (and should not) reduce the award of reparations, the 
occurrence of hostilities is a circumstance that should be taken into account 
in the assessment of compensation.1143 On this point, the EECC stressed 
that, ‘the difficult economic conditions found in the affected areas of Eritrea 
and Ethiopia must be taken into account in assessing compensation 
there’.1144 The Claims Commission appears to have taken the view that the 
potentially crippling effect of a compensation payment could be considered 
in determining its quantum,1145 noting that, ‘huge awards of compensation 
by their nature would require large diversions of national resources from the 
 
1142 State Department, ‘2018 Investment Climate Statement – Afghanistan’ 
<https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm#wrappe> 
(accessed 20 June 2018). 
1143 See further: U Kriebaum, ‘The Relevance of Economic and Political Conditions for 
Protection under Investment Treaties’ (2011) 10 The Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals 383–404; M Gritsenko, ‘Relevance of the host state’s development 
status in investment treaty arbitration’ in (n 192) 341-52. 
1144 Ethiopia’s Damages Claims, para 26. 
1145 Crawford – State Responsibility (n 992) 483. However Draft Article 42(3) of ARSIWA, 
which had stated that, ‘in no case shall reparation result in depriving the population of a 
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paying country—and its citizens needing health care, education and other 
public services—to the recipient’.1146  
Considered this way, it may be said that the AMT v Zaire Tribunal 
regarded the existence of hostilities, and not the fault of the investor, when 
it stated that the ‘realities of the current situation’ in the State should be 
accounted for when determining the method of compensation, the 
compensable heads of damages, and the valuation. The Tribunal held that 
the unstable political and business environment in Zaire meant that lost 
profit and interest cannot be compensated as if the investor was operating 
‘in an ideal country where the climate of investment is very stable, such as 
Switzerland or Germany’.1147 With the aforementioned caveats, this seems 
to be a reasoned proposition.  
To recap, the occurrence of armed conflict is a circumstance that 
affects the award of compensation in various forms. It is contextualized in 
the determination of the head of damages, the causation, and valuation, 
and it can be used to cap the award in order to prevent crippling results. 
Arbitral fora have exhibited some readiness to apply such thinking, albeit in 
different contexts, noting, for instance, that the Argentine ‘crisis cannot be 
ignored and it has specific consequences on the question of reparation’1148 
and highlighting the ‘obvious and significant negative effects of the Iranian 
Revolution’ on the calculation of full compensation to injured investors.1149 
There is certainly room for such considerations in the context of armed 
conflicts. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter dealt with the obligation to adequately compensate investors 
for losses to their property owing to armed conflict. Accordingly, section 2 
outlined the compensation regime under IHL and then used the inferences 
from this analysis to ascertain the content and meaning of investment treaty 
 
1146 Ethiopia’s Damages Claims, para 21. 
1147 AMT v Zaire, para 7.14. 
1148 CMS v Argentina (Award), para 410. 





standards on compensation for losses during armed conflict. The historical 
review that was provided in this chapter demonstrates that the primary rules 
on the treatment of aliens and the consequences of their breach emanate 
from the application of contemporaneous war law. An examination of the 
materials of the 1930 Hague Conference evidences that the rules on 
dispossession and destruction of foreign property and the compensation 
thereof stem directly from war law. The materials and conclusions of the 
Hague Conference, in turn, made their way into modern investment treaties, 
where they remain to date, in the form of war clauses.  
While sections 2 through 4 dealt with the normative framework, 
section 5 addressed the consideration of the fact of hostilities in the 
assessment of damages. It was argued that the occurrence of hostilities can 
be accounted for in the determination of the head of damages, the 
causation, and valuation, and it can be used to cap the award in order to 
prevent crippling results. Overall, this chapter suggested that in their 
assessment of compensation for losses to foreign investments in the 
context of hostilities, investment tribunals should consider IHL and the 
occurrence of hostilities. This proposition is supported by the development 
of international law, it is reflected in the express treaty language of 
investment instruments, and it is desired as a matter of policy for its ability 
to prevent crippling effects on the war-torn host State, without compromising 






Chapter 8  
Conclusion 
1. The Protection of Foreign Investments in Armed Conflict   
So, what protection does international law accord foreign investments in 
armed conflict? The short answer is that ‘it depends’. Namely, ‘it’ depends 
on the specific treaty language and on the prevailing circumstances. These 
two factors inform the operation of the investment treaty during hostilities, 
the obligations of the State towards the investments, the classification of the 
investment as a civilian object or a military objective, the level of protection 
the State is required to guarantee to the investment, the extent to which the 
State’s measures vis-à-vis the investment are open to judicial review, and 
the assessment of damages. 
The longer answer was provided over 6 chapters in this study. As a 
preliminary, it was established that the outbreak of hostilities does not ipso 
facto abrogate investment treaties and their standards of protection remain 
applicable in armed conflict (chapter 2). As regards the treatment that these 
treaties prescribe, chapter 3 proposed that investment treaties contain 
primary rules on dispossession of investments in armed conflict, the EWC. 
Under these rules, the taking of private property is lawful insofar as it is 
carried out for military needs and against compensation, while the 
destruction of foreign investments in armed conflict is prohibited, unless 
required by military necessity.  
Having addressed the State’s authority to lawfully interfere with 
protected investments the thesis examined whether and when the State 
may lawfully target investments. Chapter 4 demonstrated that the complex 
situation whereby foreign investments may be classified as targets that are 
susceptible of lawful attacks for the same reasons for which investment law 
guarantees their protection is the consequence of expansive warfare 
practices coupled with investment liberalization policies. As for all other 
instances when the investment is treated as a protected object in armed 





feasible precautions to protect foreign investments under its control from 
the effects of attacks, whether the State is the author of the attack or not. 
Chapter 5 focused on the FPS standard and argued that assessment of 
compliance with this obligation ought to take into consideration all the 
prevailing circumstances in the host State, including its capacity and ability.  
 The thesis then examined whether there are international 
mechanisms that, in the reality of hostilities, exempt States from investment 
obligations that apply in armed conflict or justify or excuse the breach of 
these standards (chapter 6). It was established that while security 
exceptions and DoB clauses may be invoked in relation to security concerns 
in the context of armed conflict, these treaty mechanisms are of limited 
scope and they are open to judicial review. It was also established that while 
CPW ostensibly assume relevance in the reality of conflict, the paradigm of 
hostilities excludes the application of many CPW thereby preventing the 
State from circumventing obligations with humanitarian aspects, such as 
FPS and the war clauses. Finally, it was argued that the occurrence of 
hostilities and the law regulating the conduct of hostilities ought to inform 
the obligation to award ‘adequate’ compensation to investors for losses 
owing to armed conflict (chapter 7). 
2. IHL and Investment Law: The Big Picture  
While the research was not concerned with the relationship between the 
regimes of IHL and investment law, as such, but with the interaction of 
specific norms that regulate a given situation, an inductive reasoning 
informs four broader questions that concern these regimes: First, does IHL 
affect the interpretation and application of investment norms and if so, how? 
Second, does investment law affect the interpretation and application of IHL 
and if so, how? Third, how does IHL interact with investment law? And, 
finally, what, if anything, does the interaction between the concepts and 
laws of war and foreign investments tells of international law? 
 Does IHL affect the interpretation and application of investment 





argued that the EWC essentially incorporates, pursuant to the VCLT, 
customary rules on the treatment of private property in armed conflict. It was 
suggested that the language of this treaty standard originates from the 
Hague Law. It was also suggested that IHL rules on appropriation and 
destruction of property should be taken into account in the interpretation of 
the EWC. Then, chapter 5 dealt with the obligation to take precautions in 
favor of foreign investments. In this regard, the thesis looked at the 
interpretation and application of FPS in light of the obligation to take 
precautions under IHL. It was suggested that while both norms should be 
interpreted in harmonization, under certain circumstances these norms may 
lead to conflicting results. In such cases, the IHL obligation to take 
precautionary measures in and against the effects of hostilities may limit or 
exclude the application of FPS.  
Chapter 6 demonstrated that security exceptions in investment 
instruments were created to safeguard trade and investment policies during 
war. It was further argued that the terms ‘war’ or ‘armed conflict’ in security 
exceptions should be interpreted to encompass modern forms of hostilities, 
such as NIACs. Additionally, it was suggested that IHL curtails the range of 
available customary defenses (CPW) capable of excusing or justifying 
violations of investment standards with humanitarian aspects in armed 
conflict.  
Chapter 7 established that PWC were designed by States to create 
an obligation to compensate aliens for losses to their property in hostilities, 
where such an obligation did not arise from contemporary war law. To a 
degree, 19th century war law (and its limits) generated the need for this 
investment treaty mechanism. In a slightly different vein, it was also argued 
in chapter 7 that IHL rules on the award of war reparations should be taken 
into account as relevant rules of international law in the interpretation and 
assessment of ‘adequate’ compensation under the EWC. Additionally, it 
was suggested that the reality of armed conflict should be taken into 





and valuation of reparations, thereby affecting again the application of 
investment norms. 
‘Is it just IHL that affects investment law, or does investment law 
affect the interpretation and application of IHL?’ This question was put to 
me in my interview for the PhD program at UCL by Dr Trapp. Chapter 4 
reflects three years of thinking over her question. It established that one of 
the more prevalent, yet contentious, practices of targeting – the bombing of 
RGT – was created in the context of an inter-state investment arbitration. 
The argument that objects in certain economic sectors may be lawfully 
targeted for their ability to generate revenues and contribute to the 
development of the belligerent was born in the framework of the American 
submissions in defense against a British FPS claim arising out of the 
American Civil War. For decades, albeit unknowingly, military manuals used 
investment arbitration as a ‘precedent’ for the definition that they put forth 
for ‘military objective’. To a degree, it may be said that investment law lies 
at the core of the most fundamental principle of IHL – the distinction 
between civilian objects and military objectives.  
Furthermore, the analysis of dual-use objects and RGT through the 
prism of investment law suggested that policies on the promotion, 
facilitation, and protection of investments may be used to augment 
humanitarian considerations by offering additional counterweight against 
controversial warfare practices. In this case, it is investment law (and its 
developmental and security-building potential for host States) that calls for 
the reconsideration of the interpretation and application of API Article 52(2) 
and what qualifies as a ‘military objective’. 
The forgoing allows us to make some broader inferences and identify 
several different levels of interaction between IHL and investment law. 
Chapter 3 suggested that the EWC and the IHL rules on the appropriation 
and destruction of property are compatible in that they seem to go in the 
same direction with respect to the treatment that they prescribe for foreign 





relationship is the result of the development of the EWC from the customary 
standard of treatment of aliens in war, which, in turn, emanated from 
customary rules on dispossession and destruction of property as codified in 
the Hague instruments. Accordingly, chapter 3 suggested that interpretive 
means (namely VCLT Articles 31(1), (4) and 31(3)(c)) allow us to avoid a 
conflict (as defined in chapter 1) between investment law and IHL norms.  
By contrast, chapter 4 illustrated several potential instances of 
divergence between investment law and IHL. One such divergence arises 
when the host State loses control over the territory where a foreign 
investment is located, and that investment becomes susceptible to targeting 
because the adversary uses it to sustain its war-fighting against the host 
State. As in the examples involving mines in Afghanistan, in such cases, an 
incompatibility may exist between the State’s obligation to protect the 
investment as a host State (the investment is arguably within the 
geographical scope of the relevant treaty) and the potential authorization 
under IHL, as a belligerent, to target that same investment. Professedly, this 
situation is, per the broad definition outlined in chapter 1, a conflict.  
 Potentially, a conflict may also arise between the State’s obligation 
to guarantee the investment certain treatment as a host State (eg: 
regulatory stability or protection of reasonably-based expectations) and its 
obligation (rather than a permission) under IHL to protect the civilian 
population. Such is the case, as with the example of the American 
investment in Israel, where IHL arguably required (obliged) that the 
investment be relocated, removed, or terminated so as to protect the civilian 
population from the adverse effects from its targeting, but such measures 
are arguably a simultaneous breach of investment standards of treatment. 
This too seems to be a case of a conflict, under the broad definition set out 
in chapter 1 above. 
Further, the State’s policies and practices on investment promotion 
and targeting may collide. Thus, by way of reciprocation, when the State 





namely concerning RGT, it risks ‘inviting’ the targeting of its foreign 
investments by its adversary. As with the example of Iraq and the US, if the 
American stance that, under IHL, a party to a conflict is authorized to target 
any economic object or commercial activity that generates revenues for the 
adversary (eg: mining), then, under IHL, this is as true for the targeting of 
American investments in conflict-ridden States. But it is doubtful that the 
US, as a home State, maintains the same views that it holds as a belligerent 
that attacks economic targets abroad (often the property and operations of 
US corporations). On the contrary, as a home State, the US seeks to 
promote and protect the investments of its nationals into conflict-ridden 
States (eg: in mining) and it takes measures to secure them.  
 In the examples set out above, in contrast to what was proposed 
regarding chapter 3, the potential incompatibility cannot be avoided 
through, say, harmonious interpretation of the concept of ‘military objective’ 
and the relevant investment standard of treatment or by way of ‘interpreting 
away’ the divergence between the obligation to remove military objectives 
from civilian areas and the limitations to such measures under investment 
standards of treatment. In such cases, chapter 1 suggested that a possible 
conflict may be resolved, particularly using the lex specialis maxim.  
But it may also be that in these cases, the conflict is ‘unresolvable’ in 
that the potential incompatibilities between the norms, practices, and 
policies set out above arguably exceed the scope of conventional 
interpretation and priority rules. Arguably in these cases, the State should 
make a ‘policy call’ – a strategic decision – that gives due respect to its 
national and international policies on the promotion and protection of 
investments and its targeting policies. It was further proposed in chapter 4 
that this seems to be the way in which such tensions have, in fact, been 
resolved in the examples set out above.  
Chapter 5 suggested that the FPS standard and the IHL obligation 
to take precautions in and against attacks should, principally, be 





prescribe a relative standard of due diligence that accounts, to a degree, for 
the State’s level of development and available means. This 
complementarity stems from, and is consistent with, the development of 
international law from uniform, absolute standards that were equal, but not 
necessarily equitable, in application to relative standards that account for 
the prevailing circumstances in the host State, including its abilities and 
resources.  
However, chapter 5 demonstrated that the ambiguity in 
contemporary investment law over the content of FPS may result in a 
normative conflict (as defined in chapter 1). For instance, an apparent 
conflict may arise where a State takes certain precautions to protect the 
investment from an attack, and these measures comply with IHL, in that IHL 
does not require the State to do more or go beyond the measures it had 
adopted (or: permits the State not to take other measures), but these 
measures simultaneously breach FPS, which holds the State to a higher 
standard, requiring it to adopt additional or other measures to protect the 
same investment in the same circumstances.  
Building on the broad definition of ‘conflict’ (as set out in chapter 1), 
chapter 5 examines whether such a conflict between the two norms may be 
avoided through harmonious interpretation of FPS under the VCLT, namely 
by way of taking the IHL norms as part of the context under VCLT Article 
31(3)(c). It was suggested that in this case, interpretation does not allow us 
to avoid the conflict. Nonetheless, it was argued that the conflict can be 
resolved, namely by applying the lex specialis principle to ascertain which 
norm deals with the factual-matrix more closely and in more detail or goes 
further in the way that it deals with the situation. Notably, the discussion in 
chapter 5 and its analysis of the interpretation and application of the FPS 
standard in the context of armed conflict assists to clarify the scope and 
meaning of this standard irrespective of hostilities.  
Chapter 6 pointed to another way of reading IHL and investment law 





it was suggested that whenever a security exception in an investment treaty 
references ‘war’ or ‘armed conflict’, it encompasses modern forms of 
hostilities, including NIACs, even absent express language. This is because 
these treaty terms should be interpreted in a dynamic evolutionary manner 
in accordance with the understanding of ‘war’ and ‘armed conflicts’ at the 
time of interpretation, not the time of the conclusion of the treaty.  
It was also proposed that the scope of the security exception and its 
interaction with other treaty mechanisms, namely the EWC, should be read 
against the backdrop of IHL, the law that was created to regulate the 
conduct of hostilities, and its rationales. In this respect, an IHL-informed 
interpretation allows us to avoid absurd outcomes whereby the security 
exception in investment treaties may (effectively) allow State to commit 
grave breaches and war crimes against foreign investments, for reasons of 
‘security interests’. 
Further, chapter 6 demonstrated that the use of the DoB clause in 
the context of hostilities is also a function of the interaction of investment 
law with contemporary warfare. It was demonstrated that the limited scope 
of the DoB coupled with the fact that modern hostilities do not automatically 
trigger severance of diplomatic relations means that in practice, this 
investment treaty mechanism is of little practical use as a defense against 
investment claims relating to armed conflict. Thus, the use (or lack thereof) 
of the DoB in the context of armed conflict is consistent with the modern 
form in which hostilities are conducted.  
Chapter 7 proposed that the compensation regimes (or legal 
frameworks) under IHL and under investment arbitration are potentially 
complementary in that one regime fills-in the gaps and shortcoming of the 
other. Thus, while investment law and investment treaties are not clear on 
the nature of investor’s rights, investment treaties often provide individuals 
direct recourse to international adjudication against the State, allowing them 





in armed conflict or for the failure to take precautions to protect their 
property from attacks.  
By contrast, modern IHL seems to support the proposition that 
individuals are holders of substantive rights, but IHL does not create a 
mechanism where individuals may file claims against the State for the 
unlawful destruction or appropriation of their property in hostilities or for the 
State’s failure to take practicable and practical means to protect them from 
the effects of hostilities. In this respect, investment treaties and investment 
arbitration provide what otherwise does not exist for individuals, including 
investors, who sustain losses owing to armed conflict: adjudication.  
Additionally, chapter 7 demonstrated another level of compatibility 
between investment law mechanisms and IHL. It was proposed that the 
obligation to grant investors nondiscriminatory treatment with respect to war 
reparations, which appears today in the PWC, traditionally (i.e., prior to the 
era of the BITs and investment arbitration) served to create a legal basis for 
an obligation to compensate aliens for losses owing to war where war law 
imposed no such obligations. It was also demonstrated that the function and 
scope of the PWC is to be read against the modern reality of war reparations 
whereby such reparations are not limited to violations of international law 
and legal obligations (ex gratia payments). Thus, the IHL-informed analysis 
of the PWC assists not only to harmonize IHL and investment law norms 
and practices but also to bring further clarity to the meaning and scope of 
the PWC and to resolve the debate over the function of this provision and 
its origins.   
Moreover, consistent with the methodology of chapters 3 and 5, 
chapter 7 proposed that the notion of ‘adequate’ compensation should be 
contextualized with relevant IHL rules under VCLT Article 31(3)(c). It was 
proposed therefore, that under a VCLT-consistent interpretation of the 
EWC, to ascertain what compensation is ‘adequate’ for unlawful destruction 
or appropriation of investments in armed conflict, the interpreter is to look 





also the severity of the violation, the capacity of the State, and other 
concomitant international obligations that are incumbent upon the war-torn 
host State.  
To recap this point, the thesis set out an overall argument that the 
potential for conflict between investment law and IHL is a significant issue, 
as the two regimes (through their specific norms) may, and do in fact, 
regulate the same conduct and the same circumstances but, in some cases, 
with different objectives in mind. Nonetheless, international law mostly (but 
not entirely) has the tools to resolve any such conflict through customary 
rules of interpretation or through rules of priority. 
Finally, considered from a higher degree of abstraction, this thesis 
tells the tale of the development of international law. Namely, the historical 
review that was provided in this study demonstrates the effects of 
codification attempts in the 20th century. The primary rules on the treatment 
of aliens in war and the consequences for the breach of these norm 
coalesced through the application of war law, mostly as codified during The 
Hague Conferences, by claims commissions that were tasked with the 
assessment of reparations for losses to private foreign property during 
hostilities in Latin America and Europe. In the framework of this litigation, 
State were required to articulate their position on the law that regulated the 
treatment of foreign property in war, and they turned to war law. 
Adjudicators, then, were required to determine the governing legal position, 
which they ascertained by reference to war law. In turn, these cases 
promoted academic engagement. Over time, this resulted in a consisted 
record of authorities that delimited and crafted the standard of protection of 
aliens by using the treaty language and customary standards of war law, as 
evidenced, inter alia, in the materials of the 1930 Codification Conference. 
Eventually, this language made its way into modern investment treaties, 
where it remains to date. 
Further in this regard, it may be suggested upon reflection that the 





international law is underestimated.1150 Chapter 2 demonstrated that the 
question of war’s effect on treaties traditionally arose from, and was 
resolved in the context of, FCN treaties. These predecessors of investment 
instruments and the litigation over the compliance with their standards of 
protection catalyzed the development of the broader legal position on the 
effect of armed conflict on treaties. It may be said that early forms of 
litigation of investment instruments assisted to develop the law of treaties. 
But investment arbitration had a radiating effect not only in general 
international law but also in the contemporary law of targeting. Chapter 4 
demonstrated that some modern targeting practices, namely RGT, originate 
from early forms of investment treaty arbitration, in particular FPS claims.  
Simply put, war lies at the heart of investment law and foreign 
investments are at the core of warfare, and the encounters between the 
notions of ‘war’ and ‘foreign investment’ over the years are responsible for 
the progressive development of international investment law, IHL, and 
general international law. 
3. The Protection of Investments in Armed Conflict: From 
Unification to Fragmentation in 50 Years or Less  
Finally, it may be appropriate to use for the very first time in this thesis the 
‘F Word’ and examine what this research has to add, if anything, to the 
discussion of the fragmentation of international law.  
 ‘Fragmentation of international law’, as Pauwelyn explained, and the 
questions of harmonization and conflict that it raises as between norms and 
institutions, ‘is a reality’.1151 Fragmentation is not a new phenomenon but 
something that is ‘inherent in the architecture of international law as a 
functionally, regionally, and procedurally decentralized and diverse 
system’.1152 Indeed, this study supports the view that the proliferation of 
 
1150 Although there is a line of literature that increasingly recognizes the significance of 
investment law in the development of public international law (eg S Schill et al (eds) 
International Investment Law and History (Elgar 2018) 3-28). 






treaties, international organizations, and specialized adjudicative fora have 
heightened the challenges of fragmentation. In this regard, this thesis adds 
nothing new to the notion of fragmentation that has not already been said 
of investment law on the one hand and trade, environmental law, or human 
rights on the other. That said, this thesis does capture particular aspects of 
the causes and implications of fragmentation of international law and the 
difficulty to deal with it.  
The ILC Analytical Study on Fragmentation and Pauwelyn 
maintained that while fragmentation is a concern, it is not an irreconcilable 
complexity, since the tool-box of international law (i.e., conflict resolution 
techniques as set out above) is sufficiently flexible to assist lawyers, policy 
makers, and adjudicators to find a balance between the need for specialized 
regimes and specific solutions on the one hand, and the need to maintain 
an overall unified system of international, on the other.1153 
On this point, the ILC noted that, if ‘lawyers feel unable to deal with 
this complexity [of fragmentation], this is not a reflection of problems in their 
“tool-box” but in their imagination about how to use it’.1154 The protection of 
foreign investments in armed conflict is one instance where the problem is 
not with the tool box, but with its users. In other words, even if the gap 
between investment law and IHL, as is the case for other regimes, derives 
from the diversity of international law both in substance and procedure, the 
extent and breadth of this fragmentation is mad-made.   
  Although this research demonstrated that, in certain respects, war 
law developed investment standards of protection and that IHL and 
investment law evolved in a complementary, symbiotic manner, there is 
nothing to that effect in modern doctrine or jurisprudence of investment law 
or IHL. While IHL scholarship is mindful of the complementary and 
 
1153 ibid, para 42; ILC, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission 
‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law’ (Analytical Study) (2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, paras 
220-222. 





conflicting interaction of humanitarian law with other fields of international 
law, such as criminal law and human rights law, a link to investment law 
was never discussed.1155  
By overlooking investment jurisprudence, IHL academics neglect the 
growing body of doctrine and practice on the treatment of private property 
in hostilities and compensation thereof and the long pedigree of 
international jurisprudence that recognizes the right of the individual to 
press a claim against the State for war compensation. In so doing, IHL 
commentators also miss a significant portion of State practice on the 
conduct of hostilities as reflected in the positions and submissions of States 
before international (investment) tribunals.  
Of note here is that none of the international reports on the Civil War 
in Sri Lanka reference the only international tribunal that ever adjudicated 
military operations against the LTTE and the only instance where Sri Lanka 
was found liable for violations of international law during the hostilities and 
made reparations thereof: AAPL v Sri Lanka.1156 In so doing, such reports 
neglect to take account of the official position of the State regarding its 
responsibility (or lack thereof) for the conduct of the STF, thereby potentially 
calling into question their completeness and probative value. 
Additionally, military practitioners and specialized institutions fail to 
account for the role of investments in the development of IHL. A review of 
State practice in the ICRC’s study of customary IHL reveals that the ICRC 
struggled to locate pertinent practice and declarations by Afghanistan to 
illustrate its perception and implementation of IHL. Interestingly, of the 
handful of relevant declarations that the ICRC was able to find and include 
in its study of customary law are declarations that Afghanistan made with 
respect to the protection foreign investments. Under ‘Practice relating to 
Rule 7, The Principle of Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military 
 
1155 UNCHR, Res 1998/43, ESCOR Supp. (No 3) UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/43 (1998), para 2. 
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Objectives’, for instance, the ICRC cited the plea that Afghan President 
made to the Taliban ‘to stop pursuing objectives of outsiders’.1157  
To recall, chapter 5 explained that this public appeal by the President 
was made in response to a series of attacks against MCC’s investment in 
Mes Aynak and as part of how Afghanistan construed its investment 
obligations.1158 By neglecting to recognize the context in which the 
President’s declaration was made, the ICRC failed to exhaust the full 
potential of the fact that investment protection is a catalyst for State practice 
and declarations in the context of hostilities. This study shows that States 
are more inclined to make public declarations concerning the obligation to 
protect civilian objects from hostilities when such objects are owned or 
controlled by foreign nationals, who stand to benefit said State’s economy. 
Had it not ignored this context, the ICRC would have found ample State 
practice and declarations by Afghanistan on the obligation to take 
precautions in and against attacks, which, like the cited plea of the 
President, were made in relation to Mes Aynak.1159  
 Likewise, investment tribunals and investment lawyers overlook the 
IHL-roots of modern treaty clauses and read into these mechanisms 
meaning and content that they never had and should never have. 
Interestingly, this ignorance stands in stark contrast to the amount of ink 
that has been spilt over the interaction between human rights and 
investment law and the growing trend to include stipulations on trade 
commitments, environmental standards, and human rights obligations in 
investment instruments.  
Additionally, while investment climate statements routinely review 
the taxation, environmental, financial, and prudential regulations in the host 
State, the State’s judiciary and institutions, and even the prevailing security 
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and political conditions in the State, such assessments always ignore the 
way that the host State perceives its IHL obligations. Investment climate 
statements of conflict-ridden host States contain no reference to the State’s 
military manuals, rules of engagement or use of force (ROE and RUF), or 
practice on ex gratia payments. Granted, such materials are not always 
readily available. However, a review of the State’s implementation of IHL 
rules on the protection of the civilian population by specialized institutions, 
such as the ICRC, is readily available online, but it too is overlooked.  
And this is a big miss since the civilian population includes, in 
principle, foreign investors and investments. In terms of risk allocation and 
negotiations of investment agreements, the State’s practice and declaration 
with respect to its obligations under IHL to protect civilians reveal the ‘floor’ 
treatment that is likely to be accorded in armed conflict to investments, as 
civilian objects. This ‘floor’ may therefore be treated as the starting point for 
negotiations of detailed security arrangements for the protection of 
investments that go beyond (or clarify beyond doubt) what the host State 
understands international law to require it to do as a minimum.  
For instance, MCC’s lawyers would have benefited from a review of 
the ICRC study of customary IHL, where they would have found 
declarations by Afghanistan on the obligation to take precautions in attacks, 
referencing specifically the obligation to take precautions in favor of civilian 
objects in the Logar Province, where the Mes Aynak investment is 
located.1160 Such a (binding) declaration by a head of State, where the State 
acknowledges its obligation to act or refrain from acting under certain 
circumstances, may prove invaluable in an investment dispute that turns on 
the State’s obligation to protect the investment in Mes Aynak.1161  
 If so, position holders, investment lawyers, military practitioners, in-
house counsels, diplomats, and risk assessors at all levels stand to benefit 
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from a more nuanced thinking over the protection of investments in a reality 
of hostilities. The sheer existence of this thesis, however, is indicative of the 
fact that such thinking, as desired as it may be, does not exist today. But it 
did exist in the past.  
Already in 1870 it was clear to American lawyers that IHL norms that 
permit or authorize the State to act in a certain manner may serve as a 
strong line of defense against treaty claims that arise out of, or in relation 
to, hostilities, especially where such claims involve the failure to guarantee 
‘the most complete protection and security’ (FPS) to foreign property.1162 As 
early as 1916 Brochard was able to conclude that the rules on the 
‘international responsibility of the state for injuries sustained by [aliens] in 
time of war’ and the rules on awarding ‘compensation for private losses 
arising out of war’ can only be derived from ‘an examination of the subject 
in the light of precedent and principle’ under the prevailing rules of war 
law.1163 And, in 1960, the Abs – Shawcross draft Convention on Investment 
Abroad annunciated that, ‘the generally accepted laws of war delineated the 
treatment of aliens’.1164 So where has this knowledge gone?  
Is it a problem in the ‘imagination’ of lawyers, as the ILC suggested, 
that has led to the fragmentation of IHL and investment law?1165 Not exactly. 
It is suggested that it is rather a reflection of the qualifications of investment 
lawyers and the way that international law is taught in law schools today. 
During the 20th century, leading commentators and ‘generalists’, such as 
Lauterpacht(s), Oppenheim, Schwarzenberger, and Borchard wrote not 
only of war and the protection of property abroad separately, but also of the 
protection of alien property in war as a topic. This is because for them, 
‘public international law’ comprised war law and the treatment of aliens, and 
 
1162 Reports of the US Agent (n 584) 55-60. See further on this authority in chapter 4. 
1163 Borchard – Diplomatic Protection (n 385) 247. On this point, see the discussion in 
chapters 3 and 7. 
1164 Abs – Shawcross Draft Convention (n 460) Article V. In this regard, see the discussion 
in chapters 3 and 5. 





therefore the treatment of aliens in war was the result of the application of 
both regimes to a given situation.  
By contrast, 21st century ‘generalists’ and investment lawyers simply 
do not know IHL while IHL lawyers see no need to know investment law. 
This is arguably because IHL is often not taught in faculties as part of ‘public 
international law’, but as a separate expertise, while investment law is often 
taught as a modality of commercial arbitration or as a ‘niche’ of economic 
law. Investment lawyers ignore IHL and IHL lawyers disregard investment 
law not for want of authorities to evince the connection between their norms 
nor for a deliberate intention to neglect an entire field of law, but simply 
because they do not know what they do not know. This suggestion is 
consistent with the above proposition that until the 1960s IHL and 
investment law were not fragmented. In other words, it is not imagination or 
originality that is required to integrate what has been needlessly 
fragmented, but a return to basics.  
This thesis provided an account of the relevant rules and standards that 
regulate the protection of foreign investments in times of armed conflict. The 
thesis offers an overall argument that the potential for conflict between 
investment law and IHL is a significant issue, since the norms of both 
regimes may (and do in fact) regulate the same conduct with different 
objectives in mind, but that international law mostly (but not entirely) offers 
tools to resolve this (potential) conflict through interpretation or through 
priority rules. Further research should consider not only the possibility, but 
also the desirability, of IHL adjudication in investment tribunals and the 
implications on the law and policy of investment law and IHL thereof. An 
assessment of this type of hostilities-oriented investment disputes, which is 
mindful that investment tribunals stand to assess the State’s conduct in 
armed conflict, may offer an opportunity to revise the burdens and 
standards of proof of violations of investment standards and the 
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